

Asian Democracy Index 2012 – Indonesia: Liberalization Minus Equality

**ANTON PRADJASTO, ANNA MARGRET, DIRGA ARDIANS,
CHRISTINA DWI SUSANTI, IRWANSYAH, INGGRID SILITONGA,
MIA NOVITASARI, SRI BUDI EKO WARDANI, WAWAN
ICHWANUDDIN, YOLANDA PANJAITAN**

Introduction

The issues of social welfare, economic disparity, and intergroup relations, as well as more traditionally political issues were dominant in Indonesia from mid-2011 to mid-2012. One reputable daily newspaper, for example, reported an incident that represents a portrait of social welfare and conditions related to the aspects of governance. The newspaper reported that every one hour, two maternal deaths occurred during childbirth in Indonesia. The issue of maternal mortality remains one of many social problems in Indonesia. In accordance with the Millennium Development Goals, the country is targeting a maternal mortality rate of 102 per 100,000 live births in 2015. The target seems difficult to achieve considering the fact that the latest data shows that the maternal mortality rate is at 359 per 100,000 live births (2012).¹

Diversity, instead of becoming an advantage, is in fact often linked to various acts of violence against religious minorities, groups of certain sexual orientations like gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, and other marginalized communities such as farmers and laborers. The destruction, arson, and obstruction in administrative processes for the construction of houses of worship in different regions continue to occur. Violence against minority religious groups continues to increase, and some of the incidents display the destruction of civil liberty in Indonesian community life. The

Anton Pradjasto, Christina Dwi Susanti, and Ingrid Silitonga are from the Indonesian Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (DEMOS). Anna Margret, Dirga Ardiansa, Irwansyah, Mia Novitasari, Sri Budi Eko Wardani, Wawan Ichwanuddin, and Yolanda Panjaitan are from the Centre for Political Studies (PUKAPOL), Department of Political Science, Universitas Indonesia.

conflicts as a result of the criminalization of Andi-Japin, a resident in an indigenous community in Silat Hulu, Ketapang, and the criminalization of labor in various places are examples of such violence. Violence against journalists has also increased both in terms of number and degree.

In contrast, political contestation is getting increasingly visible as illustrated in the general elections and local elections to elect heads of regions. Similarly, in Indonesia, one will find the institutionalization of horizontal accountability (between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government), a multi-party system, the institutionalization of local representation through the Local Representative Council, and a system of direct election of the members of the executive and legislative branches of government. Given the image of the institutionalization of democracy so described, Indonesia is not only considered as the third largest democracy in the world—following the United States of America and India—it is also seen as the democratic country with the largest Muslim population in the world.

Given the aforesaid, there are at least three reasons why an assessment of Indonesian democracy is necessary. First, the seemingly contradictory situations described above become essential in helping us to see to what extent the progress (or, more accurately, the decline) in the process of democratization in Indonesia has taken place. There are a number of main problems encountered in Indonesia's ongoing democratization. Larry Diamond, for example, views the process of democratization in Indonesia not only as having taken place rapidly, but also as a process faced with some potential setbacks, especially because of the high rate of political violence in the country (2010). Therefore, recognizing the problems and the potentials in the promotion of democracy will help to prevent the relevant stakeholders—mainly the democracy movement—from having excessive worries about or causing excessive optimism over democracy in Indonesia.

Second, as mentioned by a number of experts (e.g., Cho 2012) democracy is a process that takes place continuously. Therefore, the context becomes very important. As a country that was extensively controlled for decades by an authoritarian government—in which business and political disloyalty was widespread and the country was centralistically run—it is important to closely observe Indonesia's transition toward democracy, while noting that the transition from authoritarianism does not necessarily lead to the transition to democracy and that achieving electoral democracy does not automatically result in genuine political representativeness (O'Donnell, in CADI 2012, 38).

Third, one crucial complaint against democracy in Indonesia that has been “embraced” by the country in the past twelve years is its failure to provide prosperity for its people. It is widely agreed that the real creation of welfare is a material prerequisite for democracy (see Sen 1999 and 2009). Meanwhile, Indonesia’s democracy has become a mere momentary instrument of the politico-economic elite. Regardless of the debates about the conceptual link between democracy and prosperity, the important question that needs to be answered is, “to what extent and how beneficial is the institutionalization of democracy for the prosperity of the people?”

