Regressing, Stagnant, or Progressing?  
The 2012 CADI Asian Democracy Index Survey in the Philippines  

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Introduction  
“Eventful” is an appropriate descriptor for the year 2012 in the Philippines. Among the events that generated the most headlines in that year were those tied to the impeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Corona had been in proverbial hot water since the beginning of his term in May 2010, as he was a judicially upheld “midnight appointee” of the current president’s unpopular predecessor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. In the stifling political climate emerging from incendiary exchanges between Corona and Arroyo’s successor, Benigno Aquino III (Holmes 2012, 85-86), in December 2011, an overwhelming majority of the House of Representatives voted to impeach the chief justice “on the grounds of betrayal of public trust, the culpable violation of the constitution, and graft and corruption” (Holmes 2012, 86). In accordance with the 1987 Constitution, the Senate thus constituted itself as an impeachment court to try the chief justice. After a trial that lasted five months, in May 2012, Corona was impeached for betrayal of public trust, manifested by his failure to disclose the entirety of his wealth in his government-mandated Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth.

2012 is also memorable because of the heated debates—inside and outside the houses of Congress—about what eventually became the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act, nicknamed the RH Law, which enshrined in law the state’s sponsorship of all legal and effective means of contraception. Unsurprisingly, before it was enacted in December 2012, what was then called the RH Bill caused relations between the influential Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines and “Pro-RH” elected officials—including President Aquino—to be far from harmonious. Apart from health care, another basic service that was significantly reshaped in 2012 was education; 2012 saw the full implementation of the “K-12” (Kindergarten to Grade 12) system of basic education in the Philippines. Previously, the vast majority of Philippine schoolchildren were expected to obtain a high school diploma after finishing ten years of basic education, which the state was constitutionally mandated to provide without charge. Starting in 2012, two more years of schooling were added to state-supported basic education in the Philippines.

Besides the RH law, a standout in 2012’s list of landmark Philippine legislation is the Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act, touted to be the first such law in Asia (San Pedro and Dalangin-Fernandez 2012). It penalizes any form of “deprivation of liberty” by government authorities or their agents who thereafter keep silent about their reprehensible act, or conceal the fate of the person they caused to be “disappeared” (San Pedro and Dalangin-Fernandez 2012).

In the economic front, 2012 was the year when the Philippines’s gross domestic product grew by 6.4 percent, prompting Knight Frank and Citi Private Wealth to declare that the Philippines will likely become the sixth fastest growing economy in the world between 2010-2050 (Garcia 2012; Ordinario 2012). Our economist-by-training president trumpeted this apparent gain in his 2012 State of the Nation Address (Aquino 2012). Of interest to those who monitor industry monopolization was the near-sale of GMA-7, one of the largest television networks in the Philippines, to Mediaquest Holdings, Inc. The sale would have made that media conglomerate the owner of two of the three major television networks in the country. Mediaquest is owned by the Beneficial Trust Fund of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT); local business tycoon Manny Pangilinan is PLDT’s chairman of the board and managing director of PLDT’s controlling stockholder, First Pacific Co., Ltd. Over a year before the Mediaquest-GMA-7 negotiations fell through in October 2012, PLDT already owned two of the three cellular telecommunications companies in the Philippines.
Lastly, as 2012 came to a close, the state reported that eight public-private partnership projects were “rolled out” within the year; two other “PPP” projects had already been awarded earlier that year (Manila Times, in PPP Center 2012). These massive service and infrastructure projects are but the first of many that were planned to be undertaken during the Aquino administration (Manila Times, in PPP Center 2012).

These ostensibly terrain-altering events aside, even a cursory glance at local news articles in 2012 will reveal that many of the deficiencies that our 2011 ADI pilot survey respondents believed to be embedded in Philippine society persisted throughout 2012. Thus, in a year that seems to verify the cliche, “the more things change, the more they stay the same,” our team gamely carried out our annual task of conducting a CADI ADI survey.

Methodology

Sample Selection and Respondent Profile
As in 2011, the Philippine research team made a long list of experts in the fields of politics, the economy, and civil society. There is no complete listing of experts on the three fields that is available. To come up with the sample for the survey, the researchers put together lists of experts by sector from the Third World Studies Center. The experts were all invited to participate in the survey. They were given a week to confirm their participation and another week to accomplish the questionnaire.

Within each field, there were experts from the academe; nongovernmental/civil society organizations (NGOs/CSOs); and the “private sector,” members of which are not affiliated with the government or any academic institution, nor are primarily identified with NGOs/CSOs. The experts were categorized according to their ideological leanings; the experts were designated by members of the research team as either “(extreme) left-left leaning” (L-LL) or “(extreme) right-right leaning” (R-RL). As we explained in our 2011 report,

In classifying whether a respondent is L-LL or R-RL, the research team made the following assumptions: 1) those who are known (by their reputations, publications, etc.) to exhibit critical or dissenting opinions against the Philippine government and its policies, and are at the same time avowedly supportive of “socialist” socioeconomic policies are classified as left-left leaning; 2) those who have worked for the Philippine government, either in the bureaucracy or
as consultants, and/or subscribe to the government’s “neoliberal”
socioeconomic policies are classified as right-right leaning
(Reyes, Berja, and Socrates 2012, 138).

Some of the reactors and audience members of the last Asian Democracy
Index conference, held on August 30-31, 2012 at the University of the
Philippines-Diliman, did not take kindly to this division. Some stated that
an individual may have varying ideological stances on different issues—
stances which themselves may be dynamic—while others asked why we
did not include a centrist tendency. We were by then unable to address
their concerns regarding our binary ideological division, as to do so would
entail a significant alteration of our nearly-completed survey round’s ex-
perimental design. We will discuss our response to their comments in a
future paper.

For 2012, our sample size is forty-six—nearly double our 2011 sample
and with a more even distribution among L-LL and R-RL respondents in all
levels than in the previous year. The sample was selected using multistage
stratified sampling. To come up with this sample, we first drew up a long
list of potential respondents. Then, the long list was divided into three
groups based on the three institutional affiliation categories. Next, potential
respondent
s were classified according to their field of specialization and
ideological leaning. We tried to make sure that at any given time during
data collection, six experts per institutional affiliation—three L-LL and
three R-RL—for each field were either being invited to participate in the
project, had agreed to participate in the project, or had submitted a filled-
out survey form. While this meant that the ideal number of respondents
was fifty-four, due to time and resource constraints and other data collection
difficulties described below, we had to stop at respondent forty-six. The
complete respondent profile according to field of expertise, institutional
affiliation, and ideological leanings can be found in table 1.

