The 2015 TWSC Writeshop

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The 2015 Third World Studies Center Writeshop

On 8-10 June 2015, we conducted the annual Third World Studies Center (TWSC) Writeshop. The writeshop aims to help young faculty members, graduate students, and early-career researchers navigate the review process and get published in *Kasarinlan,* the Center's internationally refereed journal. This program is part of TWSC's goal as a multidisciplinal research center in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP), University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman, "to develop critical, alternative paradigms to promote progressive scholarship by undertaking pioneering research and publishing original, empirically grounded, and innovative studies." The three-day activity was the highpoint in the eight-month long process, beginning with the call for applications, a rigorous selection process, and then the writeshop itself. The writeshop received thirty-three submissions, accepted seven, and for this issue, we have published three. The other papers may see publication in future *Kasarinlan* issues.

The writeshop was funded by Office of the Vice-President for Academic Affairs of the UP System, the Office of the Chancellor of UP Diliman, and CSSP, also of UP Diliman. It was endorsed by the Commission on Higher Education and the Philippine Association of State Universities and Colleges.

The TWSC Writeshop is a specialized workshop that introduces the participants to the rigors of academic research and writing, and the process for getting into print after undergoing peer review. We were fortunate to have National Artist for Literature F. Sionil Jose deliver the keynote address, which set the tone for the writeshop. Five plenary lectures followed the keynote speech. Randy David (professor emeritus, Department of Sociology, CSSP, UP Diliman) gave a lecture on problematizing theory in the social sciences; Francis Gealogo (associate professor, Department of History, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University) on the contribution of quantitative research to

knowledge production in the social sciences; Raul Pertierra (professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University) on the contribution of qualitative research to knowledge production in the social sciences; Maria Luisa Camagay (professor, Department of History, CSSP, UP Diliman) on research and publication ethics in the social sciences; and Jose Neil Garcia (UP Press director and professor, Department of English and Comparative Literature, College of Arts and Letters, UP Diliman) on the academic publication process.

The writeshop fellows' papers were then discussed in small groups that included experts in their respective fields, with an eye to readying the drafts for publication. The experts in these small-group discussions were Maria Teresa Melgar (assistant professor, Department of Sociology, CSSP, UP Diliman), Eufracio Abaya (professor, Division of Curriculum and Instruction, College of Education, UP Diliman), Maria Ela Atienza (professor, Department of Political Science, CSSP, UP Diliman), and Augusto de Viana (associate professor, Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Letters, University of Santo Tomas). The papers were revised, and then submitted to reviewers. The papers published in this issue hurdled all the comments, criticisms, and recommendations of reviewers, as is the case with peer-reviewed academic journals: they are part of the successful outcome of the 2015 TWSC Writeshop.

National Artist Jose's keynote speech opens this issue. Mincing no words, he paints a critical picture of Philippine scholarship and its representation of realities in the country. For some, his assertions may trigger contrary arguments, for others an affirmation of long-held beliefs. He drew freely on his own vast experience as a journalist and writer, pointing to the traditions that shape Philippine life, and the importance of history and folklore in understanding the nation and its cultures. He ends with a profound conclusion, that knowledge is not wisdom, and that scholarship is not simply the search for truth, but also justice.

Three papers from the writeshop fellows are published here.

"Tensions and Developments in Akbayan's Alliance with the Aquino Administration," by Hansley A. Juliano (lecturer, Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University), leads this volume. The paper deals with Akbayan, a coalition of progressive, leftist people's organizations, its venture into national politics through the party-list system in the House of Representatives, and its decision to support the administration of

President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III. While the Aquino administration initially offered the promise of social reform, its actual record has been disappointing. The decision of Akbayan's leaders to support the administration thus resulted in conflicts within the party and its relations with other similar left-leaning groups. Based on a variety of primary and secondary sources, as well the author's own experience as a one-time member of the party, this paper presents a perceptive look at the dynamics inside a leftist group which opted to work with the government through an analytical model synthesized by the author. If such an alliance were to continue without question, Juliano notes, the party would be in danger of becoming just another political party, its ability to foment reform neutralized.

"The Asia-Pacific War in the Davao Settler Zone, December 1941" by Maria Cynthia B. Barriga (MA student, History Department, School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University) presents a detailed study of the impact of war on a unique province in Mindanao. At the time the war started, Davao was a frontier which was largely populated by migrants. While many of the migrants were Filipinos from the Visayas and Luzon, Davao also had the largest community of Japanese residents in the Philippines. The outbreak of war between the US and Japan thus threatened the whole fabric of the province, bringing chaos and suspicion amongst friends and relatives. By focusing on a frontier province, this study breaks away from the more conventional accounts dealing with the Philippines's political center, Manila. The article is a good contribution to our knowledge of World War II in the Philippines as it utilizes Japanese sources, as well as interviews with survivors. Barriga hails from Davao and studied the Japanese language, providing her with a unique perspective of the then frontier-province in a time of crisis.

"The Contested Development of a Philippine Tourism Landscape: The Case of Nasugbu, Batangas," by Hazel M. Dizon (assistant professor, Department of Geography, CSSP, UP Diliman), brings to light conflicting issues in the government's pursuit of a tourism policy as a driver of national development. While the development of resorts in Nasugbu was meant to bring economic progress to the town, Dizon shows that its long-time residents were instead marginalized and their livelihood threatened, even as the municipal government reaped the benefits from outsiders who developed tourist sites. Based on extensive fieldwork, this study critically highlights the inconsistencies and tensions brought about by a government policy implemented without

fully considering its effects, a policy that centers on income and infrastructure as it marginalizes the dispossessed and the locals in dire straits.

This issue also contains reviews of books of interest to social scientists, particularly those that study social movements, and information and communications technology and society.

As National Artist Jose observed, knowledge alone and the search for truth is not sufficient, it is how knowledge is used that is wisdom. These articles provide not just new knowledge, but also new perspectives and lessons to learn from. As with all other *Kasarinlan* issues, we hope the articles published here encourage critical thought, alternative viewpoints, and stimulate discussion. Should readers have any comments, questions or clarifications, they are encouraged to contact the authors directly. ❁

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For this issue, we would like to welcome two new associate editors of *Kasarinlan*, Abegail Rose L. Valenzuela and Beatriz Cecilia D. Montenegro, both TWSC research associates.

Reality and Filipino Scholarship

My most important bonafide in addressing you is my age: I am ninety and much older than all of you. This age has endowed me with so much hindsight. As you know, hindsight is the lowest form of wisdom—but wisdom just the same. I now have a much broader understanding of time as history, of time as the ultimate arbiter of conflicts, human dilemmas, political controversies. For instance, even if we did not oppose Marcos, we would have simply waited for him to die—which he did. Yes, it is difficult to divine the future but if we looked hard enough—and this is what scholarship is supposed to do—in the fifties and the sixties when we were the richest, most modern country in Southeast Asia but with visionless, corrupt leaders, we could have foreseen then that we would now be the "sick man" of the region.

It is necessary then for us to appreciate history, learn from it particularly if this knowledge helps us know ourselves better.

So many givens are in our culture but these givens, though obvious, are often not recognized because of our personal biases motivated by ethnicity, or nationalism, the search for identity—all these feelings passionately aroused in us who regard our origins as the bedrock of nation.

For instance, many of our scholars want our country to be identified with Asia. This is a logical aspiration for there is no denying that we are, indeed, in Asia. But the two great religions of this region—Buddhism and Hinduism, did not really take root here: the Spaniards came and Christianized us; over the original native culture, they imposed this Catholic patina which survived three hundred years and influenced our lives.

We are, therefore, heirs to the Greco-Roman tradition that Christianity brought. The classical aspects of culture which the Hindus and the Buddhists implanted in the Asian region and in the Asian mind did not develop here; much of our culture then is folk.

The Western aspects of our culture are subsumed in our arts.

So many of our cultural workers are bent on preserving and encouraging the culture of our ethnic minorities. After all, if we are truly looking for indigenous sources of cultural pride, it is in these ethnic achievements. We must beware, however, of the tendency to transform these cultures into museum specimens, to freeze them in time. What we must do is assist our benighted minorities to modernize so they can compete in the market for jobs. The avenues to modernity and, most of all, to justice must not be denied them even by well-meaning cultural workers who want their traditional way of life preserved.

Scholars on folk culture—like specialists everywhere—talk among themselves; they cannot see how folk culture opens the door to many development possibilities. Folklorists wallowing in myths and native epics should have their knowledge transmitted to creative writers who will then transform such epics and myths into a larger, nobler literary vision. The same with our musicologists, our folk dance scholars. The creation of fresh, vigorous artistic forms—these can be inspired by our folk culture: such innovations will then acquire a distinct Filipino face with which we can identify, about which we can exalt.

Folklorists have conferences but they never invite creative writers, poets, and composers to attend. They miss out in giving relevance and practical use of their knowledge.

History

There is so much to unearth in our unrecorded past. Although archeological findings illustrate that these islands were inhabited more than two thousand years ago, no written record of our ancient forefathers are extant; the oldest which was found some years back in a Laguna riverbed is not more than 900 years old. Ancient gold artifacts have, of course, been found to attest to the high scientific culture of our ancestors. But compared to our neighbors with their august and remembered past, its relics and monuments, we are a young nation, indeed. And our history, more often than not, is written by our colonizers. It is our duty now to write our own history, to popularize this history, remembering always that memory as recorded history—is the granite foundation of any nation.

We must now write this history from our point of view, from the bottom up and not from the top down. All too often, historians are

concerned only with front page events, the powerful men who created these events. Look at history not from this rarified perspective but from the eye level of the *masa*. Listen, journalism is history in a hurry, but literature is history that is lived.

The Two Cultures

Sometime in the mid-1950s the English scientist C.P. Snow postulated that a wide chasm has grown between the humanist and the scientific cultures. This observation is still valid today as it applies not just to the West but to us. The divide is not just between cultures but between social classes—the very many who are poor, and the very few who are rich. This division impacts on almost everything not just on values but on thinking. It explains the crippling ignorance of the masa who cannot afford a college education and, therefore, a better life and an intelligent view of our political system. If the masa votes for dumb movie stars and media celebrities to the highest public office, it is because they are shallow.

In looking at our unexamined past, at our lower classes, our very poor, and the rebel movements, we also unlock the basic ethos of nationhood. The efforts of our scholars to probe deeply into the thinking of the peasantry, of the lumpen in our villages, should be appreciated. Among these well- intentioned scholars is Rey Ileto whose *Pasyon and Revolution* attracted so much attention some three decades ago. The problem with that study is not so much the emphasis on the *Pasyon* and the lower classes as such but the misinterpretation of the *Pasyon's* influence on the masa. This is not so—the *Pasyon* is brought out only during the Holy Week and is then completely forgotten. It is the old Latin mass and the story of Christ that hold great influence on the imagination, the beliefs and rituals of the masa. How could Rey miss this? Simple. Like most scholars who can afford college and get their MAs and PhDs, Rey is middle class—he has not lived with the peasant.

This ignorance of the masa, of the quasi-religious nature of mass movements, could lead to avoidable tragedies such as the massacre in 1965 of Valentin delos Santos's *Lapiang Malaya* followers in Taft Avenue. If the government only knew, instead of a platoon of soldiers confronting the peasant demonstrators—they killed many—Malacañang should have sent a Tagalog politician overdressed in the regalia of a general—braid, epaulets, and all that color—to mollify them, and that he—a leading Filipino leader—will attend to their grievances then send them back to their villages with a jeepful of goodies.

Ethnicity

Filipino scholarship must recognize ethnicity for it is very real and divisive. The late F. Landa Jocano, who was making an ethnic map in the fifties, after several weeks of living in the Ilocos, said, Ilocanos are different.

Of course, they are distinct from the Tagalogs, the Visayans. Even the Moros are different from one another; the Maranaos, the Maguindanaos, the Tausugs—they are not united. Even among themselves, clans have existed for generations generating deadly clan wars.

In the sixties, a book titled *Sikolohiyang Filipino,* actually defined Tagalog psychology, not that of Filipinos as a people.

Indigenize Scholarship

So many institutions of higher learning—many of them comparable with the best in the world are now in the Philippines. There is no justification now for a Filipino scholar to go to Europe or the United States to obtain a doctorate on the Cordillera people. It is more than appreciating our educational system. Western ideas, doctrinaire theories concocted by Western scholars do not always apply to native conditions. Take for instance Marxism and EDSA I. Our communists were so doctrinaire, they did not consider the "objective reality"—meaning the reality in relation to EDSA I. They were not there because Marxist doctrine made no difference between Marcos and Cory Aquino—both represented the elite, the oligarchs. So the communists missed their greatest chance to capture power.

Then there is Ben Anderson's *Imagined Communities* three decades back which so many of our scholars immediately applauded and used in defining our country. Ben Anderson has written laudably on Rizal as a unique novelist produced by Spanish colonialism which other colonized communities in Asia have not done. He may be right in defining some organizations like ASEAN or the European Union as "imagined communities" but not countries that developed out of a strong sense of nationalism. In fact, nationalism will be with us far into the future as the major force in the shaping of nation-state relationships. The term *patriotism* is more appropriate, for nationalism can be claimed by everyone—it is after all, "the last refuge of scoundrels."

Foreigners can easily misinterpret local customs and rituals. An American went to Pampanga during the Holy Week. He saw the reenactment of the crucifixion, devotees whipping, cursing, and hitting the Christ as he carried the cross. The visitor was appalled and remarked how cruel the Filipinos were. He didn't know they were pious Catholics merely enacting the vicious treatment of Jesus by the Jews as he was brought to Calvary.

Even the name of your Center should be indigenized. Why do you accept the terminology concocted by a Westerner from his comfortable position? There is no such thing as a Third World—there is only one world, rich and poor countries, countries with varying political order. And all countries—rich and poor, authoritarian and democratic—are in a state of flux and development.

Pure Science

It has been said that there is actually no limit to the extension of knowledge. If there is no limit to knowledge, then there is also no limit to progress. The need to know is very much a part of our humanity but remember that old injunction that curiosity killed the cat. It is when we are confronted with the vastness of the universe as well as the human mind that we should then think also of what knowledge is for, if it will serve science's unlimited quest, the need to know, or the much higher purpose of ennobling humanity itself.

Sure, for the scientist engaged in the study of insects, it is important for him to find out the mating habits of spiders, and who knows, that knowledge may lead to the discovery of drugs that would led to the cure of cervical cancer. Or who knows, the study of the atomic particles of volcanic magma may lead to the manufacture of industrial diamonds!

The implication here is that pure science may yield important discoveries that will benefit humankind—and it also may not. For a country then whose resources are limited, whose scholars have many more important subjects to delve into that will benefit the commonweal, the pursuit of pure science is a luxury. Let the rich nations with their vast resources pursue it. A Filipino scientist can help our country more, for instance, in locating the medicinal values of indigenous plants, how to control the pests that destroy rice, coconut, or prevent schistosomiasis.

Knowledge Is Not Wisdom

With the Internet, Wikipedia, and Google, there is hardly any reason now for most people to be stupid. Information on almost any subject is now available with just one click. Still, there is information not available on the Internet and this information can only be obtained through personal experience, a tenacious memory of our past. And most of all, we must always remember that knowledge is not wisdom. It is how knowledge is used that is wisdom.

And this wisdom—the truest and most valued—is also the unending search for truth.

And what is truth?

As the Chinese said, we searched and searched for truth but in the end there is no truth. Of course, there is truth both as an abstraction and as reality, and both also have value until we, as human beings, give it, when we equate truth with justice in action or else truth is not truth at all.

Justice in action. This, scholars should always remember.

So they get to know the secrets of the atom, the origin of life, and they know now how to split the atom, create life by cloning, even create artificial intelligence as well. But in the end, of what use are these discoveries of truth?

Truth as justice in action is giving reality to an abstraction. For instance, if we see injustice—and by God, there is so much brutal evidence of it in this country—we correct that injustice by acting. That is truth, meaning, value.

All of us seek justification for our brief, trivial lives, for role models to follow, to guide us. We need not look elsewhere, to the West and its traditions we have imbibed. In fact for us Filipinos, a sterling exemplar already exists—a man of prodigious intellect and iron commitment not only to truth but to his unhappy country.

We celebrate his 154th birthday this month—Jose Rizal.❁

F. Sionil Jose is a National Artist for Literature of the Philippines. These are his remarks at the opening of UP Diliman's Third World Studies Center Writeshop, June 15, 2015.

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Tensions and Developments in Akbayan's Alliance with the Aquino Administration

HANSLEY A. JULIANO

ABSTRACT. Akbayan Citizen's Action Party's participation in the Aquino administration is fueling continuing tensions not only between and among its leaders and members but also between the party and its allied social movements. What does this reveal about the nature and dynamics of leftist group participation in Philippine politics? This study is a reappraisal of the contested democracy framework, nuancing it with the Goldstone-Desai framework on social movement consolidation. By reviewing Akbayan's official party documents and archival studies of Philippine social movements, as well as interviewing key informants and engaging in participant observation, I recount how Akbayan's alliance with the Liberal Party (LP), leading to its role as coalition partner of the administration of President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III, exhibits the limitations of formalizing coalition networks into a uniform political party. The leadership of the party, in their pursuit of electoral victory and bureaucratic appointments, appears to deviate from the aforementioned intent of their allied social movements to address the sociopolitical issues they carry. The anti-administration stance of Akbayan's labor ally, the Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL), the less-optimistic views of the rural-poor organization Kilusang para sa Repormang Pansakahan at Katarungang Panlipunan (KATARUNGAN, Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice), and the bolting-out from Akbayan of their rural sector ally, the Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (PAKISAMA, National Confederation of Small Farmers' and Fishers' Organizations) are highly illustrative examples. The party leadership, their allied movements, and their members vary in the priority they give to government-based tactics to address such issues. This, in turn, explains the dissonances and tensions between the network of Akbayan, and why other leftist parties continue to pose real challenges to their efforts. These tensions could explain why, despite their constant presence in national politics, Akbayan's capacity to effect change remains challenged in the context of a dynamically evolving status quo of patronage politics in the country to date.

KEYWORDS. Akbayan · contested democracy · National Democratic Front · Philippine Left · alliances · coalitions · Liberal Party · Philippine political parties

Introduction

The election of President Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III in 2010 was charged with nostalgia for the politics of the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution and has been analysed and subjected to overly optimistic hopes of upholding this "legacy of People Power."[1] With the death of his mother, former president Corazon Cojuangco-Aquino, on 1 August 2009, from colon cancer, Aquino was catapulted to a presidential race he did not expect to run in by a groundswell of support from civil society groups (Castañeda 2009). This compelled the then-standard bearer of the Liberal Party (LP), Manuel "Mar" Roxas II, to give way and serve as his running-mate for the vice-presidency (Ager 2009). Aquino's victory at the polls, despite the defeat of Roxas, was accepted with almost-universal acclaim, with *Time* magazine even declaring him one of the "100 Most Influential People in The World" in 2013 (Chua-Eoan 2013).

