(De)Monopolization of Democracy in Indonesia?
The Indonesian Report on the Asian Democracy Index 2011

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Background
The democratization process has been going on in Indonesia for thirteen years, following the departure of the late President Soeharto in 1998. The dynamics, characteristics, performance, and future of democracy in Indonesia have been a subject of research for many political scientists (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010).1 Indonesia is not only considered the third largest democratic country in the world after the United States and India, but it is also recognized as the largest democratic Muslim country in the world (Bayuni 2011). It is therefore pertinent to pay attention to democratization in Indonesia.

Research on Indonesian democracy has led to various assessments. Larry Diamond (2010, 35-46), in his comparison of the democracy movements in Indonesia with those in five other Asian countries,2 concluded that both the quality of, and public support for, Indonesian democracy have progressed more rapidly than in the other countries studied (Diamond 2010, 46). Relatedly, Liddle and Mujani said that Indonesia had essentially been consolidated based on the three dimensions developed by Linz and Stepan, namely: parameters of behavior, attitude and level of constitutional commitment (quoted in Diamond 2010)3. However, Diamond (2010) noted that Indonesian democracy could regress. Various sociopolitical phenomena offer indications that support this possibility. Worth mentioning are the level of political violence and the lack of clarity on the extent to which Islamic
parties and movements that favor a Sharia state will fully accept constitutional commitment. He further explained the critical points of concern, specifically the behavior, attitude, and constitutional commitment of the key elite, who retain the capacity to weaken or reverse Indonesian democracy.

Despite these, Diamond (2010) is still one of the political experts who see Indonesian democracy through rose-tinted glasses as there are experts who hold more pessimistic views. According to Aspinall (quoted in Aspinall and Mietzner 2010, 1-2), expert opinion on Indonesian democracy was divided into two opposing camps. On the one hand, some experts see an effectively consolidated Indonesian democracy relative to other countries, while the other camp says that Indonesian democracy is merely artificial, wherein the core power structure has not changed and the oligarchy of the New Order era continues to exploit the country for its own interests. Diamond (2010, 1-2) however added another group of experts that believes that Indonesian democracy has progressed but has been marred by the weight of corruption issues and weak law enforcement.

Amid these expert opinions, several institutions have published their own assessments of democracy in Indonesia. Freedom House (2011) rated Indonesia as a fully free country (“free”) with a higher score for political rights than for civil rights. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2010) ranked Indonesia sixtieth in the category of “flawed democracy” states, with a total score of 6.53 on a scale of 1-10. The Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (DEMOS) conducted national surveys in 2003/4 and 2007 that produced average indices for Indonesian democracy of 37 and 47, respectively on a scale of 100. While the score has somewhat increased, it could be said that with a score of 47 on a scale of 100, Indonesian democracy is still far from what is desired. The DEMOS assessment was based on four important forces in a democracy: 1) legal and rights; 2) political representation; 3) democratic and accountable governance; and 4) citizen participation and involvement.

The Indonesian government has also developed its own Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI), which gave a score of 67.30 to Indonesian democracy on a scale of 1-100. The IDI was developed as a measuring tool to assess progress in Indonesian democracy based on its own circumstances (UNDP 2011). However, the IDI is based on only three aspects—civil freedom, political rights, and democratic institutions—implying a “thin” concept of democracy. It does not include, as noted by Indonesian Survey Institute Director for Public Affairs Burhanuddin Muhtadi (n.d.), important aspects such as political culture. Therefore, it is difficult for the IDI to depict a complete picture of Indonesian democracy. What is needed is a measurement
that conforms to Indonesia’s circumstances to capture critical issues specific to Indonesian democracy.

It is apparent that Indonesia has similar experiences with other democracies in Asia. Some countries, including South Korea and Taiwan, are considered as countries that have achieved procedural democracy and have entered a consolidation era. However, some countries in South Asia, as well as Thailand, have regressed. In addition, several countries in Asia have already passed the point of transition from authoritarianism, yet electoral democracy is still threatened. The said countries already have procedural democracy but lack fundamental democratic principles such as participation, representation and accountability. Furthermore, democratization of several countries in Asia has not led to improvements to the quality of life of the people (DASMI 2010). Asia provides a lesson that transition from authoritarianism does not always lead to a transition to democracy; that the achievement of electoral democracy does not always create representation; and that the transition to substantive democracy does not always occur following a transition to democracy (DASMI 2010).