Geographic Coverage

We tried to include experts from the country’s three major island
groups—Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao—although at the time of data
collection, most of the respondents were based in Manila, the national
capital in Luzon. As with the 2011 survey, the research team made sure
that at least two experts in each of the fields of expertise were rooted in
and were strongly identified with localities in Visayas and Mindanao.
Table 1. Respondent Profile

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>NO. of L-LL</th>
<th>NO. of R-RL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Academe</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO/CSO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Academe</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24  22

Data Collection

Our data collection instruments were the same questionnaires we used in 2011—a questionnaire each for politics, economy, and civil society, all of which were designed to be self-administered. While most of the respondents did use the instruments as intended, we conducted face-to-face interviews with two respondents who preferred to answer the survey through interview. Apart from those two, potential respondents received their questionnaires by email or in hard copy. Potential respondents were given, on average, one week to return the accomplished instrument given to them. Most of them were given a deadline extension if they failed to submit on time.

As before, all experts were asked to indicate their responses to questions in the survey instruments using a scale of 0-10. Their ratings may describe their level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction about a certain situation, or their estimate of a level of influence and control, among others. They were also asked to give explanatory comments to their ratings if they wished. Detailed descriptions followed each query, giving examples and suggesting data sources to help ensure rating reliability. In this study, an expert is broadly defined as an individual “in a more or less favorable position to know the facts.” The assumption is that they would incorporate their personal knowledge and experience in their ratings. The data sources cited by the experts were used by the researchers to verify the ratings given.
Schedule of Data Collection and Analysis

Members of the project staff completed the first long list of potential respondents in late May 2012. Data collection began in late May 2012 and ended in late September 2012. Data processing of the completed data set took place from September 2012 to October 2013. Analysis was protracted largely due to insufficiency of personnel, the conduct of the 2013 survey, and other intervening tasks.

Difficulties in Data Collection

Over one hundred invitations to potential respondents were sent out. The refusal rate (reflecting both actual and constructive refusals) was 44 percent, lower than 2011’s 64 percent. Contributing to this decrease in refusals is the fact that 56 percent of 2011’s respondents agreed to take part in the survey again. The attachment of an information sheet describing the 2011 survey results may have also made the invited more willing to exert effort in answering the surveys. Most of those who refused to/withdrew from participating in the survey stated that they did not have or no longer have the time to participate. Others said that they did not think they were the right people to take part in the project.

Analytical Method

The method of analysis used here is in accordance with the method delineated in the latest version of the ADI Guidebook (2012), which is cited in the analysis section of this report.

Results of the 2012 CADI ADI Survey in the Philippines

Indices of Democracy

Table 2 summarizes the estimates derived from the results of the 2012 CADI ADI survey in the Philippines.

The succeeding discussion describes in detail the ratings and/or the explanatory comments of the respondents (i.e., respondent assessments of Philippine democratization at the indicator level) classified under the ADI attributes per field. Thereafter, analysis at the ADI subprinciple and principle levels will be shown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Principles</th>
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<th>Subprinciple Indices</th>
<th>Core Principle Indices</th>
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<td>Pluralization</td>
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<td>4.31</td>
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<td>L = 4.39</td>
<td>L = 5.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      |                 | E = 5.25        | E = 3.30             | E = 5.10              |

Philippine ADI = 4.84
Politics

The Level of Performance of State Violence

Regarding their responses to the item corresponding to this attribute, the respondents of the politics survey had varying interpretations of who commits undue violence (either the state as a complex or isolated “security forces”), though there was a consensus that acts classifiable as undue violence include unlawful imprisonment and extrajudicial killings. Most of the respondents who gave a score higher than 5 agreed that there are sufficient legal mechanisms to challenge those who commit human rights violations. However, they did not contradict the other respondents who said that these protective laws are poorly implemented, and a “culture of impunity” reigns in the country. One respondent noted that there is some improvement in the government’s human rights protection record after the Arroyo administration ended, while another said that human rights violations under the current administration are on the rise.

Civil Rights

The high scorers of the politics survey’s second item (rating: 7-8) who gave comments (6 out of 8) all agreed that institutional guarantees, primarily in the form of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, exist. Nevertheless, these high scorers acknowledged that there are still violations of basic freedoms in places that the law is barely (if at all) respected (e.g., warlord-run localities) and that certain groups are vulnerable to human rights violations (e.g., journalists). One respondent, who gave a low score of 4, stated that rampant human rights violations make it difficult to believe that these freedoms are actually guaranteed. This respondent believed that the poor delivery of basic goods and services also restricts the guarantee of these freedoms.

Freedom to Organize and Act in Political Groups

Majority of the respondents for the item under this attribute gave a high score (8-9). Three gave a score ranging from 5-6. One respondent believed that the Philippines may have the highest degree of freedom of assembly. Another concurs, believing that there may even be “excessive” freedom of assembly. Most of the others agree with the former, adding that citizens have sufficient freedom to form political parties (though their ideological diversity/representativeness remains questionable). The two who gave low
scores stated that these freedoms are “on paper” only. One of them believed that the freedoms in question do not exist in the rural provinces.

Permission for Political Opposition

There were scores across the entire scale for item four, with both extreme scores coming from L-LL respondents. Similar to the first item, divergences in responses are partly attributable to varying interpretations of what “opposition movements” mean. Most of those who gave a high score believed that the Philippines has an abundance of political opposition movements; the state engages with debates with all organized or represented sectors, save for secessionists and armed subversives. Those who gave middle to moderately high scores agreed that opposition exists, but their diversity is suspect. The two who gave comments seem to agree that “opposition” refers to those who are putting themselves at risk to oppose the state, or what one of these respondents referred to as the “progressive” opposition. There thus appears to be a consensus among the respondents that anti-government opposition has poor standing in the Philippine political arena.

The Expansion of Universal Suffrage

One-fourth of the respondents gave a score of 10 for the item under this attribute, agreeing that all who are allowed to vote can freely exercise their right to vote in the Philippines. One of these respondents, however, echoed what many of the other respondents saw fit to highlight—elections in the Philippines are plagued with violence, cheating, and the like. As one respondent stated, while voter turnout has been high, “[quality] of engagement however is low.” Only two of the respondents gave low scores—neither explained their ratings. Those who gave middle to moderately high scores gave a variety of explanations for their ratings, e.g., economic (the resources necessary to launch an election campaign, thus making it impossible for someone truly “of the people” to run for public office), political (again, unbridled vote-buying by the “powers that be”), and downright criminal (electoral fraud). While only indirectly related to the item’s concerns, most of the respondents seemed incapable of discussing Philippine elections without mentioning its historical lack of integrity.