Subsequent developments under his watch (the Priority Development Assistance Fund scandals, the Mamasapano clash, and the near-execution of overseas worker Mary Jane Veloso to name a few), however, have put into serious question the substance and credibility of his administration's reform agenda. For a presidency largely brought into power by the confluence of many sections of society including civil society, religious movements, and issue-based social movements, its achievements and shortcomings may very well be emblematic of the current configuration of possibilities for political action in the Philippines. Considering political reform movements have been one of the long-standing and prided achievements of the post-authoritarian Philippine liberal democratic state since the 1990s (Encarnacion Tadem 2009, 2, 20; Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 237–42), their presence has become a large, if not persistent factor in shaping and determining the direction of democratization in the country. Moreover, their actions have contributed, for better or ill, in the political maturity and development of Philippine local and national politics (Diamond 1999, 235; Hilhorst 2003, 232; Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 266–67).

For the purposes of my study, I find the presence of a self-avowed "democratic socialist" political party in the coalition network of the Aquino administration of particular importance. Claiming and performing the functions of a parliamentary leftist political party and sociopolitical movement, Akbayan Citizens' Action Party (Akbayan) appeared to be the locus of intersection by which peoples' movements,

reformist political groups, and civil society assemblages converge and participate. This network of movements claims to be the representation of new possibilities for a Philippine leftist politics independent of the struggles of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)—with its participation in the political changes brought by the 1986 EDSA revolution leaving much to be desired since its ranks suffered an ideological split in 1992 (Quimpo 2008, 91; Aceron et al. 2011, 116–17). With the CPP's above-ground front (the National Democratic Front or NDF) experiencing visible competition against other political groupings (Akbayan among them),[2] I believe a visible observation must be reiterated, if only because it is rarely voiced out. There is no single "Philippine Left." As I see it, there are only multiple groups competing with each other to most credibly claim the title—and Akbayan is merely one of them. These dynamics, however, are in themselves theoretically and strategically contentious—especially considering that it has been argued that to think that "the counter-hegemonic struggle will necessarily take on a singular economic class character" is fallacious, and thus "the 'plurality of social struggles' cannot be managed by a single political party" (Weekley 2001, 4).

The history involved in organizing Akbayan's network of movements to their alliance with the current administration should point to insights that could modulate how analyses of Philippine leftist movements have been made. Akbayan claims to offer potential alternatives to armed struggle and extra-institutional pressures through their simultaneous non-institutional struggles and reformist presences in government. This project remains a source of tension, not only between them and their competitors but more so within their ranks. While such competitions occurring could be explained as part of internal party discipline (Van Dyke 2003, 231–32; Przeworski 1985, 24–25), that such debates continue since the 1992 split within the CPP suggests that the participants may be missing some vital questions and variables.

In this study, I therefore ask: Why is Akbayan's participation in the Aquino administration fuelling tensions not only between and among its leaders and members but also between the party and its allied social movements? What do these tensions reveal about the nature and dynamics of participation of leftist groups in Philippine electoral politics? While an integral view of democracy (Quimpo 2008) argues that participation in a liberal-democratic structure is the expected, sole viable direction for leftist politics, Akbayan's experience puts this

appraisal to question. In viewing itself as a party that is independent from the social movements, it fosters a level of detachment from the movements' issues, which contribute largely to the internal and external tensions that members and allied networks have with the party leadership. These tensions involve alienation from an increasingly governance-centric political tactic, an unsettling comfort with taking part in bureaucratic concerns, and a perceived neglect of the issues of currently marginalized sectors in the policy and advocacy level. I thus propose a hypothesis on this end: The leadership of the party, in their pursuit of electoral victory and bureaucratic appointments, appear to deviate from the aforementioned intent of their allied social movements to address the sociopolitical issues they carry. The party leadership, their allied movements, and their members greatly vary in the priority they give to the importance of government-based tactics (which operate largely around national and Metro Manila politics) to address such issues. This, in turn, explains the tensions among the network partners of Akbayan and could thus be used to explain why the party's capacity to effect change remains challenged in the context of a dynamically evolving status quo of patronage politics in the country to date.

The Need for Hybridity: An Integrated Framework

Accessible literatures regarding social movements and political parties in the Philippines are arguably limited in their theoretical underpinnings, as well as their tendency to view each movement as unique and unlikely to be part of a wider-yet-relatively consistent politico-ideological environment.[3] In addition, whatever documentation comes up detailing their histories appears self-edifying, denying the student of social struggles a more critical documentary appraisal.[4] Akbayan is not different in this aspect, in that there is a gap in the literature with regard to the internal politics and tensions that have characterized the networks that make up and support Akbayan. Such a gap inhibits Philippine leftist movements' appreciation of their precocious situation in Philippine politics, where their notions of activism and waging reforms for social change remain static.

For this study, I will use an amalgam of two existing frameworks regarding party-movement relations. First and vital is Goldstone-Desai's framework of social movements–political party formation/maintenance (Desai 2003), initially used in analyzing the cases of the Communist Socialist Party in Kerala and the Communist Party of

India of West Bengal, and why, despite having similar programs, and why, despite having similar platforms, the Kerala party was able to gain a majority government while the West Bengali party did not. This framework shall be complemented with Nathan Gilbert Quimpo's contested democracy framework, which attempts to address existing realities for Philippine leftist movements and primarily argues that while "oligarchs, caciques, bosses and *trapos* are still very dominant in Philippine politics . . . their predatory rule has been challenged and continues to be challenged by the poor and marginalized" (Quimpo 2008, 48).

Illustrating how social movements act as political parties and vice versa, the circular figures marked 1–4 denote the dynamics involved (see figure 1):

1. Cyclical institutional politics as a system with its own rules, which could be affected;
2. Protest actions mobilized by social movements to affect institutional politics, while the state (the repository of institutional politics) can similarly deploy such tactics;
3. Associational actions like network-building and alliance-forging that affect the standing and capacity of both the state and social movements to maintain their institutional integrity as well as their capacity to enact their political projects; and
4. Any social movement involved, which in this case will be Akbayan.

Considering that social movements/political parties, by virtue of their fluid identities, can engage formal and institutional politics in a variety of ways, it is understood that Akbayan could conduct itself accordingly, all for their so-called purpose of enunciating integral democratic politics. This also applies to member movements and agents within the reach of Akbayan (which I label broadly as sectoral groups, issue-based groups, and individuals).

Taking from the above theoretical frameworks, my study attempts to explain how the tensions inside the network of Akbayan occur. Internal debates between pragmatism and ideological fealty, as Akbayan's case will show, are significant in determining a party's consolidation and survival. It has been argued that a political party, in its very construction, employs political articulation, largely defined as the



Figure 1. Conceptual framework integrating the Goldstone-Desai and Quimpo frameworks.

"process through which party practices naturalize class, ethnic, and racial formations as a basis of social division by integrating disparate interests and identities into coherent socio-political blocs" (De Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2009, 194–95). Debates and tensions inside movements, therefore, are expected to happen. The only difference is how skilful a party is in maneuvering its programs and political projects to consolidate its ranks.

What puts a party in tension with its affiliated movements and networks, however, is the fact that social movements have the potential and capacity to wage their own notion of politics (or, for that matter, build their own political parties to represent them in Congress). While Akbayan's party leadership maintains their commitment to strengthening liberal democracy, the affiliate movements' dissatisfaction with the issues the Aquino administration focuses on leads them to

clamor for extra-institutional political projects beyond the formal line of the party. Depending on how Akbayan is able to deal with these transforming relationships, the party might be able to maintain the status quo of its working alliances or experience potential key changes in turn (see figure 1).

I precisely chose to use and build upon the contested democracy framework and the Goldstone-Desai framework due to key indispensable relations that both frameworks tackle. In my view, Quimpo's contested democracy framework uncritically looks at liberal democratic governance, considering his claim that "[f]ormal democracy, despite its deficiencies, provides the opportunity for subordinate classes and communities to push for popular empowerment, and, further, for a more equitable distribution of the country's wealth, and ultimately bring about a stable, more participatory and egalitarian democracy" (Quimpo 2008, 53). This optimistic view visibly ignores an existing counterargument to it. Wherein Quimpo views the state as a space of contention separate from elites and popular movements, it has also been contended that states are constructions of specific power relations that can (and will) limit the actual extent of participation and reform possible. As Abrams notes, any state's construction serves an "ideological function" that allows for "conservatives and radicals alike believ[ing] that their practice is not directed at each other but at the state" (1988, 82). In prioritizing capturing positions and appropriating state power, political actors become susceptible to what has been labelled in Gramscian thought as transformism/*trasformismo,* which refers to

> a lack of programmatic distinction between the different political parties emerged on the electoral terrain, and thus with no stable connection with defined social groups. Transformism is, first of all, the exclusion of the masses from the management of the state, and it is always a sign of political hegemony on the part of moderates. (De Nardis and Caruso 2011, 15)

It is perhaps more prudent to look at the role that Philippine leftist groups can play inside state structures less optimistically than has been borne out above, lest we risk perpetuating an unrealistic view of a political situation wherein "the world of illusion prevails" (Abrams 1988, 82). The Goldstone-Desai framework, by its capability of integrating peculiar situations, opportunities, and shifts of power practice among actors and subjects, allows us an appreciation of the complexities of leftist participation in liberal democracy. One should note that both the Kerala and West Bengal parties have been operational

for decades (since 1934 for the Communist Socialist Party, and 1964 for the Communist Party of India), while Akbayan has so far only been operational for about eighteen years (1998–2016). Nevertheless, my preference for the Goldstone-Desai framework is helped by the fact that, in my view, Akbayan's situation exhibits a curious mixture of elements found in the case studies Desai observed. As a political party growing out of social movements, Akbayan has been organizing within the grassroots and various sectors while linked with civil society and mainstream reformists (similar to the Kerala Communist Party of India). Yet, its current presence in the Aquino administration has, in one way or another, reignited tensions and feelings of neglect among the sectors the party was supposed to represent (like the West Bengali case). A seeming disconnect of directions and priorities between Akbayan and its constituents has become apparent.

To fully substantiate the arguments I will make below, I employed several data gathering methods, which include (1) archival research (studying internal documents of the party that are open to the public, classified documents, and relevant literature to Philippine leftist social movements); (2) key interviews (conducted with Akbayan's former party-list representatives Walden F. Bello and Arlene "Kaka" J. Bag-ao, Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka [PAKISAMA, National Movement for Farmer Organizations] national coordinator Raul Socrates Banzuela, and Kilusang para sa Repormang Pansakahan at Katarungang Panlipunan [KATARUNGAN, Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice] secretary-general Danilo Carranza; (3) a focus group discussion (held with the mass movement organization Alliance of Progressive Labor [APL], led by its then-secretary-general Josua Mata, its then-chairperson Daniel Edralin, and two other members who requested anonymity); and (4) my own experiences and observations as a former member of Akbayan's youth wing, Akbayan Youth, falling under participant observation.[5]

Leftist Movements in the Philippines and Worldwide

What denotes a "leftist" political platform in the Philippines? One can take the argument that a "Philippine leftist" movement operates along the understanding that "it must decipher the complexities of ruling class hegemony in its particular time and culture and engage in a historically specific counter-hegemonic struggle, in all major institutions of state and civil society" (Weekley 2001, 4). In practice, this must

mean that "one of the most important tasks" of a leftist movement is to "force the state to play a different role from that of executive committee for the bourgeoisie, i.e., one that instead gives structural support to democracy and rights, redistributes social wealth and protects the weak" (Weekley 2010, 54).

With persisting issues continuously espoused by different Philippine leftist movements, discussions about their prospects and futures continue animatedly. We can glean from studies of social movements in the Philippines that these movements are not wholly detached from the predicaments that have been plaguing political organizations in the world for the past years. Even before the end of the Cold War in 1989, questions regarding broad leftist prospects for governance already existed, insofar as they continue to attempt gaining political power within the confines of existing liberal democracy. Przeworski, for example, gives a very sobering (if not cynical) appraisal of what and where the leftist projects at the time usually led to (Przeworski 1985, 41). Socialist and social-democratic political parties in Europe, according to him, tend to inevitably face the conflict of whether they will maintain their priorities and policy directions as befitting a workers'/peoples' party, or take the more catchall approach that takes the form of a conscientious nationalism, which will attract people of many classes in supporting welfare-state policies. The choice of the CPP to characterize its struggle as primarily national-democratic (Weekley 2010, 50–51), as well as the nascent arguments of the self-identified Filipino social-democratic movements, suggests this observation also holds true in the Philippines.[6]

The defocusing of the workers' and peoples' movements will inevitably lead to the dissolution of their relationships with marginalized groups. However, if they continue to maintain a workers-only membership, they will remain marginal as a party—especially since many working peoples and precarious groups do not automatically attribute their problems to class struggle (Przeworski 1985, 15, 24–27). By the end of the Cold War, parties in general apparently faced newer challenges, as well as suffering from a continuing de-legitimization with regard to their hitherto credible leadership and source of access to political participation. It was suggested that "political parties now have lost their rooting in society and increasingly depend on the resources of the state" (Kersbergen 1995, 246). At the same time, parties were forced "to open up to new movements in the hope of reaching those sectors of the population . . . whose political relevance can no longer be ignored" (Hellman 1992, 60).[7]

The situations in different countries in Latin America, however, gave causes for optimism, considering the leftist political parties were actually able to enter government in local levels. Goldfrank, for his part, argued that the cases of the Chilean Socialists, the Brazilian Social Democrats, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party) in Brazil, and the Broad Front in Uruguay show how leftist movements "remain[ing] critical and continu[ing] the search for other options" may indeed pay off (Goldfrank 2004, 194). Compared to Przeworski's negative appraisal of extending constituencies for leftist political parties, Baiocchi argued, in the experience of Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil, that while "[o]n one hand, to privilege the party's bases of support might jeopardize its re-election by narrowing the spectrum of potential supporters; on the other, to broaden excessively the range of social demands risks disfiguring the party's redistributive platform and alienating its bases of support" (Baiocchi 2003, 15), the solution to such dilemmas would be "political"—that is, to struggle and continuously find ways to "negotiate with diverse groups and build a temporary consensus" (Baiocchi 2003, 16).

The continuing growth of social movements espousing leftist platforms despite unfavorable circumstances, as evidenced by the discussions above, continues to provide possibilities for resistance and the enactment of new arrangements. Of course, any potential victory toward the capture of state power and the possibility of taking the reins of governance has to be handled carefully, especially since "this activity lasted only as long as the campaigns themselves [. . . .] If grassroots organizations are demobilized and their militants excluded from political participation, the consequential alienation of this sector will weaken the democratic forces. To some extent, this process has already begun, leaving bitterness and disillusionment in its wake" (Schneider 1992, 275). Model narratives in the developing countries of social democratic governments supposedly empower their citizens and push forward social welfare policies. These narratives notwithstanding, they should be viewed critically and should actually give us pause.[8]

In the Philippines, the emergence and proliferation of nongovernment organizations during the 1980s (with efforts that has sustained themselves ever since) do suggest that "grassroots organizations or people's organizations provide a basis for meaningful participation," even as their effects remain largely indirect (Silliman and Noble 1998, 307). Inasmuch as they contribute to the development of civil society, entrenched elite interests remain difficult to actually combat (Eaton 2003, 490). Hence, the space for participation in the party-list system,

enshrined in the 1987 Constitution (art. 6, sec. 5) to constitute 20 percent of the total House representatives, which should be "filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This fluidity of identification could be delineated along class-mass parties, formally defined as parties where "the centre of power and authority . . . is located in the executive committee of its secretariat, although formally the ultimate source of legitimate authority is the full party congress" (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 179). This also allows for "considerable intraparty conflict, particularly between pragmatists whose primary concern is electoral victory and ideologues who place much higher value on 'constituency representation'" (Gunther and Diamond 2003, 179).

Precisely because of such dynamics, protest organizing, political education, and institutional parliamentary engagement by Philippine leftist political parties persisted through the years. Inspired by the Latin American possibilities, both of the more prominent leftist parties in the Philippines, Bayan Muna (Country First) and Akbayan, took to local politics and strengthening grassroots bases in order to build up clout for their long-term national struggles (Quimpo 2008, 161). However, despite their being on the same side of the political spectrum, leftist parties remain isolated from one another and sometimes actively cultivate such distance. Thus far, it would appear, they "have managed to forge only tactical alliances, often only on particular issues and concerns," and it was argued that "[i]f the new, leftist groups want to become a truly significant force for the deepening of democracy in the Philippines, they will have move (sic) into more strategic unities and alliances" (Lopez-Wui 2009, 312).

Coalition to Party to Coalition: Akbayan's Development as a "Democratic Leftist" Movement

Studying Akbayan's history and directions is a continuing project, inasmuch as its very existence, identity, and effort to position itself in the Philippine liberal democratic space remain in contest and fluid. As early as its formation, a conscious effort toward organizing a political movement that is alternative, more expansive, and more inclusive and "friendlier" to parliamentary politics than existing Communist movements is evident among the movements that would eventually

form Akbayan. It is documented to have been initially composed of four political blocs (Quimpo 2008, 64–68; Dionisio, Karaos, and Santiago-Oreta 2011, 84): the Movement for Popular Democracy, Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa (BISIG, Collective for the Promotion of Socialist Thought and Practice), Pandayan para sa Sosyalistang Pilipinas (Pandayan, Forging a Socialist Philippines), and Siglo ng Paglaya (Siglaya, Century of Liberation), another "democratic bloc" from the national democrats that split from the CPP, eventually reorganizing under the Padayon bloc.

At the time of the party's founding, Bello, then an academic from the University of the Philippines' Department of Sociology and a transnational activist since the martial law period, was hailed founding chairperson (Bello 2012). With its eventual expansion, Akbayan began forging relationships with sector-based organizations. While Akbayan membership is determined on an individual basis, these organizations became the main source of members and mass bases for the party.[9] This motley assembly of various and varying peoples' organizations could be explained as among one of the developments within Philippine civil society and social movements, coming from the opening of spaces by the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, the 1987 Constitution, and the institutionalization of the party-list system in Congress. Coming up with a cohesive and united front for political projects, as it is, remained a challenge, as would be illustrated in the various coalition-building attempts in the wake of the fall of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos—especially when the demand to reframe party-mass movement relations into three-way party–mass movement–constituency relationships arose (Akbayan 1998, 7; Constantino-David 1998, 33–36; Abao 2005, 4–5; Saracho 2012, 231).