In this study, the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) was used to evaluate and assess democracy in Indonesia. Using the ADI’s recommended methodology, critical issues concerning democracy in Indonesia were revealed. Afterward, it was determined that there are some continuing measures that could be undertaken to improve the quality of democracy in Indonesia.

Overview of the Asian Democracy Index

To find out about the status of democracy of a country, experts usually use general elections as one of the key measures. A country is categorized as democratic when it has organized elections that are transparent, fair, and competitive. Freedom House, for instance, uses four basic criteria that a country must meet to be classified as an electoral democracy, namely: 1) a competitive multi-party system; 2) the exercise of universal suffrage; 3) a voting/polling system that is confidential, secure, and free of massive fraud; and 4) significant public access of political parties to their voters (Freedom House 2012a). Based on the measures set by Freedom House, since 1999, Indonesia has always been classifiable as a free and democratic country.

Note that the category of electoral democracy is different from the category of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is characterized by the freedom to exercise the rights of individuals, the enforcement of law, and the presence of various other preconditions for a free society. According to Freedom House, of 119 countries that were categorized as electoral democracies in 2009, as many as eighty-nine countries have met these criteria, including Indonesia (2012b, 14-19). Therefore, as previously mentioned, many have hailed Indonesia as the third largest democratic country in the world.

However, it is uncertain whether the categories of electoral democracy and liberal democracy have adequately reflected the quality of

democracy, especially regarding the transformation of the basic values of democracy into the reality of life in particular communities. This matter is relevant in the context of the transition to democracy in Indonesia, which is still considered to have serious problems in terms of participation, representation, and accountability. This situation is the background of the increasingly skeptical view that democratization during the Reform Era/post-New Order period (1998-present) has not yet been able to improve the Indonesian people's quality of life.

Related to the above-discussed matter is the question of accountability, which is relevant due to the increasing rate of corruption in Indonesia. In 2011, Indonesia ranked one hundred (out of 183) together with eleven other countries in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) that was released by Transparency International.² The CPI ranges from 0 to 10; the smaller index number indicates the higher potential of corruption in a country. In 2011, Indonesia's CPI was 3.0. These figures reflect how the problem of corruption exists not only at the central government level, but also in the level of local governments. According to data from the Ministry of Home Affairs that were compiled in November 2012,³ a total of 474 officials in local governments faced legal problems: ninety-five were suspects, forty-nine defendants, and 330 convicted persons. As many as 280 of the 474 persons were heads of district or mayors.

The distant relation between democratization and welfare of the people can be seen from the increasingly larger economic disparity during the post-New Order period. In recent years, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Indonesia increased significantly—from USD 172.9 billion 2002, it became USD 850 billion in 2012. In the same period, GDP per capita also increased from USD 933.00 to USD 4,000.00. However, this increase in GDP per capita was followed by greater inequality among different groups in Indonesian society. It was estimated that 20 percent of the high-income groups controlled nearly half of the country's revenues; 40 percent of low-income groups controlled only 16.85 percent. The gap in revenue distribution between the top and bottom groups was bigger when compared with the gap in the early years of the Reform Era, within which the figures were 21.66 percent and 40.57 percent, respectively. According to the data of the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS),⁴ the Gini index of Indonesia in the past few years has also continued to increase, indicating a growth in inequality in the country. In 2011, the index reached 0.41, the highest during the Reform Era; in 1999, the number was 0.31.

The increasing disparity is also reflected in people's expenditures. According to data from the World Bank, based on average expenses, as

many as 55 percent of the Indonesian population can be categorized as middle class, i.e., earning between USD 2.00 and USD 20.00 per day.⁵ Those with expenses below USD 2.00 per day are classified as very poor or very lower class, while those with expenditures between USD 2.00-4.00 per day are considered to be lower-middle class; USD 4.00-10.00 are the middle-middle class; USD 10.00-20.00 are the upper-middle class; and more than USD 20.00 are the upper class. However, closer inspection of the average increase in the expenses made by each of the classes in the past years reveals that the increase in expenses of the middle-upper class is many times higher than that of the lower-middle class.