Efficiency of the State

For the item under state efficiency, the majority of respondents gave a score in the 3-6 range, indicating a general dissatisfaction with the way the
government in general is implementing its policies. The comments support this interpretation—adjectives such as “uneven,” “inefficient,” even “dismal” were used by the respondents to characterize how the government goes about its executive functions. One respondent mentioned that the bureaucracy is exceedingly complex. Another stated that there is a “culture of patronage” that is deeply entrenched in Philippine society. Others appeared to synthesize these comments, finding that government inefficiency can be rooted in both procedural inadequacies and corruption. Those who gave higher scores than the others believed that the current administration is a genuinely reform-oriented one.

The Presence of Non-Elected Hereditary Power

With the exception of one respondent, all of the respondents gave scores of 5 and below for the political survey’s seventh item. Four believed that non-elected groups virtually (or, in the case of one, actually) monopolize political power in the Philippines. The respondents said that political power holders in the Philippines who do not overtly “throw their hat” into the political arena include religious groups and business families. The sole respondent who said that political power is wielded wholly by non-elected groups substantiated his score by stating that even elected officials are affiliated/belong to these non-elected groups. This was seconded by an expert who gave a 1. The said expert believed that the political system in the Philippines is akin to “an aristocracy, if not a plutocracy.” A respondent who agreed with the latter two but gave a rating of 5 problematized the “elected/non-elected” dichotomy, stating what most of the experts agreed upon—the distribution of political power (or lack thereof) is influenced primarily by the multifaceted Philippine elite, a complex that includes political dynasties, the wealthy, and those with backing from the United States.

The Rule of Law

None of the respondents were inclined to state that the rule of law is well-established in the Philippines. Nevertheless, evidence of the rule of law in the Philippines, according to one respondent, is the recent impeachment of the Chief Justice Corona. A respondent who answered the survey before the impeachment echoed this sentiment. However, this one incident stands behind the weak implementation of the constitutional republic’s laws. Corruption of the judiciary is one reason why four experts believed
that the rule of law has yet to flourish in the Philippines. All of the respondents agreed that the marginalized have poor access to justice.

**Electoral Fairness**

The respondent agreed that elections in the Philippines were generally fair, but they are subject to manipulation by the elite, who are capable of “playing dirty” to ensure that they secure elective posts. One respondent believed that this was tied to a lack of transparency and accountability on campaign activities of candidates. A couple of respondents talked about institutionalized “winnability,” wherein the likelihood of one’s success in winning an election lies largely on one’s popularity, party affiliation, and/or membership in a political dynasty (all of which are determinants of how well one can attract financial backing), not on one’s platform. In rural areas, according to one respondent, “the politics of guns, goons, and gold and familial ties still predominate.”

**Transparency**

All but two gave scores ranging from 1-6. The two who gave high scores and comments—one from the L-LL side and one from the R-RL side—highlighted laws and executive issuances that mandate government transparency. However, many of the other respondents raised the continuing failure of Congress to pass the Freedom of Information Bill. Again, some of the respondents found it necessary to downplay the existence of formal guarantees in light of their poor implementation.

**Independence and Checks and Balances among State Power Apparatuses**

The impeachment trial of Chief Justice Corona was a major issue discussed by the respondents in the item under this attribute. Nevertheless, most of them did not allow their opinion of the trial to primarily influence their scores. Although the Philippines does have a tripartite division of government to assure checks and balances, some respondents pointed out that there are activities by one branch of government that are not (effectively) monitored by the other branches (e.g., the utilization of “intelligence funds”).
Dispersion of Political Power in Parliament

Most of the respondents who gave comments on the item under this attribute agreed that there are virtually no ideologically differentiated parties in the Philippines—indeed, political “turncoatism” was found by some of them to be popular among Philippine politicians. According to them, save for a few party list groups, a Philippine political party usually revolves around particular personalities, the most influential among whom is the incumbent chief executive. Such comments served to justify mostly low ratings; the sole high rating came from a left-leaning respondent who believed that “[members] of the minority still get to be members of important committees.”

Political Representation

Only one respondent said that minorities were fairly well-represented, but with the caveat—echoed by the other respondents—that a group’s representation in Congress does not translate to that group having a significant influence on Congress’s legislative agenda. There was no gulf between the responses of left-leaning and right-leaning respondents, with two relatively high scorers—an L-LL and an R-RL respondent—(faintly) praising the existence of party list groups, the success of which they nevertheless downplayed due to the party list system’s distortion by traditional political elites.

Democratization of State Institutions

According to the respondents, public consultation by the executive and legislative branches of government do take place, though one L-LL respondent believed that consultation is limited and another believed that the “voice of the people” is only listened to by the government when “accompanied by protest actions.” Two respondents from the academe wondered why the item under this attribute correlated the “fairness and rationality” of decisions made by the government with the democratization of state institutions; they gave scores similar to that of the majority, i.e., near the middle of a 2-8 range.

Participation System and Degree of Participation

High scores for the item under this attribute came from two respondents from election watchdogs. Many noted or emphasized that political participation
by the citizenry is typically limited to participation in elections—which may be the reason why two respondents in the left-leaning column gave unexplained low scores (a 1 and a 2).

**Affirmative Action**

The majority of respondents from NGOs/CSOs gave middle high-high scores (6-8), while most of the other respondents—save for one who gave an unexplained 9—gave scores in the low-middle high range, 77.78 percent of whom gave a score below 5. The low scores seem to be the result of the respondents' belief that state-enforced affirmative action, as explained in the description for the item under this attribute (e.g., allocated seats in the legislature for women and people with disabilities), does not/no longer exists in the Philippines. For the high scorers, the party list system, laws such as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, and certain admission policies of elite public schools, are among the existing manifestations of affirmative action in the Philippines.

**The Public Credibility of the Current Democratic Institution**

The two items under this attribute were concerned with public trust for the government as a whole and the legislature. Ratings for the former were in the 2-7 range (mean: 5.67) while ratings for the latter were in the 3-6 range (mean: 4.67). Nearly half of the respondents justified their relatively higher ratings for the first item by mentioning the trust ratings of President Aquino, which some noted were lower than in previous years but remained fairly high. Many of the respondents said that they gave relatively lower scores for the second item because the Philippine Congress, as a whole, has (long) been seen as a privileged body populated largely by corrupt politicians.