Akbayan made waves when it began actively participating in the electoral process in 1998. Its most visible achievements on the national level would be its legislative work in the party-list system. Its representatives have championed national sovereignty and territorial integrity, bills on women's rights, the defense of human rights and redress for human rights violations, social justice and asset reform, promotion of good governance and reform of political institutions, co-sponsored bills on employment rights, foreign policy and international relations, bills seeking to criminalize discrimination against the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community, mandatory human rights courses for military personnel, asking rightful compensation for human rights victims during the martial law period, a National Land

Table 1. Akbayan's electoral performance in the party-list system, 1998–2013

Election Year	Votes	First Representative	Second Representative	Third Representative
1998	232,376	Loretta Ann P. Rosales	n/a	n/a
2001	373,595	Loretta Ann P. Rosales	Mario Aguja	n/a
2004	852,473	Loretta Ann P. Rosales	Mario Aguja	Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel
2007	466,448	Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel	Walden Bello	n/a
2010	1,061,947	Walden Bello	Arlene J. Bag-ao	n/a
2013	829,149	Walden Bello[a]	Ibarra Gutierrez III	n/a

Sources: Fermin 2001; Llamas 2001; Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 2004, 2007, 2010b, 2013.

[a] Bello resigned from his post on March 11, 2015 (Bello 2015; Cayabyab 2015), with his seat subsequently filled by third party-list representative Angelina Ludovice-Katoh (COMELEC 2015).

Use Act, and initiating the debates for legislation on reproductive health care (Akbayan 2001b, 9–13; 2003b, 2–12). Most celebrated was the passage of Republic Act 9189 or the Absentee Voting Law, extending the right to vote for national government positions among overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) (Mercado 2006, 116–17). Eventually, their representatives (enumerated in table 1) advocated public access to information, regulation policies for basic and natural resources, enabling laws for government bureaucracies, as well as strengthening Akbayan's relationships with sectoral organizations and other activist movements, both local and international (Akbayan 2003c).

What is notable about Akbayan's political work is its willingness to participate in different issues that could be conceivably placed under the heading of advocating for social welfare, asset reform, strengthening democratic institutions, and the advancement of the state's institutional interests, even if these are not entirely defined by traditional leftist frameworks. Viewing it consistent with its promises of "transforming

politics," Akbayan has been comfortable with cooperating with congressmen from other political parties, be it from traditional elite political parties or from so-called progressive parties, in creating and passing legislation. It was at this point that Akbayan ventured into allying with another traditional political party: the LP.

LP, despite being among the first political parties in the country, is not entirely the picture of robust party politics in the Philippines. In fact, it has suffered from cyclical massive defections and subsequent returns by political clans and interest groups during and after elections, as determined by the victor of the presidential seat (Kasuya 2009, 34). Nevertheless, it has consistently strived in reinventing itself as "a reformist political party that genuinely addresses the need for political, social, electoral and economic reforms" (Rodriguez 2009, 140). There is, therefore, significance in the very idea of this alliance between Akbayan and LP—if only for the perceived sense of complementarity in the identity, directions, and actions of LP and Akbayan. Both parties subscribe to what has been argued as a liberal tendency in political participation: "reformist, constructive, consultative, and interested in incremental but enduring change . . . the evolution of the status quo into something that at the very least is marginally better than that which came before" (Quezon 2006, 25).

The possibilities being open and inviting during the tail end of the administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Akbayan took up the question of whether the party would be willing to take the opportunity to join a national electoral campaign during their Fourth Regular National Congress. Then-Akbayan party-list representative Bello related that questions on the possibilities of allying with "acceptable traditional parties" have been floating as early as 2007–2008 (Bello 2012). The political report presented during this congress assessed that while Akbayan benefited from its participation in the party-list system, "the democratic opening provided by the party list elections had considerably narrowed" (Akbayan 2009a, 3). It was also in this congress that Akbayan resolved to launch Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros-Baraquel's senatorial candidacy as part of LP's senatorial slate (Akbayan 2009b), which paved the way for the debate on which presidential candidate to carry. Bello and Bag-ao recounted that those supportive of the candidacy of Roxas (then a senator and the LP president) were quite convinced of the possibilities that his "reformist" campaign will be a boon to Akbayan's electoral prospects.

In contrast, more cautious elements in that congress (then led by Ricardo Reyes, a former CPP official and member of Akbayan's Executive Committee) argued that the party be more circumspect of this engagement (Bello 2012; Bag-ao 2012). When consensus was achieved to support Roxas, the resolution passed in 16 August 2009 by Akbayan proclaimed that "Roxas supports our party's platform of political and economic reform that would create a climate of modernity and political pluralism which would be conducive to AKBAYAN's expansion and growth" (Akbayan 2009c). This support carried over to the subsequent shift of the Roxas campaign toward the candidacy of Aquino, following the death of his mother, former president Corazon Cojuangco-Aquino, on 1 August 2009.

Overall, the 2010 electoral campaign was viewed as a relative success, with Akbayan's achievements somewhat satisfactory according to the party's leadership (Bello 2012). Aquino won with 15,208,678 votes (SWS 2010); Akbayan, in turn, was able to garner 9,106,112 votes for Hontiveros-Baraquel's senatorial candidacy, placing her on 13th place, insufficient to get her into the twelve allotted senatorial seats (COMELEC 2010a). The party also got 1,061,947 votes for party-list seats in the House of Representatives, allowing Bello and Bag-ao to participate in Congress (COMELEC 2010b). Their contribution to LP's victory became their stepping-stone in becoming government functionaries.

Subsequent campaigning in the 2013 midterm elections, however, proved less optimistic for Akbayan. The main party's votes were actually reduced to 829,149 votes for party-list seats (COMELEC 2013), yet still enough to seat Bello and Bag-ao's successor, Ibarra "Barry" Gutierrez III, in the House of Representatives. Hontiveros-Baraquel's second attempt to gain a Senate seat was proportionally less successful, considering that the increased votes she garnered (10,840,047) only allowed her to place seventeenth on the list, way outside the allotted seats (*Rappler* 2013).[10] This is remarkable considering that the other main Left-oriented political party, Bayan Muna, also managed to increase its votes in contrast to the 2010 elections (COMELEC 2013; see figure 2). Furthermore, Bag-ao, the previous Akbayan representative, shifted alliances to LP after supposedly being denied re-nomination as a party-list representative. This led to her appointment as a "caretaker representative" of Dinagat Island in 2012 (after its original solon, Ruben Ecleo Jr., was charged with graft cases), subsequently winning her own term in the 2013 elections (Tupaz



Figure 2. Party votes of Left-oriented political parties, 1998–2013. *Sources:* Fermin 2001; Llamas 2001; Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 2004, 2007, 2010b, 2013.

2013). These less-satisfying results, as I will show later, have material and political explanations.

Institutionalizing "Akbayan in Government"

Bello and Bag-ao represented Akbayan in the Fifteenth Congress from 2010 to 2013. To systematize legislative work, the party leadership conceived a collaborative body called Akbayan in Congress. This body compartmentalizes the legislative agendas Akbayan currently holds and will attempt to participate in. Bello holds issues dealing with urban constituencies such as labor and urban poor, as well as OFWs. Bag-ao, in turn, prioritizes issues of the rural sector, specifically farmers, fisherfolk, and indigenous peoples, as well as women's rights and justice-related concerns. The representatives themselves mentioned that while they support each other's assignments, this prioritization scheme reflects their former background as advocates from civil society and peoples' organizations (Bello 2012; Bag-ao 2012).

These engagements and achievements have been a point of pride for both representatives, saying these contribute to their continued efforts of presenting Akbayan as a party that has supposedly maintained its high level of integrity despite being part of a governing coalition. Even if their party is now being tagged as "the President's party list," then-representative Bello is quite confident that the Philippine electorate "sees [Akbayan] as a new kind of Left, as willing to take responsibility, that it is practical and pragmatic . . . [P]eople do see us working on Congress and the streets. [My sense] is that it is a good image" (Bello 2012). Then-representative Bag-ao, in turn, supports this assessment and says that Akbayan, by their assessment, is consistently seen as "the reasonable, democratic Left" compared to other leftist parties in the country (Bag-ao 2012). Viewed as continuations of their legislative work, it is visible that Akbayan is restructuring its dynamics, opening itself for political opportunities while trying to bring its constituencies into play.

On the executive bureaucracy, key Akbayan leaders serve in various positions in government to date, mostly appointed by the president (listed in table 2). To systematize their interventions, the party also conceived a collaborative body specifically called Akbayan in Government. Coming from the party platforms the party has upheld over the past years, specific engagements in government sectors are consolidated in order to give Akbayan a better picture of engagements

Table 2. Key Akbayan leaders in the Aquino administration

Name	Former Position(s) in Akbayan	Held Government Post(s)	Office
Ronald Llamas	Party President	Presidential Adviser	Office of Political Affairs (OPA)
Loretta Ann Rosales	Chair Emeritus, 1st Party-List Representative	Chairperson	Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
Joel Rocamora	Party President	Secretary/Lead Convenor	National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC)
Mario Aguja	2nd Party-List Representative	Member, Board of Trustees	Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
Daniel Edralin	National Vice-Chairperson, Secretary-General	Member and Chairperson for Committee on OFWs	Social Security System (SSS)
Percival Cendaña	National Chairperson	Commissioner-at-Large	National Youth Commission (NYC)
Ana Theresia "Risa" Hontiveros	1st Party-List Representative	Appointive Member, Board of Directors	Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth)

. . . . . .

that could be maximized by the party's access to political power. Akbayan views its presence in office as a means to actualize and execute the party's policy propositions over the years. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Akbayan remains adamant in claiming these positions as victories for their political party, it must be noted that any current developments these offices are advancing are not entirely attributed to Akbayan but still largely to the Aquino administration's entirety (with the Akbayan label remaining a minor functionary). The direction Akbayan takes in the current Aquino administration is presented to be consistent with the struggle for good governance and social welfare. Discourses inside the movement itself, however, show that this front is not as unified or consistent as it claims.

Table 2 *(continued)*

Name	Former Position(s) in Akbayan	Held Government Post(s)	Office
Angelina Ludovice-Katoh	Member	Commissioner[a]	Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor
Tomasito Villarin	Member	Undersecretary	Office of Political Affairs (OPA); Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Gibby Gorres	Member, Akbayan Youth	Member	Youth and Students Sectoral Council, National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC)
Gio Tingson	Member, Akbayan Youth	Commissioner for Natural Resources	National Youth Commission (NYC)

Sources: Cay and Nonato 2014, 64–65. Other information were drawn from publicly available data online from the Presidential Communications Operations Office, Commission on Human Rights, National Anti-Poverty Commission, Government Service Insurance System, Social Security System, National Youth Commission, and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation.

[a] Note: Ludovice-Katoh left her post to serve as party-list representative following Walden Bello's resignation as first party-list representative effective March 11, 2015 (COMELEC 2015; *GMA News* 2015).

Limits to Akbayan's Agency and Opportunities—Demobilizing Threats

Akbayan's currently amicable relationship with the Aquino administration has attracted its own share of supporters and detractors. While the party does find its newfound image as a potent governing element a positive development, it would be inaccurate to say that the entire network of Akbayan (as well as its audience) believes the same

way. Akbayan's transition from mass movement organizing into governance spaces has sparked tensions and frictions from its allies in civil society and mass movements. The departure of PAKISAMA from being a mass movement ally of Akbayan, the APL's continuously critical take on the Aquino administration, as well as the dissatisfaction of the still-allied rural group KATARUNGAN, point to contradictions in the party structure and its avowed principles. Akbayan's relationship with the labor and agrarian reform movements suggests that the party's focus on winning national political posts is posing problems to their long-standing mass bases.

The APL was formally organized in November 1996 during its National Founding Congress, seeing itself as "a 'national' labor center" that "draw[s] into its fold various forms of labor organizations and not just trade unions," thus emphasizing its pluralistic origins and yet moving toward a "union structure consolidated along industry and geographical lines" (APL 2006, 1). The movement is one of the founding members of Akbayan as discussed earlier, even if their internal policy says that their membership in Akbayan is on an individual basis. Josua Mata, secretary-general of APL, related that APL enforces such a policy "in order to assure that there is autonomy between the party and the movements, while there is coordination between them" (APL 2012).

With this arrangement between APL and Akbayan, it is thus remarkable for the former (and a point of pride for them) that despite backing and supporting the latter, they "have always believed that the party should be accountable to the mass movements; but the mass movements are not accountable to the party" (APL 2012). Due to this level of autonomy, APL separates its stances from Akbayan's alliance with Aquino. They stated that they have never supported the LP-led coalition government, since coalition talks began with Roxas and the Akbayan leadership. APL's members figured in the debates of Akbayan's Third National Congress, voicing vocal dissent against supporting Roxas.[11] When the LP candidacy was transferred to Aquino, APL, having broadened itself as the Sentro ng mga Nagkakaisa at Progresibong Manggagawa (SENTRO, Center for United and Progressive Workers), posed the condition that they will only endorse Aquino should he support the movement's "labor agenda proposal." Negotiation, however, fell through—and thus "APL never endorsed the Liberal Party and I don't think we will" (APL 2012).

APL remained skeptical of the relationship Akbayan has with the president. They also raised concerns on how Akbayan's links with the

president had a "demobilizing effect" on the party's membership. APL pointed to the party's allegedly "turning lukewarm" in supporting social movement struggles, like issues of labor contractualization, political dynasties (the president being part of one), and the layoff of workers from Philippine Airlines affiliated with the workers' union Philippine Airlines Employees' Association. APL traced this commitment to criticism to their view that the Aquino administration has no capacity to enact long-term systemic overhauls or reforms: in fact, they believe that Aquino's administration "is a government that was elected by the people, but essentially carries an elitist, pro-landlord, pro-capitalist interest" (APL 2012).

The two subject agrarian reform movements trace their beginnings from a series of consultations conducted by the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas immediately after the 1986 People Power Revolution (Putzel 1998, 88). PAKISAMA was comprised of and consolidated with organizations from around "70% of the provinces in the country and participated in by more than 10,000 peasant leaders." The August 1986 national consultation thus resolved to build "a strong national alliance that will push for genuine agrarian and aquatic reform, rural development, and the protection of peasants' rights" (PAKISAMA 2015). Currently, PAKISAMA has also ventured into piloting agribusiness efforts, opening opportunities for higher incomes and productivity among its member farmers as well. They also continue to engage campaigns for policy reforms and similar legislative agendas in different capacities (Banzuela 2012).

For its part, KATARUNGAN is formally identified as "a grassroots-based network of peasant organizations established in December 2007, with presence in 15 provinces nationwide" (ISS 2015a). However, its secretary-general Danilo Carranza noted that the mass bases which participate in KATARUNGAN were formerly part of the larger rural mass movements of the CPP, which left it during the 1992 split (Carranza 2013). The mass bases that eventually gave rise to KATARUNGAN (such as rural poor communities within the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac, and the Negros Island), furthermore, have also been organized in partnership with the nongovernment organization Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights Services (RIGHTS) (RIGHTS Network 2012). Primarily, the member organizations and activists of KATARUNGAN are advocating for the "land redistribution of around 100,000 hectares of private and public lands and grant of ancestral domain titles. Several chapters of KATARUNGAN are also

resisting land grabbing especially in areas that are being developed for eco-tourism purposes" (ISS 2015b).

Carranza and the current national coordinator for PAKISAMA, Raul Socrates Banzuela, related that when the party-list law was approved in 1995, they were already participating in the consolidation of Akbayan, in the hope that there would also be avenues for participation in a party that professed to be composed of democratic leftist forces/movements. Akbayan's subsequent victory and representation in Congress thus also became a foothold for both KATARUNGAN and PAKISAMA's political efforts (Banzuela 2012; Carranza 2013).[12] Banzuela noted how a majority of them subscribed to Akbayan's platforms and its political programs. Their participation in Akbayan and its coalitional efforts from 1998 to 2009 were similarly motivated. PAKISAMA expanded Akbayan's linkages in the rural development sector on different levels (local, national, and international levels) (Banzuela 2012).

As PAKISAMA expanded, it had been very active in pushing for agendas involving the rights and concerns of farmers. Their most celebrated victory, also counted as a landmark policy development by the rural sector movements, was the campaign of the Sumilao farmers of Bukidnon to win back their 144 hectares of ancestral and productive farmland wrested by the San Miguel Corporation (Banzuela 2012), supported by Arlene "Kaka" J. Bag-ao, then a lawyer and organizer for the Akbayan-allied Balay Alternative Legal Advocates for Development in Mindanaw (Niemelä 2009; Bag-ao 2012). Their partnership with Akbayan, however, was complicated as of Akbayan's Fourth Regular National Congress, the same event inaugurating the alliance with LP. While Akbayan confirmed the alliance with Roxas, PAKISAMA and KATARUNGAN expressed their reservations on the alliance, while still agreeing that LP (and by extension, Aquino) is the most acceptable choice at advancing an agrarian reform agenda (Banzuela 2012; Carranza 2013).

The publicized promise of Aquino during the formal launch of his campaign on 9 February 2010, to actually distribute Hacienda Luisita before June 2014 (Sisante 2010) apparently strengthened PAKISAMA's optimism. However, when they began lobbying Aquino even during the campaign period to begin distributing Hacienda Luisita's lands, going so far as to talk about it in Aquino's campaign headquarters with their allied federations inside the hacienda, all they got were vague

concessions, which are yet to be acted upon up to this day (Banzuela 2012). This became one of their impetuses to eventually bolt out of Akbayan. Banzuela (2012) recounts PAKISAMA's own Council Meeting in Aklan held sometime in September 2009, where the observation was made that "for the past eight to ten years, not a single representative of Akbayan came from the basic sectors. All the representatives were coming from the professional sector [. . . .][T]hose leading the nomination for representatives [are] chosen for 'winnability.' And you will find that there's no affirmative action from the party to put anybody from the basic sectors among the first three nominees." Sealing their decision to become independent was their acknowledgment of the fact that, for all intents and purposes, Akbayan was first and foremost a national political party that targeted national electoral and governmental prominence. These seemed too limiting to PAKISAMA's long-term project of ensuring that the leaders of the rural sectors (farmers, fisherfolk, and indigenous communities) themselves could become their legislative representatives. Remaining in Akbayan would mean continuing to be represented by professionals, which runs counter to their sectoral aspirations (Banzuela 2012).

In light of the immediate aftermath of the 2013 midterm elections, Carranza observed that Akbayan actually has had very limited success in pushing for the actual and substantive implementation of agrarian reform. It was hoped that the supposed-proximity of Akbayan leaders within Aquino's cabinet (Llamas foremost among them) would sway Aquino toward actually deploying political pressure to Congress for the extension of Republic Act 9700 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms Law. In reality, these moves were frustrated time and again from 2012 onward, no less in part due to Aquino's retention of Agrarian Reform Secretary Virgilio de los Reyes (Carranza 2013), who has been consistently criticised by nationwide agrarian reform advocates due to his dismal performance of land distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Manahan 2013, 16). While KATARUNGAN continues to participate in inter-civil society and intra-movement advocacies for agrarian reform, they have chosen to carry limited expectations of Akbayan's clout in government, considering a majority of their advocacies have received very limited support from Akbayan (Carranza 2013).

