

# Asian Democracy Index 2014: Dynamics in Civic Participation and the Continuing Economic Inequality in Indonesia

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## **Background**

### Democracy in Indonesia in 2014: The Seeds of New Forces Against Oligarchy

“A new hope” was the tagline used by *TIME* on the cover of its October 27, 2014 issue, which displayed a close-up photo of Joko Widodo, who by then had been inaugurated President of Indonesia for the period 2014-2019. Being featured as the cover story, Jokowi—as the President is more popularly addressed—received international attention/exposure. *TIME* called Jokowi “a force for democracy.”<sup>1</sup> This indicated that world had its eyes on the newly elected President of Indonesia, which was also evident in the presence of a number of world leaders at the inauguration of President Jokowi and Vice President Jusuf Kalla on October 20, 2014. Has Jokowi truly become a new hope for democratic forces in Indonesia? His work within his five-year term will answer that question.

Jokowi won the election by 8,370,732 votes against his contender, Prabowo Subianto, and has indeed introduced a new trend in Indonesia’s democracy. The Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla ticket was nominated by a coalition of political parties under the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), that won 53.15 percent of the votes, whilst the Prabowo-Hatta Rajasa

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ticket was nominated by a coalition of parties under Gerindra and Golkar; they obtained 46,85 percent of the votes. Jokowi being a “newcomer” in national politics (i.e., not a leading figure in political party), who is also related to the older regime of power (i.e., the New Order regime), is considered a new trend in the recruitment and circulation of national political elites. Generally seen as a unique character who deviates from the preceding political leaders in Indonesia, Jokowi’s popularity soared above the older figures such as Megawati Soekarnoputeri (chief of PDI-P), Aburizal Bakrie (chief of Golkar), Hatta Rajasa (chief of National Mandate Party/PAN), and Prabowo Subianto (chief of Gerindra).

Based on the experiences in two previous presidential elections (2004 and 2009), political parties always nominated their chief of party or the party’s leading figure as candidates for president. Jokowi won the the 2014 presidential election despite not being a central actor in his party, nor was he a member of his party’s central board. This was an indication of the work of “alternative” forces, i.e., people’s political participation, and the work of volunteers and supporters of Jokowi. During the candidacy process in the political party, pressure and lobbying waged by groups of volunteers and supporters were proven effective at influencing the different opinions of PDI-P’s elite circle, including that of the chief of party, Megawati. Megawati could have nominated herself president, but instead gave her support for Jokowi whose popularity ranked the highest, according to surveys conducted prior to the election. During the election, support from Jokowi’s groups of volunteers had managed to gather their forces, which led to Jokowi winning the presidency in Indonesia.

The 2014 election and Jokowi’s electoral victory are the main issues in the dynamics of Indonesia’s democracy in 2014, the year which also marked the sixteenth anniversary of political reform in Indonesia. The presidential inauguration also hallmarked the conclusion of the fourth general election in post-Reformasi Indonesia. Legislative election at both local and national levels have contributed to the transformation of political forces within the national parliament. The 2014 legislative election saw twelve contesting parties—with only one new political party—, which was won by PDI-P with 18.95 percent of the votes at the national level. The Democratic Party led by former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono only got 10.19 percent of the votes, which brought the party down to the fourth position—a rather sharp decrease compared to where it was previously in 2009 (with 20 percent of the votes). Golkar remains on the second position despite a decrease of votes (with 14.75 percent). Gerindra came out as the political party with a significant increase of

votes; from the eighth position in the 2009 election, it went up to third place with 11.8 percent of the votes in 2014. Islamic political parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the United Development Party (PPP) remained in the middle rank, attaining 6.79 and 6.53 percent of the votes, respectively. PPP and PKS also saw a decrease of votes in 2014 election. Meanwhile, the National Democrat Party (Nasdem), which participated in the election for the first time, managed to get in the middle ranks, with 6.7 percent of the votes, next to PKS. Two political parties, the Moon and Star Party (PBB) and Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI), failed to meet the 3.5 percent parliamentary threshold requirement, thus they did not win any seats at the national parliament (see table 1 for a summary of these movements).

Votes obtained by the top three parties vis-à-vis voter turnout since 1999 can be seen in table 2. These results show the changes in the political constellation within the national parliament in the last two elections. The Democrat Party used to be the holder of Presidency (2004-2014) and the majority party in the parliament (2009-2014); in 2014, it suffered a huge loss. PDI-P, which became an opposition party within two terms of Yudhoyono's presidency (2004-2014) came out as the winner of the election, its first win since 1999, which was the first election in the Reformasi era. A shift in position of the winning party is worthy of political analysis and to a certain extent is a reflection of the "reward and punishment" stance of voters toward political parties. In this respect, Democrat Party received "political punishment" from the voters, whilst PDI-P turned out to be an alternative party that had been given a chance by voters to rectify the situation. Nevertheless, the overall result of the 2014 election showed that most parties suffered a decline of votes, which signified a weakening party identification amongst voters. The result showed a trend of voters distrust towards political parties or an increasing anti-party sentiment, which in fact had started happening earlier, especially after the 1999 election.

A contributing factor to the decay of public trust toward political parties is a wide practice of political corruption involving a number of party elites and party board members. During the second term of Yudhoyono's presidency, there were many party elites who became suspects of corruption cases, including the few closest and trusted colleagues of the President in Democrat Party, namely Anas Urbaningrum (former chief of Democrat Party), Andi Mallarangeng (Yudhoyono's loyal supporter, former minister under Yudhoyono), and Jero Wacik (advisory board member of Democrat Party, former minister

under Yudhoyono). Corruption involving the Democrat Party elite made it harder for Yudhoyono's government to gain public support and appreciation.

