

Asian Democracy Index 2013: Persistent Oligarchy and Rising Civic Participation in Indonesia

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Introduction

One of the most populous countries in the world, Indonesia has experienced complex political dynamics in the years following the beginning of the Reform Era in 1998, which had a strong impact in the process of Indonesian de-monopolization in the fields of politics, economics, and civil society. The 2009 General Election placed nine political parties into the national legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia or DPR RI), altering the distribution of political power. The second term of the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2009-2014) introduced a coalition of parties supporting his and Vice President Boediono's administration. The coalition is known as the Joint Secretariat (Sekretariat Gabungan or Setgab) and holds 80 percent of DPR RI's seats. The president's intention with the coalition is to assure the effectiveness of his government by mobilizing the majority in DPR RI. The absence of a majority party in the election (Yudhoyono's party, Partai Demokrat, gained a mere 26 percent of the national votes) has forced the president to gather political support by appointing members of parties in the coalition to be his cabinet ministers.

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The Joint Secretariat consists of six parties,¹ with Demokrat as its leader. The other three parties in DPR RI—Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or PDIP), the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya or Gerindra), and the People’s Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat or Hanura)—chose to be on the side of the opposition. However these three parties do not always share the same view on government policies. PDIP—led by Megawati Soekarnoputri—is the only party that has been consistently criticizing and has become the main opposition party against the central government’s policies. Hanura and Gerindra sometimes share the same position with members of the coalition, which makes the opposition camp in DPR RI a rather “flexible” grouping. However during the course of his government, President Yudhoyono did not always manage to control his coalition members. In several cases, like those of the Century Bank case and the fuel price increase, the coalition could not form solid support for the government’s side. The politics of public policy was influenced by the interest of each coalition member, with the the dominant ones being Demokrat, the Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, or Golkar), and the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, or PKS).

As the nation prepared for the election in 2014, political parties were in a hot pursuit for the presidency as incumbent President Yudhoyono was no longer qualified to run because he already served two terms. This constitutional restriction opened the door for new candidates to be nominated by other parties. Additionally, the new election law determines that parties must achieve 3.5 percent of the popular vote in order to get parliamentary seats, an increase from the 2.5 percent threshold in the 2009 elections. The political temperature among the elite was rising, while civil society movements were gaining momentum as their bargaining position vis-à-vis the status quo groups became better in the nationwide fight against corruption.

Indonesia’s score in the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) in 2013 was 4.97 out of 10, a drop from 2012’s 5.27. This decrease calls for scrutiny, as it demonstrates that monopolies in the sectors of politics, economy, and civil society have not diminished from 2011 (the first year an ADI survey was conducted in Indonesia) to 2013. Despite the passage of several laws that guarantee citizens’ civil and political rights, the enhancement of political space for public participation, reform in the electoral system management, the launching of economic programs to increase the welfare of the poor, social security improvement, and the increase of the

minimum wage rate, the concentration of political and economic power within certain few groups has resulted in unfair competition.

Corruption remains a serious problem. In the 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, Indonesia ranked 114 out of 177 countries, with a score of 32, far from the “very clean” 90-100 range.² Even if the international community sees Indonesia as among the few free and democratic countries that managed to survive the 1997-1998 financial crisis, the country is still unable to combat chronic corruption. The country’s Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) is perceived to be making a breakthrough in revealing and processing high-profile corruption cases involving bureaucrats, prominent businesspersons, and political party leaders. However, the effort to eliminate corruption remains a massive ongoing task. Many political corruption cases were still “untouchable” by the law. One such example is the abuse of social benefit funds in the local budget as campaign funds of incumbent local heads of government during local elections. Law enforcement officials found that this kind of cases were very difficult to take to court.

The profile of the Indonesian macroeconomy from 2012 to 2013 showed positive performance. According to the Indonesian Central Bank, economic growth in mid-2013 was at 5.18 percent, (it was at 6.5 percent during the whole of 2012).³ The main reason for this growth was consumption and investment. Also, government spending was at a lower rate than in previous years due to the moratorium on civil service recruitment.