In fact, some preconditions of liberal democracy, as specified by Freedom House, now face serious challenges in Indonesia (e.g., the increasing social conflicts and intolerance against another's religions and beliefs). Based on data from the Ministry of Home Affairs, there were ninety-three cases of social conflicts in 2010. In 2011, that number declined to seventy-seven cases, but it increased again in 2012; until the end of August 2012, the number of social conflict cases was eighty-nine.⁶ In 2011, intolerance cases in violation of the freedom of religion were also increasingly common. According to the Wahid Institute, in 2011, the number of such cases reached 183, or an average of fifteen cases each month—16 percent more cases than in the previous year.⁷

These facts suggest the need to reconsider the theories and concepts of democracy and democratization that have been considered dominant, especially if one aims to understand and analyze new democratic states. In addition to re-examining the concept of democracy, an evaluation of democracy in a country like Indonesia will need to utilize a new intellectual framework to explain the phenomena/facts of new democracies in the contemporary world. In light of this need, in 2010, the Centre for Political Studies of Universitas Indonesia (PUSKAPOL UI) and the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies (DEMOS), in collaboration with the Democracy and Social Movements Institute of Sungkonghoe University and the Third World Studies Center of the University of the Philippines, compiled an index that offers an alternative approach to measuring democracy—the Asian Democracy Index (ADI).

The ADI is a univariate measure of the concept of democracy. As mentioned, the present research on democracy started with the assumption that the study of developing democracies in Asia, especially in Indonesia, requires a new framework so as to better explain the complexity of the process of democratization in Asia. Here, that framework is the redefinition of the notion of democracy as a process of

de-monopolization, i.e., as a process of power redistribution that takes place in many institutions in the fields of politics, economy, and civil society. This concept of democracy has two core principles, namely, liberalization and equalization. Liberalization refers to the extent to which various sectors are free and autonomous from authoritative political power, or how free these sectors are to determine their own priorities (CADI 2012, 44-45). This principle primarily depends on the extent of the disintegration of the old forces from a monopoly. Equalization is a measure of the extent to which minority groups gain access to resources (CADI 2012, 45). Thus, equalization can also be seen as a process of the transformation of power in the fields of politics, economy, and civil society.

Methodology

In 2012, PUSKAPOL UI and DEMOS were in their second year of conducting the ADI project in Indonesia. The survey for that year was conducted by interviewing fifty-four expert respondents using a questionnaire that contains semi-closed questions as the measuring instrument. The method used was the assessment of the opinion of these experts on certain indicators of democracy, responses which are expressed in ratings ranging from 0 to 10 and optional comments. The indicators/questions that were asked to the experts were limited to those relevant to their field of expertise. In connection with the method adopted, as can be gleaned from table 1, and as will be discussed in detail later, the process of determining the sample of respondents was also based on categories and criteria that represent the spectra of the respondents' positions and roles in their community in addition to their specializations.

Concept Operationalization

As previously mentioned, the concept of democracy is redefined as a process of de-monopolization that occurs in three fields, namely politics, economy, and civil society. Thus, in ADI studies, the democracy index is measured/obtained from the aggregate of scores of politics, economy, and civil society indices.

Recall now that "democratization as de-monopolization" has two core principles. These principles have two subprinciples/subvariables each. Liberalization is measured via two subvariables, i.e., autonomy and competition. Equalization, meanwhile, is measured using subvariables called pluralization and solidarity. These subvariables and their field-specific variants are discussed in detail in the analysis section of this paper.

Sampling Framework

The fifty-four respondents were determined via purposive sampling based on the determination of categories and specific criteria to represent the spectra of ideologies, positions, and roles of the respondents in their respective communities. To reiterate, there are three areas of expertise: politics, economy, and civil society. There are also three political positions toward the government: pro-government, moderate, and anti-government. Lastly, there are three community roles: academic, practitioner, and policymaker.

The fifty-four respondents can be classified according to their areas of expertise: eighteen were experts in politics, eighteen in economy, and eighteen in civil society. Within each group, there are six representatives per political position toward the government, which can be divided into two per community role.