Contradictions for "A Party in the Corridors of Power"

There is a shared sentiment among the leaders of APL, KATARUNGAN's Carranza, and PAKISAMA's Banzuela on how the composition, priorities, and ideological dispositions of the tight network of party leaders have affected and glossed over whatever differences and tensions the party's component blocs might have had over the years. These dynamics are very comparable to Manali Desai's analyses of the Communist Party of India in Kerala and the Communist Party of India in West Bengal, which I used as a model for my observation. Most marked among her arguments would be that despite the pioneering activists coming from the upper castes of their respective local societies, their organizing efforts, directions, and critical approaches are highly different from one another.[13]

While the party leaders suggest that this is a part of the party's consolidation and maturation as a political agency (Bag-ao 2012; Bello 2012), the movements think that this might be actually contributing to the party's bureaucratization, becoming less accountable to the comprising mass movements (APL 2012). The respondents point to the increasing primacy of former leaders from the BISIG bloc, led by Secretary Ronald Llamas, as the likely root of such recent developments.[14] The leaders of APL, KATARUNGAN, and PAKISAMA voiced concerns on whether the party is still maintaining its integrity as a politico-social movement that is answerable to the leftist mass movements comprising it. APL Chairperson Daniel Edralin calls the party's problematic vagueness of positioning "*dikit-ism*" or the party's pandering to people in influential positions in government. Mata added that it was beginning to disturb them that Akbayan's cozy relationship with LP led the party to start regulating criticism of the administration, with BISIG-affiliated leaders allegedly expressing displeasure at APL's highly critical rhetoric against the administration (APL 2012).

That its component social movements, APL, KATARUNGAN, and PAKISAMA, continue to find their identities as social movements-cum-people's organizations an important counterbalance to Akbayan's increasingly transforming nature suggests that these organizations find something in the party's directions that no longer corresponds to their initial agreements, and that their identities as social movements with their own prerogatives and priorities should be asserted if not made paramount (illustrated in figure 3). Akbayan's currently amorphous identity, while still able to relate with social movements, has been subjected to questioning, especially their perceived benefiting from



Figure 3. Framework illustration of subject social movements' relationships with Akbayan

access to governmental influence and resources. Current and former members of Akbayan have begun questioning whether the party is still an independent movement, considering it has received vast amounts of technical and financial support from LP's (and by extension, Aquino's) network (Cay and Nonato 2014).[15] This serves as a double-edged quality that has inspired the appreciation of formalistic, process-oriented civil society groups, yet also stimulated resentment from sectors dissatisfied with the fact that Akbayan participates in the strengthening of this still-contentious status quo. While working to facilitate détentes between government offices and select civil society groups, it nonetheless neglects other interests of other sectors of society whose relationship to governance remains problematic.

Quo Vadis: Who's Left, Really?

Akbayan's position in the Aquino government, rather than opening spaces for dialogue between such competing leftist parties, narrowed spaces further and polarized these parties against each other. Bayan

Muna's existence since 2001 as a leading party-list group was seen as a testament to the NDF's existing mass bases and the continuing appreciation of the national democrats' political program (Caouette 2004, 657). This subsequent development did pose challenges for Akbayan's efforts to project itself as a democratic leftist political party during this time. Curiously, the issues that Bayan Muna would uphold (reflected by the allied organizations of its parent movement Bagong Alyansang Makabayan or Bayan) would include rights for the education sector, youth, women, workers, peasants and fisherfolks, indigenous peoples and the urban poor, government employees, religious social action groups, as well as OFWs, the very sectors Akbayan attempts to consolidate under their umbrella organizations.[16]

The persistent subculture of negative identification within Akbayan (herewith defined as "publicly presenting Akbayan as 'not the national democrats' and building political capital from such identification")[17] actually limits its capacity toward properly enunciating its own independent, stable, and long-standing political program. Such a stance seems ironic, if one will consider the general voter trend of Akbayan to the cumulative Makabayan[18] voter total since 2001. There is a remarkable parallelism regarding their dips and spikes in voter share—suggesting that voter perception of them may not be entirely differentiated at all (see figure 4).[19]

Inasmuch as Akbayan's position has been a conscious effort to inaugurate a "democratic leftist" politics that can engage and change Philippine governance apparatus, records are aplenty to show that this identity has also been forged retroactively (and remains to be sustained as such).[20] Its alliance with LP could be seen in this light as the opportunity for Akbayan to perform its potential as a social movement inside government structures on its own terms (more accurately, its own terms of what "leftist governance" should be). Thus, their activities and narratives were rewritten and expanded in order to highlight this change in their relative position to power. Due to this, the tussles that Akbayan had with an evolving NDF intensified in the current administration. This points to existing realities, both historical and sociopolitical, suggesting that this contest among similar constituencies still show the inability of Akbayan to truly divorce itself from the cultural legacy of the NDF.

It was initially hoped that redressing factional differences could still be achieved (Navarro and Elumbre 2011, 84). After all, former representative Bello himself, when he was interviewed earlier for this study, would recall how he worked together with some parties from the

NDF on key legislation and that "overall, despite ideological differences, the antagonism is not as high as it was five or six years ago" (Bello 2012). The lead-up to the 2013 midterm elections, however, saw their tussles taking a turn for the less-amicable. The allegations of "un-genuine" representation of the country's "marginalized sectors" thrown between Akbayan and Anakbayan (another NDF-affiliated movement, in turn among the organizations instrumental in the foundation of Kabataan Partylist) triggered by Commission on Election's (COMELEC) attempt to disqualify "unqualified" party lists during the first weeks of October 2012 point to the possibilities of their tensions devolving further into low-brow oppositionism, likely stimulated by their concern for their possible political futures.[21] While both parties were eventually cleared to participate in the 2013 elections, Akbayan would receive fewer votes than Bayan Muna, Anakbayan's senior coalition partner in the oppositional Makabayan bloc (as shown in figure 2).

The exposure of corruption scandals involving officials affiliated with the president also posed subsequent challenges to Akbayan. The Priority Development Assistance Fund scandal (which involved House representatives and senators laundering public money for their own benefit via the alleged assistance of businesswoman Janet Lim-Napoles) led to an outpouring of outrage and protests. Largest among these protests was the "Million People March," which occurred on 26 August 2013, attended by at least seventy-five thousand Filipinos from various socioeconomic classes. The presence of Akbayan and other partisan Left movements, normally expected to spearhead such movements, were markedly de-emphasized (Calonzo 2013). The Supreme Court subsequently declared the Priority Development Assistance Fund practice unconstitutional (*Belgica et al. vs. Ochoa et al.*, G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013). The same verdict of unconstitutionality was handed down against the executive budgetary policy known as the Disbursement Acceleration Program or DAP (*Araullo et al. vs. Aquino et al.*, G.R. No. 209287, 1 July 2014). Akbayan chose to justify the Aquino government's previous actions on these ends as supposedly consistent with government policy (Akbayan Party-List 2014), earning them harsh criticisms from competing leftist movements (KMU 2014).

With negative press about the Aquino administration's credibility beginning to increase substantially, then-Akbayan Representative Bello sent an unsolicited letter dated 9 August 2014, attempting to convince the president to fire budget secretary Florencio "Butch" Abad (the



Figure 4. Comparative voter share, 1998–2013. *Sources:* Fermin 2001; Llamas 2001; Commission on Elections (COMELEC) 2004, 2007, 2010b, 2013.

architect of the DAP program) and agrarian reform secretary Virgilio de los Reyes (on account of the latter's continued failure in implementing existing agrarian reform laws), if the government was to continue pursuing reforms with credibility. Aquino, however, dismissed this exhortation and stood by his cabinet secretaries (Cabacungan 2014), with the leadership of Akbayan officially issuing a message disowning Bello's pronouncements, professing their continued support of the president. This situation, however, led to criticisms by affiliates and allies of Akbayan and even from outside organizations (Casauay 2014). APL (since reorganized into SENTRO) supported Bello's "well-intentioned proposals and constructive criticisms," rebuking Akbayan for its inability to "support the principled position he has taken" (SENTRO 2014).

Further tensions within and outside Akbayan, coinciding with the volatile Mamasapano incident of 25 January 2015,[22] led to Bello's resignation as Akbayan representative on 11 March 2015 (Bello 2015; Cayabyab 2015) and to Ricardo Reyes's resignation from the party entirely on 25 April 2015 (Reyes 2015; Mohideen 2015). SENTRO subsequently exhorted Akbayan to depart from the administration coalition, as continuously protecting it supposedly "open[s] [Akbayan] to many unsavory charges, real and imagined, that will hound us for many years to come, and which will seriously destroy our reputation and future as a political party that purportedly espouses genuine freedom, justice and democracy" (Mero 2015).

This split in the ranks of Akbayan's constituencies became more explicit after Bello's declaration that he is running as an independent Senatorial candidate in the 9 May 2016 National Elections, and Akbayan's open disavowal of his candidacy in favor of Hontiveros-Baraquel's third bid for the Senate, while remaining a part of the LP coalition (Macaraig 2015). As of press time, Hontiveros-Baraquel managed to land in the 10th slot in voter preference, while Bello is trailing at the 30th to 34th range (SWS 2016).[23]

Conclusion

This study dealt with the development, consolidation, reorientation, and subsequent narrative building Akbayan undertook as part of its long-term project to become a leftist political party in power. While making a name for its anti-corruption crusades, the party would also make conscious efforts to position itself as the more accessible and

reasonable ally of different groups in Philippine civil society, at least compared to reemerging traditional political parties (reformist in character or not) and the reconsolidating NDF. Thus, Akbayan allied with what it claimed to be the more reasonable traditional political party with both the machinery and with the possibility of pushing a reform agenda: the LP under Aquino. While this situation afforded Akbayan access to political capital and allowed its members to practice handling power in governance, the party must now reckon with the view that its ascension to power has bereft them of their more critical appraisal of Philippine political realities. The misgivings and tensions the Akbayan is having with the social movements they dealt with (the labor and rural workers' sectors), as well as their members who are currently experiencing dissonance with their actions, are perhaps brought about by their conscious appraisal, review, and reorientation of their history to justify their current governance praxis—something that is not as reflective of the party's membership as previously assumed. That competition from a more agitated NDF would continue to hound Akbayan's existence, its claim to power and its legitimacy as "the democratic Left" appear as something they had expected since their inception, yet something that the party has not fully addressed.

It remains to be seen whether Akbayan has properly assessed the limitations that their narratives and analyses of Philippine politics will afford them in the near future—and whether this will change their seemingly unwavering loyalty to an LP-led administration in spite of the criticisms now being levied at them by opponents, outside observers, and their own allied movements. The question of leftist political agency remains a murky terrain for such "old dogs" whose habits die hard. Philippine leftist movements, I would say, are in a very precarious balancing act of attempting to appeal to a general electorate historically and socially isolated from their political history, while at the same time attempting to transform whatever gains and institutional practices they have achieved. The institutional history and partisan gripes among these leftist political parties remain integral to the question of how a leftist political program might thrive in the country. That their historical tensions remain alive, if kept periodically at bay, is quite understandable. That they seem to be unable to differentiate themselves on other terms (despite their claims to being programmatic parties) remains disturbing.

Integrating the Goldstone-Desai and the Quimpo social movement frameworks turned out to be appropriate in highlighting the transitions

the party is taking. The framework's flexibility and enumeration of key factors for study, I believe, allows it to be utilized for studying most social movements adhering to leftist ideological persuasions, insofar as the situation (1) involves intra-class and bloc interactions within these movements and (2) suggests these tensions will potentially affect the form of governance these movements will adopt presently or in the future, when they formally become ruling political parties. Since Akbayan's practice of contention in the political space has been well-sustained by its linkages, it is unsurprising the party still wants to benefit from it even if it is in government. However, being inside state apparatuses that have their own institutional logic yet still wanting to retain that position, their experiencing levels of tension and negotiation with affiliate and sympathetic social movements is inevitable. Future research into social movements (as well as the potential political parties they could give birth to) would therefore be well served to practice a certain level of sensitivity to the multiplicity of ideals and programmatic approaches within social movements *and* political parties, and not to primarily assume general uniformity among unified political parties or movement coalitions—as befitting the actual, material experience of democratic politics.

Inasmuch as Akbayan remains well-intentioned yet primarily pragmatic in its political projects, it is beginning to run the long-standing risks of most so-called Philippine progressive activist groups,

> well-meaning, but closed-circle, groups presumed to speak for the hearts and minds of the rest of Filipino society . . . end[ing] up as another elite "convenor group" or "council of elders," mouthing what they thought were the priorities and aspirations of the larger part of Filipino society. And yet the social, economic and political cancer is still there—robust and seemingly indestructible. (Hidalgo 2011, 280)

Akbayan would therefore be well served by critically reviewing, reconsidering, and reappraising its position as a social movement. Otherwise, with its current position, it is likely to be fully assimilated by an intransigent Philippine political system, slowly but surely neutralizing its actual capacity for engineering substantial reform and political change—precisely because of its attempts to be more proximate to traditional sources of power.❁

Notes

1. Aquino's election was explained and (more often than not) rhapsodized in publications made at the time (for example, Rocamora 2010; Villacorta 2011). Hofileña and Go (2011), in contrast, offer a sober account of the elections, attributing Aquino's victory to competent public imaging and the transformation of established electoral strategies.
2. The 1992–1993 split within the CPP was engineered by its own Central Committee in releasing the 1991 document entitled "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors." The document claimed centralizing party policy and political strategy should be done to address the party's then-being plagued by "weaknesses and mistakes in the three fields of party life: ideology, politics and organization." This move for centralization caused sections of the party to "declare 'autonomy' . . . taking with them whole groups of Party members" (Weekley 2001, 228–33). The most injurious aspect of this split was the exposure of Operation Kampanyang Ahos: internal party purges within the period of 1982–1985, which involved the torture and summary execution of alleged "deep penetration agents" inside the movement (Garcia 2001; Abinales 2001, 2008). This saw "the movement weakened and split into competing factions . . . . and many former cadres turned to reformist activism within new leftwing parties and organizations" (Rutten 2008, 2). Subsequent accounts were written about the political struggles that have fraught the NDF, its affiliated parties and "rejectionist" (RJ) leftist groups (some of the latter who would go on and support the foundation and political consolidation of Akbayan), which tended to fault the NDF's (and by extension, the CPP's) ideological intransigence, while nonetheless grudgingly praising the resiliency of its "reaffirmist" (RA) resistance movement even as it isolates itself from other leftist groups (Pabico 1999; Caouette 2004, 609–11, 693–94; Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 267; Quimpo 2008, 59; Melencio 2010, 140–41; Rivera 2011, 293; Saracho 2012, 232).
3. An early recounting of social movement activity in the form of university-based student organizations in the Philippines tended to claim that there is "no possibility that a political group can emerge out of the present student aggrupations . . . . This inability to unite may be attributed to the diversity of issues student organizations uphold and to the pressures of vested groups who endeavour to influence them or win their support" (Damo-Santiago 1972, 214). This hypothesis is now belied by the historical narratives of student movement unity in multiple sociopolitical issues over the decades (Lacaba 2003; Pimentel 2006; Abinales 2012). A later study released by the Institute of Popular Democracy would similarly prefer to represent social movement activity as primarily dependent on "the current socio-political environment they operate in" (Fabros et al. 2006, 17), which somewhat ignores the potential effect of "interactions of cadres with outsiders" such as "state actors, allies, counter-movements, the wider public [and] also more personal contacts such as relatives and peers" (Rutten 2008, 5).
4. This difficulty is most apparent when studying still-active political parties, especially those affiliated with traditional political forces. For recent examples of political hagiography, see Crisanto and Crisanto 2007, and Malaya and Abad 2006. In contrast, revisiting the older history of political parties with limited public coverage (such as the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas – 1930) allows for detailed history writing and appraisals. For such a case, see Fuller 2007; 2011; 2015.

5. As a former member of Akbayan Youth, I was part of the youth wing's International Committee, which is primarily given the responsibility of liaising with international organizations that have solidarity or working relationships with Akbayan, in tandem with officials and leaders from the main party. At the same time, I was also employed by the Active Citizenship Foundation, a "non-stock, non-profit organization committed to promoting people's active participation in community activities," which primarily cooperates with Akbayan's programs between May 2011 and March 2012.
6. This tendency toward choosing a wider and less-ideologically charged label has been the standing justification of Filipino social democrats with regard to their origins and directions:

> Social democracy in the Philippines emerged not only in the context of the Marcos regime in the late 1960s–90s, but also as a reaction to Marxism-Leninism . . . Those activists who were initially termed as "moderates" turned to social democracy/democratic socialism with its traditions of upholding political democracy, economic justice and social/human solidarity. (Tolosa 2011, 4)

   To their credit, social democrats' identification was not primarily reactive. Taking up Catholic social teaching as a further influence "[t]he embryonic Filipino social democrats, both competing with and learning from Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and immersed in the lives and struggles of the basic sectors with whom they were engaged, saw themselves as responding in a radical way to the call to commit their lives to social and political transformation" (Tolosa 2011, 4–5).
7. This became more evident in the case for socialist parties who identified closely with Soviet hegemony, since their "ideas and politics are . . . shaken by doubts, driven by failures, embarrassed by calamities of their own making" (Keane 1998, xii). This, despite the positive appraisal of many re-democratizing states during the third wave of democratization that political parties "proved highly effective instruments for socializing the general public into the ways of democracy and for increasing the political capacity of civil society organizations (from neighborhood organizations to the trade unions) to press their demands against the state and deepen the process of democratization" (Encarnacion 2003, 100–101).
8. While the Partido dos Trabalhadores has made a name for itself for practicing radical democracy with its internal structures and actually integrates its supportive movements without the risk of co-optation, this party was nonetheless appraised as "often [winning] elections on protest votes, only to garner electoral sympathy later." The increase of middle-class professionals inside the Partido dos Trabalhadores and the eventual settling-in of bureaucratization have posed the risk of the party's own checks against such bureaucratization "lose its effectiveness, and the possibility of factional fights again becomes a potential downfall for administrations" (Baiocchi 2003, 216–18). The same could be said of the limited successes that movements in Montevideo, Uruguay, has experienced, where "an enduring political culture that tends to favor 'representative democracy' over 'participatory democracy', consistent with the statist and party-centered evolution of the Uruguay political system" has produced less-than-favorable results (Chavez 2004, 94). Less-optimistic would be the track record of social democratic movements in the Northern Hemisphere—

ironically where social-democratic thought first emerged. Studies point to "a social democracy that has confirmed its rupture . . . with its role as the primary political representative of working-class interests . . . [S]ocial democracy has demonstrated its protean talent for adapting to the requirements of the different phases of capitalism" (Evans 2012a, 11), demonstrated in the cases of Canada's Co-operative Commonwealth Federation–New Democratic Party (Evans 2012b, 93, 95), the United Kingdom's Labor Party (Sheldrick 2012, 178), and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) in Germany (Schmidt 2012, 439).