Despite relatively high economic growth, the gap of income in Indonesia remains a serious problem. The Indonesian Gini Index was 0.41 in 2011, up from the 0.34 score it received in 2010. In 2012, it went down to 0.30. The Gini Ratio is an index ranging from 0 to 1, which indicates a country’s level of income gap. Higher scores of Gini Ratio shows higher level of income gap. The Indonesian National Bureau of Statistics (BSP) stated that the number of the poor was 28.07 million or 11.37 percent of the population during September 2012 to March 2013. Furthermore, eight provinces experienced an increase in their poor population: West Sumatera (an 0.14 percent rise), South Sumatera (0.76 percent), Bengkulu (0.83 percent), Banten (0.03 percent), West Kalimantan (0.28 percent), North Sulawesi (0.24 percent), Gorontalo (0.29 percent), and Papua (0.47 percent).⁴ These increases show that Indonesia’s supposedly positive economic growth was not accompanied by the decrease of income gap. Economic inequality remains a threat even in the midst of high economic growth.

In 2013, the civil society sphere was marked by a number of conflicts among certain groups, especially religious ones. Violence against minority religious or faith-based groups occurred (e.g., the resistance to the construction of houses of worship, rejection toward Ahmadi and Syiah minority groups, and several other similar cases). In its observation on the subject matter, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom stated in its June 2013 Annual Report that the Indonesian government had failed to take the right actions in coping with the discrimination, persecution, and attacks on minority religious groups (236-241). According to the Report, local government units kept on halting the construction of religious minority houses of worship, and the national government refused to execute one decision of the Supreme Court that allowed such construction (USCIRF 2013, 238-239). This situation only implies that pluralism and solidarity remain problematic in Indonesia.

Methodology

De-monopolization, the conceptual foundation of the Asian Democracy Index, contemplates three fields: politics, economy, and civil society. To measure the development of democracy, de-monopolization is operationalized as having two main variables or principles: liberalization and equalization. Liberalization's subvariables or subprinciples, are autonomy and competition, while equalization's subprinciples are pluralization and solidarity. Each subprinciple is then broken down further into nineteen indicators in the political field, twenty indicators in economy, and eighteen indicators in civil society.⁵

The ADI is a univariate measurement of the concept of democracy, conducted through interviews with twenty-seven expert informants utilizing questionnaires—one per field—as instruments of measurement. The method used is expert assessment of questions. Experts are asked to give answers to these questions in the form of scores that range from 0–10, along with optional explanatory comments. The process of determining the twenty-seven experts is based on criteria representing the spectrum of expertise, ideological stances, positions, and roles in society. For the 2013 survey round, the period of study was June 2012 to June 2013.

The sampling method was purposive sampling. There are three considerations in selecting respondents. The first consideration is the experts' areas or fields of expertise (politics, economy, civil society); secondly, their standing vis-à-vis the government (pro-, moderate, anti-); lastly, their roles in society (academics, practitioners, and decisionmakers).

The Results of the 2013 ADI Survey in Indonesia

Indonesia's aggregate ADI score for 2013 is 4.97 (see table 1). This is a decline from the scores in previous years. However, there has not been any significant change in the actual situation of democratization as de-monopolization in the country.

Table 1. Asian Democracy Index in Indonesia, 2013

Liberalization		Equalization		Democracy Index - Indonesia
5.23		4.71		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	4.97
5.02	5.43	4.18	5.23	

In the three years of ADI research in Indonesia, neither of the main principles of democracy, liberalization and equalization, received high scores (i.e., significantly higher than the median score of 5), which contributed to the low score of the overall index. Like the previous year, the quality of access to resources score, i.e., overall equalization, is at 4.71—lower than overall liberalization, which is at 5.23. Under the principle of equalization, the subprinciple of pluralization obtained a score of 4.18, the lowest among the subprinciple scores.

The high score of liberalization is still mainly due to the relatively high political liberalization score. However, it should be noted that the decrease of the 2013 score from the 2012 score is due to the decrease in the quality of de-monopolization in politics (from 6.24 in 2012 to 5.64 in 2013; see table 2) and civil society (5.57 in 2012 to 5.11 in 2013; see table 4). However, the liberalization score in the field of economy (see table 3), which had contributed the most in lowering the ADI score in the previous two surveys, increased in 2013, although the increase is miniscule.