Table 1: Respondent Profile

Position	Community Role	Field/Area			Total
		Politics	Economy	Civil Society	
Pro-Government	Academic	2	2	2	6
	Practitioner	2	2	2	6
	Policymaker	2	2	2	6
Moderate	Academic	2	2	2	6
	Practitioner	2	2	2	6
	Policymaker	2	2	2	6
Anti-Government	Academic	2	2	2	6
	Practitioner	2	2	2	6
	Policymaker	2	2	2	6
Total		18	18	18	54

Statistical Measure

The measure of index score was obtained using a measure of centrality, using mean and median scores to ensure normalcy of data from the results

of the respondents' assessments of all question items. In addition, though not detailed here, the t-test statistic was used to test the significance of changes in scores between 2011 and 2012, i.e., by comparing mean scores in pairs for each subprinciple/subvariable.

Some Notes for Improvement of the ADI Methodology

1. There is a need for a panel of experts, i.e., expert-respondents with the same area of expertise, to ensure the validity and reliability of the measure every year.
2. There is a need for a data collection method that is more dynamic than just completing a questionnaire that contains semi-closed questions. It is proposed that the assessment by experts be carried out using more dynamic methods, such as focus group discussions and the Delphi method.
3. There is a need to reconsider the weighting of variables that are measured.

Overview of Research Findings

The aggregate score of the index of democracy for Indonesia in 2012 was 5.32. The breakdown of this score can be seen in table 2. Indonesia's ADI slightly increased from 2011; the overall score then was 4.99. The increase, however, is not deemed significant; it remains a low score.

Both core principles of democracy had low index scores, though the principle of liberalization had an index score which was slightly higher (5.60) than the index score of equalization (5.02). In comparison with the 2011 scores, the increase in the score of equalization was more significant than the increase in the score of liberalization. However, in general, as can be gleaned from the figures in table 3, the condition of democratization/de-monopolization in Indonesia did not experience significant changes from 2011 to 2012.

Furthermore, the field index scores of liberalization were higher than those of equalization in all three fields. Liberalization in politics had the highest score (6.24) among all field liberalization scores, followed by civil society liberalization (5.57), indicating that liberalization occurred mainly in politics, then later in the field of civil society.

Table 2: General Overview of 2012 Indonesian ADI

Liberalization		Equalization		Democracy Index - Indonesia
5.60		5.02		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	5.32
5.41	5.79	4.65	5.34	

The overall equalization score, which was lower in comparison with the score of liberalization, was the result of averaging relatively low overall pluralization and solidarity scores. The differences of the scores in the indicators of both were not very significant. Similarly, the apparent improvement in the 2012 equalization score from the 2011 score was found to be not significant.

At 4.65, the index score of pluralization was the lowest subprinciple score. Pluralization in the field of economy obtained the lowest field sub-principle score. Meanwhile, the index score of solidarity was 5.34, which, like the pluralization score, was also lower than the autonomy and competition scores.

Table 3: Comparison of ADI Scores (Indonesia), 2011-2012

Year	Liberalization		Equalization		Indonesian ADI
	Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	
2012	5.60		5.02		5.32
	5.41	5.79	4.65	5.34	
2011	5.48		4.50		4.99
	5.44	5.51	4.19	4.81	

The scores of the two core principles of de-monopolization in which the score of liberalization was higher than that of equalization indicate that the process of democracy in Indonesia still prioritizes the liberalization over equalization or equality and the high score of liberalization may not necessarily expand the equalization of citizens' access to resources and to power. It can be concluded that democracy in Indonesia is an insecure position; in other words, the score can decline at any time.

Compared with the assessment result of 2011, in 2012 there was not any significant change. The score of liberalization was higher than that of equalization, and the score was determined by the low score of pluralization. Another change was on the quality of autonomy (from 5.48 to 5.41), which temporarily declined while others tended to improve.

An increase in the score indicates the increasing institutionalization of political institutions and the adaptability of the political actors to these changes. However, these are not immediately used for the benefits of the public. This at the same time shows that the movement of democracy is still more focused on the field of the state and government. In the meantime, the institutionalization in the field politics is not accompanied by the institutionalization or establishment of a mechanism that can ensure the fulfilment of economic and social rights of the citizens. This absence exists in relationship between the national government and the local governments as well as between the government and the citizens. The ruling regime appears to have the tendency to escape from its responsibilities for fulfilling the socioeconomic rights of its citizens. Similarly, socioeconomic empowerment which enables the citizens to be independent is still far from optimal.