This research begins with the perspective that developing democracy in Asia requires a new framework for assessing democracy to explain the complexities of democratization in Asia. The development of the Asian Democracy Index is based on a redefinition of democracy by making the de-monopolization of the process and institutions, occurring in the political, economic, and social arenas, the key to transition to democracy. Democracy here has two principles: liberalization and equalization. Liberalization is used to measure the extent to which different sectors achieve independence and autonomy from the old authoritarian political power and then be able to determine their own priorities. This really depends on the extent of the disintegration of the old forces of monopoly. Meanwhile, equalization is used to measure the extent to which minority and even subaltern groups can substantially acquire access to resources in various sectors and enjoy equal access to resources and power. Equalization is therefore a process of transformation of power in each arena, namely politics, the economy, and civil society (DASMI 2010).

The development of Indonesian democracy requires measurements that can capture its complexity. It is hoped that the Asian Democracy Index can become an alternative tool to evaluate and assess Indonesian democracy. In this way, critical issues in Indonesian democracy can be revealed and steps can be taken to continually improve democracy in Indonesia.
General Method

Measurement and Assessment Process

The data for the Asian Democracy Index were derived from face-to-face interviews with individuals considered as experts using survey questionnaires. Each expert was asked for their assessment on a number of questions, specific to their respective expertise. Descriptive statistics through central tendencies (mean, median, and mode) and cross tabulation have been applied to the collated scores.

The selection of experts was based on three criteria: 1) the area of expertise: economics, politics, or civil society; 2) view towards the government: pro-government, moderate, and anti-government; 3) role in society: academic, practitioner, or politician.

Secondary data, such as internet surveys and the number of human rights covenants ratified by the Indonesian government on the state of human rights protection in terms of civil liberties, labor rights, etc., were also collected, as supporting information on the survey questions.

Experts’ Profiles

DEMOS and the Center for Political Studies, Department of Political Science Universitas Indonesia (PUSKAPOL UI) gathered the data between 18 July and 25 August 2011. Those considered “experts” were individuals who possess knowledge and expertise on the subject area, either because they work in that area (e.g., as a member of parliament in the political arena, a non-governmental organization [NGO] activist in the civil society arena, or a business person in the economics arena) or are academics and researchers who focus on that area. A total of twenty-seven experts were interviewed.

Difficulties during Survey

The first difficulty experienced during the survey was in locating the experts within the stipulated spectrum of political positions, i.e., pro-government, moderate, or anti-government. In truth, this classification had already undergone changes since the initial design, when it was formerly based on an ideological spectrum (liberal, moderate, conservative). It is difficult to identify the political ideology of experts and public figures in Indonesia. This can be seen as a continuation of the socio-political situation, which had undergone de-ideologization and de-politicization during the thirty-two-year rule of Soeharto. Political ideology is not articulated directly and openly by either political parties or public figures.
These days, hardline fundamentalist Islamic groups are finding the courage to openly express their political ideologies. It was difficult to locate the position represented by these groups, whether pro- or anti-government, because, on the one hand, they hold a political view that rejects secular politics, including the concept of democracy; while on the other, they are largely left alone by the government.

The opposite is true for economists, whose ideology is much easier to determine and consequently their positions toward the market and state intervention in economic affairs. In fact, almost none of the economists in Indonesia openly propagate ideological support for the market economy. As for their position in terms of supporting or opposing the government, their differences are not particularly striking. It is actually easiest to differentiate them based on whether or not they are involved with, or work for, the government.

We held in-depth discussions to make qualitative assessments of each expert, which examined the track record of their statements. These assessments were interpretative and could be improved in future studies. So far, the bases for choosing the experts were considered accurate. It also confirmed that in the democracy setting in Indonesia, people rarely refer to ideologies when making political choices. Pro- and anti-government positions are also flexible during the current transition period, as evidenced by the present dispensation—a coalition of various groups that do not share the same political ideology.

Over the last few years, the government has been unpopular as a consequence of various corruption scandals, thus making it easier to see who among the experts are pro-, anti-government, or in between. This explains our methodological decision to revise the ideological spectrum of expert informants to reflect their degree of support, or lack of it, for the government.

The availability of experts for meetings also proved to be a difficulty. Most of them are busy people. This led to difficulties in arranging interview schedules, which was the biggest obstacle we faced in gathering data. It was also difficult for several experts to spare the time to answer the questions on their own and return the questionnaire by email. The interview method was chosen (with three exceptions, who were contacted via internet survey). As a result, it took longer to conduct the interviews than had been planned, i.e., a month instead of two weeks.
Experts’ Comments on the Survey Questions

A number of experts felt that several of the questions were too broad, making it difficult to capture the complex dimensions of democracy in Indonesia and give scores. Two illustrative examples follow:

- Several civil society experts had difficulty in scoring the influence private companies have on society, since the media is heavily influenced by companies, while NGOs are not. Thus, they differentiated the two prior to giving the score.