Table 1. Shifting Position and Political Forces in the National Parliament Based on the 2014 Election Results

No.	Political Party	2009 Election	2014 Election	Changes in Position, 2009 and 2014
1	Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle/PDI-Perjuangan (PDI-P)	14.03%	18.95%	Rising from 3rd position
2	Golkar Party	14.45%	14.75%	Remained the same
3	Gerindra Party	4.46%	11.81%	Rising from 8th position
4	Democrat Party	20.85%	10.19%	Declining from 1st position
5	National Awakening Party/Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB)	4.94%	9.04%	Rising from 7th position
6	National Mandate Party/Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)	6.01%	7.59%	Declining from 5th position
7	Prosperous Justice Party/Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)	7.88%	6.79%	Declining from 4th position
8	National Democrat Party/Partai Nasional Demokrat (Nasdem)	--	6.72%	N/A
9	United Development Party/Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)	5.32%	6.53%	Declining from 6th position
10	Hanura Party	3.77%	5.26%	Declining from 9th position

Source: Data gathered from the National Election Commission (KPU-RI), compiled by Puskapol FISIP UI.

Table 2. Increasing Anti-party Sentiment Amongst Voters Based on Voter Turnout and Votes of the Three Winning Parties

Election	Voter Turnout	Votes of Three Winning Parties
1999	92%	PDI-P 33,74%; Golkar 22,44%; PKB 12,61%
2004	84%	Golkar 21,58%; PDI-P 18,53%; PKB 10,57%
2009	71%	Demokrat 20,85%; Golkar 14,45%; PDI-P 14,03%
2014	75%	PDI-P 18,95%; Golkar 14,75%; Gerindra 11,81%

Source: Data gathered from the KPU-RI, compiled by Puskapol UI.

Corruption also plagued other political parties. One of the incidents inciting public uproar was the capture of the chief of PKS, Luthfi Hasan, in a case of bribery involving the importation of beef within the Ministry of Agriculture. PKS is an Islamic party that has long been known to have an image of being honest and anti-corruption. The incident gave PKS a hard blow, which in turn also contributed to the decrease of votes for PKS in the 2014 election. Golkar and PDI-P were also not free from corruption. In fact, according to data collected by Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), Golkar and PDI-P are among the political parties whose members were mostly involved in corruption during 2013 to 2014. Corruption amongst political party members worsened Indonesia's score as measured by the corruption perception index (CPI). In 2013, Indonesia scored 32 and ranked 114 from a total of 177 measured in the index (Transparency International 2013). Indonesia's CPI score moved up slightly in 2014 and ranked 107 (Transparency International 2013). These scores indicate that Indonesia is one of the most corrupt countries in the world.

### Overview of Indonesia's Economy Prior to the 2014 Elections

June 2013 to June 2014 was the last year of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Boediono administration's second term. A few months earlier, in April 2014, the legislative election was held to elect 560 members of the House of Representative at the national level (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR). Consequently, events in this election year significantly affected the performance of the economy in this period.

Yudhoyono's administration revised the 2013 State Budget in January 2014. The growth rate was originally set at 6.8 percent in the budget; it was reduced to 6.3 percent. During the implementation the budget, economic growth only reached 5.7 percent.<sup>2</sup> While the economic growth target was not reached, the inflation rate had soared to 8.5 percent as indicated by constantly increasing prices of basic needs that burdened poor communities.<sup>3</sup>

The low economic growth achievement cannot reflect the decreasing level of poverty. Even though there has been a decreasing level of poverty, World Bank and Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) both agreed that the level of disparity has increased. Of the 250 million Indonesian population between the year 2013-2014, there was about 28 million (11 percent) categorized as poor.<sup>4</sup> Interestingly, the relative poverty rates in Indonesia are indeed experiencing a consistent decline. BPS data shows that since 2006, the relative poverty rate in Indonesia was 17.8 percent, and was 11 percent in 2014,<sup>5</sup> which means on average there has been a decline of 0.78 percent in relative poverty.

To clarify, BPS distinguishes between two concepts of poverty: relative and absolute. Among the eastern Indonesia provinces, one can find the four provinces that have the highest rate of relative poverty, namely Gorontalo, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua, and West Papua.<sup>6</sup> In Western Indonesia, West Java, Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra, and Lampung are among the provinces that have the highest rate of absolute poverty.<sup>7</sup>

In the last year of Yudhoyono's administration, policies on labor's welfare were still far from implemented for both workers who worked in the industrial sector and migrant workers. They were still experiencing unjust treatment from companies and foreign employers even though the government had issued policies to alleviate this problem.

One of the demands that resulted in a tug-of-war between workers and government is the policy of outsourcing, which was legalized by the government through Law No. 13/2003 and other ministerial regulations. Workers have demanded to remove this law because it is more detrimental to workers compared to companies.<sup>8</sup> Related to the outsourcing policy are low wages and temporary work-by-contract policies that are still intact. Workers have also demanded that such policies be removed.

In addition to the three demands, workers also demanded social security under which the state guarantees both workers' health security throughout their lives as well as workers' retirement security. Before 2004, the state only granted health and retirement benefits to civil servants and military personnel.