Similarly, the same situation is also found in the field of civil society. The presence of institutions such as the ombudsman and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission were not optimal yet in strengthening the position of the civil society when facing the state and the business sector. The civil society still directs its movements to the de-monopolization in politics, while the attention to de-monopolization in the field of the economy was found to be lacking. The de-monopolization in politics alone is far from sufficient. Social and political liberalization does not substantially determine the de-monopolization of other sources of power.

The score of competition in civil society was relatively high (6.42). It is reflective of civil society's diversity of scope and the values civil society fights for (good governance, human rights, gender equality, children, sustainable environment, and social justice) in almost all of Indonesia.

The diversity of issues dealt with by civil society organizations represents the diversity of interests existing in the community. Even if there are problems related to diversity, such problems are likely to be caused by the politicking of “issues of diversity” by the political and economic elites, as well as weak equalization among the members of civil society. In connection with this, cooptation of media by elite groups and groups that control capital prevents public interests from being properly represented. Thus, expectedly, civil society organizations (CSOs) are considered relevant only in the discussion of issues that gain public attention, such as corruption. Coupled with low public participation in CSOs, the significance of the influence of these organizations was considered by the 2012 experts to be minimal, echoing the opinion of the 2011 experts.

In general, in the field of civil society, the activities of the society were found to be autonomous from the state’s control and intervention. However, a matter of concern was that the state (the government) had the tendency to let some issues continue to exist while it was supposed to have taken some actions to deal with these issues (e.g., the lack of action in solving horizontal conflicts among different groups in the society). A result of such omissions is the increasingly dominant role played by the market in the life of Indonesian civil society. Another matter of concern is the state’s effort to resume the control of CSOs through the amendments to the law on civil organizations.

Index in the Field of Politics

The score in the field of politics, at 6.16, was the highest score among all field scores. The index in the field of politics was derived from the score of political liberalization (6.24) and political equalization (6.07). A summary of the scores in politics can be seen in table 3.

The political liberalization score was obtained by obtaining the average of the political autonomy score, which was at 7.00, and a much lower political competition score (5.74). The relatively high score of autonomy was mainly the result of the collective rating in the freedom of assembly and activity indicator, which was 8.17—the highest of all indicator scores in the three fields. In addition, freedom to stand as an opposition also received a good rating from the respondents (7.61), offsetting the 6.6 civil liberty rating. Freedom from violence of the state apparatus gained a lower score (5.61) than all of the aforementioned. This indicates that the authorities did not show that they are pro-society at the time of socioeconomic conflicts.

Table 3: Index in the Field of Politics

Liberalization		Equalization		Score
6.24		6.07		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	6.16
7.00	5.74	6.35	5.86	

In the political competition subvariable, the highest score was given to the freedom to exercise voting rights during elections (7.94). A very low score, however, was given to informal group's influence on politics (3.44), indicating that these groups have a high amount of influence on Indonesian politics. The organizing of fair elections got a score of 6.67, while the effectiveness of the executive's policy and the transparency of the parliament, the executive, and the judiciary both gained a score of 5.50. The rule of law indicator gained a score of 5.39.

Political autonomy got a higher score than political competition because the procedural aspect of the political factor was considered by the experts to be good, although there were still substantial/fundamental weaknesses such as the high influence of the informal groups (such as religious groups, business sector and military) in the political process.

Political equalization gained a score of 6.16, which was the result of obtaining the mean of the scores of all equalization indicators (both pluralization and solidarity indicators). The indicators of pluralization consist of the balance of power in parliament (6.89) and the checks and balances between government agencies (6.33). State agencies were not considered to be highly democratic in their operation (6.11) and the representation of social groups in parliament was considered to be limited (6.06).

The political solidarity score was partly derived from the high score of public confidence in democracy (6.89). The guarantee of political participation of citizens was rated at 6.33. Affirmative action in the parliament was considered to be limited, receiving only a 5.89. Public confidence in the government also got a low score of 5.39. Public confidence in the legislature received the lowest score (4.78) among the indicators of political solidarity.