**The Public Credibility of a Democratic Institution and the Public Attitude to Democratic Participation**

Only one respondent gave a low score (a 4) for the item under this attribute. She gave no explanation for her score. One respondent gave a 5, giving the opinion that since democracy refers to procedural democracy in our collective psyche, it may not be seen as necessarily the most desirable system by the majority of citizens who are more concerned with “concrete desirables” such as “jobs and justice.” This was seconded by another respondent, who said that preference for democracy appears to be common among the
middle class, but members of the lower class tend to prefer paternalism or a “Singapore-style” state. Apart from one other respondent who gave an unexplained 6, all the other respondents gave a score between 7-10. Thus, majority of the respondents believe that democracy is still the preferred type of system by the Philippine citizenry.

**Economy**

*Freedom/Autonomy of Economic Activities from Political Intervention*

Five of the fifteen respondents of the economy survey believed that private companies in the Philippines conduct their day-to-day business largely without government intervention; their recoded ratings range from 6-8 for the item corresponding to this attribute. All of the other respondents gave a rating ranging from 1-4 after recoding, indicating their belief that political elites are in collusion with economic elites, resulting in the abundance of monopolies/duopolies in the retail and service sector and the dominance of elite players in Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. Many of the respondents stated that such control extends to the local government unit (LGU) level, where traditional elites hold sway over both politics and business.

*Protection of Basic Labor Rights*

The economy survey respondents were divided in their responses to the first item under this attribute. Most of the left-leaning respondents gave a score between 1-4, indicating their belief that labor rights are generally poorly established in the Philippines, despite the existence of a Labor Code and similar legislation. According to some respondents, these laws are “very weak” or are poorly implemented; monitoring mechanisms to ensure the proper implementation of such laws do not function because of resource constraints. Those who disagreed cited the features of the country’s labor laws that do appear to be functional (e.g., a mandated bias toward laborers, especially of small and medium enterprises). As regards the second item under protection of basic labor rights, all except one of the left-leaning respondents believed that forced and child labor remains rampant in the Philippines, giving scores ranging from 2-4. In contrast, only one respondent from the right-leaning camp gave a score lower than 5, noting that “unscrupulous employers do get away with ‘murder’” if they bribe certain authorities. The egregious existence of child workers was highlighted by
many of the experts, with some from both the left-leaning and right-leaning
groups stating that this is more prevalent in rural, agricultural areas,
where farming remains a family affair.

Autonomy of the Decision-making Process for the Formation of International
Political Economy Policy

A few right-leaning respondents gave a score between 6-9 for the item under
this attribute, indicating their belief that Philippine economic policy is (fairly)
free from foreign influence. Only two of the eight left-leaning respondents
saw fit to give a score of five—the scores of the other members of the L-LL
group were in the 0-3 range, scores that were mirrored only by two R-RL
respondents. Many of these low scorers believed that the Philippines is utterly
dependent on foreign capital, either from the United States or the country’s
neighbors in Asia. Two left-leaning respondents believe that the Philippine
state is beholden to foreign transnational companies and multilateral financial
institutions.

Economic Transparency

Most of the respondents think that rules to ensure transparency and
economic competition are poorly implemented in the Philippines. One
respondent went so far as to say that corporate transparency is non-
existent in the country. An outlier, however, believed that corporate
transparency is high thanks to “the growing number of [companies
listed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC] and the
campaign of SEC.” Other respondents drew attention to the existence of
non-listed companies, the filial ties that protect members of the dominant
family-owned companies from scrutiny, and what they claim to be various
forms of financial misrepresentation by SEC-listed companies, e.g., to
inflate their value.

Economic Fairness

While the range of scores given by the respondents for the item under this
attribute is from 1-8, the average score is 3.87. Most respondents gave low
scores because they perceived key Philippine industries to be dominated by
monopolies, which make for what one respondent described as an uneven
playing field. Two respondents brought up the lack of anti-trust laws in the
Philippines. One of the respondents diverged with the majority’s negative
view of industry monopoly; he believed that “even tycoons compete fiercely
and for the betterment of consumers.”
Government’s Accountability

Generally, for the item under this labor-focused attribute, the left-leaning respondents gave lower scores than the right-leaning respondents. Two of the high scorers from the latter group thought that the government effectively protects labor rights in the Philippines—one went so far as to say that it was “over-protected.” Both believed that the minimum wage system is detrimental to Philippine labor—one claimed that it is responsible for a largely unregulated informal sector, the other says that “there would be more gainful employment” if minimum wage is abandoned in favor of non-wage benefits. Many of the other respondents said that labor contractualization is prevalent in the country, making many members of the labor force prone to various forms of abuse by their employers. Some of the respondents nevertheless believed that labor protection is improving under the Aquino administration.

Corporate Accountability

In response to the item under this labor-focused attribute, a majority of the respondents believed that there are loopholes in laws and regulations that allow companies to circumvent the protection of labor rights because of their orientation toward profit maximization. One respondent noted that “there is no institutionalized penalty or real significant reward” for companies to “take labor rights seriously.” Others mentioned labor contractualization again, tying it to business process outsourcing (BPO); a number of respondents noted that BPO companies—referred to by one respondent as “the so-called savior of the Philippine economy”—have poor policies regarding the protection of labor rights. One respondent noted that non-skilled laborers have a particularly precarious status in the Philippines.

Economic Monopoly

After recoding, none of the respondents gave a score higher than 5 for the item under this attribute, showing that all of the respondents thought that the Philippine economy is dominated by particular groups, specifically tycoons (including mainland Chinese businessmen or “taipans”) and local and foreign conglomerates. Some respondents said that there is high foreign concentration in key industries. A couple of L-LL respondents perceive this condition to be detrimental to the Philippine economy since these economic
elites have traditionally exhibited profit-focused/rent-seeking behavior. While most agreed with the aforementioned two or reported this condition with an objective tone, one R-RL respondent believed that “the tycoons themselves compete.”

**Regional Inequality**

Again, after recoding, none of the respondents gave a score higher than 5 for the item under this attribute—in fact, the average rating is a very low 1.76. According to many respondents, economic inequality in low-income regions is more pronounced than in high-income regions. One respondent noted that “the poverty level in some provinces in Mindanao [is] worse than in a country like Bangladesh.” Two respondents cited the current nationwide Gini coefficient of 0.45, which is indicative of the country's proximity to a state of high inequality.

**Inequality of Income**

Ratings after recoding for the item on income inequality range from 0-4, reflecting a consensus among the respondents that very few control resources in the Philippines.