In 2004, the government enacted Law No. 40/2004 creating the National Social Security System. It took another seven years for the government to enact another law, Law No. 24/2011, which regulates the creation of an agency to implement the social security scheme (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Social Security Agency), or BPJS). The two tasks of BPJS are to provide workers' health scheme and retirement scheme. Unfortunately, as of this writing, only the task to provide workers' health scheme has been accomplished.

Within the issue of natural resources management, Indonesia saw the stronger alliance between the government and big capital powers. In the last year of Yudhoyono's administration, it was become more obvious that economic policies had been pro-market and had taken the side of big corporations' interests. Law No. 27/2007 on Capital Investment was one of the Yudhoyono's milestones in embracing a pro-market policy. Two other policies stipulated, in his last year, demonstrated his administration's leaning toward encouraging foreign and big capital in the economy. They were Presidential Regulation No. 39/2014, on List of Business Fields based on Capital Investment and the Master Plan for Acceleration<sup>9</sup> and Extension of Indonesia's Economic Development (Master Plan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Indonesia, abbreviated as MP3EI).<sup>10</sup>

The two policies mentioned above were criticized mostly by civil society because behind them was an intention to allow more foreign investors and big capital in plantations, other agricultural businesses, and the natural resources industry. These policies have the tendency to create greater dependency between small-/medium-scale enterprises and farmers and foreign and big investors. In addition, these policies have opened up the possibility for investors to leave behind environmental destruction in the wake of land extension. This situation has led to conflicts between corporate and local residents. At the regional level, the implementation of these two policies was supported by local government, which granted business permits to investors.

### The Rise of Voluntary Civic Groups

The shifts in the political power constellation within the national parliament contributed to the shifting of political party coalitions, both during the presidential election that was conducted after the legislative election as well as in political positioning amidst decision-making processes in parliament. The changes in political positioning in the parliament have resulted in the opening of a space for an equal contestation between political factions or coalitions within the parliament. The number of seats won by each of the three parties that won the biggest

percentage of votes (PDI-P, Golkar, and Gerindra) are not very different. Such a situation has an impact on political processes in the parliament, including the formation of political coalitions. Consequently, it is logical to think that contestations in policy-making processes within the parliament will only become tighter. Under such circumstances, members of parliament are more likely to be less critical and less autonomous in conducting their work since the political party/faction has gained more control over its members.

The alteration in the political constellation within the parliament as a result of the 2014 legislative election was a breath of fresh air to a number of civil society organizations, allowing them to reformulate their strategy and advocacy to influence policymaking processes in facing oligarchic practices in politics. To many civil society activists, political parties have become a paradox in Indonesia's democracy. Since the Reformasi era, from one election to another, political party leadership in Indonesia has become more elite-centred, with the continuing domination of the "old-school" main figures, such as Yudhoyono in Democrat Party, Megawati in PDI-P, Prabowo in Gerindra, and Aburizal Bakrie in Golkar. The basis of recruitment and promotion within the party structure have become more limited due to the expanding influence of kinship ties, and monopolistic business connections are used to fill a number of political positions through the nomination of local leader candidates, presidential candidates, and legislative candidates. Although their views might differ on the matter of building political coalitions, the political parties' collective attitude toward nominating their candidates for presidents as well as local leaders appeared to be very flexible, inconsistent, and pragmatic. As a consequence of such a tendency, civil society organizations and activists are required to do more in their advocacy work and lobbying as they need to consider the weakening of political parties' commitment. This also means a longer term strategy for change is needed, especially to oversee and anticipate results of lobbying and any changes of positioning amongst the politicians.

The work of civil society organisations in resisting widespread oligarchic politics reached a high point prior to the 2014 election due to the following factors: 1) then President Yudhoyono could no longer be a candidate for president because he had served two terms, consequently it enabled a wider pool of competition for presidential candidates; 2) PDI-P as an opposition party provided wider access for civil society activists to enter formal politics within the political party; PDI-P's ambition to win the election had made the party open itself up for recruiting more civil



society activists with a strong background of grass root activism; 3) the presence of Jokowi, who was publicly known, ever since he was still the mayor of Solo, as being a leader who remains close to common people, bold enough to create breakthroughs, and was a long-time politician who built up his career starting from sub-district level, which allowed him some distance from the central party elites, thus making him “safe” from their influences too. The seeds of resistance against oligarchic politics started when a number of civil society activists “ushered” Jokowi from being a mayor of Solo into becoming the governor of Jakarta in 2012. Jokowi’s success in becoming the governor of the capital city was indeed a strategic stepping stone to prepare him for the presidential contest in 2014.

During the aforementioned period, groups of volunteers who supported Jokowi emerged and performed their work to ensure a smooth process of his presidential candidacy. To become a candidate for president, Jokowi needed approval from Megawati as a prominent party figure and chief of PDI-P. It was not an easy task to get that approval, especially since some members of PDI-P still wanted Megawati to run for office. The movement wanting Megawati to run for president grew stronger right after PDI-P became the winner of the 2014 legislative election. Nevertheless, hard facts as provided by a number of polls suggested that Jokowi’s popularity had played a significant role behind the winning of PDI-P in the legislative election. There was in fact a strong public expression wanting Jokowi to run for president.