- Several experts found it difficult to answer questions on affirmative action and special care. Affirmative action and special care for women are considered quite good, while affirmative action and special care for other groups are considered very poor.

Research Findings

This research resulted in an index based on expert assessments on the areas of 1.) politics, 2.) the economy, and 3.) civil society. Expert assessments were further broken down into categories of experts, namely pro-government, moderate, and anti-government. Table 1 shows the Indonesian index from the categories of experts in each of the three areas.

On the average, the Indonesian index was 4.9, when measured on a scale of 0 to 10. Viewed by area, the Indonesian politics index was highest with 5.5, while the Indonesian economy index was lowest with 4.24.

We should add that those in the pro-government and moderate categories did not greatly differ in their assessments, with respective scores of 5.35 and 5.04. A more substantial difference was noted for those in the anti-government category, with a score of 4.44.
In this research, the concept of democracy was broken down into two core principles: liberalization and equalization. The liberalization principle was further broken down into two variables: autonomy and competition, while the equalization principle was also broken down into two variables: pluralization and solidarity. These principles and their corresponding variables were then analyzed in each of the three areas: politics, the economy, and civil society.

The Indonesian index for the political sphere based on the four democracy variables is provided in table 2.

Overall, the assessment of autonomy in the political sphere scored the highest, with a score of 6.86. Pro-government, moderate, and anti-government experts all gave autonomy in the Indonesian political sphere the highest score. Pro-government experts gave higher scores than the moderate and anti-government groups across all four variables. However, the high score for autonomy in the political sphere did not draw a parallel score for competition,
which was much lower (5.17). Pluralization in the political sphere scored 5.39, while solidarity scored 4.78.

The Indonesian index for the economic sphere based on the four democracy variables is provided in table 3.

The Indonesian economy index results showed that autonomy and competition are in a better position than solidarity. Pluralization was in the worst position in the economic sphere. Autonomy and competition scores were in the middle range.

Pluralization scored very low across all the categories of experts, with an index score of 3.09. Experts in the pro-government category tended to rate pluralization higher compared to those in the moderate and anti-government categories, which both gave lower scores for pluralization in the Indonesian economy. Solidarity scored 4.24, signaling a less than harmonious condition in the economic sphere.

The Indonesian index for the civil society sphere based on the four democracy variables is provided in table 4.

The Indonesian civil society index presented an interesting situation. Competition scored higher than the other variables. Under the principle of liberalization for civil society, autonomy scored lower than competition (4.46 compared to 6.44). While under the principle of equalization, solidarity scored better than pluralization (5.41 compared to 4.08).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Experts</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Pluralization</th>
<th>Solidarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>7.27</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>5.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-government</td>
<td>4.17</td>
<td>5.27</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Indonesian Index from the Perspective of the Principles of Liberalization and Equalization

The three Indonesian index areas (politics, the economy, and civil society) and four democracy variables (autonomy, competition, pluralization, and solidarity) have been consolidated in table 5 as shown below.

Finally, table 6 shows that the total score for the liberalization principle (5.48) is higher than the equalization principle (4.50). This table also shows that Indonesia’s overall index score for 2011 is quite modest at 4.99.

**Table 5: Indonesian Index in Terms of Four Democracy Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
<th>Competition</th>
<th>Pluralization</th>
<th>Solidarity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>5.51</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 6: Indonesian Democracy Index 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Liberalization</th>
<th>Equalization</th>
<th>Index on Indonesian Democracy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>6.01</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation and Analysis**

The research findings illustrate that Indonesia still has a lot of homework to do to advance its democracy. This part contains our interpretation of the research findings. In this way, we can trace what conditions need to be improved so that Indonesian democracy can become better.
Analysis of Four Democracy Variables

**Autonomy Variable**

Autonomy has the highest index score in the political sphere. The data show that autonomy has a higher index score in the political sphere than in the economic and civil society spheres. The autonomy index scored 6.86 in the political sphere, 5.0 in the economic sphere, and the lowest in civil society with 4.46.

Most of the experts stated that the level of state violence has substantially decreased compared to the New Order era. The freedom to establish political organizations and to protest through demonstrations or other means is rated as having improved when compared with the New Order era. In addition, civil rights were said to be better protected. The right to religious freedom is notable because of the Ahmadiyah case. The violence that engulfed Ahmadiyah and the government’s poor handling of the case bear significance for the autonomy score.

Moreover, data show that autonomy in the economic sphere was lower compared to autonomy in the political sphere. Most of the experts stated that there is a mutually beneficial relationship between political and economic actors. This causes distortion in some government regulations to benefit certain parties. Labor protection remains poor because of frequent outsourcing practices and salaries not in line with needs. There are still plenty of companies, especially in the informal sector, which employ children despite the existence of regulation on the minimum age for workers. In addition, the presence of international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund and World Bank) still has a dominant influence on government policy.