What follows is an attempt to give an interpretation of these numbers. Monopolization in the field of politics is increasingly stronger. This is because of the politically motivated revision of the law on political parties in order to reduce the number of political parties. The alleged aim of the revision is to decrease the number of parties eligible to enter the legislative

body, so that the decision-making process in the legislature will become more effective and the government can also work more effectively. Considering that the number of parties eligible to compete in the election of 2014 was down to twelve from thirty-eight in the 2009 election, it is safe to say that the political aim of those who want to limit political participation was successfully reached.

The stronger monopolization in the civil society arena was mainly caused by the weakness of the state in protecting the rights of its citizens, especially the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion in a time when intolerant groups have become more and more malevolent. It is also marked by the ongoing conflict between marginalized groups and owners of capital that cannot be managed by the state.

Meanwhile, monopolization in the field of economy appears to have weakened, allegedly due to the enactment of the Law on Social Security. The Law is scheduled to be formally implemented in 2014, but the social security funds are already available. The Law has become a stepping stone in concretizing social security plans.

The score of liberalization in politics, at 5.64, despite being slightly lower than the scores in the same field principle in the previous two cycles, is significantly higher than liberalization in economy (4.89) and civil society (5.11). This suggests that political liberalization has been given wider space than economic and civil society liberalization. The score for political liberalization is partly due to the relatively high political autonomy score, which is at 6.30. Within the three survey cycles, the Indonesian government has consistently shown relaxed control over political life. Even if the space for political competition is relatively limited; it is only open to the oligarchy, particularly those within political parties. Competition among political actors has become more limited, as reflected by the endorsement of the same old figures nominated by parties as presidential candidates for the 2014 Election: Prabowo Subianto, Wiranto, Hatta Radjasa, Megawati, and Jusuf Kalla.⁶

In the field of civil society, even if the liberalization score in that field decreased from last year's score, the 6.00 received by the liberalization subprinciple of competition in 2013 is still higher than the score in the same subprinciple within the political (5.17) and economic (5.11) fields in the same year. This trend has been consistent within the three years of Asian Democracy Index research in Indonesia. This demonstrates that the struggle of civil society organizations in the face of many societal problems has become a common struggle all over Indonesia.

This variety of societal problems in Indonesia today reflects the variety of public interests. One of the main problems lies within mass media, especially television, which has become more faithful to serving media owners' vested interests, as well as the overall arena of competition among media owners in alliance with party leaders. Many television programs have shaped the public to become an uncritical consumptive society. Thus, public interest is not represented in these programs. Besides, the protection of civil liberty, which should be upheld by the state, has been ignored—dogmatism is allowed to win over rationality. Furthermore, the state has become more controlling over mass organizations, as evidenced by the enactment of a revision of the Law on Mass Organization in May 2013. This revision was the subject of public scrutiny throughout the year leading to its enactment.

The low overall equalization score—lower than that of liberalization—can be attributed mainly to the score of the equalization subprinciple of pluralization; at 4.18, it is the lowest among the four subprinciple scores. The solidarity score, at 5.23, despite remaining within what can be called the poor range, is still better than the political autonomy score in politics, which has a 5.23 score (see table 2).

The main factor behind the low score of equalization lies in the economic field. Despite increasing from last year's score, pluralization in the Indonesian economy had a score of only 2.96 in 2013, far lower than the scores in politics (5.44) and civil society (4.44). The increase of the solidarity score in the economic field (4.24 in 2011, 4.79 in 2012, and, 5.14 in 2013) still has not significantly affect the quality of equalization, partly because this increase is accompanied by the decrease of solidarity in the field of politics (5.86 in 2012, dropped to 5.18 in 2013).

In the field of politics, political spaces created by political parties have tended to become more narrow. Politics in Indonesia in 2013 was like a battle for political power among giants that took those in the grassroots as their victims, who found it more and more difficult to enter the formal political field. With the existing regulations, it has become very difficult for people to form new political parties through grassroots network-building without access to substantial amounts of money.⁷ This, as previously mentioned, is allegedly caused by the policy on simplifying the number of political parties.