The emergence of groups of civil society declaring themselves as volunteers in support Jokowi’s presidential candidacy received the limelight prior to 2014 election. It is noteworthy that such movement, albeit embryonic, had actually started since 2012 when Jokowi ran for governor of Jakarta. It can be argued that the emergence of these groups of volunteers working for a specific political objective has marked a new phase of civil society organizations and their strategic pathways. Following Jokowi’s achievement in winning the presidency, civil society activists seemed to part ways into 1) supporters of Jokowi who then took parts in the government structure, and 2) those who remained to be “critical supporters” outside the government structure, focused more on making sure that Jokowi stayed true to his commitments, while keeping active the resistance against the oligarchy in politics.

Against the above situation as an important overall context, the cover of *TIME* featuring Jokowi as “a new hope” is comprehensible. However, it is important to note that the resistance against oligarchy in politics is never easy, although Jokowi is seen to have emerged from a series of efforts and battles

against oligarchic practices. In the first three months of his presidency, Jokowi had made a number of disappointing moves amongst his own supporters and other critical civil society groups. Among others, his appointment of ministers with questionable backgrounds, challenging communications with PDI-P elites including Megawati, highly politicized selection of the national chief of police, and, arguably, Jokowi's speculative style of leadership. Indonesia's path to democracy still requires a longstanding strategy and commitment as it will have to survive existing oligarchic power in politics.

## **The Asian Democracy Index in Indonesia in 2014**

### **Methodology**

The Asian Democracy Index employs univariate data in assessing "democracy." ADI is premised on a redefinition of the concept of democracy as "a process of de-monopolization" of the processes and institutions in the political, economic, and civil society fields.<sup>11</sup> There are two main principles in assessing democracy as a process of de-monopolization, which are regarded as variables, namely: 1) liberalization and 2) equalization.

Liberalization is understood to be the measurement of a degree to which different sectors achieve independence and autonomy from the old authoritarian political power, thus enabling them to determine their own priorities. This depends on the extent of disintegration of the old forces of monopoly. As a variable/principle, liberalization has two subprinciples: autonomy and competition. The subprinciple autonomy is measured by four indicators within the field of politics, five indicators within the field of economy, and six indicators within the field of civil society. Meanwhile, the subprinciple competition is measured by six indicators under the field of politics, four indicators under the field of economy, and 5 indicators under the field of civil society.

Equalization is understood as the measurement of the degree to which minority and subaltern groups can substantially acquire access to resources in various sectors and enjoy equal access to resources and power. Equalization is, therefore, a process of transformation of power in the fields of politics, economy, and civil society. Equalization has two subprinciples: pluralization and solidarity. Pluralization is measured by four indicators within the field of politics, seven indicators within the field

of economy, and four indicators within the field of civil society. Meanwhile, solidarity is measured by five indicators under the field of politics, seven indicators under the field of economy, and three indicators under the field of civil society.

Deriving from the above conceptual breakdown and elaboration, the process of de-monopolization is then measured by a total of fifty-seven indicators consisting of nineteen indicators of politics, twenty indicators of economy, and eighteen indicators of civil society. All of the fifty-seven indicators are then formulated questions in the three questionnaires corresponding to the three fields. Each questionnaire is answered by a source person who is regarded as expert in their respective field.

Expert resource persons or interviewees in this survey should ideally consist of twenty-seven people. Each of the fields (politics, economy, and civil society) will be represented by people with varying ideological leanings (pro-democracy, moderate, and anti-democracy) roles in society (academics, practitioner, and decisionmakers both from the parliament and bureaucracy). However, in 2014, the Indonesian ADI survey team managed to interview only twenty-five experts, lacking one expert in the field of economy and another in civil society. We acknowledge our limitations in the conduct of 2014 survey, namely the difficulties in finding appropriate interviewees as stipulated in the criteria for expert selection. Data collection involved a structured interview with semi-closed questions using the ADI questionnaires as our instruments.

In 2014, some modifications were employed in the categorization of experts. Previously, from 2011 until 2013, the ADI survey team in Indonesia had used “political positioning”—namely pro-government, moderate, and anti-government—as the criteria of expert grouping. For the 2014 survey, we changed “political positioning” to the following “ideological categories”: pro-democracy, moderate and anti-democracy for politics; statist, moderate, and neo-liberal for economics; and pluralist, moderate, and fundamentalist for civil society. This modification was done in response to the most recent development following the “election year” of 2014, where transition of power took place (change of president and a shift of political forces in the parliament) and the changes in the groupings of experts factually took place, making them harder to identify by their political positioning but clearer to map by their ideological stances in general.

#### Reflections on the ADI in Indonesia, 2011-2014

The total score of Asia Democracy Index in Indonesia for four consecutive years, from 2011 to 2014, appears to be stagnant. Initially,

within a year since the survey was first conducted, the score seemed to get better, showing an increase from 4.99 in 2011 to 5.27 in 2012. However, such trend did not extend to 2013, as the score in that year went down to 4.97. The 2014 score increased, and in fact, at 5.42, is the highest ever attained in Indonesia. It is important to note that the fluctuation in the yearly index scoring remained less than 5 percent, which also indicated that the changes that happened were not a general pattern. This finding suggests that the de-monopolization process in all the three fields (politics, economy, and civil society) has not changed significantly.