Civil society autonomy appears to be the worst, with an index score of 4.46. Although there is now freedom for the public to assemble and establish organizations, the legal infrastructure has not yet incorporated the democracy paradigm. Several policies are considered as limiting freedom of expression, for instance, the Law on Electronic Information and Transactions, the Law on Pornography and Pornographic Acts, and the Bill on State Intelligence and Secrets. In addition, most experts stated that private businesses have a very strong influence on the mass media. While there has been improvement in meeting basic education needs, provisions for other needs like electricity, water, food, health, social security, etc. are still far from what they should be.
Competition in the area of civil society (6.44) is higher than in the economic (4.92) and political (5.17) spheres. Competition is part of liberalization, which measures tolerance/inclusivity, capability and visibility, transparency, and diversity of voluntary associations.

Experts generally agreed that the presence of civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Indonesia was very good, representing both a range of societal values and the public interest. Compared to political parties and the private sector, NGOs are considered more open and transparent.

In terms of tolerance, experts stated that there is a very large number and variety of NGOs and CSOs in Indonesia. Nevertheless, not all CSOs reflect values of tolerance. Some CSOs express the opposite. The variety of NGOs can be seen from the presence of some groups that campaign for human rights, pluralism, and tolerance, and other groups that are anti-pluralism and anti-tolerance. Yet the number of those organizations is considered small. Thus, experts are of the view that this strand of NGOs still reflects the variety of societal interests. It could be said that NGOs in Indonesia are reasonably representative of all societal groups.

The number of CSOs has shot up since Soeharto’s fall in 1998. In the post-Soeharto era, public freedom has opened up and has provided the opportunity for various groups to establish organizations. Data from Indonesia’s Ministry of Home Affairs show that the number of CSOs in 2005 was around 3,000. In 2010, that number increased to 9,000. This large number clearly reflects societal values and needs.

In terms of transparency, Indonesian NGOs are considered to have progressed far more than political parties. Many NGOs have now begun to operate transparently. They share information with the public, including their financial reports. Political parties have not yet done this. Several NGOs have also begun to manage regeneration and succession in a democratic manner.

Moreover, competition in the political sphere has an index score of 5.17, while competition in the economic sphere has an index score of 4.92. One aspect that is still poor in both political and economic practice is that neither is transparent. Experts assessed that these two areas display relations that are mutually beneficial for their respective interests, while shutting out the public. Experts rated transparency as poor in the economic sphere. Although companies have gone public and created financial transparency, many money practices are not revealed. Examples of said practices are corporate taxation and company ownership, which can be entrenched in multiple layers, making it difficult to determine the true owner.
On the issue of competition among companies in Indonesia, experts stated that many companies still receive special treatment through “money games” with the government. The bigger the company, the more of the competition is closed, making it unfair. The Indonesian Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU) was established during the reform era to oversee business competition. However, the KPPU lacks the necessary resources and capacity to effectively do so.

**Pluralization Variable**

Pluralization is lowest in the economic sphere but across all spheres, pluralization maintained low index scores. In the economic sphere, the pluralization index score is 3.09, with 5.39 in the political sphere and 4.08 in civil society. In the economic sphere, it is a fact that conglomerates control economic activities. Experts stated that foreign conglomerates are far more dominant than local conglomerates. Sectors controlled by foreign conglomerates include the following: oil and gas, palm oil, coal, and banking, among others (Gie 1990; Winters 2011).

Various regulations issued by the government provide broad opportunities for foreign investors to control economic activities. Foreign investors can lease land for ninety years for their businesses. Foreign investors are also permitted to share ownership of up to 99 percent in a bank in Indonesia. Several government regulations also permit foreign investors to invest in the retail business. As a result, foreign investors control many important sectors that prop up the Indonesian economy. Control of assets by conglomerates, especially by foreign investors, has caused extraordinary disparities in revenues.

Pluralization in civil society has a low index score, although it is somewhat higher than pluralization in the economic sphere. This is because the mass media is still not free from the business and political interests of its owners. Electronic media do not offer quality programs to the public. Inequality of access to information is still high, where the internet is monopolized by the educated and access to libraries is considered poor. There are limited opportunities for those who wish to engage in cultural activities.

Pluralization index score was highest in the political sphere. During the reform era, institutions have been established to improve the quality of horizontal accountability, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), Indonesian Broadcast Commission (KPI), and the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM). However, ensuring a better mechanism of checks and balances demands integrity from the people within these institutions. The same applies to parliament. While parliament is seen
as quite representative, it is noted that not all members of parliament carry out their functions optimally.