9. Key sectors that were marked as active supporters as recorded in 2001 include the APL, PAKISAMA, Confederation of Independent Unions in the Public Sector (formerly Caucus of Independent Unions), Kapisanan ng mga Kamag-Anak ng Migranteng Manggagawang Pilipino (Association of Migrant Filipino Workers' Kin); Lesbian and Gay Legislative Advocacy Network, and the youth organizations Movement for the Advancement of Student Power and Student Council Alliance of the Philippines (Akbayan 2001a, 3).
10. Hontiveros-Baraquel's campaign, at the same time, has been met with criticism for its supposedly disjointed projection of her as an advocate of the ruling government coalition, which supposedly clashed with her previous reputation as a hard-hitting sectoral and issue advocate when she was Akbayan representative (Lazaro 2013).
11. An APL member who requested anonymity recounted the proceedings, noting that while Akbayan leaders say that Roxas is "an inconsistent neoliberal" that could be reasoned with to push for a more reform-oriented platform, they were unconvinced because Roxas was a "patronizing" cacique who does not consult with the affected sectors of society (APL 2012).
12. Even if the Congress for a People's Agrarian Reform's campaigning for a substantive agrarian reform policy led to a watered-down Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (largely in part to the strong lobby of a landlord-dominated post-Marcos Congress led by Negros Occidental Representative Hortensia Stark), PAKISAMA nonetheless saw this as an opportunity to distribute 10.3 million hectares out of the 30 million hectares of arable land under the government's jurisdiction (Kasuya 1995, 28; Banzuela 2012). Akbayan adopted Congress for a People's Agrarian Reform's (and by extension, PAKISAMA's and KATARUNGAN's) policy proposals, incorporating it in its own agrarian reform platform. This is hallmarked by its "land to the tiller principle" where those who work to develop the land should own it, just compensation to the former landowners while granting affordable amortization for the land title grantees, and collective farming efforts to ensure maximum productivity among its farmers (Akbayan 2006).
13. A similar separate study suggested that what Kerala was able to achieve (that West Bengal did not) were "changes in the balance of class forces and how these have played out in a sub-national context" (Sandbrook et al. 2007, 92). The question now stands on whether Akbayan's comparable historical experience and development has borne out similar results. Curiously, Akbayan's tensions and problems in terms of coalitional concerns could be largely compared to the West Bengali experience. Even if Akbayan has taken the route of the Kerala activists to expand its partnership with a national, mainstream party, its organizational integrity seems affected by the growing exclusivity and bureaucratization of its

leadership. Inasmuch as the party claims to reflect the concerns of its constituency, party cultures and structures have been pretty much indistinguishable from the leaders of the former BISIG bloc. BISIG's public website (http://filipinosocialism.wordpress.com/), last updated 20 December 2008, identified its chairperson as Tomasito Villarin and its national secretary-general as Edwin Chavez. Villarin now serves as an undersecretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government, a department ran by Roxas from 2012 until 2015, while Chavez serves under him directly.

14. The former BISIG president, having brokered Akbayan's alliance with the LP, has been officially hands-off from the party since his appointment to the cabinet, and BISIG itself as a bloc is indistinguishable from Akbayan's officers since at least 2008. It is interesting to note how the organizational composition of BISIG, which could be accurately considered a "rainbow coalition" of different perspectives and ideological moorings, could well serve as a generalization of Akbayan's current character.
15. In their investigative research, Cay and Nonato (2014) documented conversations with current and former members of Akbayan. Of particular interest to this study would be the information from Paula Bianca Lapuz, who left Akbayan in 2009 for disagreeing with the coalition. She questioned the viability and actual benefit of the coalition to Akbayan's political representation, pointing out that Akbayan is in a position where it cannot "bite the hand of the one who feeds [it]" (Cay and Nonato 2014, 92). The study also documented a lengthy list of donors which contributed money to Akbayan's campaigns in the 2010 elections—mostly from "Chinese-Filipino tycoons and executives of big businesses, who at first glance do not seem likely to contribute to a progressive, leftist party, like Akbayan" (Cay and Nonato 2014, 71–72).
16. Bayan's members include, in no particular order: Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Student Christian Movement of the Philippines; General Assembly Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership, and Action (GABRIELA); Kilusan ng Manggagawang Kababaihan (Women Workers' Movement), Amihan (National Federation of Peasant Women), Samahan ng Malayang Kababaihang Nagkakaisa (Association of United and Free Women), Health Alliance for Democracy, Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, Alliance of Concerned Teachers, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya ng Pilipinas (National Federation of Fisherfolk Organizations); Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees; Promotion for Church People's Response, Kalipunan ng Katutubong Mamamayan sa Pilipinas (National Federation Of Indigenous Peoples' Organizations), Migrante International, First Quarter Storm Movement, Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (Association of Urban Poor Communities), and Sinagbayan (Bayan 2015).
17. Among the peculiar labels I have noticed in the vocabulary of Akbayan's members and organizers is the term "fascist Left," which they largely use to refer to the Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army–National Democratic Front. The term is usually a derisive label to their allegations regarding the NDF's practice of "vanguardism" and "democratic centralism" borne out of the CPP's efforts to recentralize party strategies, leading to the 1992 split.
18. As stated in Makabayan's website: "Makabayang Koalisyon ng Mamamayan ([Citizen's Nationalist Coalition or] Makabayan) was founded on 16 April 2009.

It is a political coalition that is presently comprised of 11 Philippine progressive parties: Bayan Muna, Anakpawis, Gabriela, Kabataan, Courage, Migrante, ACT-Teachers [Alliance of Concerned Teachers], Katribu [Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas or National Alliance of Indigenous Peoples Organizations in the Philippines], Akap Bata [Sectoral Organization for Children, Inc.], Piston [Pagkakaisa ng mga Samahan ng Tsuper at Operator Nationwide], Kalikasan [People's Network for the Environment], and Aking Bikolnon [Child of Bicol]. The national council also includes personages in the field of arts, governance, mass media and people's organizations. In its founding assembly, Makabayan rallied for change that is embodied in their call 'Pilipino para sa Pagbabago, Pagbabago para sa Pilipino' (Filipinos for Change, Change for Filipinos)" (Makabayan 2015).

19. That both Akbayan and Bayan Muna avowedly pursue divergent forms of political organization yet conduct virtually identical actions did not remain unnoticed. Immediately after the 2010 national elections, comments were raised on the results of the decision of Philippine leftist political parties to ally with traditional political machineries. A forum organized by the Third World Studies Center on 24 June 2010, asked for the reasons behind these leftist parties trying to expand their influence in the political arena and "why did their mass base, as shown in the unbroken successes in the Lower House, fail to bring them to the Senate" (TWSC 2010). Akbayan's foray into the senatorial elections has been discussed earlier in this study. At the same time, it was recorded that two parties from the NDF (Bayan Muna and GABRIELA Women's Party) supported the Nacionalista Party ticket and Manuel "Manny" Bamba Villar Jr.'s campaign for the presidency, with Bayan Muna's party president Satur Ocampo and GABRIELA's Liza Maza included in the senatorial slate of the Nacionalista Party. While both parties would publicly deny their formal relationship with the Nacionalista Party during the campaign period, Ocampo would later acknowledge that they did conduct talks with Villar and that the NDF bloc "gave Villar at least more than 2 million votes" (Ocampo, as quoted in TWSC 2010, 3).
20. Akbayan supporters make efforts to actually disassociate Akbayan historically from the legacies of prior leftist movements, claiming that to attribute its emergence from the NDF "does not capture the richness of the group's historical experience, and does injustice to the prospects and promises of post-EDSA politics" and "paints an all-too-simplistic picture" (Moralina 2011). While this claim is technically true, it still demonstrates how Akbayan's political praxis seems "allergic" toward relating to their erstwhile comrades.
21. COMELEC opened a minefield when its commissioner Sixto Brillantes declared on 26 September 2012, that seventeen party-list groups were disqualified. They justified it by saying that these groups do not correspond to supposed legal qualifications for a sector to be allowed to run, with an undisclosed seven more groups to follow (*Rappler* 2012; Narito 2012; Reyes 2012). Tensions began when Anakbayan released statements by its chairperson Vencer Crisostomo, urging COMELEC to disqualify Akbayan from running for the party-list representation in 2013. They justify this call from the fact that Akbayan's leaders are now key functionaries in the Aquino government, and that their leaders, being professionals, cannot be considered genuine representatives of Akbayan's supposed sectors (Alvarez 2012; Tupaz 2012). The situation came to a head when Anakbayan members stormed an Akbayan press conference on 16 October 2012, vocally

denouncing the party's ties with the administration and calling Akbayan names. Anakbayan members and then-Representative Bello eventually had a physical struggle with each other, incensing Akbayan members to unceremoniously throw the Anakbayan members out of the press venue (Casauay 2012).

22. The incident involved a fatal encounter between elements of the Special Action Force of the Philippine National Police and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, a splinter group from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front—the latter currently in peace negotiations under the 2012 GPH-Moro Islamic Liberation Front Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (OPAPP 2012) and the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (OPAPP 2014). With forty-four casualties among the Special Action Force personnel, seventeen killed among the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and at least seven civilians (*Rappler* 2015), the violent encounter compromised the stability of the negotiation process and the presumption of good faith between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This is further complicated by Aquino deflecting command responsibility on the fatal incident (Bacani 2015) despite the Philippine National Police Board of Inquiry clearly placing him among those responsible for violating the chain of command that led to the incident (PNP-BOI 2015, v, 44–45).
23. Editor's note: No time machine was ever involved in writing this article. It may seem anachronistic that an article published in 2015 discusses events in 2016. The simple and plain explanation: the process of revising and tidying up the article ran into the first quarter of 2016.

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The Asia-Pacific War in the Davao Settler Zone, December 1941

MARIA CYNTHIA B. BARRIGA

ABSTRACT. As a Filipino-Japanese settler zone before and during the Asia-Pacific War, Davao offers a case of how conflicts affect frontiers where people of warring countries had coexisted. This paper presents a local history of the war in Davao, a province in southern Philippines. Of the three and a half years of the Asia-Pacific War, it zooms in on the Japanese bombing and military invasion from 8–31 December 1941. Archival and oral sources in Filipino, Japanese, and English languages were examined to identify common exigencies and to search for patterns of how the residents responded to those. The paper finds that the proximity of Filipino and Japanese populations caused panic, chaos, and a domino of violence. At the outbreak of the war on 8 December, Filipino suspicions against the Japanese residents burst into open animosity, which led to indiscriminate murders and the incarceration of the Japanese populace. On 20 December, some of the Japanese residents released by the invading Japanese military used their positions as mediators to seek vengeance against Filipinos who had abused them. In this monthlong chaos, Filipino and Japanese residents survived through prewar linkages that transcended their nationality. From 8–20 December, the Japanese residents survived Filipino hostility and internment with the help from non-Japanese family and friends outside the camps. From 20–31 December, many Filipinos were cushioned from the Japanese invasion by Japanese family, friends, employers, and employees. Besides nationality, kinship and prewar networks based on locality and livelihood influenced Davao residents' experiences of the war.

KEYWORDS. Davao · Asia-Pacific War · conflict · frontier

Introduction

Davao covers the area around Davao Gulf in the southeasternmost corner of the Philippines, in the island of Mindanao. To the north of Davao, beyond the mountains, is Agusan; to the west is Cotabato; to the south is Celebes Sea; and to the east is the Pacific. In the northern part of Davao Gulf lay the islands of Samal and Talikod. The western coast of Davao, the center of economic activity and later the site of Davao City, is kept fertile by Mount Apo. As the American explorer

Figure 1. Map of the Philippines showing the then-province of Davao (1914-1967) before it was divided into the provinces of Davao del Norte, Davao Oriental, and Davao del Sur. *Source:* Map by Roel Balingit from Wikimedia Commons.

James Burchfield gushed, "We saw soil ten feet deep, rich volcanic ash land that would grow anything that could be grown in the tropics. We saw a land well-watered, big region all around the Gulf with streams frequent as deer paths" (quoted in Tiu 2003, 48).

At the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War in 1941, Davao was a province with twenty-one municipalities and subprovinces, including the Chartered City of Davao (Philippine Commonwealth Commission of the Census 1940, 3–4). Thoroughfares of Davao City's *poblacion*, the Central, were lined by bazaars, restaurants, offices, and houses mostly of Filipino, Japanese, and Chinese residents (Mizuguchi 2010, 8–10; Panuncialman 2002, 105). Likewise, the barrios along the banks of the Talomo River (starting from Barrio Talomo in the coast, upstream to Tugbok, Mintal, and Calinan) were dotted by plantations, warehouses, houses, offices, hotels, and stores of Filipino and Japanese residents. In particular, Barrio Mintal was a known Japanese enclave—complete with a Japanese school, at least one Shinto shrine and one Buddhist temple, a Japanese cemetery, and an obelisk memorializing Kyôzaburô Ohta, the Japanese pioneer who established the oldest and most influential Japanese corporation in Davao (see the map insert "Dabao ni Okeru Zairyuu Nihonjin Chuushin Chizu" [Map of the City by the Japanese Residents in Davao] in Ohno 1991). Further south, in Barrio Daliao was the headquarters of the Furukawa Plantation Company, the largest and wealthiest company in the province.

The indigenous people of Davao were a diverse lot. Local historian Macario Tiu listed fifteen ethnic tribes: Ata, Bagobo, B'laan, Dibabawon, Giangan, Kalagan, Kulaman Manobo, Mandaya, Manguwangan, Mansaka, Matigsalog, Obo, Samal, Sangil, and Tagakaolo. He adds that each tribe is not homogenous, that characteristics of different tribes overlap, and that many intermarriages have occurred among them. Tiu (2005, 47) explains that distinction among the tribes remains because the tribal people themselves acknowledge them.

The Bagobos, the ethnic group that traditionally resided in what in 1936 would become Davao City, was observed to live in loose, dispersed small groups without a single political unit. These groups (locally called *banod*) consisted of only several hundred families led by a datu who had no special privileges outside settling conflicts within his banod. The members were free to leave or marry into other tribes, and slaves may be set free by their masters. When the Japanese pioneers started trickling into Davao in the first decade of the twentieth century, a number of ethnic communities, especially the Bagobos, welcomed them.[1]

The first waves of Japanese migrants came to Davao from 1903 to 1905. Laborers in the ending Benguet Road Project connecting Manila to Baguio, these Japanese migrants moved to Davao in response to the



Figure 2. Davao province and the population of each municipality and subprovince in percentage to the provincial population, 1939. *Source:* Philippine Commonwealth Commission of the Census (1940, 2).



Figure 3. Davao City and its barrios, 1939. *Source:* The list of districts comes from the Philippine Commonwealth Commission of the Census (1940, 3–4). An unlabeled map was lifted from Google, with the rivers highlighted by the author and the names of districts labeled over.

need for manual labor in American plantations there. Led by Kyôzaburô Ohta, a Japanese who had worked in Manila and became conversant in English and Spanish, they pitched in their savings and established the Ohta Development Corporation (hereafter Ohta DC), which allowed them to legally own land (Yu-Jose 1997, 108; Iwasaki 2009, 104; Goodman 1967, 1–2). The Japanese pioneers—as the Japanese migrants of this period came to be called—were few and many of them married into the ethnic community. Although they were deemed queer by their American and Filipino neighbors, they were nonetheless valued as plantation workers (Corcino 1992 in Abinales 2001).

The dynamics between the Japanese migrants and their host communities changed during the first boom in the production of abaca, Davao's main industry. From 1918 to 1921, at least a hundred Japanese were murdered by ethnic groups—a conflict that historian



Figure 4. Central (Davao City Poblacion) at the outbreak of the war. *Source:* Map drawn by the author from information provided in Mizuguchi (2010, 8–10).

Table 1. Population of Davao by citizenship, 1903, 1918, 1939

	1903	1918	1939
Total	65,496	69,390	292,600
Filipino	20,224[a]	64,006	270,823
Japanese	no data	4,472	17,888
Chinese	no data	762	3,595
American	no data	80	112
Spanish	no data	48	52
All others	no data	22	no data

Source: Reports of the Philippine Census, 1903, 1918, 1939.

[a] The figure pertains only to "civilized" population. The total population of Davao District in 1903 was 65,496 of which 69.1 percent (45,272) was "wild." Unlike the 1918 and 1939 censuses that categorized the population by citizenship, the 1903 census categorized the population by civilization (wild, civilized) and by race (brown, mixed, white, yellow, black).

Shinzo Hayase attributes to the Japanese plantations' rapid expansion (Hayase 2007a, 177). The First World War triggered a rise of demand and prices of abaca fiber and, consequently, an influx of Japanese capital and migrants. Yoshizo Furukawa, for example, established the Furukawa Plantation Company (hereafter Furukawa PC) in 1914 and amassed land all over Davao City. Likewise, the Ohta DC established subsidiary companies through which it may indirectly acquire more public lands (Hayase 1984, 257–59, 271). Furthermore, the Japanese migrants of this period, unlike the Japanese pioneers of the earlier generation, formed a cohesive community that refused to assimilate or even acculturate with the local community. In 1919, Orlie Walkup of the Bureau of Lands observed that because of the "intense national conceit or patriotism [the Japanese] will never become wholehearted citizens of the country which received them" (quoted in Cody 1959, 180). As the Japanese plantations and communities expanded, they displaced the ethnic groups who had traditionally roamed the western coast of Davao Gulf and who based their livelihood and religion in its environment. Most likely, the indigenous people's murder of Japanese residents in the late 1910s to the early 1920s was made in retaliation.

During the dip in the abaca production industry in the early 1920s, many Japanese residents, especially laborers from Okinawa, chose to remain in Davao. According to Yoshizo Furukawa, a Davao in recession still offered far better living conditions than Okinawa (Ohno 2011, 230), which was but a group of small islands in the

farthest south of Japan, sitting along the typhoon belt, and of barren soil. As recalled by Yasue Igei, a Japanese woman from Okinawa, "No matter how poor one got, he could still eat three times a day [in Davao because] root crops grew wild in the river and other vegetables were easy to plant."[2] When the industry picked up in mid-1920s, so did Japanese migration. Unlike in other Southeast Asian countries to where Japanese civilians migrated, most Japanese women in Davao were married and population increased not only because of new entrants but also because of childbirths (Yu-Jose 1992, 69–71). Yasue Igei and Sendai Nakama, for example, came as migrant brides for Japanese men already settled in Davao; Emi Nakama and Masa Ginoza were summoned by their husbands after acquiring their own abaca hills; and Moto Yonamine accompanied her husband to Davao. Before the war, Yasue bore two children; Sendai, at least three; Masa, four; and Moto, six.[3]

Despite the Japanese economic and cultural presence, the Filipino settlers numbered the most. The Filipino settlement began in 1848 after the conquest of the Spaniard Jose Oyanguren. However, Spanish authority was unstable and was never enough to dominate the area (Tiu 2003, 1). The 1903 census recorded only 20,224 "civilized brown" individuals. Frederick Wernstedt found that though population jumped to 64,006 in 1918, this increase was not accompanied by land applications, suggesting that Filipinos were coming into Davao to work and reside in established towns and plantations (United States Bureau of the Census 1905, 129; Census Office of the Philippine Islands 1920, 104; Wernstedt 1971, 49). Mostly from oral sources I found that the Filipino migrants in the late 1910s, like the Japanese, came to Davao to work as laborers in Japanese-owned and/or managed plantations, pier, and lumberyards.[4] When Japanese corporations had already dominated Davao's economy in the 1920s, Filipino professionals, especially doctors and lawyers, and government officials came to work for them (Dacudao 2006, 45–47).