Nevertheless, when we partially observe the changes of the score in each field, research on democracy in Indonesia may benefit from valuable information detailing the dynamics of democratization process that takes place in the country as seen through the ADI. We can see a general pattern of changes in the scoring for the democracy indices that signifies a pattern of changes within two fields, i.e., politics and civil society. These two fields display a positive correlation that influences the score of the aggregate democracy index. The pattern of changes within the fields of politics and civil society can be summarized as follows: the scores in these two fields increased between 2011 and 2012, but decreased in 2013; which is also the reflection of changes of the pattern of the democracy index score in general. A rather different pattern, however, is found within the field of economy, showing a trend of consistent increase in 2013.

To understand better the changing condition of each field in Indonesia, one needs to take into account the elections in 2014 as an important political context. As previously stated, in 2014, Indonesia had a legislative election in April and a presidential election in July. Along with the five-year election cycle in Indonesia, there is a growing tendency of massive allocation and distribution of economic resources as it gets closer to the election, e.g., packages of subsidies for the poor and short-term poverty alleviation programs with an instantaneous approach. This kind of effort contributed to the increase of the indices within the field of economy in 2013, in comparison to the previous two years. Despite the increase, the overall economy score in 2013 remained low at 4.49. In contrast, the field of politics and civil society showed a decline, which suggested that the situation of both politics and civil society worsened as it got closer to the election. This happened because of the growing antagonism and fragmentation within civil society, including among the elements of civil society that were initially unconsolidated. Political parties carelessly mobilized people just to win their votes in the absence of substantial political education. Political parties often used primordialist

sentiment as the means to get the people's support and in turn weakened the values of pluralism and solidarity.

In 2014, the scores within the field of politics and economy moved into different directions. The score in politics increased and reached the highest compared to the previous years, while the score in economy that went up in 2013 eventually declined in 2014 and reached the lowest point in four consecutive years. Consistent patterns were found in the variable equalization along with its two sub-variables, pluralization and solidarity, scoring lower than the variable liberalization along with its two sub-variables, autonomy and competition. This finding suggests that in Indonesia, equal opportunity and access to resources in politics, economy and civil society remained minimal.

In order to comprehend the context of democracy in Indonesia, especially after the legislative and presidential elections were concluded in 2014—which led to the increase of the political index, a decrease of the economic index, and a stagnant index of civil society—we need to go deeper into the details of all sub-variables and indicators.

#### Scores within the Field of Politics, 2014

The score within the field of politics in Indonesia is 6.72, which is the highest compared to all the previous years; it was 5.50 in 2011, 6.16 in 2012, and 5.48 in 2013.

Table 1: Index in the Field of Politics, Indonesia, 2014

Liberalization		Equalization		Political Index
6.80		6.63		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	5.03
7.64	6.24	7.00	6.34	

The above scores indicate that the field of politics in Indonesia appears to have undergone an advance in its de-monopolization process during the election year of 2014 in light of the transition of presidential power and

tight competition among political parties that contended in the legislative election. An indication of this can be seen in how the Democrat Party, the winner of 2009 election, lost its support and fell to the fourth position in the 2014 election. As shown in table 1, the votes of the three winning parties in the 2014 election have a rather close margin. Furthermore, competition between elites within the oligarchy grew tighter, thus posing a bigger challenge to the monopoly of political forces. Another phenomenon is the rise of political participation of civil society during the election.

The score of 6.80 in political liberalization is the result of the combination of the autonomy score at 7.64 (an increase from last year's 6.30) and the competition score at 6.24 (an increase from last year's 5.17). Autonomy has the highest score within the field of politics, partly due to the scores in freedom of association and activity of political groups, which has the highest score among all indicators in this index (8.67); permission for political opposition (8.22); and freedom from state violence, and civil rights.

In the variable of equalization, the subvariable pluralization enjoyed the most significant increase, from 5.44 in 2013 to 7.00 in 2014. Among the indicators, the highest score under this field subprinciple is that of universal suffrage, at 8.33. Meanwhile, political solidarity contains the indicator that obtained the lowest score: public trust toward the parliament, which was at 4.83. However public trust in democracy remained relatively high; with 7.67, it is the second highest score under political equalization. However, the scores also reflect how the Indonesian parliament kept its notorious reputation as a corrupt institution, an extension of the many cases involving its members that happened in the previous years.

Political parties, as the only institutions responsible for recruiting parliamentary members, have an equally tarnished image. One of the highest profile corruption case was blown up in 2014 shortly before the parliamentary election, as the national Commission of Corruption Eradication arrested the chief of the PPP party, who was also the Minister of Religious Affairs in Yudhoyono's cabinet. He was allegedly accused of being involved in a corruption case in the program of the hajj pilgrimage, one of the most lucrative programs managed by his ministry.

The seemingly progressing de-monopolization process in politics can further be observed through other indicators. Firstly, the result of the 2014 parliamentary election showed that there is no majority power among the ten political parties gaining seats in the national parliament (DPR). Democrat Party, dominating the parliament and the presidency

since 2009, lost a significant number of votes in the parliamentary election. The narrow gap of electoral power among the parties was reflected in their popular votes.