**Inequality of Asset**

Since “asset” is herein construed to refer primarily to property/real estate, and, as shown above, income inequality is high in the Philippines, the respondents gave ratings ranging from 0-3 (after recoding) for the item under this attribute. Many respondents cited the limited success of land reform as a key reason for this condition—many farmers are landless, observed one respondent. Another respondent tied this condition to his observation that “about 80% of the population is ‘unbanked.’”

**Inequality of Employment**

Most of the respondents gave scores ranging from 5-7 for the item on employment inequality. In their comments, the respondents are in agreement that discrimination of workers by age, gender, religion, marital status, ethnicity, and region of origin, among others, exists in the Philippines, but few of the respondents saw labor discrimination as particularly serious. L-LL and R-RL respondents alike thought that labor opportunities in
the Philippines are generally available to a wide variety of Philippine citizens, though one respondent believed that foreign multinationals are (naturally) biased toward foreign executives in terms of salaries.

The Social Security System

Generally, the respondents believed that the social support system in the Philippines is weak and lacking despite government programs such as the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program, though some respondents thought that support for the poor is improving under the current dispensation. Respondents perceived allocations for basic social services to be largely insufficient. Lastly, they thought that the social insurance provided by the government is limited and issues of corruption beset the Social Security System (for private sector employees) and the Government Service Insurance System. They generally believed that the state’s social insurance programs only cover a small portion of the country’s population.

The Activity of Trade Unions

This attribute has three items. For the first item, dealing with labor union organization, five of the fifteen respondents stated that labor unions—trade unions in particular—were very well organized. One respondent noted that there were many committed, “full time” labor organizers. The others disagreed with the aforementioned five, believing that many in the large informal sector were by and large not organized. Interestingly, three R-RL respondents—a high scorer and two low scorers—mentioned that only about 10 percent of Philippine laborers were organized. For the second item, concerned with labor union influence on the policies of the central government, the majority of respondents stated that labor unions are represented in government, but generally have little influence on national government policies. The two outlying high scorers did not give comments. Those who did mention party list groups concerned with laborers as one of the few, largely unheeded voices of Philippine labor in government. For the third item, focused on labor union influence on management processes, most of the respondents stated that participation of labor unions is limited in large companies. An “odd-man out” gave a high score, stating that labor unions participate actively in company management processes, though he said that “[whether] they affect decisions as a minority in the wage boards and in politics is another issue.”
Corporate Watch
For the item under this attribute, scores range from 0-8, higher on average among L-LL respondents than R-RL respondents. Civil society in the Philippines may be “dynamic in all fronts,” as noted by one respondent, but many other respondents think that both the Philippine state and civil society—in the eyes of several respondents, represented in this context by consumer welfare groups—fail to effectively monitor corporate activity.

Awareness of Reducing Inequality
Majority of the respondents gave middle-high scores for the item concerned with the general public’s enthusiasm about reducing economic inequality in the Philippines, mostly due to Philippine civil society. Those who disagreed with this majority—from both sides of the ideological divide—stated that the general public is in fact by and large apathetic, with few of them supporting mass movements dedicated to poverty reduction and the like. However, high scorers and low scorers generally agreed that educating the public—e.g., by making the fundamentals of economics comprehensible to the layman—is needed to increase the Philippine public’s awareness and participation in economic inequality reduction.

Civil Society

Autonomy of Society from State Intervention
For the first item of the civil society survey, on government interference in social activities, the respondents gave scores ranging from 3-10. One right-leaning respondent said that members of his CSO circle were free in designing development projects. Five respondents (three L-LL and two R-RL) connected the item to the constraints on media freedom. They attributed the said constraints to various factors such as the pressures imposed on media by various social groups and events such as extrajudicial killings committed by private citizens and/or informal actors such as private armies. The private ownership of media outfits was also identified as a factor influencing media freedom. While the respondents generally recognized the government’s lack of direct hand on limiting media freedom, they cite government responsibility from its inaction and weak law enforcement that serve as context for these events.
The phenomena of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances—not only of media people, but also of organization leaders who oppose government-sponsored projects—were also raised by four experts (one L-LL and three R-RL) as a means of government interference in citizen's social activities. Interestingly, mention of such gross human rights violations was not always complemented by a low score. Only the left-leaning respondent gave a score of 1, while the other three gave scores greater than 5. One of the right-leaning respondents described the country's level of freedom from government interference as “close to fully free,” except for the extralegal disappearances.

In the second item in the civil society survey, regarding the social influence of government organizations, respondents’ scores range from 0-8 after recoding. Some of the respondents, in their comments, did not directly state how much they think government-sponsored NGOs influence society. Their comments were largely descriptions of the observed state of government-NGO partnership in the implementation of government tasks and projects. Clearly, however, the respondents generally agreed on the existence of government-sponsored NGOs and/or NGOs working with the government. Some right-leaning respondents said that these NGOs have minimal influence or less influence than independent NGOs. A left-leaning respondent stated that there may be “exertions of control” through NGOs sponsored by individual politicians. However, the said expert clarified that whatever control these NGOs might have were mitigated by militant organizations.

**Autonomy of Society from the Market**

The item attached to this attribute generally received low scores (after recoding) across sectors and political leanings, with 2 as the median, 0 as the lowest score, and 6 as the highest score. The respondents seemed to agree on the significant influence of private companies on media, government institutions, and to some extent, NGOs. Five respondents (three left-leaning and two right-leaning) emphasized how private corporations influence media or public opinion through their financial capacity to advertise and pay to communicate their interests and through the ownership of media outfits. A respondent elaborated on how companies utilize their financial power to use the military and police against the people and to exact favors from politicians whom they supported during elections. Despite this, all respondents qualified that independence still exists among NGOs as a whole. One respondent even claimed that companies’ influence on media
and the government are counterbalanced by NGOs and independent educational institutions.

**Autonomy of Social Members**

The first item attached to this attribute, pertaining to the provision of citizens’ basic needs, generally garnered low scores. Most respondents supported their answers with various manifestations and indications of poverty. Others criticized the government’s lack of concrete, effective and/or appropriate strategies to combat poverty. Only a right-leaning respondent praised the current government program, mentioning the CCT program, which according to her would take some time to have an impact.