By the 1930s, the "Davao Land Problem"—that is, the Japanese's illegal acquisition of land through Filipino subleases and dummy corporations—became a hot issue in Manila and in other urban centers such as Cebu. To that concern, observes Patricia Dacudao (2006), the Filipino settlers in Davao responded with apathy. They continued their partnerships with the Japanese and, if necessary, protected the Japanese from investigation teams from Manila. Although Filipinos working for and with the Japanese indeed sided with them in Manila's Davao Land Problem, more and more Filipino migrants poured into

Davao in the 1930s and even up to early 1941. These newcomers brought with them nationalist sentiments fuelled by debates on the question of the impending Philippine independence and with anti-Japanese sentiments borne out of Japan's military expansion to China. At the outbreak of the war, therefore, there seemed to be two types of Filipino settlers (where the Japanese were concerned): early settlers who were friendly with the Japanese, and 1930s migrants who held anti-Japan sentiments.

By the outbreak of the war, Davao remained to be a multicultural frontier, albeit its composition and the dynamics of its peoples had transformed. In examining frontiers, scholars consider a variety of factors: ethnicity, nationality, religion, generation, social class, and affinity to the frontier (i.e., length of stay and reason for coming to the frontier). In examining how the indigenous Filipinos, Japanese migrants, and Filipino settlers experienced the outbreak of the war in Davao, this paper considers the residents' (1) kinship, (2) prewar networks based on livelihood and specific locality in Davao, and (3) nationalist sentiments and racial prejudices.

Studying migration into Mindanao in the twentieth century, Frederick Wenstedt (1971, 61–63) found that most migrations were at the urging of families already in the frontier.[5] Oral sources illustrate how this was so. During and after their migration, the Suarez-Magallanes family was in constant contact with their relatives, the Dakudao and the Gaston families who had long preceded them.[6] Matsuda and Chibana of Yomitan Village in Okinawa,[7] and Jôtarô Nakama and Magoichiro Yonamine of Kin Town (also in Okinawa),[8] all had fathers, uncles, and brothers in the frontier before they left Japan. Kamado Nakama[9] and her sister were forced to move to Davao because all their relatives had migrated, leaving no one in Okinawa to take care of them (Kin-Chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai 2002, 252).

Once in the frontier, the new migrants relied on their families already there. The four Japanese men mentioned above initially lived and worked in their kin's farms before acquiring their own lands or being employed by a company. Likewise, Justiano Pilapil, one of many migrants from Danao, Cebu, sailed to Davao with his wife and lived with his in-laws who were already tenants in a plantation (Tiu 2005, 133). Perhaps because they were in a foreign country, the Japanese formed ward, town, and prefectural associations for mutual aid—for example, helping members whose farms were destroyed by water sprout, soliciting donations to let an ill member return to Okinawa,

and simply welcoming a newcomer (Yomitan-son Shi Hen San Iin Kai 2002). The largest of these organizations was the Japanese Association.

As a factor, kinship (and places of origin) created enclaves of residents coming mostly from the same towns and, consequently, the same country. An exception to this were the Filipino-Japanese families, formed mostly between Japanese pioneers and indigenous Filipinas before the first influx of migrants in the late 1910s.[10] Although these intermarriages were demographically insignificant (in the 1939 census, they numbered 269 in a province with a population close to 300,000), this paper considers them for two reasons: first, oral sources show that these intermarriages, having been cultivated within close-knit ethnic communities, formed familial bonds that went beyond the basic family unit. In these villages, living with an aunt or an uncle seemed just as natural as living with one's own parents. Second, though few in number, these intermarriages are a unique feature of the frontier.

The second link that influenced Davao residents' experience of war was their networks based on locality and livelihood. Migrant laborers had been provided with lodging by their companies since the first boom of the abaca industry during the First World War. By the 1920s, the plantations and their vicinity were dotted with schools, dance halls, cockpits, health centers, bazaars, and places of worship where laborers, employees, and tenants mingled and interacted. At times, as in the case of the Ohta DC, movies were regularly shown in its warehouse in Davao City ("Hahira" in Yomitan-son Shi Hen San Iin Kai 2002). Or, as in the case of the Dakudao estate in Tugbok, tenants and employees were invited into the landlord's mansion for parties and gatherings (Kenji Migitaka, in Dakudao, n.d.). The Ohta DC, in particular, had so strong an influence that even children of current employees went to school with a vision of working for it ("Hahira" in Yomitan-son Shi Hen San Iin Kai 2002).

Although Japanese enclaves existed, economic interactions transcended nationality. Because the Public Land Act of 1903 (and of 1919) prohibited residents besides Philippine and American citizens from acquiring public land, many Japanese companies and individuals partnered with Filipino landowners. In this partnership, locally called *pakyaw*, the Japanese cultivated land legally registered under the Filipino as if it were his own.[11] The Japanese cultivators (*jieisha*) then hired Filipino and Japanese laborers. In 1935, more than 87 percent (1,798 of 3,062) of the jieisha cultivated Filipino land (Hayase 1984, 118). In commercial centers such as the Central, Calinan, and Tagum,

Japanese residents worked as helpers in Filipino houses and stores, and vice versa (Yu-Jose 1996, 73).

This paper does not consider social class as a factor, though it existed in Davao. While the laborer in the outskirts of Davao City might have the same daily grind as the laborer in Pantukan on the other side of the gulf, it is unlikely that the two had ever met, mingled, and formed networks. In contrast, the laborer in Davao City would have regularly interacted with his employer, especially after harvest, during Christmas, and other celebrations. During the war, the laborer's relationship with his employer and the employer's relationship with his employees and tenants influenced their survival.

The third factor influencing linkages and divisions in the Davao Settler Zone was racial prejudice, which in this paper pertains specifically to Filipinos' hostility toward the Japanese people and the Japanese's discrimination against people whom they deemed as outside the Yamato (pure Japanese) race. Despite reports on the Davao Land Problem that depict Filipinos in Davao as sympathetic to their Japanese neighbors and colleagues, a score of Filipino settlers held anti-Japanese sentiments similar to those in Manila. This may be explained by the fact that Filipino migration into Davao continued well into the 1930s when Manila was stirred by preparations for independence and by news of Japan's atrocities in China. Noticeably, accounts which sympathized with the general Philippine sentiment that viewed the Japanese as enemies were held by Filipinos who migrated into Davao from the late 1930s to just before the war—for example the Campo family, the Soriano family, and Matilde of Leyte.[12]

Likewise, despite the close working relations of many Japanese with Filipinos, ideas of Japanese racial superiority and destiny to lead Asia were filtering into Davao. In the 1930s, ten Japanese schools were established in the province.[13] In these schools, students were taught Japanese values, bowed in the direction of the Imperial Palace, recited the Imperial Rescript in which they promise to lay down their lives for Japan if necessary, and sang military songs. Along with this Japanese pride came the prejudice against those who were not Japanese. As Japanese migration scholar Shun Ohno observed, "They were proud of being 'first-class nationals' and wished to prevent the *nisei*'s (second-generation Japanese) assimilation into Filipino society and become third-class nationals (Ohno 2011, 238)."[14]

War and Frontier Communities

Despite Davao's unique position as a prewar Japanese migrant destination and a Filipino-Japanese settler zone in a predominantly pro-US country, its experience of the war has been barely examined. Local historians Ernesto Corcino (1998), Gloria Dabbay (1992), Heidi Gloria (1987), and Macario Tiu (2003, 2005) focus more on the Spanish and the American periods and on the ethnic tribes.[15] Likewise, scholars on the Philippine-Japan relations who cover Davao write more about its prewar economic development and the dynamics among the Japanese migrants and the Filipino host community then (Goodman 1967; Saniel 1966; Yu-Jose 1992; Iwasaki 2009). General works on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, of course, cannot delve into Davao local history; instead, they highlight Davao's prewar Japanese communities and the Filipino-Japanese relationship that led Filipinos in Davao to collaborate with Japan (Agoncillo 1965, 48–50; Syjuco 1988, 49).

Recently, the war in Davao had been recounted in a number of publications (see for example Lucaks 2010; Yap-Morales 2006; Vallejo 2009). Japanese migration scholars have also dealt with the Japanese residents' experiences of the war in Davao (Hayase 1999; Ohno 1991; Kaneshiro 2002). These war accounts, however, examine only the experiences of either the Filipinos or the Japanese residents. In this paper, I place both Japanese and Filipino accounts on the table to understand Davao's wartime experience as a Filipino-Japanese settler zone.

To examine a multicultural frontier's experience of the Asia-Pacific War, the paper looks into conflicts in other frontiers, particularly those in the late nineteenth into the twentieth century when ideas of nation and state began to draw borders bisecting the map. Tessa Morris-Suzuki (1999) narrates how Okhotsk, a multicultural crossroad in the thirteenth century, was named, imagined, occupied, and finally divided by both Russia and Japan in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bart Nabrdalik (2008) shows how international borders were imposed in southeastern Poland—through forced migration and ethnic cleansing. However, conflicts in frontiers are not always in the form of borders imposed from the outside. As observed by Boal and Livingstone in their analysis of ethnonational hostilities between the Irish and the English in Belfast, "Frontier environments display culture contrasts . . . [and] are regions of stress" (1984, 166). As meeting points of cultures, frontiers are sites of conflict.

Examining the forms of conflict within the frontier itself, the contributors of the anthology *Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific* (Aspinall, Regan, and Jeffrey 2013) have noted the heterogeneity of conflicts in frontiers. Civilians, regardless of nationality, become victims. Perpetrators include the military of opposing countries, the police force, the guerrilla fighters, and the civilians themselves. Proximity to enemy population can be both a cause of exigency and means of survival. Moreover, violence occurs not only between one national against another, but also between nationals of the same country. Likewise, aid comes not only from co-patriots but also from citizens of the opposing nation. In the case of Saipan, a Pacific island that had long-standing interaction with the Japanese civilians before the Asia-Pacific War, the line between civilians and military increasingly blurred as the war wore on. Keith Camacho (2008) concludes, the local Chamorros who served as interpreters to the Japanese military not only stood as agents of the Japanese military rule but also laid vulnerable to the animosity of fellow Chamorros, even their kin, especially in the neighboring pro-US Guam.

This mesh of conflict and mutual aid makes an inquiry on conflicts in frontiers imperative in understanding wars. In frontiers where people of opposing nations had long coexisted, the costs of war go beyond human casualty, economic disruption, and destruction of infrastructure; here, wars affect human relationships. How, for example, was conflict experienced in Pacific islands where Japanese civilians had resided decades before the Asia-Pacific War? I concur with Boal and Livingstone (1984, 168) that to understand a multicultural frontier's experience of conflict, the experiences and perspectives of various social groups need to be considered. This paper focuses on the experience of Davao, one of the several localities in the Pacific that hosted Japanese settlers before the war.

The paper takes the approach of local history, which presupposes that people within a geographic location have a shared past. In 1977, Alfred McCoy (1977, 740) observed that while a number of local histories of the war had cropped up, these mostly follow concerns of Manila, not of the locality itself. Five years later, in a speech in the National Conference on Local History, Resil Mojares (1982, 2–5), citing McCoy, enumerated the roles of local historians in studying the Asia-Pacific War, and called for the search of alternate perspectives. From the 1970s to the 2000s, local histories of the war have been filling up the shelves—commemorating the valor of local residents

(Acebes 2008; Lacar 1982) and searching for alternate perspectives (Mallilin-Jamboy 1985; Hofileña 1990; Joven 2005).

In the conclusion of his *Ylo-ilo*, McCoy laid out methods through which local historians might explore alternative perspectives: go out of conventional periodization that commonly follows military and political landmark events, explore other geographical scope besides administrative demarcation of provinces and islands, and utilize a mix of oral and archival sources.

While this paper focuses on the outbreak of the war, it provides a rather lengthy introduction of the prewar dynamics of the indigenous Filipinos, the Japanese migrants, and the Filipino migrants as it presupposes that linkages among them were factors to their wartime experiences. To delve into the experiences of these three groups, the paper zooms in on the first month of the three-year war, from the first Japanese air raid on 8 December 1941, to the end of December 1941 during which the invading Imperial Forces weeded out anti-Japanese elements. After December 1941, very few crimes against Filipino civilians were reported in the Records of the War Crime Trials. This suggests that after December 1941, conditions in Davao had more or less normalized, the invasion had ended and the Japanese military occupation had begun. Davao residents' experience of the Japanese military occupation proper (which lasted from February 1942 to mid-1944) and the final year of the war during which Davao was razed by American bombers (August 1944 to August 1945) merit separate discussions.

In this paper, while "Davao" pertains to the province, stories are skewed toward the city bearing the same name because its population had the highest percentage of Filipino (29 percent) and Japanese (79 percent) in the province.[16] I used as primary sources the Records of the War Crime Trials and the reports of the chapter heads of the Japanese Association when the Japanese military took over Davao in 1941.[17] Noticeably, there are more Japanese memoirs and collective biographies than Filipino written reminiscences. The Filipino side is written mostly in family histories, in Santiago Dakudao's war diary, in the collective biography provided in *Battle of Ising* (Vallejo 2009), and in few scattered newspaper clippings. Like Davao's local historians, the primary sources are mostly on the Spanish and the American periods and on the ethnic tribes. Thus, to supplement the sparse Filipino written sources, I interviewed old Filipinos (and Filipino-Japanese) who experienced the war in Davao.

In the Eve of the War

The outbreak of the undeclared Second Sino-Japanese War and the succeeding Nanjing Massacre in 1937, Hitler's declaration of war in 1939, and Japan's advance into Indochina in April 1941 made the war ever more real to Washington and Manila. In April 1941, the Commonwealth Government established the Civilian Emergency Administration to store supplies and conduct air-raid drills and practice evacuation. In July of that year, Washington formed the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), a joint US-Philippine Army command, and recalled Douglas MacArthur to be its commander.

Davao belonged to the 10th Military District (Mindanao) of the Visayas-Mindanao Force (Ancheta 1982, 6-7). In September 1941, USAFFE training camps were established all over the country; Davao's training camp was in the present-day Davao Medical Center (Regional Hospital) in Bajada, just north of the Central.[18] In Malalag and in Sasa, the USAFFE had installed airstrips. In the Central, close to San Pedro Church (present-day Cathedral) and Provincial Government Office, was the Army barracks (see figure 4). Besides the military installations cropping up one after another, Filipino civilians, such as Luciano Abenoja and Alfonso Gravador, were trained for military service.[19] Retired Philippine Army officers who took up the plow, such as Filomeno Namoc and Anastacio Campo, were recalled to duty. Residents were also kept abreast of the state of the United States–Japan diplomatic negotiations and Japan's military advances in Northeast Asia through word of mouth. Jose Campo, for example, recalls his Japanese classmate Hiroyuki Mizuguchi[20] giving them news about the Sino-Japanese War (Yap-Morales 2006, 29). Having interviewed Filipinos in Davao in the 1950s, Cecil Cody wrote, "Filipinos working for Japanese in 1932 recall hearing their employers decry the assassinations of political leaders and the rise of the military" (1959, 182).

Filipino settlers, especially recent migrants, began to fear their close proximity to a large Japanese population. Jose Campo, whose family had just moved and resided in the Central, recalled that the Japanese Association Office just a few blocks from their house hosted more and more meetings as the war drew closer (Yap-Morales 2006, 52). Writing in 1941, Florence Horn summarized the rumors flying around Davao:

> Furukawa laughs a little grimly when he says that he never bothered to deny hysterical stories about his company's activities in Davao. When he imports an auto crane and the rumor flies that the Japanese are bringing in armoured tanks into Davao, he issues no statement of denial. When people say there is ammunition stored in his warehouses, or that the recreation field he has built for employees is so located and designed that it would be an excellent landing-field for Japanese war planes, Furukawa says not a word. He insists that it would do no good to deny even the worst accusations. (Horn 1941, 275 in Abinales 2001)

Davao at War

Panic at the Outbreak

At the outbreak of the war, this fear burst into open panic. Santiago Dakudao, a wealthy Filipino living in Tugbok, in the southern outskirts of Davao City, wrote in his diary:

> On the first day of the bombing incident, it was learned that a plane landed in Tamugan Cogonal. Rumors had it that the pilot was forced to make a landing because of an unfavorable condition. Another version said that it was done purposely to make contact with some Japanese nationals on the spot for reasons of military strategy. The pilot was identified in a drinking bout with the Japanese in Ventura, a posse was sent to arrest him. As he tried to escape, he was shot and died along the way to the hospital. The news created quite a stir among the residents of this city . . . The pilot was later identified to be the son of Uchida from a Bagobo maiden. His name was Jose Uchida from Bayabas. (Dakudao, n.d.)

The unfortunate Filipino-Japanese Jose Uchida was of course not the pilot. Tameichi Hara, a Japanese commander who was with the task force that attacked Davao, recorded that of the twenty bombers and fighters that left carrier *Ryujo*, one landed in Davao because of engine trouble. Its crew escaped and was rescued by the accompanying destroyer *Kuroshio* (Hara 1961, 38).

The bombs themselves were not a problem for the residents. Japanese and American sources—and even Santiago Dakudao who took the outbreak with nonchalance—agree that the bombing was sporadic and non-obtrusive, to say the least. In a span of two weeks, only about

twelve bombs were dropped, all of which were on military installations far outside commercial and residential areas. The oil tanks they hit (the few times that they did) were easily plugged by military personnel on the ground (Gleeck 1993, 95). There was no casualty, and only one was wounded. Tameichi Hara, recalling his bewilderment at Davao's lack of defense, described, "It was the most peculiar operation" (1961, 38).