In the field of civil society, one of the main problems was the state's negligence in handling cases in which it had to intervene, especially cases of horizontal conflict. The absence of the state was then filled by market dominance within civil society life, while at the same time the state tried to

control mass organization through (i.e., through the Law on Mass Organization). On the whole, there is an imbalance of power in public discourse because the focus of news in the mass media was controlled by very few people. The realm of civil society was more controlled by market forces either socially or politically through state regulation. This situation went as far as the state determining the relevant role organizations can play in civil society.

It can thus be concluded that there had not been any significant changes in the state of Indonesian democracy from 2011 to 2013 based on the ADI survey data. De-monopolization in Indonesia is thus defined merely by some political freedom from state intervention mixed with a variety of issues and ideas advocated by civil society activists. Moreover, based on the survey data, the diversity of access to economic resources diminished since the previous year even if solidarity in the economic field had increased.

Thus, it can be stated that based on the 2013 survey data, institutionalization within the fields of politics and civil society was not accompanied by mechanisms created to guarantee the fulfillment of social and economic rights of citizens. This void occurred between national and local governments and between the state and citizens as well. Any political, social, and economic development not based on facts or research or without the involvement of stakeholders may be a causal factor as well.

As the previous discussion showed how solidarity increased in the economic field, the chances to create economic equality is perceived to be mainly in the hands of individuals and the market instead of the state. The creation of public mechanisms to guarantee the fulfillment of social and economic rights have been formally introduced, but they have not been implemented effectively.

Social and political liberalization is not seen by those we surveyed to be substantial determinants of demonopolization of power resources. The guarantee of civic liberty does not serve the purpose of furthering demonopolization in the fields of politics, the economy, and civil society. Furthermore, any effort to de-monopolize is still concentrated at the state level. De-monopolization, therefore, is still focused in the political rather than the economic field.

With the governing regime's penchant to avoid taking responsibility in fulfilling its citizens' rights, independent and private community groups continue to face serious difficulties in their attempts to influence public affairs. The next sections of this paper discuss these and the other gaps previously discussed in more detail.

The Politics Field

The total score for political de-monopolization in 2013 is 5.48. It is lower than the score in the previous two surveys (6.16 in 2012 and 5.50 in 2011). The scores for the two subprinciples within the political field, liberalization and equalization, also dropped—the political liberalization score was at 5.64 in 2013, a decrease from 6.24 in 2012, while the political equalization score decreased from 6.07 in 2012 to 5.30 in 2013. Within political liberalization, the political autonomy subprinciple is at 6.30, higher than political competition's 5.17. Meanwhile, under political equalization, the political pluralization score is at 5.44, higher than the 5.18 political solidarity score (see table 2).

Table 2. Index in the Field of Politics, Indonesia, 2013

Liberalization		Equalization		Score
5.64		5.30		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	5.48
6.30	5.17	5.44	5.18	

Political autonomy in 2012 was higher (7.00) than in 2013 (6.30). Political autonomy contains the freedom of association indicator, which received an average score of 7.67, the highest of all indicator scores in the said field subprinciple. The indicator of civil rights and the freedom for political opposition scored 6.78 and 6.22, respectively. Civil rights were perceived by the experts to be generally hardly threatened, but there were some freedoms that the experts found to be restricted, such as the freedom to practice one's religion. Still on civil rights, state officials did not necessarily act violently directly toward citizens, but tended to be negligent in protecting civil and other rights of citizens. This view of the experts is reflected in score received by the indicator of freedom from state violence, which, at 4.78, is the lowest among the indicators under political autonomy.

Political competition also suffered a 0.57 drop from last year's score, due to the decrease of the score in almost all the indicators within that subprinciple. There are two indicators that scored higher: freedom to vote at 7.56 and free and fair elections at 6.22. These relatively high scores

were largely due to the fact that free and fair local elections were held from 2012 and 2013. As previously mentioned, all the other scores of the indicators under political competition remained relatively low. Transparency of processes in parliament, the government, and the judiciary scored 5.11; effectiveness of government policy scored 4.78; and law enforcement and rule of law scored 4.67. This is not surprising, because there has not been any significant progress made in those areas. Poor transparency remains a big issue within the three branches of state institutions. From 2012 to 2013, the several high state officials were defendants in cases brought before the KPK, including members of parliament, cabinet ministers, heads of local government, and high-court judicial officers. One of the most high-profile cases involved the Minister of Youth and Sports who was also President Yudhoyono's right-hand man. Another controversial case saw the leader of a religious political party, which was widely perceived as a "clean" party, also involved in a major corruption case. At the national parliament level, a number of senior politicians were also charged with corruption by the KPK. More stunningly, several judges of the KPK at the local level were also allegedly taking bribes for the cases that they were handling.