**Solidarity Variable**

Solidarity is lowest in the economic sphere. Solidarity has a lower index score in the economic (4.24) than in the political sphere (4.78) and in the civil society (5.41) spheres. There are various factors contributing to the low solidarity index in the economic sphere, including business activities that do not provide social security and the continued absence of labor union activities. Labor is insufficiently organized and the labor movement fragmented, making it unable to direct its power to enforce compliance of management with the workers’ right to adequate social security. The ambition of labor groups to be involved in companies’ decision-making practices is still far from realized. Workers do not have the opportunity to hold shares in the company, so there are no opportunities to attend important company meetings. Furthermore, labor still has minimal power to influence policy-making by the government.

In addition, public participation, whether through consumer groups or environmental groups, is still weak. People are basically unenthusiastic about participating in reducing imbalances. Several religious organizations do engage in activities for economic empowerment, but have yet to achieve policy change.

The solidarity index score in the political sphere is also low. Experts stated that although people appear to be active in general elections, they do not participate in policymaking. Affirmative action for women in the political sphere is seen as adequate, with 30 percent of parliament dedicated for female candidates, but there are problems in its execution. Public trust in the government is low because of various corruption cases that have yet to be settled. Public trust in parliament is also low. Despite all of these, the public still appears to have faith in democracy.

The solidarity index score is the highest in civil society. While there is no affirmative action taken by the government for the disabled, elderly, and other minority groups, affirmative action for women’s group and the education sector has already taken place. Public involvement in NGO activities is considered low but is already on the rise. CSOs are considered quite influential in the government’s policy-making process, but it depends on which issues they are working on. Anti-corruption NGOs are currently considered to have a very strong influence on policy making, compared to NGOs working on other issues.
Analysis of Main Principles of Democracy: Liberalization and Equalization

The equalization index is lowest in the economic sphere while liberalization is highest in the political sphere. The data show that equalization has a lower index score in the economic sphere (3.66) than in the political sphere (5.08) and in civil society (4.75). The low score for equalization in the economic sphere appears to be the result of a very low pluralization score (3.09) as well as a low solidarity score (4.24).

Monopoly is still considered to occur in the economic sphere, with certain groups still in control of the economy. Inequality of assets is also more pervasive in this era of democracy than in the previous era. Lower-class control over land has declined over time. Income equality has not been achieved. Twenty percent of the population with the highest income control an increasingly large share of national income from year to year; while forty percent of the population with the lowest income control a decreasing share. Furthermore, economic inequality among regions is still a very serious concern. The economic pie was expected to be (re)distributed once regional autonomy was introduced. However, the lower classes have not been given their share of the economic pie. The welfare of the people has been lost, especially in those regions that remain left behind, e.g. eastern part of Indonesia.

Equalization has been used to measure the extent to which minority and subaltern groups have obtained access to resources in various sectors and been able to enjoy equality of access to resources and power. Equalization is therefore a process involving transformation of power in each sector, namely politics, the economy, and civil society. The resulting index shows that equalization has shown no meaningful progress in the economic sphere nor is there equality of access to economic resources.

Table 7: Forbes 40 Wealthiest Citizens

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total wealth (USD billions)</th>
<th>Average wealth (USD billions)</th>
<th>Total wealth as % of GDP</th>
<th>Wealth concentration index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data of the Forbes Magazine (quoted in Winters 2011) show that concentration of wealth in Indonesia has a very high index score compared to other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. Winters (2011) stated that the concentration of wealth in Indonesia is three times that in Thailand, almost four times that in Malaysia, and twenty times that in Singapore.

Liberalization also has the lowest index score in the economic sphere (4.96), compared with the liberalization scores in civil society (5.45) and in the political sphere (6.01). Liberalization is used to measure the extent to which the different sectors have achieved independence and autonomy from the old authoritarian political forces and have been able to stipulate their own interests. This very much depends on the degree of disintegration of the old monopoly forces. Since the liberalization score is lower for the economic sphere than for the other spheres, this may explain the similarly low equalization score for the economic sphere. Existing democracies are not particularly successful in undertaking economic liberalization when the economy is still not autonomous, especially from politics. There is a mutually beneficial relationship among political and economic elites that is far from transparent. Failure of economic sector liberalization constrains equalization in the economic sector. The low index scores of the economic sphere for both the liberalization and equalization principles show that Indonesian democracy faces big problems in the economy.