Rather, the fear of their proximity to Japanese communities plunged the city into panic and chaos. The bombing occurred around six in the morning, after which children still went to school (Kabasares 2004). In Davao Central High School, pandemonium erupted only after it was announced that war had been declared (Mizuguchi 2010, 11). In a town in Pantukan in present-day Davao Oriental, rumors spread that all Filipinos who were associated with the Japanese would be killed. Jose Cabrera, a Filipino who served as bodyguard to a Japanese family in the town, took advantage of his employer's incarceration in the Central. Hearing that the volunteer armies were accepting recruits with weapons, Jose stole his employer's pistol and joined the guerrillas. Throughout the war, he would be part of the guerrillas wandering around present-day Davao del Norte (Vallejo 2009, 112). Out of fear that the twenty thousand Japanese civilians would aid the invading Japanese military and in an effort to separate the two populations at war, Filipinos incarcerated the Japanese—men, women, and children.[21]

For decades, Filipinos believed that many Japanese civilians were actually undercover spies sent as vanguards for the Japanese invasion. Lydia Yu-Jose finds that the number of Japanese spies in Davao was not significantly higher than in other parts of the country. She adds, however, that Japanese elites, such as Yoshizo Furukawa and Yasaku Morokuma, presidents of the two largest corporations in Davao, were invited to Tokyo to brief military top officials on conditions in the Philippines and attended meetings for strategic landings (Yu-Jose 1996, 73–74).

The general Japanese populace seemed just as distraught about the outbreak of the war as the Filipinos. Kenji Migitaka, a student in the Japanese Calinan Elementary School, recalled, "Suddenly my teachers . . . were panic-stricken and began running around in the school premises" (Dakudao, n.d.). For the Japanese residents, Davao was a land full of promise in which they strove hard to create a better life than what they had in Japan—hard work which the war put to waste. Chibana and Jôtarô Nakama had been farming in their relatives' land

in Davao and saving money since 1929 and 1934, respectively. Like many migrants from Okinawa, both men borrowed money to finance their trip to Davao. At the outbreak of the war, they had just acquired their own abaca farms. Jôtarô wrote, "After I've paid the money I borrowed from my uncle, I partnered with a young man to buy my own abaca hills but war began, and it was all for naught."[22]

Japanese Internment

Immediately after the first bombing, Japanese civilians were incarcerated as enemy aliens. Both the Davao provincial government and the Japanese residents were unprepared. There were too few Filipino soldiers to apprehend and guard the twenty thousand Japanese residents. Because the incarceration was unexpected, the Japanese were captured with only the clothes on their back and families were separated. The internees were crammed in a few makeshift camps for almost two weeks. Overcrowding, lack of proper sewage and sanitation, and food scarcity should have been expected.

When the commotion that followed the first air raid on 8 December reached Yasue Igei's village, her husband left on his bike to check the situation. When Yasue was told that he was captured by Filipino soldiers, she gathered her children and hid in a nearby house. There, she saw Filipino soldiers approach and heard gun shots, followed by a shout that commanded the Japanese civilians to surrender. Yasue's friend, Masa Ginoza, had just returned from walking her children to school. Without her family, she was taken by the Filipino soldiers to the internment camp. "The children were on their own," Masa recalled. "We were worried that they wouldn't have even an *onigiri* (rice ball) to put in their mouths; after a while, there were mothers who went crazy."[23] Filipino-Japanese mestiza Aiko Tanaka[24] watched as her mother insisted to the Filipino soldiers that she accompany her Japanese husband to the internment camp. Of course, it was in vain.

Lucky were those whose local organizations acted fast. Moto Yonamine, for example, recalled that at the bombing, her community was assembled by their local organization chief. The women and children were hidden in the plantation manager's mansion, while the men waited for the Filipino soldiers. Meanwhile in Tugbok and Calinan, the Japanese employees of the Dakudao, Lacson, and Ventura plantations congregated, finding safety in number and were waiting for

the Filipinos to intern them. Seeing that the Japanese properties were being looted in their absence, Santiago Dakudao "gave word to our Japanese workers that they are free to deposit their possessions to the custody of the plantation for safekeeping" (Dakudao, n.d.).

School buildings in both the Central and in the villages did not suffice. In the report of the chief of the Japanese Association Davao City Chapter, he complained that despite the availability of school buildings, these were not opened to the Japanese internees, and women and children slept outdoors. Kenji Migitaka, whose family was interned in the Japanese Calinan Elementary School, recalled, "It was a pity to see those assigned to live in the shacks especially when it rained, and it rained almost every night . . . And when it rained at nights, the Japanese children were given to sudden bursts of helpless cries creating confusion, anxiety and depression" (Dakudao, n.d.). In the Davao Central Elementary School, the toilets burst with overflowing feces, and volunteers had to bury theirs using bare hands. Hiroyuki Mizuguchi, a graduate of the school, requested the Filipino guards to allow him to visit the schoolteachers at their homes. Allowed, Hiroyuki borrowed from the teachers—his former teachers—the keys to the rooms where equipment were stored. Thus, with appropriate tools, the Japanese internees constructed proper sewage and makeshift shelters.

Food was also a problem. Hiroyuki Mizuguchi remembered that on the first few days the internees were given just a spoon of rice per meal. Matsuda, who was camped in the Central High School, recalled that fifteen people shared a plate. Masa Ginoza in another camp described a similar situation. Until the local government commissioned the Osaka Bazaar, the largest store in prewar Davao, to aid in food rationing, the internees lived on the baskets of bread, *kakanin* (rice cake), and fruits brought into the camp by their non-Japanese friends and families outside (mainly Filipinos, with a rare exception in Hiroyuki Mizuguch's case as he had a Spanish employer/patroness). About a week after they were incarcerated, Hiroyuki was tasked to use his connections with the Filipinos to smuggle in bread, which his group sold to the hungry Japanese internees.

To top it all, ill-thoughts gnawed on the internees; it did not help that men and women were interned separately. Masa Ginoza recalled that in the female camp, rumors flew that Filipino soldiers were randomly shooting internees in the men's camp. Meanwhile in the men's camp, rumors that Filipino soldiers raped the women proliferated.

The rumors were not always groundless. Fely Campo, a Filipina nurse in the Ohta Hospital in Mintal, recounted:

> I heard many stories. The volunteer guards, a few of whom worked in the hospital, had abused some of the Japanese attendants who were incarcerated in the hospital along with the Japanese civilian patients who were confined there . . . One day the female Japanese attendants were crying. They said the guards had raped them. I was just too afraid to talk to the guards. We were afraid of what ideas would enter their heads. We were young nurses at that time. (Yap-Morales 2006, 44)

At the sight of the invading Imperial Forces, the Japanese internees stirred, their Filipino guards "had become nervous and unnaturally restless" (Kenji Migitaka in Dakudao, n.d.) and the tension in the camps exploded to open conflict. According to Magoichiro Yonamine, the internees were gathered in the schoolyard and surrounded by Filipino guards. "The Philippine soldiers who heard that the Japanese Forces were arriving began randomly shooting the machine gun."[25] When the Imperial Army tanks barged in the camps, however, tables turned and the Filipino guards who were not able to escape were beaten to death ("Chibana 1907," Yomitan-son Shi Hen San Iin Kai 2002). The Davao Japanese Association Davao City Chapter recorded that during the internment, thirty-one internees were shot to death, another ten were massacred in the Osaka Bazaar, twenty-four were wounded, and five were missing.

In their incarceration from 8–20 December, the Japanese residents in Davao had their first taste of war. They suffered poor living conditions, lack of food and water, separation from families, ill-rumors, and Filipino hostility. Nevertheless, the Japanese would not have survived the two-week incarceration were it not for the food, clothing, tools, and protection supplied by non-Japanese friends and families outside.

Japanese Invasion

Before daybreak on 20 December, Japanese troops landed at Daliao and Talomo in the south of the Central, and at Sasa and Tibungko in the north. By sunrise, about twenty Japanese warships, including a carrier, had reached the strait between Santa Ana Wharf and Samal Island. For about an hour, these warships shelled the coast, while about ten bombers bombarded the USAFFE defenders. The USAFFE,

its lines breached, withdrew to the hilly northwestern side of Davao City where Japanese tanks would be at a disadvantage. Although they destroyed the Generoso Bridge to cover their tracks, Japanese planes detected the move, and more than fifty USAFFE supply trucks were blown up (Gleeck 1993, 96–97). On the same day, an estimated 12,000 Japanese soldiers, artillery, cavalry, tanks, and cyclists marched victoriously into the city (Ancheta 1982, 48).

At the news of advancing Japanese forces, Filipino families in the Central scampered toward the outskirts. The Campo family evacuated to Tigatto, about twenty kilometers north, with their longtime friends and neighbors, the Palma Gil family. The large Arieta family (relatives included) walked toward their friend's fishpond in Panabo. The Magallanes-Suarez family, together with their attendants, relocated to their farmhouse in Baliok, Talomo. Likewise, the Soriano family moved to their farmhouse in Catalunan. The Dakudao family, already outside the Central, circled the city to check on their relatives and to gather food and medicines. The Filipina nurses in the Ohta Hospital in Mintal, who were instructed by the Filipino Dr. Cuyugan to stay, were advised by their Japanese patients how to behave in front of the Japanese soldiers. Once the soldiers arrived, these patients also mediated on their behalf.

Meanwhile, several Japanese male residents formed the Japanese Volunteer Guards,[26] which had branches around the province and a headquarters in the Guino-o Autobus Terminal in the Central. In the Central, Mizuguchi recalled that there were about sixty members divided into two squads, and were trained to handle rifles. During the invasion, they were tasked to guard posts and aid in liquidating anti-Japanese Filipinos. Until the Kempei Tai arrived in Davao in June 1942, they were supposed "to keep peace and order" and "to catch Filipino recalcitrant, whom they called 'bad elements.'"[27]

With the help of the Japanese Association and the newly formed Japanese Volunteer Guards, the Imperial Forces imposed their brand of order. On 28 December, Filipino families in Calinan were awoken by Japanese soldiers, who barged into their shacks, pulled down their mosquito nets, and ordered them to file outside.[28] After a roll call, thirty men were taken to a nearby school to be exhibited for the residents to place a charge on. If after one or two days no accusation was placed on the exhibited men, they were let go and instructed to secure a "Good Citizen Certificate" from the Japanese Association

office in Mintal. In the same week, similar mass arrests were reported in Daliao and in Tibungko.

Having been assessed by Japanese residents (chosen specifically because they knew the local language), Filipinos were classified between good (*bueno*) and bad (*malo*). Those deemed as good citizens were given "Good Citizen Certificates" (Mizuguchi 2010, 39). Those suspected of being anti-Japan and classified as malo were publicly executed. Those known to be part of the USAFFE were boarded on a truck and never seen again. On 28 December, a public execution of several Filipino men was held in the Davao Central Elementary School.[29] The following day in Mintal, a certain Justo Pacheco was tied to a tree in a schoolyard, bayoneted, and machine-gunned for allegedly refusing to surrender his pistol.

Besides aiding the Japanese military in setting up the military occupation, Japanese residents and corporations also vouched for their families, neighbors, employees, and employers. The men who were exhibited in Calinan and then instructed to secure "Good Citizen Certificate" in Mintal were accompanied by Japanese Association members of the Calinan Chapter. In the case of Daliao, the Furukawa Plantation Company mediated and attested that the incarcerated Filipinos were its employees. In the Central, queuing Filipinos—men and women, young and old—were accompanied by Japanese friends and families who can vouch for their characters. Cesar Matsuo's Japanese father, before leaving his family to hide somewhere else to keep them safe from anti-Japanese Filipinos, left his wife a letter for the invading Japanese military. It stated that her husband and her children were Japanese nationals, and should be treated with respect.[30]

Being vouched for by a Japanese did not ensure the Filipinos of protection, as it was not only against the Japanese military that the Filipinos needed to be wary. In the closing days of December, three cases of disappearances—in Calinan, in Tibungko, and in Daliao—were reported in the Records of the War Crime Trials. Common to these cases is that, first, unlike the public executions, they were shrouded in secrecy. Second, the witnesses were threatened into silence, and the victims' families lived with the uncertainty of whether their fathers and husbands would still come home or not. Third, the silence and uncertainty were broken by Japanese friends who, despite the threats, whispered to the victims' families the fate of their loved ones.

Of the twenty Filipinos apprehended in Daliao, two disappeared. Of the thirty or so Filipinos exhibited in the schoolyard of the Japanese

Elementary School in Calinan, about five disappeared and a few others were tortured before being released. Of the Filipinos who were incarcerated in the Tibungko Lumber Company office, four were blindfolded, separated from the others, and never seen again. The Calinan murder case was closed because of the lack of evidence. Of the numerous Calinan residents who witnessed the exhibit of the suspected Filipinos, only two Japanese neighbors were able to tell the widows how their husbands were murdered. In Tibungko, the laborers were threatened not to speak of the incident, and the first Filipino witness to come forward did so a year and a half later, under pressure from the victim's family, and whispered the story only to the victim's wife—not to the authorities.

The Filipinos who disappeared were presumably murdered, not by the invading Japanese soldiers but by the Japanese residents. According to Alfonso Oboza, mayor of Davao City from 1 February 1942 to 8 May 1944, Filipino residents complained more about the Japanese Volunteer Guards than the Japanese soldiers.[31] The motives of these civilian murders can be inferred from the Japanese experience from 8–20 December. After the Japanese military took over Davao, the chapter heads of the Japanese Association submitted a report where they listed their grievances against the Filipinos.

Common to the reports, and substantiated by Filipino accounts, was the ransacking of Japanese houses and stores. As one chapter head reported, even the bananas that they expected to eat when they arrived home were looted. "No law was in operation," Santiago Dakudao described the conditions in Tugbok and Mintal. "There was no authority to hold any man in check except his conscience." Similar ransacking was described by Hiroyuki Mizuguchi in the Central and by Pedro Ataran in Tagum (in present-day Davao del Norte) (Mizuguchi 2010, 8–10; Vallejo 2009, 133).

The Japanese residents also deplored the brutalities they received from Filipinos immediately after the 8 December bombing. Teodoro Tatishi, the prime suspect in the murder of four Filipinos in Tibungko, justified, "The Tibungko Lumber Company had volunteer guards to protect the civilians but they did not protect me or my father."[32] Although Teodoro, a Filipino-Japanese laborer of the Tibungko Lumber Company, did not detail his experience with the Filipino volunteer guards, one can imagine that it was not unlike the experience of Jose Uchida of Bayabas. In Calinan in the other side of the city, a similar Filipino volunteer guard unit was organized by the residents led

by a USAFFE lieutenant. Like in Tibungko, its proponents disappeared after being apprehended by the Japanese residents.

Finally, besides Filipino hostility, the looting of Japanese belongings and their harsh internment, prewar personal and work-related rivalries with their Filipino neighbors also came into play. Lucena Dionisio, widow of one of the Filipinos who disappeared in Calinan, testified in 1946:

> When the war broke out, my husband and a few other prominent Filipino residents, with the help of a Philippine Army lieutenant, formed a volunteer guard unit. The Japanese residents of Calinan did not like this at all. Aside from this possible reason, there were some personal differences between Dr. Alejandro Lara (another Filipino who disappeared) who owned a drug store and the Japanese residents who wanted to monopolize the drug store business in the locality. Akiyama was not in good terms with my husband because of some dental bills which remained unpaid by Akiyama. Watanabe was not in good terms with Dr. Augusto Lucas (third of the disappeared Filipinos).[33]

In the Japanese invasion on 20 December, tables turned. The Japanese Association and the newly formed Japanese Volunteer Guards were tapped to facilitate the establishment of the military rule. Because of Filipino hostility after the 8 December bombing, their two-week internment and the looting of their belongings, a number of Japanese residents abused the power given to them and liquidated the Filipinos against whom they held grudges. In the Japanese military's classification of Filipinos, the Japanese residents and companies vouched for their Filipino friends and families. While the abuses by the Japanese residents could not be prevented, the victims were at least told of the truth by a handful of Japanese friends.

After the Outbreak and After the War

From January 1942 until March 1944, there were only two cases in the Records of War Crime Trials. Despite this drop in reported criminal cases, rumors of Japanese atrocities continued to proliferate, suggesting that during the Japanese military rule, conflict and violence in the frontier remained, albeit in a different form. In March 1944, the Kempei Tai conducted a two-month-long mass arrest, inquiry, and torture of Filipinos suspected to be aiding the guerrillas. In September

of that year, the Central was razed to the ground by American bombers and more air raids rained on other commercial and residential centers in other parts of the province. In April 1945, American troops landed in Cotabato, advanced toward Davao, and triggered a frenzy of Filipino massacres by retreating Japanese military. Meanwhile, the Japanese civilians were ordered to escape to the interior mountains of Tamogan with the Japanese military; here they lived vulnerable to the wild environs of the mountain and to American air raids targeting the Imperial Army. Moto Yonamine's four children and Cesar Matsuo's brother were but a few of the casualties in Tamogan (Kin-Chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai 2002, 229; Cesar Matsuo, interview by the author, 26 April 2014).

After Hirohito surrendered in August 1945, the Japanese in Tamogan started trickling down the mountains and into American camps where they were given medicines and food, and protected from the vengeance of Filipinos wrathful against anyone associated with Japan. From there they were taken to the Daliao Stockade and, by batch, repatriated back to Japan. Filipino-Japanese who were sixteen years old and above were given a choice between going to Japan and staying in Davao (Yu-Jose 1996, 80; Aiko Tanaka, interview by the author, 30 April 2014; Cesar Matsuo, interview by the author, 26 April 2014). Filipina wives of Japanese residents and their mestizo children below sixteen years old, such as Cesar Matsuo and Aiko Tanaka, were not allowed to go to Japan. Meanwhile, Filipinos in evacuation—the Campo and the Dakudao families, for example—returned to their homes. Families of victims of the Japanese massacres returned to the scenes of the crimes to collect the remains of their loved ones. Families of Filipinos who disappeared—for example, the Sorianos—vacillated between mourning for their deceased and hoping that their loved ones would return home.

Japanese plantations were confiscated and distributed to Filipinos. Filipina wives of Japanese residents and their mestizo children who remained in Davao hid in fear of anti-Japanese animosity of Filipinos. Local histories written in the 1950s focused on the diverse ethnic tribes, problematized how to rehabilitate the city, and barely mentioned Davao's history as a Filipino-Japanese settler zone.[34] In the 1960s, Davao saw another influx of Filipino migrants, newcomers who did not share the other residents' prewar and wartime experiences (Wernstedt and Simkins 1965, 90–92). The silencing of Davao's prewar Japanese residents immediately after the war and the influx of new Filipino

migrants might explain the lack of primary sources on the Filipino prewar and wartime experiences.