These cases show the grip of corruption and collusion practices remained strong, and the three high-state institutions still possessed weaknesses in terms of transparency. The arrest of judges mentioned above indicates that there seems to be what can be called a thriving "mafia" within the justice system, which makes the public pessimistic about the future of law enforcement.

The indicator of informal groups' existence in politics scored the lowest within the subvariable of competition (2.67). This was the lowest score received by an indicator under political liberalization. This low score reflects how informal groups based on religion, ethnicity, and clan relations still have significant—if not increasingly stronger—influence in politics. In the context of regional autonomy, a number of local clans had demonstrated their domination in the course of elections of local legislatures and chief executives, as can be observed in the provinces of Banten and South Sulawesi. During the last several years, the clans of the deceased Haji Chasan Shohib di in Banten and the Limpo in South Sulawesi have been increasingly dominating local executive and legislative positions, either at the provincial or district level.

Equalization in politics scored 5.30 in 2013, a 0.77 drop from its score in 2012. This decline can be attributed mainly to the decline in the score of the political pluralization subprinciple, which dropped from 6.35

in 2012 to 5.44 in 2013 (a 0.91 drop). The subprinciple of solidarity also suffered a 0.68 drop (5.86 in 2012 to 5.18 in 2013).

The highest score among the indicators under political equalization is the indicator of public trust in democracy (6.67), which is slightly lower than last year's score (6.89). This relatively high score is in line with the results of many other surveys on public support for democracy. A survey by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences in 2012 showed that the majority of respondents (70 percent) assessed that democracy was a "good" or "very good" political system. 79 percent of the respondents also agreed that democracy was better than any other political system. 72 percent of the respondents felt "satisfied" and "highly satisfied" with the current system of democracy.

On the other hand, some indicators under the subprinciple of political solidarity received lower than the other indicators under political equalization. Public trust in the parliament and the government scored 3.56 and 4.89, respectively. The score of guarantee of public participation and affirmative action for parliament seats, despite having decreased from last year score, is still higher than the scores of the aforementioned two indicators. The expert's assessment of the state of affirmative action in Indonesia is likely based on the increased number of women elected to the parliament after the 2009 election—18 percent in the national parliament, an average of 16 percent in the provincial parliament, and an average of 12 percent in the district/municipal parliament.

A number of indicators within the subvariable of pluralization—checks and balances, power balance in the parliament, formation of democratic state institutions, and the representation of social groups in the parliament—scored within the range of 4.89 to 5.78. Scholars of Indonesian politics still seek an explanation on why political reform resulting in the emergence of a competitive multi-party system has not produced substantial institutional improvement.

Post-New Order elections have resulted in a high number of political parties in the parliament. However, the balance of power and checks and balances have failed to work properly. Rather than serving as critical counterparts to provide checks and balances among institutions, political parties are more eager in trading interests among themselves by negotiating the substance of policy bills—never mind the fact that the final results of their discussions are unresponsive to public needs. A clear example was the inter-party interaction in the discussion of the political party, legislative election, and presidential election bills. It showed that for the political elite, their parties' survival within the political power circle is

more important than the ideal of establishing a more democratic and effective political system.

The Economy Field

The total score for de-monopolization in the field of economy in 2013 increased by 0.28 points, from 4.21 in 2012 to 4.49 in 2013. This score is the aggregate of scores in economic liberalization (4.89) and economic equalization (4.23), both relatively low numbers. Economic autonomy, competition, and solidarity enjoyed a rise from 2012 scores. As in the 2012 survey, economic pluralization scored the lowest in the economic field, receiving a score of 2.96 (see table 3).