The second indication is the higher contention among the oligarchic elite. They can switch allegiances across time, depending on the coincidences of interests of the moment. During one phase, they constituted two opposing sides; during another, they allied in supporting one common cause. The 2014 presidential election had created two opposing coalitions: the Red and White Coalition (PDI-P, PKB, Hanura, Nasdem, PKPI) and the Great Indonesia Coalition (Golkar, Gerindra, PKS, PPP, PAN). PDI-P gained the most seats in the parliament and won the presidency. During Yudhoyono's tenure (two successive terms from 2004-2014), he attempted to embrace as many parties as possible in his coalition in order to make policymaking in parliament more manageable, with the support of a majority of parties. This had led to the creation of what has been dubbed a "cartel" in politics, which had its embryo in the previous period, which had detrimental effects in the practice of representation.<sup>12</sup> President Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2002) many times rejected to comply to this collective power of parties, which brought him ultimately to his impeachment. His successor, Megawati, chief of PDI-P, managed to last as (unelected) president until 2004 by making compromises with these parties. During his presidency, President Yudhoyono tried to avoid confrontation with other parties by creating a big coalition, distributing cabinet seats for members of his coalition parties in exchange for parliamentary support, to varying results; sometimes he succeeded in getting agreement for his programs, sometimes not.

In the final phases of the 2014 parliamentary election process, vote results have been known to the public. PDI-P obtained the most seats in the national parliament, but other parties managed to pass a bill on the Structure and Functions of the Parliament in a span of few months. The law basically regulated the distribution of leadership positions in the parliament based on party coalition power, not on the number of seats. PDI-P failed to take any leadership positions, which were all distributed among the opposition parties. PDIP-P reacted by creating a shadow or contending leadership, which had caused confusion among the public and the just-elected president and his cabinet. The two coalitions finally reached a consensus, but this case illustrates the harsh competition of power among parties in the national level. Another issue is the behavior of parties in policymaking process. Early indications, during the first few months of

Joko Widodo's presidency, showed the fluidity of cohesion between and within the coalitions. In the case of the appointment of the national police chief, both Red and White coalition and Great Indonesia coalition showed support for the nomination of an allegedly corrupt candidate, challenged by wide public disapproval. However in another case, the revision of Local Election Law, the coalition was sharply divided. Half of the parties from Red and White Coalition supported the non-reformist revision; a similar situation took shape in the Great Indonesia coalition.

The third indication is the emergence of people's substantial participation during the electoral process. Voting turnout remains relatively at the same rate as the last election, but the quality of people's participation significantly increased. The 2014 election year saw the rise of civil society in voluntary activism around the campaigns and the monitoring of the vote-counting process. Participation was widespread not only among the traditional bases of parties, but also among professionals, artists, and the general public.

Approaching the parliamentary and presidential elections, there was an increase in the quality of political participation among individuals and groups. Shortly before the parliamentary election, the two presidential candidates had been publicly announced by their respective parties. The stark differences between the two candidates and the following sharp competition between the two camps of parties in turn would create a sharp division of preference among the public as well. Fortunately, this had made the public enthusiastic in following the news on the elections. Many individuals and communities went further to create voluntary activities in observing and monitoring election processes—especially during the campaign, vote casting, and vote counting—in order to ensure a transparent and honest process and avoid the possibility of fraud or other violations. Some of the more outstanding projects were the creation of [www.jarungu.com](http://www.jarungu.com), which collects and displays profiles of candidates during the parliamentary elections; the registration of individuals as official ballot station observers to local election supervision bodies during the parliamentary and presidential elections; and the network of individuals observers in collecting copies of vote counting documents, which would then be posted online in the website [www.kawalpemilu.org](http://www.kawalpemilu.org).

#### Scores within the Field of Economy in Indonesia, 2014

The overall index value of economy in 2014 is 4.41, which indicates a decrease of 0.08 point compared to 2013. The index value of economy



was at 5.09 in 2011; in 2012 at 5.43; and in 2013 at 5.03. The scores in the four subprinciples in economy stagnated or worsened compared to those in 2013 (see table 2 for a summary of scores in the economic field).

Table 2: Index in the Field of Economy, Indonesia, 2014

Liberalization		Equalization		Economic Index
5.02		4.00		
Autonomy	Competition	Pluralization	Solidarity	4.41
4.94	5.09	2.88	4.80	

In the subprinciple of economic autonomy, the lowest-scoring indicator is the prohibition of child labor, with a score of 3.88. 2013 data from National Commission on Child's Protection reported that there are 4.7 million child workers in Indonesia. Most of them are in Papua province (34.7 percent of the total number of child workers); 20.46 percent are in North Sulawesi; and 19.82 percent are in West Sulawesi. Protection of children from working is already enshrined in national law, but problems are still encountered in the enforcement/implementation of the law and programs of related ministries.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, in the subprinciple of economic competition, the scores for the four indicators ranged from 4.75 to 5.50. The transparency of large corporations and fairness in competition both obtained scores of 4.75.

The highest-scoring indicator in economics is protection of workers' rights, which is at 6.00. 2014 saw the launching of the healthcare social security program, which is a part of the universal social security for workers, which also includes a pension scheme, workplace injury benefits, and death benefits, all based on the Law on Social Security of 2004. The healthcare scheme was launched in January 2014 and implemented by a national agency. Another scheme will be launched in mid-2015. Debates and negotiations among related parties still abound on the rate of contribution for the next schemes, but nevertheless, this program is a breakthrough in developing a safety net for Indonesian workers, which include a large number of informal workers.<sup>14</sup>

Pluralization has the lowest score among the four economic subprinciples. Indeed, equalization in economy has the lowest score among all variables from the three fields (politics, economy and civil society), which had also been the case in the three previous survey cycles. Within pluralization, the lowest scores were obtained by the indicators of economic disparity among regions and asset ownership inequality (both were at 2.13). Economic inequality among regions remains an outstanding issue, since it is rooted in the economic policy and programs of the New Order authoritarian regime. As mentioned earlier in this report, disparity can be observed between the island of Java, where the country's capital city is located and most of government and business deals take place, and other islands. Arguably the worst conditions can be seen in the eastern regions, the people of which, due to various factors such as geography and the lack of decent infrastructure and other discriminatory policies, still find it difficult to catch up with developments in other regions, therefore have the highest rate of poverty in the country.