Civil liberty, while formally guaranteed, still receives threats of violence by the government apparatus. This is apparent in the handling of land-related conflicts and religious conflicts. In many land-related

conflicts, such as in Mesuji, Lampung, Sape Harbor in Bima, and Ogan Komering Ilir in South Sumatera, there was violence perpetrated by the state apparatus against farmers, fishermen, and laborers. Violence took various forms, such as intimidation, criminalization, arrest, assault, and homicide.

In addition, in some religious-based conflicts, the state does not take any actions in favor of minority groups. In the case of violence against the Ahmadiyah group, for instance, the attackers were only given light punishments while the victims (members of Ahmadiyah) were tried on charges of going against the law. In the case of the construction of Yasmin Church in Bogor, the government of Bogor City revoked the permit to build the church. This act sparked further violence perpetrated by the public against the Church's congregation.

Even though public trust in the process of democracy is high, the distrust in the government agencies and the parliament is quite obvious. This is partly because the function of representation is not carried out optimally yet. The implementation of various government policies does not provide the results that can be directly enjoyed by society. In addition, a lot of other problems such as poor health infrastructure and high maternal and child mortality rates have not been dealt with seriously.

The poor quality of the performance of representative state institutions has made the people's distrust of the government higher. The function of legislature does not run optimally and it is visible from the limited number of laws and regulations that are passed as well as the limitation of the laws in terms of substances. These laws and regulations thus fail to answer the demands of the public. In addition, cases of corruption involving members of the central parliament and the local parliaments were extensively covered by the mass media. Many members of the local parliaments in various provinces and districts/cities are and have been investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission.

It should also be noted that the middle class, members of which have relatively good resources to support their political participation, appears to feel reluctant to take part in politics. In "non-political" issues (environment and lifestyle, among others), they are willing to play an active role, but not in decidedly political issues. Participation by the middle class is substantial during elections. In the process of policymaking and oversight of government performance, however, middle class participation is very limited.

Index in the Field of Economy

As in 2011, the index score for the field of economy was the lowest among the three field index scores. The scores obtained in the principles of liberalization and equalization in the field of economy were also lower than those found in the fields of politics and civil society. Table 4 summarizes the scores in the economy field.

Table 4: Index in the Field of Economy

Liberalization		Equalization		Score
4.66		3.91		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	4.26
4.5	4.95	2.69	4.83	

The index score of economic equalization was much lower than the index score of economic liberalization, meaning economic autonomy and economic competition were still at a better state than economic pluralization and economic solidarity. The economic pluralization subprinciple had the lowest score out of all field subprinciple scores; at 2.69, it is also much lower than the other economic subvariable scores, which are all greater than or equal to 4.5. The low score obtained by economic pluralization occurred as a result of very low scores for most of that field subprinciples' indicators: monopolization of economy by a specific group (2.25), interregional disparity (2.63), income disparity (2.38), and disparity in assets (2.06). The highest score within the same set of indicators was for inequality and discrimination in employment (4.00). "High" though it is, this index score reflects the poor quality of pluralization of power in the field of economy, which is reflective of obvious economic disparity.

Equalization in the field of economy was also made up of the economic solidarity subvariable, which obtained a score of 4.83. The indicator with the best score within this subvariable was the condition of political influence of workers' unions, which received a 6.00, which was enough to offset the score of participation of the unions in economic solidarity (4.63). Other indicators with middling scores were organized unions (5.44) and public awareness of economic inequality (5.00). Protection of

the poor (4.38), social insurance (4.44), and society's supervision of companies (3.69) all received markedly lower scores than the other indicators in the economic solidarity set. All in all, economic solidarity scores seemed to be due to the disparity between the power of companies and that of social groups. The 2012 index showed the existence of political power of workers' unions, which counterbalanced the power of the monopolists of the Indonesian economy.