Table 3. Index in the Field of Economy, Indonesia, 2013

Liberalization		Equalization		Score
4.89		4.23		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	4.48
4.67	5.11	2.96	5.14	

The score of economic liberalization for 2013 is 4.89. It is the aggregate of the scores in economic subprinciples of economic autonomy (4.67) and economic competition (5.11). Among the indicators of economic autonomy, the lowest score was received by the political elite's influence on private companies (4.11), which shows the relative independence of those companies from state control. The low economic autonomy score can also be attributed to the low scores in three other indicators: protection for workers' rights (5.11); child workers (4.44); and independence from the influence of foreign companies (4.89)—all of which shows the weakness of state in the times or situations when it is badly needed. Another important matter to note is the collusion between political elite and private corporations perceived by the experts—in exchange for the protection over their businesses provided by state apparatuses, private companies awarded officials top positions within their companies. Despite all these, Indonesia is known to have one of the most comprehensive set of labor laws concerning workers protection. It has also

ratified the largest number of International Labour Organisation conventions. However, weak law enforcement remains a serious problem. For example, labor supervisory officials do practically nothing to follow up on reports on the violations of the labor laws or on imposing crackdowns on labor movements.

The economic competition received an average score of 5.11 this year. It is an aggregate of the scores of four indicators: transparency of big corporations (5.33), fairness in economic activities (5.11), government effort in protecting workers rights (4.89), and the extent to which private companies protect the rights of their workers (5.11). All of these indicators scored modestly. Among the important matters to note concerning these scores include the dilemma faced by private companies in terms of their financial transparency. If they implement full transparency, they could possibly suffer a deficit because large sums of money have to be paid to the bureaucracy. It is widely perceived that bureaucracy is very weak, and the government is not yet ready to be fully transparent and clean, as the practice of corruption is still widespread within government apparatuses. Examples include widespread corruption among tax and customs officials.

In terms of workers protection, there tends to be discrimination in treatment toward workers in and outside of Indonesia. The Ministry of Labor seems to be neglecting the problems of workers protection abroad, citing the existence of agencies of workers protection in other countries and the pertinent laws there as excuses.

Economic equalization scored 4.23 in 2013 as a result of the scores in the economic pluralization (2.96) and economic solidarity (5.14) subprinciples. As previously mentioned, economic pluralization received the lowest score among the field subprinciples in 2013. This is due to the very low scores in the indicators of inter-region economic equality (1.89) and monopoly by certain groups (2.11). This quantitative representation of the views of the experts can be verified by other measures. As previously mentioned, the BPS issued the Indonesian economic gap (Gini) index in September 2012, which is at 0.41. It was the highest Gini index that country had obtained since it attained independence. Some of the causative factors of the economic gap include the increasing number of corruption cases and the decreasing amount of government subsidy for public welfare. Conflicts based on natural resources management also led to the above-mentioned figures.

In line with the low score in the indicators under the economic pluralization subprinciple, the Asian Development Bank reported in 2014

that in 2013, the number of poor people in Indonesia—i.e., those with a daily income of USD 2.00 or less—increased (200). This went inversely against BPS data, which stated that the number of the Indonesian poor is decreasing. The parameter used by the BPS is the decrease in government spending for poverty eradication.⁸ Another notable example is the decrease in asset ownership among farmers—current data shows that only 30 percent of Indonesian farmers possess their own lands.

The seven indicators under the subprinciple of economic solidarity obtained a better average score than those in under the subprinciple of economic pluralization. The indicator of public awareness in handling economic gap obtained the highest score (6.22) while the indicator of public monitoring over private companies scored the lowest (4.44). Public awareness is still limited to matters related to environmental pollution or destruction. On another note, the political influence of labor unions is considered better, with the the increase of minimum wage in 2012 being considered by experts as an indicator thereof.

The Civil Society Field

The total score of de-monopolization in the field of civil society is 5.03. It is the lowest average Indonesian civil society score ever obtained. This is because in general, a decrease of score occurred within all the principles and subprinciples of civil society de-monopolization. Among the subprinciple scores, the civil society competition subprinciple still scores the highest, at 6.00 (see table 4).