The second item attached to this attribute, concerned with special care for vulnerable individuals, attained low to moderate ratings. A left-leaning respondent, who gave a 1, did not believe that the government could provide such special care given the government’s inability to care for the lower classes as a whole. Four right-leaning respondents recognized the presence of laws and/or programs for such special care but cited the lack of/poor implementation of these laws. On the other hand, a left-leaning respondent acknowledged government pronouncements and mechanisms to address the needs of vulnerable sectors but qualified that results are still wanting. Another left-leaning respondent called attention to a disconnect in government formal pronouncements and real actions, adding that government poverty alleviation program are “at best palliative or dole out.”

The last item attached to this attribute, related to education, received moderate to high ratings. Many respondents identified the provision of free basic education as a significant education opportunity for Philippine citizens. Many of them, however, criticized the poor and deteriorating quality of basic public education, as manifested in low teaching quality and poor educational facilities. In addition, some cited how poverty indirectly reduced access to education. Furthermore, a respondent criticized the current “internationalization” orientation of basic education, particularly the K-12 program.

**Tolerance**

Item seven of the civil society survey received generally moderate to high scores. Most of the respondents who commented seemed to agree that Philippine citizens are generally open and tolerant of other ethnicities and
religions with some exceptions. Some of the cultures or cultural values some respondents classified as poorly tolerated were: Moro or Muslim culture, atheism, divorce, and reproductive health.

**Capability of Voluntary Association**

The respondents seemed to agree that NGOs are influential, but differ in their perceived extent of influence. On one hand, some respondents highlighted the NGO movement's strong political influence, in terms of policies, protest movements, and how NGOs serve to fill the inadequacies of the government. On the other hand, respondents cited the NGOs' limited reach, lack of financial self-sufficiency, and vulnerability to decrease in funding support as factors limiting their influence.

**Public Good of Voluntary Association**

Many of the respondents who gave comments seemed to agree that the NGOs in the country generally represent public interest. However, they pointed out the existence of NGOs that do not serve public interest such as government-run or business-operated NGOs. One respondent also mentioned “fly-by-night” NGOs that exist to defraud funders.

**Transparency of Voluntary Associations**

The foci of respondents' comments for the item under this attribute differ. One respondent noted NGOs’ observance of basic requirements to assure transparency. Another mentioned the lack of oversight features in some NGOs in the context of expanding operations. Two respondents credited the principled nature of NGOs in ensuring democratic operations.

**Diversity of Voluntary Associations**

Many of the respondents who commented viewed Philippine NGOs as diverse. However, one respondent saw the NGO movement as dominated by left-leaning groups. Another one gave a low score on the basis of his belief that NGOs do not have the capacity to draw general donations for worthy causes.
Inequality of Public Spheres

Most of the respondents gave scores higher than 5, which may be a reflection of a generally positive view of media fairness. However, their critical comments of the media are very much related. In particular, they criticized how the media reflects the views and vested interests of individual media practitioners or of media outfit owners, who in turn are allied with other private entities. They also believed that corporate media’s dependence on advertising and commercial ratings negatively affect the level of consideration for public interest. Some respondents also mentioned how particular religious groups own and control television or radio stations.

Inequality of Information

Comments revolved around two main issues: 1) the differential access to sources of information, particularly to mass media; and 2) the quality and completeness of information accessed. Most of the comments lean toward the first. Some respondents thought that people generally have access to mass media, such as the radio. They pointed out that access differs depending on the type of media and the geographical location of the population (urban versus rural).

Inequality of Culture

For the item under this attribute, the respondents seemed to agree that the few cultural facilities and activities that exist are limited in terms of access. According to some of the respondents, cultural education is supposedly not a government priority and various officially supported cultural activities are class-specific in terms of access and appeal.

Inequality of Power

The respondents generally agreed that a wide gap exists between the rich and the poor in the country, or that a powerful elite exists, in the form of political dynasties, business elites, and the church, to name a few. Aside from purely class-based differences, the respondents said that opportunities also differ between citizens in rural and urban communities.

Institutional Guarantee of Diversity and Affirmative Actions

Scores for the item attached to this attribute range from 1-9. Some respondents went so far as to state that affirmative action programs are
virtually non-existent in the Philippines. Divided though they were in scores, the respondents generally believed that (the few) affirmative action programs that exist have (excellent) legal basis, but are poorly implemented.

**Participation and Support of Social Groups**

Respondents differed on the item attached to this attribute. One respondent believed that there is high citizen awareness and participation in NGO activities, but donations from people are low. Another observed that there is significant people’s participation in NGO activities, but mostly among the middle class. She added that people from the grassroots participate when participation is economically beneficial for them. Some of the respondents contended that NGOs still have limited reach and operations. Moreover, these respondents believed that NGO support is weakening.

**Governance of the State and Civil Society**

There seemed to be a general agreement among the respondents that NGOs are actively exerting effort to influence policies. Many of the respondents pointed out that actual NGO influence depends on factors usually related to government structures and the subjective openness and accommodation by officials. In addition, one respondent observed that NGOs are more influential at the national level than at the local level.

**Analysis**

In our last country report, the CADI method of analysis, limited to description and comparison of the sub-components[indicators of democracy) was applied. We will do so again here, for as we stated before, we will have to conduct the study several times before we are able to determine whether the CADI way of looking at the causal or correlative relations among the political, economic, and civil society fields is applicable in the Philippines.¹

According to the latest version of the ADI Guidebook, “if a country has a high political democracy index but low economic democracy index, the country has a weak democratic foundation [and if] a country has a low political democracy index but a high civil society democracy index, the country has a great potential to further develop its democracy” (CADI 2012, 86). Included herein as figure 1 is an illustration by Heeyeon
Cho—principally responsible for ADI’s theoretical frame—that supports these statements by showing the interrelatedness of political, economic, and social monopolies.

Figure 1: Relation among the Political, Economic, and Social Monopolies

Source: Cho 2012, 17

Based on Cho’s diagram, removing the legal guarantees of social monopolization will contribute to political de-monopolization, but without removing the legal guarantees of economic de-monopolization, the “material base” of a particular polity will be kept under elite control, which will significantly diminish the effectivity of the aforedescribed sociopolitical de-monopolization effort. In the ADI survey instrument, this interrelationship is clearly manifested in purposefully redundant indicators and attributes across all the fields.

The Cho/CADI framework thus presumes that monopolization in one field has a “gravitational pull” on the others, e.g., if among the political, economic, and civil society fields, a field has a significantly lower level of de-monopolization than the remaining fields, then a major hindrance to further democratization across all the fields is the high degree
of monopolization in the odd field. An inverse situation—e.g., a field has a significantly higher score than two fields with low scores—is possible, but in accordance with Cho and CADI’s formulae, a high-scoring outlier among the fields should have a much higher score if the scores in the remaining fields were also significantly higher.