Two other indicators in pluralization received low scores: economic domination of certain groups (2.50) and income inequality (2.50). A 2014 report stated that with a gross domestic product of USD 6,838.00 per adult, Indonesia is included in the emerging markets of the world, but its wealth inequality is in the "high" category (Shorrocks, Davies, and Lluberas 2014, 30). The same source stated that in Indonesia, there are "129,000 people in the country [who] are in the top 1 percent of global wealth holders, and 98,000 are US dollar millionaires." (Shorrocks, Davies, and Lluberas 2014, 56).

Inequality of asset ownership is stark in the rural areas. According to the National Board of Land, the Gini index of land ownership is high, at 0.72, which reflects a grave condition of inequality. 2013 Data from BPS also showed that the poverty rate in the rural areas is significantly higher than in the urban areas.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, the World Bank noted in one report that the poverty rate in Indonesia had fallen during the span of 1999 to 2013, and the pace of poverty reduction is decelerating. It is also reported that there are more than 65 million Indonesians living just above the poverty line and that they are vulnerable to falling into poverty.<sup>16</sup>

The overall score of economy supports a conclusion that that the monopolistic economic structure remains intact and pluralization in economy is still at a low rate, marked by a strong monopoly of assets, wide income gap among groups and regions shown by the relatively high Gini index value, inequality and discrimination in the labor market, and the low rate of workers' wage.

### Scores within the Field of Civil Society in Indonesia, 2014

In the field of civil society, the subprinciple of autonomy had two negative aspects that stand out: 1) the strong influence of the market on society (at 1.88); and 2) the low rating of services for minority and marginalized groups (at 3.68). These low scores negatively contributed to the 2014 civil society autonomy index. This is a reflection of what occurred in the movement of civil society groups, which still inadequately advocate the provision of access to resources for minorities and marginalized groups. As an example, the government has been developing infrastructure and facilities for public transportation, but most of them are not accessible to disabled persons. Many larger cities still failed to provide accessible public transportation for the disabled. This is related to the strong grip of market on public policy and development, resulting in the privatization of public service provision by the national and local governments to accumulate capital and target only a certain segment of consumers. The government has not succeeded in managing many public service provisions such as transportation, clean water, decent housing, and facilities for middle to small businesses.

There is, however a positively assessed aspect under this subprinciple, which is the autonomy of civil society, obtaining an aggregate score of 7.28. Civil society groups were considered by the survey participants to be relatively free from state intervention. In many instances, civil society groups were able to initiate movements to advocate certain causes, e.g., in criticizing government's policies or programs, monitoring the behavior of public officials or institutions, and other political issues in general.

The scores under the subprinciple of civil society competition reflect facts that are related to the above findings. Under this subprinciple, the weak spot is the low rate of diversity of voluntary groups (5.25). There are still many public issues not represented by the existing civil society groups. Most of civil society activities or projects are targeted toward issues within larger narratives such as electoral politics, natural resources and environment, law enforcement, and the combat against corruption. In the meantime, the advocacy of providing access to economic and political resources in the daily life of the general public is almost absent.

Within the subprinciple of civil society pluralization, a serious problem is the low level of access to information for the general public (3.38). Access to public information is essential as the basis for members of society to process such information into knowledge, and to decide on actions to take based on that knowledge. Complete and comprehensive government data and information are difficult to access, as the authorities also fail to

manage and publish them. Additionally, there are no civil society institutions organized enough to provide periodically comprehensive data on certain issues. This lack of adequate data has made it difficult for political observers and practitioners to respond to certain government policies by advocating discourses based on empirical data, and as a consequence they can only offer casual opinions. Currently, there has been a rise of awareness among civil society to produce policy recommendations based on research and data. However the government as policymakers are expected to create a working information network and provide access to information for the general public.

Still in line with the above findings, the lowest score in the subprinciple of civil society solidarity is affirmative action for marginalized groups (at 4.63). The identity and interest of marginalized groups in Indonesia are yet to be represented in the political process, resulting in discriminative laws produced by policymakers, which is especially common at the local level of government. The position of civil society groups advocating the interest of marginalized groups is still weak; aggregation of public interest and a wider-scoped movement are very seldom supported by other groups due to the domination of certain paradigms or the differences in perspectives among civil society activists.

### **Conclusion**

The Asia Democracy Index forwards the key concept of de-monopolization as a process through which democracy can be measured and explained by examining the distribution of power and resources in the fields of politics, economy, and civil society. In order to understand de-monopolization, one needs to see how an authoritarian regime or dictatorship manifests in many forms of monopoly practices, where a certain group of people deliberately hold a significant amount of power over politics, economy, and civil society, as they try to keep their group small in size, enjoy the privileges of being in power, and sustain the practice of monopoly. Any effort that is systematically done to diminish the influence, lessen the grip on power, or challenge the ruling group of the authoritarian regime can be seen as part of the de-monopolization process, and it needs to be identified closely whether it happens in the fields of politics, economy, or civil society and to what extent it has happened. In Indonesia, the 2014 Asia Democracy Index survey in Indonesia found that de-monopolization in politics in the country was slightly stronger than in the previous year, while it worsened in economy and remained stagnant in the realm of civil society.