Just like in 2011, liberalization from the monopolists of economic power (4.66) remained far behind compared with liberalization in the field of civil society (5.57) and liberalization in the field of politics (6.24). The low economic liberalization score was partly due to low economic autonomy scores, particularly the scores for the condition of child workers indicator (3.44) and the independence of the government from the foreign capital indicator (3.89). Such results show the strong influence of foreign capital in the economy, inhibiting the de-monopolization of economic power. The vulnerability of the very weak groups in society, such as child workers, is another characteristic of Indonesian society that negatively impacted the de-monopolization of economic power in the country.

The highest-scoring subvariable score in the field of economy was achieved by the competition variable. The highest-scoring indicator under this subvariable was the one concerned with how well private companies provide protection of rights of workers, which appears to be connected with the high score obtained by the political influence of workers' unions indicator under the solidarity subvariable. Meanwhile, other indicators obtained scores that were not much different from each other and were equally low: the government's protection for workers (4.75), transparency of large companies (4.63), and, lowest of all, fairness of economic activities (4.25).

Democracy as partly the de-monopolization of economic power in 2012 may correspond with some of the facts about the Indonesian economy. The country's economy enjoyed rapid, quite high economic growth (about 6 percent) while the European and North American countries have been affected by a severe economic crisis since 2008. Growth, however, appears to be driven by the inequality of power relations among economic actors. As previously mentioned, economic disparity, as indicated by the Gini ratio coefficient index, has continuously increased since 2009.

Business people and companies are not seen as transparent regarding a wide range of their policies and practices, especially in economic activities that exploit the weak bargaining power of the various marginalized

community groups. Groups such as child workers remain in existence despite the fact that Indonesian has been enjoying its economic growth. Interestingly, the workers have started to gain political power, which helps to reduce the disparity in the bargaining position of production actors in economic activities. The political power of the workers was marked by their success in pushing continuous wage increases at the local level in the past few years, via activities such as a lengthy strike of Papua Freeport workers and the success of movements for preventing the increase in the price of fuel-based oil.

Index in the Field of Civil Society

The total score of de-monopolization in the field of civil society was 5.44, a 0.35 increase from the 2011 score (5.09). The breakdown of the 2012 civil society score can be seen in table 5.

Table 5: Index in the Field of Civil Society

Liberalization		Equalization		Score
5.57		5.20		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	5.43
4.86	6.42	5.00	5.47	

Equalization in the field of civil society had a low score. There was no significant difference between the scores of civil society equalizations' two variables, namely, pluralization (5.00) and solidarity (5.47). This score was affected by persistent inequality in terms of the opportunity to obtain information and the access to cultural activities and facilities. Meanwhile, access to cultural activities and facilities was given relatively high marks because the public was seen to have had equal access to cultural activities and facilities.

Regarding the subvariables of civil society liberalization, civil society competition (6.42) scored higher than civil society autonomy (4.86). The relatively high score of competition was mainly contributed to by the perceived diversity of nongovernmental organizations (7.28), though the accountability of those organizations was given a low score (5.83).

Tolerance among NGOs could be said to be low (5.83), as indicated by the score for the indicator concerning how democratically NGOs have been run. Meanwhile, the low score of civil society autonomy was affected by the strong influence of the market on society (2.44) despite the fact that current people's activities were considered free from the government's intervention (7.39).

Even though in general the people's activities were found by the respondents to be free from the state's control and intervention, as previously mentioned, the state in fact fails to fulfill the duties it has concerning society, such as solving horizontal conflicts. As a result of such failures, the market takes on these duties.

Regarding Indonesian social diversity, the historical roots of Indonesian society promote tolerance toward acculturation of diverse cultures even though the potential for intolerance remains in existence. In addition, the diversity of Indonesian society is visible through the diversity of issues that are dealt with by CSOs such as children, women, human rights, good governance, anti-corruption, environment, among many others. This diversity of issues shows the diversity of interest groups in society. Diverse though they are, they still have to deal with (internal) accountability and democratization issues. Lastly, as mentioned before, if there are problems as regards diversity, such problems are largely due to the politicking of the elite.

According to the respondents, the media has been relatively objective in exploring and spreading information. However, the media has been co-opted by the interests of the elite and capital, making it difficult to voice the interests of the public, thus becoming less instrumental for expressing public interests. It is not surprising that the government's radio and television networks have not functioned as the media that serve public interests.