Figure 2: Autonomy in Politics, Economy, and Civil Society (Philippines 2012)

Figure 3: Competition in Politics, Economy, and Civil Society (Philippines 2012)

Figures 2–6 clearly show that the economic field received the lowest scores across all subprinciples. As explained above, the scores for political and civil society autonomy would most likely be significantly higher were it not for economic autonomy’s low score—the extent of economic power-holder influence on Philippine decision-makers and lobbyists cannot be deemed insignificant. High civil society competition may suggest low popular support of discriminatory practices across all the fields, but this situation coexists with elite monopolization of political and economic power, indicating low politico-economic “competitiveness” of the majority. The fact that economy received the lowest score in pluralization—a very low one at that—shows us that the unjust distribution of material wealth and resources is the most under-addressed among the country’s chief ills, undermining any achievement toward the equalization of political and socio-cultural capital in the country. The fact that economic solidarity
obtained a score of 4.30—noticeably lower than the 5.85 and 5.10 of political and civil society solidarity, respectively—shows us that there seems to be less effort to engage the citizenry through civil society in helping to de-monopolize the economic sphere than in the other two spheres.

Moving on to the principle level, the 2012 version of the ADI guidebook states that “[a] high liberalization index represents that the country has established institutional and procedural democracy to some extent” and “a high equalization index means that the country has established a strong democratic foundation and has great potential to democratize further” (CADI 2012, 86). Thus, the fact that economic liberalization received the only score below 5.0 suggests that at the level of government and nongovernment power-holders, economic inequality elimination measures are either the most insufficient or the worst implemented.

As can be gleaned from the respondents’ comments, many of the aforementioned problems in the economic sphere can be addressed by solutions that will directly or indirectly lead to progress in democratization in all fields, e.g., better implementation of de-monopolization laws and policies and direct infusion of public resources toward particular inequality elimination projects. This has been said repeatedly by others who study
Philippine democratization. A singular contribution of the CADI ADI remains the index’s ability to show where NGOs/CSOs and the citizenry at large are lacking in terms of intensity of palliative/curative action. Based on our 2012 data, we reiterate our claim in 2011 that the Philippine citizenry must be made more concerned with ways to eradicate unjust wealth and resource distribution in all levels of society; those who vigilantly fight for the protection of political and civil rights should fight just as vigilantly for the protection of socioeconomic rights.

Figure 6: Summary of Field Subprinciple Scores

The next section deals with this paper’s titular query—is Philippine democratization regressing, stagnant, or progressing? Are the gains of activists for political, economic, and social de-monopolization between 2011 and 2012 outweighed by their losses? To ascertain this, we will first briefly compare our findings with the findings of other studies conducted in 2012 about democracy/democratization/de-monopolization in the Philippines. Afterward, we will compare the results of the 2012 survey with the results of the 2011 survey.

Comparison with Related Studies Published in 2011-2012

Table 3 gives a summary of the ratings garnered by the Philippines from 2011-2012 in various indices of democracy as well as the Human Development Index.

Overall, the findings of the 2012 CADI ADI concur with the findings of some of the recent studies on Philippine democratization produced by local and foreign researchers, both the broad kind and those that focus on particular fields. The scores given by Freedom House to the Philippines after a multi-method research process for their two indicators of
“freedom,” Political Rights and Civil Liberties, have both remained at 3.0 since 2011 (Freedom House 2011, 2012). After conducting a specialist survey, the European Intelligence Unit (EIU) still considers the Philippines among the world’s “flawed democracies” (which ranks above what EIU calls “hybrid regimes” and authoritarian regimes) as the country’s overall democracy score—obtained after aggregating the scores it received in EIU’s five indicators of (political) democracy—is still below the minimum score needed to be considered a “full democracy.” Lastly, from 2011 to 2012, the aggregate of the scores given by the United Nations Development Program to the Philippines in their numerous multi-field indicators of human development increased by a negligible .54 percent, indicating that from 2011 to 2012, the “[advancement] of the richness of human life” (Amartya Sen, quoted in UNDP 2013a) in the Philippines stalled at the “medium” level.

Table 3: Freedom, Democracy, and Human Development Index Ratings of the Philippines, 2011-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>2011 rating</th>
<th>2012 rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>3.0 (Partly Free)</td>
<td>3.0 (Partly Free)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom in the World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economist Intelligence Unit</td>
<td>6.12 (Flawed Democracy)</td>
<td>6.3 (Flawed Democracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>.651 (medium)</td>
<td>.654 (medium)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: EIU (2011, 5), (2012, 5); Freedom House 2011, 2012; DRA 2012; and UNDP 2013

Comparison with the Findings of the 2011 Survey

Figures 7-9 reveal slight change in the ratings from 2011 to 2012 across all sectors. The graphs generally show decline in ratings in 2012 compared to 2011. For the experts in politics, mean rating in autonomy registered the highest decline of 1.4 points, while the other subprinciple indicators revealed an even smaller decrease in rating, as shown in figure 7. Compared to politics, lower scores were given by experts in economy in all subprinciple indicators. Pluralism registered the lowest mean rating among the four subprinciple indicators, as shown in figure 8. This mean rating is also
lowest across all sectors. Figure 9 reveals that mean rating in competition is highest among the other subprinciple indicators in the civil society sector. The ratings given by the experts in this sector is relatively lower than that of politics and slightly higher that of the economy.

Figure 7. Comparison of Responses in Politics, 2011-2012

Figure 8. Comparison of Responses in Economy, 2011-2012
Both the 2011 and 2012 data are ratings given by a random sample of experts in three sectors namely, politics, economy and civil society, and with either left or right political leaning. To test whether the differences in the ratings are statistically significant, t-tests were conducted, for each sector, comparing mean ratings of the four subprinciples, given in 2011 and 2012. Table 4 summarizes the results of the t-tests indicating that the differences observed in the 2011 and 2012 ratings are statistically insignificant. This implies that the differences observed here may not be necessarily true if we have the entire population. Larger sample size would more likely yield significant results.

Comparison of ratings provided by experts who participated in both surveys were also made to control for random differences of sample. This also addresses the limitation of the sampling frame of nationwide population of political, economic, and civil society experts—a population that is very difficult to determine.

The responses from these 2011-2012 “panelists” at all levels of analysis are easy to compare directly. The 2011-2012 panel has fifteen members—four political experts, five economic experts, and six civil society experts. The total number of right leaning and left leaning experts is eight and seven, respectively.