Moreover, data show that the two main principles of democracy—liberalization and equalization—have low index scores. However, the principle of equalization has a lower index score (4.50) than liberalization (5.48). These index scores for Indonesia for the main principles of democracy are not satisfactory. From these two figures it can be said that Indonesian democracy is positioned in the middle, containing the threat that it could suffer a setback at any time.

The data also show that both variables derived from the principle of equalization have low scores. The total pluralization index score is lowest (4.19) across all variables. Meanwhile, the total solidarity score is the next lowest (4.81).

In all three areas, the liberalization index score is higher than the equalization index score. Liberalization is ongoing in the political sphere. The same is true in civil society, notwithstanding the powerful influence of private companies on the mass media. This creates an imbalance in public discourse.
Analysis of the Indonesian Democracy Index

The index is lower in the economics sphere than in the politics and civil society spheres. The economy index has a lower score (4.24) than the politics index (5.5) or the civil society index (5.09). This is chiefly due to the influence of the equalization index for the economy, which scores well below the average (3.66).

These data indicate that the democratization process in Indonesia is not yet able to overcome monopolization of political, social, and, especially, economic resources. Concentration of economic resources and access to such resources by the dominant few continues. Several experts stated that a few foreign conglomerates and economic powers dominate economic activities. They particularly control extractive industries that are capital-intensive. This unequal access to economic resources in turn creates income inequality. Meanwhile, decentralization—whose agenda is not to centralize sources of power at the center—has not been sufficiently successful in overcoming economic disparities among regions.

This inequality is increasing because Indonesia does not have a social security system that can be used for disintegration of this monopoly, i.e., to de-monopolize centralized sources of economic power. Although labor union activities and numbers are now “thicker,” this is not sufficient to build up real strength. There is also an extremely low level of concern for monitoring business performance.

This low index score for the economic sphere can also be attributed to weak regulations on de-monopolizing control over economic resources. Experts considered the quality of liberalization—in the sense of being free from monopoly—as moderate (4.96).

De-monopolization efforts in the democracy process have been insufficient from a political perspective. After more than a decade since the fall of authoritarian governance, it appears that political and social liberalization has not had substantial influence on de-monopolization of the sources of economic power. This research shows that there has been liberalization in the political sphere—and this fact is generally accepted by supporters, opponents, and moderates.

Perhaps we should not rush to say that the continued strength of monopolistic systems in the economic sphere has caused the quality of liberalization and equalization in the political and social spheres to be less than optimal. In other words, the failure of economic de-monopolization has implications for the quality of de-monopolization achieved in the political
and social spheres. We find this in several comments from experts, who emphasized the hard power of business to influence politics and civil society.

Public spaces, including the media, are heavily controlled by economic power pointing to a serious information gap. Media ownership by certain groups is a reflection of unequal access to and distribution of information. Media owners decide what the public should be informed about. The same applies to the media owners’ effect on the public’s access cultural activities and facilities. There have been many art groups that have been unable to continue cultural expression. Moreover, public space in its physical sense is full of shopping malls and gas stations, which are more representative of business interests. The implication is a loss of citizenry. When the power of the economy is so huge, we no longer have citizens, but consumers. This research shows that while there has been affirmation in the political sphere, particularly for women, this has not been applied to civil society empowerment. And the level of citizen participation, whether in the domains of politics or civil society, is still low.

Why is Indonesia’s Index Score Still Low?

The Indonesian democracy index is below the “average” figure (4.99) illustrating that “de-monopolization” is not even halfway there. There are many items on the agenda that still need to be formulated and implemented for this to occur. But to say “halfway there” has little meaning unless we go deeper to identify the pertinent parts that are deficient.

The poor quality of de-monopolization is primarily influenced by the principle of equalization, or, more specifically, equalization in the economic sector. If we look at it from the perspective of pluralization, we find that poor equalization occurs in the economy (3.09) and in civil society (4.08). Furthermore, if we look at it from the perspective of solidarity, politics (4.78) and the economy (4.24) are the main influences on the poor quality of this index.

Meanwhile, we found that the principle of liberalization—the process of restoring autonomy—scored above the “average” (5.44 for autonomy and 5.51 for competition or 5.48 overall). This especially applies to liberalization in the political sphere (6.86 for autonomy and 5.17 for competition). Freedom from monopoly or liberalization from monopoly in the political sphere is above “average,” but this does not apply to the economic and civil society spheres.

What significance should we place on this? Liberalization weighs heavier (5.48) than equalization (4.50). However, the scope of liberalization is neither broad nor deep. Liberalization is still very limited in the political
sphere, and even more limited in civil society. This suggests that the formal political instruments and procedures now are potentially available for the majority of the population for de-monopolization of power. The old forces that used to be the backbone of the Suharto’s regime no longer easily dominates the scene of Indonesian politics. Socio-political power has begun to be dispersed among various groups. At the community level, inclusivity of culture, religion, language and racial/ethnic groups, and plurality of ideas are all valued. Only a few minority groups reject such inclusivity. But civil society is not necessarily sufficiently autonomous from various other powers, especially economic ones.