On the matter of affirmative action in Indonesia, there have been some affirmative actions for women's groups. Examples of these are the 30 percent quota for female representation in parliament and the law on domestic violence.

CSOs have impacted the decision-making process, although only in a few specific issues, such as anti-corruption. Regardless of what successes CSOs have achieved, public participation in CSOs were found by the respondents to remain weak. This has resulted in the less grounded CSOs, which are politically estranged and are socially disconnected.

To review, in the field of civil society, liberalization (5.49) was viewed as being better than equalization (5.06). In this field, freedom was viewed to be largely artificial, since it has yet to be substantively

utilized to de-monopolize sources of economic, political, information-related, symbolic, and social powers. Civil society was found to be complacent with freedom and does not want to use that freedom to achieve anything more substantial than it had already achieved.

Conclusions

The following summarizes the findings discussed above, serving as this paper's conclusion:

- The index score in the field of politics (6.16) was the highest compared with the index scores in the two other fields, i.e., economy (4.26) and civil society (5.43).
- In the field of politics, the score of the autonomy subvariable was the highest (7.00); the three other political subvariables received the following scores: competition – 5.74, pluralization – 6.35, and solidarity – 5.86.
- Political autonomy is considered relatively good since the structures, procedures, and institutions for the implementation and/or protection of civil liberty and political freedom are already in place.
- Political pluralization is also considered good. There is an indication of the diversity in representation and participation in formal political institutions (e.g., the parliaments and other state agencies) in Indonesia.
- Political solidarity is relatively low because of low trust in the government and in parliament in particular. In addition, the representation of marginalized groups and women is also considered low.
- Political competition received the lowest marks due to the perceived high dominance of economic, religious, and political dynasties, and the authority of the judiciary, which is not seen as independent.
- The economic subprinciple scores are the lowest of all the field sub-principle scores.
- The economic pluralization score is the lowest subprinciple score of all. This was a consequence of perceived economic monopoly committed by certain groups, a large income disparity, disparity in terms of assets, and the disparity among regions.
- In the field civil society, of the four subvariables measured, the score of autonomy is the lowest. The indicators under this subvariable include the dominating influence of the private sector/market on the society. In addition, the services provided to vulnerable groups and minorities were found to be inadequate. Such results also indicate that the respondents think that there is minimal government intervention in the private sector/market.

- Civil society competition is assessed as the best of all the subvariables in the civil society field. This evaluation was primarily due to the indicator concerning the diversity of NGOs/CSOs in terms of their presence in various areas and the scope of the issues and values that they deal with.
- Under civil society solidarity, the indicator that obtained the lowest score is the absence of affirmative policy for marginalized groups. This further suggests that discriminatory practices are still widespread in Indonesia, which is a major hindrance in the development of democracy in the country.

Notes

1. This figure came from the results of the Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey conducted in 2012. In 2007, the maternal mortality rate was recorded at around 230 per 100,000 live births.
2. For details, go to <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/results>.
3. Visit the Ministry's website (<http://www.kemendagri.go.id/>) for details (largely in Bahasa).
4. Further information can be found at the BPS website (<http://www.bps.go.id/>).
5. The World Bank Indonesia data bank can be viewed at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia>.
6. Again, visit the Ministry's website (<http://www.kemendagri.go.id/>) for details.
7. For details, go to <http://www.wahidinstitute.org/wi-id/>.

References

- CADI (Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index). 2012. "The Asian Democracy Index: A Guide." *Asian Democracy Review* 1:36-87.
- Cho, Heeyeon. 2012. "Democratization as De-monopolization and Its Different Trajectories: No Democratic Consolidation without De-monopolization." *Asian Democracy Review* 1:4-35.
- Diamond, Larry. 2010. Indonesia's Place in Global Democracy. In Aspinall, Edward and Marcus Mietzner eds., *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*, 53-74. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Freedom House. 2012a. Methodology. Freedom House website. <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2012/methodology>.
- . 2012b. *Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and Their Global Repercussions – Selected Data from Freedom House's Annual Survey on Political Rights and Civil Liberties*. Freedom House website. http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/FIW%202012%20Booklet--Final.pdf.
- Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Random House.
- . 2011. *The Idea of Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