Most of the panelists (66.67 percent) gave, on average, a higher score than they did in 2011. The 2011-2012 average difference in mean scores per panel respondent per field is 0.65 for the political experts, 0.55 for the economic experts, 0.30 for the civil society experts. In the political and economic field, the subprinciple scores of the experts increased except in
autonomy. The scores of the civil society experts for autonomy and pluralization increased, while their scores for competition and solidarity decreased.

Table 4. Mean Difference of Subprinciple Scores and T-test P-Values, by Sector, 2011-2012 (All Respondents)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>p-value</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>0.558</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These changes, however, are clearly miniscule; the panelists seem to think that there is no change in the state of Philippine democratization from 2011 to 2012. This is validated by a comparison of the comments from the two sets of responses. Based on the comments, the panelists generally did not perceive any major change in the state of Philippine democratization. Some of the respondents even asked us to refer to the comments they gave for the 2011 survey for the explanation for their 2012 ratings. This further suggests that the minor changes in scores among the panelists do not reflect a general perception that democratization in the Philippines is either improving or regressing—most of the panel respondents believe that the status of Philippine democratization has hardly changed in the span of a year.

**Conclusion**

There were no notable polarizing events in the Philippines just before and during the data collection timeframe of the 2011 survey, save for a number of Aquino-versus-Arroyo actions resulting, among others, in the suicide of a key Arroyo military man-turned-cabinet secretary and the termination of the careers of two major Arroyo-affiliated public officials (Holmes 2012, 82-84). Most of the respondents predominantly talked about the perennial problems of the Philippines in their comments. Others discussed the successes and failings of President Aquino, who had been in office for a little over a year. A few also mentioned the landmark events of the last two years, such as the 2010 elections and the 2009 massacre of dozens of journalists and relatives of a candidate for elective office in Maguindanao province.
Table 5. Philippine “Panelist” Scores, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Principles</th>
<th>Subprinciples</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Subprinciple Indices</th>
<th>Core Principle Indices</th>
<th>Philippine ADI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>7.19</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pluralization</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalization</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Philippine “Panelist” Scores, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Principles</th>
<th>Subprinciples</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Subprinciple Indices</th>
<th>Core Principle Indices</th>
<th>Philippine ADI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization</td>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.17</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>5.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pluralization</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>4.92</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalization</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As previously stated, 2012 was a particularly eventful year, full of divisive events. However, only the economic respondents appear to be sharply divided at the indicator level, even though the readily observable direct impacts of 2012’s polarizing events (e.g., the RH Bill debates, the chief justice’s impeachment) are largely on the political and civil society spheres. Such a result is unsurprising—the significant difference between the L-LL and R-RL economic specialists is a natural consequence of categorizing the respondents based primarily on the Philippine socialist and liberal market-advocate cleavage. Moreover, regardless of political leaning or institutional affiliation, most of the respondents implicitly stated that democratization is hampered by systemic problems, which can only be solved by making changes at the structural level. Among the primary variables for consideration at that level is the relationship of political institutions and private enterprises. A camp that calls for significant government intervention—verging on control—in industry, agriculture, and services will naturally come into conflict with a camp that calls for the government to (strictly) adopt a laissez faire politico-economic policy. All of the respondents also recognize that these changes need not/should not be initiated by the government alone.

Drafting this paper took several months. In the earliest version, written well before the May 2013 local-legislative elections, the following paragraph can be found in the paper’s conclusion:

When this report is publicly disseminated, the 2013 Philippine local-legislative elections will have ended. The Sixteenth Congress will begin in the middle of the term of President Aquino, a member of the landed elite and currently the most prominent member of the Aquino political dynasty. Before the election, much talk has been made about political dynasties, given how the likeliest members of the Philippine Senate, according to public preference surveys and historical trends, will be members of families that have been in politics for generations (Curato 2012). In the field of economics, “growth without development” seems to ring truer than ever in the Philippines; poverty will remain prevalent. Mergers of large companies are expected to continue, further concentrating wealth among entrenched elites. Lastly, certain civil society groups appear to be becoming more and more intertwined with both political and economic power holders, as is typical during an election season. Promises from politicians of improving the quality of life of the marginalized will abound, but hardly any of these promises, if any, will be fulfilled.
As it turns out, virtually all of these predictions came true. If the 2011-2012 ADI survey results are to be viewed at face value, such lack of any progressive developments in 2013 seems inevitable, what with the country’s institutional and cultural flaws (or, to use a more neutral adjective, “peculiarities”). As with last year, however, the points of convergence among experts from various political leanings and institutional affiliations point to possible means of multi-sector collaboration to ensure that the comprehensive de-monopolization of power continues, helping the Philippines on the path to achieving as close to a state of democracy as possible. Determining the correlations or causal relationships among the fields of politics, economy, and civil society with precision may be beyond the scope of this study, but in highlighting the relative neglect of liberalization and equalization in the field of economics, advocates of democracy in the Philippines—both state and non-state—are asked to examine whether or not they are pooling resources toward causes that may already be either overrepresented or are dealt with only at a superficial level.

Acknowledgements:

Many thanks to the reactors of the 2012 ADI conference (namely Professor Felipe Miranda, Mr. Bonojit Hussain, Dr. Temario Rivera, Dr. Edna Estifania Co, and Professor Malaya Ronas) for their insightful comments and suggestions on how to better validate and analyse our findings. We are also grateful to the UP Third World Studies Center and the Social Sciences and Philosophy Research Foundation for providing support for the conduct of the 2012 survey and the 2012 ADI conference.

Notes

1. See notes 5-11 in Reyes, Berja and Socrates 2012, 179 for an explanation of rating recoding.
2. The timeframe should probably between one democratically elected administration to another, probably between the first, agenda-setting state-of-the-nation address of one president and after the passage of the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). Such a time frame seems ideal because 1) the conduct of successive “regular” elections is seen as a hallmark of a procedural democracy (Henry B. Mayo, quoted in Miranda et al. 2011, 11), and 2) a particular administration’s national policies and a particular congress’s legislative agenda—already observable by the time the state’s budget for the following year is finalized via the GAA—reflect not only the interests of political elites, but also changes in the degree of economic power-holder lobbying and citizen participation in policymaking and lawmaking processes. Moreover, the diversity of sectoral party lists that are elected into congress may also serve as an indicator of representativeness of civil society in the country’s bastions of power.
3. These five are electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties (EIU 2012, 1).
References