But this political opportunity is not accompanied by significant transformation in power relationships, especially in the economic sector (3.66) and civil society (4.75). In the political sphere, this transformation has been mediocre (only 0.8 above the average).

It is interesting to note that two antagonistic groups—pro-government and anti-government—both highly rate the success of developing “autonomy.” On autonomy in the political sphere, both pro- and anti-government experts made similar assessments (7.33 and 7.25, respectively) about the democracy process in Indonesia.

Pro-government experts do not always see the democratization process as having succeeded in the de-monopolization of sources of power. We only see de-monopolization achieving a high score (7.33) in the area of group autonomy. This may illustrate a tendency for pro-government experts to give importance to “a minimalist state role.”

The same is true in the realm of civil society, which stresses “freedom from state control.” Not only have civil society groups mushroomed (density), their activities have also increased (vibrant). Meanwhile, anti-government experts in other sectors gave a score of “moderate.”

Nearly all experts share the view that almost no de-monopolization has occurred in the economic sector. One minor point should be made here. Experts who were pro-government (5.42 for autonomy and 6.0 for competition) and moderate (5.75 for autonomy and 5.50 for competition) gave “moderate” scores for liberalization in the economic sector. Economic liberalization has yet to occur in the view of anti-government experts. All groups agreed that there has not been significant de-monopolization, which is primarily due to the low level of equalization.

Moderate and pro-government groups gave high scores for competition in civil society. Both groups consider the important contribution civil society can make in de-monopolization. However, those in the anti-government
group have a more negative view of de-monopolization in civil society, particularly in relation to accountability.

In the case of pluralization in civil society, the anti-government group found low equality of access to social resources such as information and culture. Anti-government informants still considered knowledge, information, and development of cultural values to be dominated by certain powers.

**Conclusions**

Indonesia’s score for the Asian Democracy Index is 4.99, on a scale of 0-10. This score shows that Indonesian democracy is still problematic despite thirteen years of post-authoritarianism transition. This provides a stern warning about the state of democracy in Indonesia, compared with several other democracy indices, which gave Indonesia a score higher than 5.

The index score indicates that developments and achievements are out of balance with the concept of propping up democracy on the ongoing process of transition. Indonesian democracy has been propped up by significant liberalization of politics, but this has been accompanied by low equalization in the economic sphere. Economic equalization is the lowest among all components of the index score. Moreover, the role of civil society is classified as mediocre, lacking a significant role in animating democratic change. Liberalization and equalization are categorized as poor in the area of civil society.

The index findings from this research appear to confirm various criticisms by experts regarding the oligarchy phenomenon—a serious issue that Indonesian democracy now faces. Various important resources in social and economic relations are managed in a way that is closely connected to the old power of the elite, who in turn has enjoyed monopoly since the authoritarian era. In the political sphere, there have been many institutional and procedural developments that have opened up new space for autonomy in formal political contests such as national and local elections. While many new faces have arrived at the political scene, this does not mean that these newcomers are completely free from the political power of the oligarchy. To be involved in politics require substantial funds. The alternatives coming from civil society are not numerous enough and do not have a significant influence on the political arena.

It appears that the increased de-monopolization occurring in the political arena is not yet able to promote de-monopolization in the economic and civil society spheres. A high degree of liberalization is only possible if there is a substantial change to the prevailing monopoly power of the elite. New forces must be able to engage in change in order for a significant level of democracy
to emerge. It appears that the transformational capacity to pass through monopoly barriers is significant. Continued weakness in transformational capacity will lead to an inability to maximize opportunities that have arisen in the political and civil society spheres for democratization, tending towards autonomy and the ability to introduce new rules and procedures.

We should therefore be strongly critical of the conclusion made by various prior research that Indonesian democracy had been consolidated. Consolidation in the economic and civil society spheres should begin to be seen as closely connected with political democracy, which has experienced a wealth of change over the last thirteen years. The powers that have monopolized the economic sphere are still substantial barriers to improving the quality of democracy in Indonesia. Monopolies are still extremely strong in the economic sector and have been carried into the political and civil society spheres.

**Recommendations**

The Asia Democracy Index can become a gateway for a more detailed review of the analysis of the transition to democracy, especially in the context of Indonesia. Starting with the methods developed in this research, it is apparent that further research can be developed that emphasizes investigation and mapping of how monopolies over resources and power in the political, economic, and civil society spheres can become substantial obstacles to the quality of democracy.