Table 4. Index in the Field of Civil Society, Indonesia, 2013

Liberalization		Equalization		Score
5.11		4.90		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	5.03
4.37	6.00	4.44	5.52	

The score of civil society liberalization dropped 0.46 points from 5.57 in 2012 to 5.11 in 2013, which can be attributed mainly to the apparently worsening condition of civil society autonomy. The causative factors of this condition are the strong grip the market has on society or the relative weakness of the public against the the domination of market participants (an indicator under civil society autonomy, which received a score of 2.00) and the poor state of basic public needs services (3.89) especially for vulnerable and minority groups (3.44). Based on the responses of the experts, market domination is indicated by the control of public services such as health, banking, clean water, and education by the private sector, which has also reached remote areas in the country. Public service provision by private companies is in contradiction with the notion that the state has the obligation to provide for the basic needs of its citizens. Currently, the public even has to bear additional burden to acquire public services.

Indeed, market domination in Indonesia is clearly getting stronger. This means that the state has partly failed to do its duty to protect its citizens, as the state has allowed non-state actors and religion-based groups to hinder the protection of the basic rights of vulnerable and minority groups. This is evidenced by the state's disregard for the destruction of places of worship and killings of members of religious minorities, landgrabbing of farmers' land by palm oil businessmen, and many others.

As it was pointed out in the explanation of the concept of monopolization, liberalization is not merely the presence of civil liberty from state intervention—it is also marked by the freedom of civil society groups to compete with one another. The 2013 ADI survey found that all of the indicators under civil society competition, one of the subprinciples of civil society liberalization, except for public tolerance, all scored below 5. Other indicators under civil society liberalization gained better scores, such as the “variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that work to advocate public needs” indicator (7.56) and “the influence of mass organizations on the public” indicator (6.56). Despite the regime's recognition of the diversity of Indonesian society and its claim that the constitution guarantees the existence of such diversity, its poor performance in protecting inter-religion or inter-faith relations among citizens still remained in 2013, thus the low score in the related indicator (4.22). According to the experts, differences have become a perceived as a threat in public sphere, a threat that the state has not been able to handle satisfactorily. Meanwhile, the presence of the many different kinds of

NGOs reflects the diversity of issues and sectors represented by those organizations. However, this diversity has not been transformed into an asset for challenging the dominant ideology/school of thought that has threatened Indonesian mass plurality.

Civil society equalization dropped by 0.30 points from its 2012 score. Among the reasons given by the experts for this decrease is the decline in citizens' capability in gaining access to resources. The poor quality of civil society equalization can also be attributed to limited access to information (an indicator that received a score of 3.33), cultural activities and facilities (4.67), and the availability of affirmative action policy for marginalized groups (4.11). Most of the experts noted that the inequality in getting information is evidenced by the very wide social gap and the unequal distribution of public facilities and infrastructure. A positive signal in the area of access to information is the objectivity of media coverage, though the score in the related indicator remains rather mediocre (5.11). Even if the media is considered relatively objective in its coverage, it is not free from the control of market and the interests of the oligarchy. As previously mentioned, the mass media, especially television, has somewhat lost what can be called its public character; it has become the arena of competition among capital owners, i.e., those whose interests are intertwined with those of the political party elite.

Meanwhile, affirmative action has not been implemented for marginalized groups such as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender individuals, senior citizens, and the disabled. The only notable political achievement as regards affirmative action policy is the action for women groups—30 percent of the electoral candidates of a political party has to be women. However the implementation of an electoral affirmative action policy for women has not been followed by the creation of laws to further transform gender power relations.

The poor quality of equalization in civil society is perceived by the experts to be something that can be alleviated to a certain point, due to their opinion that members of society have reacted positively to programs offered by NGOs or other mass organizations (an indicator receiving a score of 6.44). Also, the experts believe that the influence of NGOs/mass organization on government policymaking is still quite considerable (6.00). Examples of active public participation is the public's enthusiastic response to coverage of corruption cases or environmental issues, and their charitable activities, e.g., assistance given by the public to natural disaster victims.