The aggregate score of Indonesia's democracy index value in 2014 is 5.42, which means it has slightly increased compared to that of 2013 (4.97). As stated earlier in this article, within a year since the Asia Democracy Index survey was first conducted, the score seemed to get better, showing an increase from 4.99 in 2011 to 5.27 in 2012. However, such trend did not recur in 2013 as the score went down to 4.97. The result of 2014 Index survey increased and in fact attained the highest score of all the four years that ADI surveys had been conducted in Indonesia. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the fluctuation in the yearly index scoring remained less than 5 percent, which indicated that the changes that happened could not be considered a general pattern. This finding also suggests that the de-monopolization process of all the three fields (politics, economy, and civil society) has not changed significantly.

Variations within the total index value of democracy in Indonesia need to be understood as the dynamics of de-monopolization process, which is constituted by a number of principles, subprinciples, and indicators. Looking at the two main constituent principles/variables of democracy as de-monopolization, liberalization and equalization, in 2014, the former had a higher score (5.79) than the latter (4.82). The liberalization score of 5.79 indicates a relatively strong authoritarian regime and structure that remains within the democratic system in Indonesia, which can be found in the fields of politics, economy, and civil society. This condition is further indicated by the lower score of equalization, which signifies that the people at large still find it difficult to access political, economic, and social resources. The situation that describes liberalization and equalization can be detailed more in each of the three fields by examining each of the subprinciples and indicators that constitute those two main variables. Of all the three fields, the overall score in politics is the highest (6.72), followed by civil society being moderately low (5.15), and economy showing being the lowest (4.41).

The high index value in politics in 2014 is closely connected with how Indonesia went through a transition of power both at the national and local level through the conduct of elections. Those elections had significantly changed the political power constellation in the parliament. As previously mentioned, there is no political party that holds a majority in the national parliament as a result of the 2014 legislative election. Even the total votes for PDI-P as the winning party in 2014 is the lowest that the party had ever achieved since 1999. This trend indicates a weakening party identification amongst voters as the moderately low votes are also found in other parties. The politics of oligarchy, which relies on a small

circle of power-holders who sustain the practice of monopoly, remains dominant and in fact has been the underlying factor behind many winning politicians, both at the national and local levels. Meanwhile, the results of the presidential election was driven by many people being drawn into some sort of polarized political blocs, which contributed to intense political discussions in the public realm, heightened debates between the blocs, and to a certain extent increasingly better structured political education and civil society political participation. Generally, it can be said that the index value of politics in Indonesia became better in 2014 more because of growing political knowledge and interest, less apathy of the people, public initiatives in political education and information sharing, and much less because of positive developments in the political system in general.

The low score of index value in economy, which has been consistently low in all the four surveys since 2011, is due to the fact that the demonopolization process in this field remains the weakest in comparison to that within the other two fields. Monopoly of public assets, the large income gap, and unequal treatment and discrimination in the labor market are among the conditions that still exist at large. The persistently weak demonopolization process in economy in Indonesia may be the factor that explains the fluctuation of the total index value of democracy in the country. Although in 2014, procedural democracy led Indonesia to witness a peaceful power transition and the rise of civil society participation in politics, in the same year, economic inequality remained the biggest challenge for the country to address. For the first time in 2014, Indonesia saw massive political participation initiated by many civil society groups and activists, who wanted to make sure that the presidential election was free and fair. Nevertheless, now that a new president is installed—a person dubbed “a new hope” by worldwide media—Indonesia still has to prove whether it can actually resolve the acute problem of inequality as it manifests in the economic realm.

### Notes

1. For more on this issue of TIME, see <http://time.com/3511035/joko-widodo-indonesian-democracy/>.
2. Source: <http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/158024-tahun-terakhir-pemerintahan-sby-minim-prestasi-di-bidang-ekonomi-panen-penghargaan-dari-luar-negeri.html> (in Bahasa Indonesia).
3. Source: see the link in the previous note.
4. World Bank and BPS, as quoted by <http://www.indonesia-investments.com/id/keuangan/angka-ekonomi-makro/kemiskinan/item301>.
5. Source: see the link in the previous note.

6. Source: BPS, based on September 2014 data. For details, visit <http://www.bps.go.id/>.
7. Source: BPS, based on September 2014 data. For details, visit <http://www.bps.go.id/>.
8. See Tjandraningsih, Herawati, and Suhadmadi (n.d.)
9. Source: <http://www.walhi.or.id/di-akhir-masa-pemerintahan-sby-mengeluarkan-kebijakan-yang-menguatkan-monopoli-pemodal.html>.
10. Source: <http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/158024-tahun-terakhir-pemerintahan-sby-minim-prestasi-di-bidang-ekonomi-panen-penghargaan-dari-luar-negeri.html>.
11. For a more in-depth explanation of ADI concepts, see CADI (2012).
12. More about this cartel in Indonesian politics can be found in Slater (2004).
13. Source: <http://www.theindonesianinstitute.com/stop-pekerja-anak-sebagai-perlindungan-terhadap-anak/>.
14. Source: <http://theprakarsa.org/new/in/news/detail/536>.
15. Source: <http://indonesiasetara.org/mengurangi-ketimpangan-meluruskan-esensi-pembangunan-ii.html>.
16. Source: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/brief/reducing-extreme-poverty-in-indonesia>.

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