An important note to the democratization agenda in the future is the importance of looking at the relations between these three sectors in influencing the overall democracy index score. The good news is that, based on the portrait of de-monopolization in the political sphere, which has been able to achieve a significant degree of liberalization, we should continue to advocate this as a factor in the transformation that permits liberalization and equalization in the other sectors. A transition to democracy that focuses on liberalization of politics must be advocated further, especially by promoting opportunities in the political sphere and the role of civil society in embarking on de-monopolization efforts in the economic sector, which are becoming an increasing challenge for the future of Indonesia’s transition to democracy.

**Notes**

2. He compared Indonesia with Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Mongolia.
3. Diamond (2010) and Liddle and Mujani (quoted in Diamond 2010) concluded that Indonesian democracy is essentially consolidated based on the argument that: a) on
behavior, no political group is currently threatening to remove democracy or leave the state of Indonesia; b) on attitude, there is relatively substantial support for democracy as the best form of government; c) on the level of constitutional commitment, key political and social actors are committed to resolving disputes and pursuing their interests through a constitutional process, i.e., in a non-violent way.

4. Aspinall (quoted in Aspinall and Mietzner 2010) quoted several experts, namely Robinson and Hadiz and Boudreau, who say that Indonesian democracy is only artificial. He also quotes Ramage and MacIntre who say that Indonesian democracy as having been consolidated. Finally, he places Davidson and himself at the middle.

5. In Freedom House’s 2011 assessment of freedom in the world, Indonesia received scores of 2 for political rights and 3 for civil rights on a scale of 1-7, where 1 is the most free and 7 is the least free.

6. See DEMOS (n.d., 19-21). The four key tools of democracy contain thirty-two democracy tools.

7. The Indonesian Democracy Index was developed by Bappenas together with several experts. This index has three variables: Civil Rights, Political Rights and Democracy Institutes. See UNDP (2011).

References


## Appendix

List of Indonesia Experts Asian Democracy Index 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area and Type of Expert</th>
<th>Pro-government</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Anti-government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practitioners/Businesspeople</td>
<td>Female, economist, and member of an economic advisory body working for the Indonesian President</td>
<td>Male, placing 29th on the list of the wealthiest businesspeople in Indonesia, according to Forbes Magazine</td>
<td>Businessperson and founder of social democratic political NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics/Researchers</td>
<td>Senior economist and lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia. Works closely with the Vice President's office</td>
<td>Male, senior lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia; non-partisan activist</td>
<td>Female, Executive Director of a think-tank organization on economy and trade; critical economic pundit in mass media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-makers (Ministers/Legislators, etc.)</td>
<td>Chairperson of the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board</td>
<td>Male, legislator from the purported opposition party</td>
<td>Female, legislator from the purported opposition party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area and Type of Expert</td>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Anti-government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Practitioners</td>
<td>Male, long-time CSO activist now with the ruling party (Politician and Head of Policy and Strategy Development Center)</td>
<td>Male, media activist, and Adjunct Professor in Public Relations and Journalism at a university in Australia</td>
<td>Male, leader of one of the two biggest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, 1998-2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics/Researchers/Intellectuals</td>
<td>Male, senior board member of one of the oldest think-tank institutes in development studies and visiting lecturer at a military school and State Administration Institution</td>
<td>Male, Professor in Political Science, and Senior Researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences</td>
<td>Female, lecturer at the Political Science Department, University of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-makers (Legislators, State Apparatus, etc.)</td>
<td>Male, Doctor of Law, Special Adviser for Legal Affairs to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono</td>
<td>Male, legislator from Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), purportedly the opposition party</td>
<td>Female, legislator from National Awakening Party (PKB), which is part of the ruling coalition, but actively criticizes government scandals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area and Type of Expert</td>
<td>Pro-government</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Anti-government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Watchdog Organizations</td>
<td>Male, Indonesia’s representative on ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights</td>
<td>Executive Director of a national NGO network, working in social empowerment</td>
<td>Male, Program Director at a human rights watchdog organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass-based Organizations</td>
<td>Male, one of the chairs of the Central Board of the largest grassroots Islamic organization in Indonesia</td>
<td>Female, Chairwoman of the women’s branch of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization</td>
<td>Male, Chair of Advocacy Division, hardline Muslim group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics/Researchers/Intellectuals</td>
<td>Male, deputy director of a research center that actively promotes liberalism</td>
<td>Male, journalist, and former deputy chair of Indonesia’s Press Council</td>
<td>Female, lecturer at University of Indonesia and expert staff member at the Women’s Empowerment Movement (GPSP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>