Conclusion: **Threats to and Opportunities for Indonesian Democracy**

There has not been any significant change in the process of de-monopolization in Indonesia, as is marked by the following notable points. The 2013 ADI formed by an aggregate of scores in the fields of politics, economy, and civil society still demonstrated the poor status of overall de-monopolization in the country, as evidenced by the drop in overall score (4.97 in 2013 from 5.27 in 2012) and the fact that the overall score in politics (5.48) remains much higher than the scores of the other two subprinciples (4.49 for economy and 5.03 for civil society). The slight increase in the score of economy is notable, but this is mainly due to a betterment of economic solidarity; the opinion of the experts on economic pluralization is still very low. Indeed, economic equalization remains the noticeably lowest-scoring field in Indonesia (4.23, as opposed to the 5.30 of politics and 4.90 in civil society). Overall, many principle/subprinciple scores or score relations remain the same, e.g., liberalization in the political arena remains the highest among the field liberalization scores, while the overall equalization score is more or less stagnant.

As shown in the discussions above, as the civil society movement became more dynamic in 2013, it should also be noted that political participation had also become more substantial, paving the way to the possibility of deepening democracy in Indonesia. Pro-democracy civil society groups in 2013 attempted to establish an alternative force to balance the influence of the political elite oligarchy, especially in the process of political recruitment. Building up of voluntarism by civil society activists had boosted the emergence of voluntary groups, which later became a significant force in promoting alternative presidential candidates who were considered genuinely popular among the public and had no ties to previous cases of human rights violations and corruption or any other connection to the former authoritarian elite. In 2013, the movement, helped in no small part by support from the mass media, found relative success in its campaign for reform; it is widely accepted that the emergence of Joko Widodo as a presidential candidate in the 2014 election was due to the support of these voluntary groups and individuals.

Ten years of *Reformasi* saw the emergence of a new common enemy for civil society. The achievement of KPK in disclosing and investigating corruption cases involving high level public officials and political figures such as cabinet ministers, members of parliament, and heads of local government steered civil society to combat the waves of attacks against KPK from politicians in the legislature. Corruption became the unifying issue

among civil society groups in supporting KPK. In light of all this, in 2013, KPK can be said to have shown considerable bravery in arresting a political and personal confidant of the president allegedly involved in a major corruption case, risking massive resistance from the political elite.

The next feature is the widening gap of inequality, worsened by conflicts on natural resources among the local people, corporations, and the government. The public undoubtedly has the weakest leverage, which in turn has boosted the necessary awareness among civil society activists to fight against the oligarchy in the political and economic fields. Even if liberalization and competition in politics is dynamic and resulted in some of the ADI scores within that field being higher, the balancing power of civil society is still peripheral. It remains difficult for civil society to combat the oligarchs who monopolize the decisionmaking process and control public opinion through the ownership of mass media.

Indonesia still struggles to further strengthen its political institutions and balance the influence of the oligarchic political elite in political decisionmaking processes. Corruption and collusion practices, significant obstacles in achieving the above objective, are still widespread and any effort to fight against such practices has faced huge resistance from the elite circle. The fact that the economic condition is stagnant, with increasing inequality and level of poverty, and the continued domination of the few mega-rich on economic resources, only complicates the problem of monopoly.

Fortunately, hope lies in the sphere of civil society. Developments in 2013 saw civil activism becoming more political, as political awareness among common people is also rose. The issue of corruption, as a common enemy, was able to unify the otherwise fragmented parts of Indonesia's civil society. Their common aim is quite obvious: to combat the control of the oligarchy in all of the ADI fields, especially in the field of politics.

Notes

1. These six are Partai Demokrat, the Party of the Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya, or Golkar), PKS, the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN), the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP), and the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa or PKB).
2. For details, go to <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>.
3. For details, go to <http://www.bi.go.id/en/statistik/perbankan/indonesia/Default.aspx>.
4. For more details on these statistics, visit <http://www.bps.go.id/>.
5. For more details on Asian Democracy Index terminology, see Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index (2012)
6. Prabowo Subianto was presidential candidate in the 2009 election. Wiranto was presidential candidate in the 2004 and 2009 elections. Hatta Radjasa is a prominent

minister in Yudhoyono's current cabinet and leader of PAN. Megawati was president in 2001-2004 and presidential candidate in elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009. Lastly, Jusuf Kalla was Yudhoyono's vice president in the latter's first term and presidential candidate in the 2009 election.

7. Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem), a new political party, is led by a media mogul and was once also supported by another big media owner. It is the only newly formed party allowed to compete in the 2014 election. Local political parties are only allowed in the province of Aceh.
8. Again, for more details, visit <http://www.bps.go.id/>.

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