Also since the 1960s, Japanese economy and Philippine-Japanese relations picked up. Around the same time, Japanese repatriates who lived in Davao before the war made annual pilgrimages to Davao. Around the 1970s, recalled Cesar Matsuo, his Japanese father visited him and his siblings. In the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the Philippine Nikkei Jin Kai International School was established and continuously attracted Filipino-Japanese students. Filipino-Japanese children who had to hide immediately after the war began to use again their Japanese names—for example, Aiko Tanaka. As he published his memoir (2010), Hiroyuki Mizuguchi had moved to Davao and once again settled there. In 2013 a memorial was put up in the former Japanese Cemetery in Mintal "as a sign of long history of friendship between Davao and Japan."[35]

Conclusion

For a period so short, the Asia-Pacific War has attracted much attention from scholars and enthusiasts alike. A quick look at Morton Netzorg's and Shinzo Hayase's voluminous bibliographies on the period attests to this observation (Netzorg 1977; Netzorg 1995; Hayase 2009). The endeavor of historians to expand the historiography and search for new sources and perspective also cannot be faulted. Since immediately after the war, civilian survivors and veterans had been recording their reminiscences of the period. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, historians, such as Resil Mojares (1982) and Alfred McCoy (1977), called for the use of local history to reassess dominant assertions on the period. Since the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, scholars have used a mix of Filipino, Japanese, and American sources, which not only enlightened Filipinos as to the reasons for Japanese policies and brutalities, but also put to the fore stories of people who fell in the cracks of the dominant collaboration-resistance dichotomy (see for example, Ikehata and Jose 1999)

This paper aims to contribute to this discourse on the Asia-Pacific War using Davao's experience as a Filipino-Japanese settler zone. Guided by insights from studies of other conflicts in other frontiers, I examine how the Asia-Pacific War was experienced in Davao and how prewar linkages and divisions affected people's responses to its exigencies.

In his analysis of the Japanese residents in wartime Davao, Shinzo Hayase concludes: "Relations of mutual trust that could have prevented the confusion that arose at the outbreak of the war did not exist between the Japanese and their Filipino neighbors" (1999, 272). I would like to further nuance this observation in my examination of the Filipino and Japanese archival and oral sources. Familial and cordial relations between Filipinos and Japanese were very few in number if compared to the total population of Davao Province. After all, the Japanese comprised only about six percent of the provincial population, and most of them came and lived in Davao barely interacting with Filipinos. However, where they existed, familial and cordial relations among Filipinos and Japanese residents did facilitate each other's survival during the various stages of the outbreak of the war.

Rather than an absence of mutual trust that could have prevented chaos, that chaos was started by racial prejudice brewing since before the war. Japan's 8 December bombing in itself was not an exigency. Rather, the panic it caused led to indiscriminate murders of Japanese, Filipino-Japanese, and Filipinos suspected of conniving with Japan. Coupled with hasty and haphazard internment of Japanese civilians, racial prejudice and panic caused massacres of Japanese residents during Japan's invasion on 20 December. Considering what the Japanese residents had suffered and the prewar racial prejudice they themselves held, it was no wonder that many a Japanese abused the power given to them by the invading Japanese military.

That said, the Filipinos and Japanese residents would not have survived the monthlong chaos were it not for the prewar linkages between them. Filipino-Japanese family ties and neighborhood and occupational networks facilitated in the sharing of resources and information. Moreover, these linkages extended beyond personal interactions. The Japanese tenants and employees of the Dakudao estate, whether they knew the family personally or not, would have benefited from the offer of safekeeping their belongings in the Dakudao warehouse. The Filipino employees of the Furukawa Plantation Company in Daliao benefited from the vouch of the company even though it is safe to assume that they had never personally met Yoshizo Furukawa. Though mutual trust might have been absent, neighborhood and occupational linkages still facilitated Davao residents' survival of the chaos at the outbreak of the war.

At its core, the paper advances the need to listen to frontiers, especially those in which people of warring countries had long

coexisted. Davao was one such case. More cases in the western Pacific—the area that the Japanese used to call the "South Seas" (*nan'yo*)—await to be examined. It is my hope that local historians of these communities would come together to find common themes in the experiences of frontiers in the Asia-Pacific War.❁

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Notes

1. For more information about Bagobo culture and how it transformed in the twentieth century, see Gloria (1987) and Hayase (2007b).
2. どんなに貧しくても三度のご飯にはありつけたからね。タンコン（ウンチェーバー）は川に自生するし、ほかの野菜もよくできた。(Kin-Chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai 1996, 122).
3. Yasue Igei (born in 1910) came to Davao in 1927 as a migrant bride. For a time she and her husband lived in a community of Japanese residents, but around the mid-1930s they acquired a farmland and became independent cultivators (自営者 read as "jieisha"). Emi Nakama (born in 1918) left Kin Town along with her daughter and six other relatives at the behest of her husband who was already in Davao. They lived with her husband's family, and later became independent cultivators. Residing in Bago, they sometimes hired Filipinos (Bagobos) and were invited to local festivals. Masa Ginoza (born in 1908) came from a relatively well-off family in Kin Town. She was summoned to Davao in 1928 by her husband who had been cultivating a Filipino-owned land since 1923. As independent cultivators, she and her husband had farm implements that their neighbors regularly borrowed, and employed Japanese and Filipino laborers. Her three daughters went to the Japanese school in Daliao. Accounts of these three women came from Kin-Chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai (1996). Sendai Nakama came to Davao in 1930 as a migrant bride of Akira Nakama. Immediately before the war, she sent her older children back to Okinawa for schooling; however in their escape to Tamogan in 1945, she had with her at least three children, the oldest of whom was born in 1936. Lastly, Moto Yonamine of Kin Town, Okinawa came to Davao in 1936 with her husband and brother-in-law. They first resided in the southern part of Davao City together with many Kin Town migrants. Later, they moved to the eastern coast of Davao Gulf when an American business partner offered them land. Sendai's and Moto's accounts maybe found in Kin-Chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai (2002).

4. For example, Monico Batoon (Tiu 2005, 125), Felimon Egos (Tiu 2005, 127), and Anatalio Marinay (Tiu 2005, 134).
5. Patricia Dacudao (2006, 48) likewise observed that Filipinos adapted to the frontier through food and lodging provided by families already in Davao.
6. The Suarez-Magallanes family, which migrated to Davao in the mid-1930s, consisted of Jose Magallanes of Iloilo, his wife Nena Suarez-Magallanes of Negros, and their four daughters Maryann, Margot, Ising, and Fely. Before the war, they resided in the Central and had several estates in the southern part of Davao City. My main source for their story is Suarez Magallanes (2007). The Dakudao family in this paper pertains only to Carmen Lacson-Dakudao and Santiago Dakudao; their children were in Manila during the time of the narrative. Santiago Dakudao was one of the late 1910s migrants. With the aid of the Ohta Development Company, he studied medicine in Tokyo and became the first resident doctor of the Ohta Hospital in Mintal. On the eve of the war, the Dakudao family resided in their mansion in Tugbok, had a plantation in Calinan, and sublet a number of its other estates in southern part of Davao City to Japanese agriculturalists. The Dakudao family was one of the wealthiest and most famous Filipino families in pre-Second World War Davao, hence their story is mentioned in numerous sources. This paper relies mostly on *Sang Una* and on Michaelangelo Dakudao's unpublished manuscript, "The Japanese Interlude in Davao's Past," a collection of primary accounts which consists of a portion of Santiago Dakudao's wartime diary; a letter by one of Santiago's employees, Ken'ichi Migitaka, written immediately after the war; and an essay by Ken'ichi's son, Kenji, written in the early 1990s.
7. Chibana (born 1907) and Matsuda (born 1920) were two of the numerous Japanese residents in Riverside in the upper stream of Talomo River, Davao City, from Yomitan Village in the Okinawa Prefecture in Japan. Chibana migrated in 1929, weeded farms of his neighbors, and after acquiring his own land in 1934 summoned his wife and child to live with him in Davao. Matsuda was summoned to Davao by his father when the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, presumably to avoid conscription. Through friends in his ward association, Matsuda became a runner-boy for the Ohta DC. During the war, both Chibana and Matsuda were conscripted first to construct air fields and commandeer food from plantations in the vicinity, and then in late 1943 into the military. There is a notable difference in how the two men viewed their involvement in the war effort. While Chibana admitted that the conscription greatly disrupted their daily activities, and viewed the war negatively, Matsuda found pride in his job in the military and considered Japan's occupation of Davao as its victory in its eight-year war (starting in 1937). Perhaps because he employed Filipino laborers before the war, Chibana spoke about the Filipinos rather sympathetically. Accounts of the Yomitan migrants come from the online copy of the Yomitan-Son Shi Hen San Iin Kai (2002).
8. Jôtarô Nakama (born in 1910) from Kin Town in Okinawa Prefecture migrated to Davao in 1934 to avoid military conscription. He worked in his uncle's farm as an all-around errand boy and supervised both Japanese and Filipino laborers. His account can be found in Kin-Chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai (1996, 133–34). Magoichiro Yonamine did not record an account of the war. We know about him through the account of his wife, Moto Yonamine, whose background is discussed in Note 3.
9. Kamado Nakama (born in 1914) came to Davao in 1930, lived with her parents in the eastern coast of the Davao Gulf. Hers was a Japanese migrant community, and

in 1933 she was married to a neighbor and fellow Kin Town migrant. On the eve of the war, she had two sons whom she sent back to Okinawa to escape the possible dangers in Davao.

10. I have not encountered a Filipino-Japanese prewar marriage that was not between a Japanese pioneer and an indigenous Filipina before the first boom in the abaca industry in the late 1910s. Also, the Japanese residents, even the Okinawans, generally discouraged intermarrying with Filipinos; and Filipino accounts attest that the Japanese preferred to either return to Japan to get married or ship in migrant brides.
11. For more Filipino-Japanese partnership in agriculture, see Dacudao (2006) and Hayase (1984).
12. The Campo family migrated to Davao in 1939 when Captain Anastacio Campo was designated as provincial inspector of the Philippine Constabulary. Together with his wife Remedios and nine children, Anastacio resided in the Central and maintained a farm in Kapalong in present-day Davao del Norte. Their eldest daughter, Fely, worked as a nurse in the Ohta Hospital in Mintal. The eldest son Jose was a student in Davao Central High School and was classmates with Hiroyuki Mizuguchi, whose memoir also serves as a reference material for this paper. All information on the Campo family comes from Yap-Morales 2006. The Soriano family, consisting of Jesus (a lawyer), his wife Carmen, and five children, migrated to Davao in 1940. They rented an apartment in the Central near Jesus's office, and bought a farm in Catalunan, which they entrusted to a Filipino foreman. Information on the family comes from M. N. Panuncialman's biography of Carmen Soriano (Panuncialman 2002). Matilde (surname masked) moved to Davao from Leyte in 1941. She lived and worked in her older sister's household near Santa Ana Wharf. Data on her experience come from an interview with her by the author on 1 May 2014, in Davao City.
13. These schools were in Mintal, Daliao, Calinan, Bayabas, Manambulan, Lasang, Lasang East, Tongkalan, Digos, Catigan (Toril), Wangan, and Bangcas. All but Digos were within Davao City. There was another school in the Central, established in 1921 (Philippine-Japan Historical Museum).
14. Yu-Jose (1992) also tackles the increasing Japanese nationalism in the 1930s albeit from a different angle. She concludes that although Japanese writers had various views on the Philippines during the early twentieth century, by the end of the 1930s these converged and reached a consensus in part due to Japan's domestic politics and in part due to pressures from Filipinos in the 1930s. In 1935, for example, Secretary of Agriculture Eulogio Rodriguez declared the *pakyaw* illegal, cancelled all land applications discovered to be connected to the Japanese, and arranged for the Japanese deportation. At once, the Japanese Association announced that they would defend "to the last drop of their blood" the land they were cultivating (Yu-Jose 1992, 127).
15. This paper uses "ethnic tribes" and "indigenous peoples" interchangeably. They refer to Filipinos who deem themselves part of the ethnic groups listed by Macario Tiu and (currently) the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples. These are Ata, Bagobo, B'laan, Dibabawon, Giangan, Kalagan, Kulaman Manobo, Mandaya, Manguwangan, Mansaka, Matigsalog, Obo, Samal, Sangil and Tagakaolo. I agree with Tiu that while these groups largely overlap culturally and linguistically, while further studies must be made, and while intermarriages have blurred their

differentiation, distinction is still made because the ethnic groups themselves do so (Tiu 2005, 47).

16. Computed from the Philippine Commonwealth Commission of the Census (1940).
17. Shinzo Hayase (1999) and Grant Goodman (1991) cautioned researchers from using the Records of the War Crime Trials as it was compiled immediately after the war when anti-Japanese sentiments were still high. I took note of this potential bias. I discovered, however, that while the American investigators gave their opinion, they did not seem to censure data. In one case file, a letter of a Japanese mother pleading for her implicated son was even included.
18. For the list of military districts, see Ancheta (1982, 6–7). The location of the training camp comes from oral sources in Vallejo 2009, 87–88, 95–102, 118–19.
19. Before the war, Luciano Abenoja and Alfonso Gravador resided in present-day Davao del Norte. Luciano was a farmer and Alfonso Gravador was part of the Philippine Army. Both men went to the cadre camp in Davao City for training, and in May 1945 fought in the Battle of Ising. Filomeno Namoc joined the Philippine Army in Bohol in 1937 and migrated to present-day Davao del Norte in 1941. After the USAFFE was established, he was recalled to Tagbilaran for active duty. During the war, he returned to Davao to be closer to his wife and child. Like Luciano and Alfonso, he also fought in the Battle of Ising (Vallejo 2009, 87–88, 95–102, 118–19).
20. Hiroyuki Mizuguchi, born in 1921 to Japanese parents, migrated to Davao with his siblings at their father's behest. His parents, having found high-paying work in the Central, wanted their children to study in Davao, and pursue a professional career. Hiroyuki became one of the few Japanese students in the Davao Central Elementary School and in the Davao Central High School. In 2010, Hiroyuki published his memoir *Jungle of No Mercy*, which serves as a reference material for this paper.
21. The figure 20,000 is an estimate for the Japanese population at the outbreak of the war. According to Hayase, however, "there is no way of verifying it statistically" (2014, 144n1).
22. おじさんから借りた旅費を返済した後は自分の稼ぎだから、ウチガミのニーセー（青生）と二人で麻山を買ったんだが戦争になって、サワラバイ（むだ骨になった）。 (Kin-chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai, 1996, 133).
23. 子どもとは離れ離れになって心配のあまり与えられるおにぎりも口にすることができず、しまいには頭がおかしくなった母親もいた。 (Kin-Chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai 1996, 127).
24. Aiko Tanaka (born in 1930 to a Bagobo Filipina and a Japanese pioneer, resided in Baracatan, an interior village in Davao City), interview with the author, 30 April 2014.
25. 「日本軍の上陸を知ったフィリピン兵が、逃走する際に機関銃を乱射したんだ」(Kin-chô Shi Hen San Iin Kai 2002, 225).
26. Hiroyuki Mizuguchi calls it "Japanese Vigilante Troop" (2010, 41–42). Shinzo Hayase uses both "volunteer army" and "self-defense league" (1999, 274). I follow the term used in the Records of the War Crime Trials.
27. Alfonso Oboza in Records of the War Crime Trials, Bundle 24, Report 241; Hayase (1999, 277).
28. The Calinan case is in Records of the War Crime Trials, Bundle 22, Report 235; the case involving the Tibungko Lumber Company in Ilang, Davao City is in

Bundle 17, Report 163; and the Daliao case is in Bundle 22, Report 228. The case of Justo Pacheco is in Bundle 22, Report 236.

29. Alfonso Oboza in Records of the War Crime Trials, Bundle 24, Report 241.
30. Cesar Matsuo (born in 1940 to a Bagobo Filipina and a Japanese pioneer in Sirib, Davao City), interview by the author on 26 April 2014.
31. Alfonso Oboza in Records of the War Crime Trials, Bundle 24, Report 241.
32. The case involving the Tibungko Lumber Company in Ilang, Davao City is in Records of the War Crime Trials, Bundle 17, Report 163.
33. The Calinan case is in Records of the War Crime Trials, Bundle 22, Report 235.
34. Case in point, the Historical Data Papers–Davao Province in the Philippine National Library, Manila; Pacis (1950).
35. "The Monument of No Regret," in Mintal Public Cemetery, Davao City, photo taken by the author on 23 April 2014.

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The Contested Development of a Philippine Tourism Landscape: The Case of Nasugbu, Batangas

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ABSTRACT. A strong reliance on tourism is one of the Philippines's key strategies to attain economic growth and security. This requires infrastructures and scenic locations that attract tourists. However, these scenic locations also contain the agricultural landscape. Consequently, peasants are displaced from their homes and livelihoods to give way to tourism projects. With Nasugbu, Batangas as a study site, the paper employs critical landscape approach by examining the sociopolitical and economic relations between government officials, private tourism developers, and farmer residents that take place in its agricultural and tourism landscapes. Through interviews with various stakeholders and examination of state policies, infrastructure, and resources, the study reveals that the combination of the decentralized power of the local government units and the dynamics between government and private sectors (political patronage and through corporate social responsibility) boost the government's agenda of making tourism work for the economy. The paper posits that the kind of development that arises from the shared landscape of tourism and agriculture is contested development.

KEYWORDS. landscape · tourism · development · agriculture · Nasugbu · Philippines

Introduction

White sand beaches, tropical climate, seventeenth- to nineteenth-century architecture, natural wonders, colorful festivals, and friendly, smiling English-literate locals constitute the Philippine tourism landscape. With these images, Philippine tourism paints an adventurous, easygoing leisure, true to its catchphrase, "It's more fun in the Philippines!" However, the making of the Philippine tourism landscape is far from being fun. Conflicts and contestations transpire in the creation of this landscape but are concealed by the picturesque panorama being presented to tourists.

Tourism is one of the sectors that the Philippine government has relied on to fast-track the development of its economy. Believed to have comparative advantage because of the country's geography, heritage, and culture, tourism is hoped to bring foreign exchange earnings, employment, and investments to the Philippines. However, in the government's enthusiasm to fulfill the requirements of a viable tourism industry, it has put the needs of other key economic sectors on the sidelines. This paper examines the development trajectory of the state by looking into its tourism landscape composed of multiscalar—national, regional, local—development plans and policies, allocation of resources, and sociopolitical relations that result in undermining the already marginalized agricultural sector. The geographic lens of critical landscape is used to interpret not only what we see in the tourism landscape but also how it has been created.

State policies have recurrently identified tourism as a means of accelerating national development. Presidential Decree (PD) 189[1] of 1973 considers tourism an "untapped resource base toward an accelerated socio-economic development." Executive Order (EO) 120[2] of 1987 states that the tourism industry "has played a significant role in promoting the economies of many nations," while the Tourism Act of 2009 considers it an "engine of investment, employment, growth and national development." Since the 1970s, the state has drawn national and regional development plans and created administrative structures to ensure domestic and inbound tourism. In 1973, the national tourism organization (NTO), composed of the Department of Tourism (DOT),[3] the Philippine Tourism Authority, and the Philippine Convention Bureau, was established. Priority tourist areas for investment and infrastructure development were identified through the 1974–1977 Tourism Four-Year Plan (DOT 1974). In 2009, the Tourism Act of 2009 (Republic Act 9593) was promulgated. Within this policy, the Tourism Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority (TIEZA) was created, overtaking Philippine Tourism Authority's functions and designating, regulating, and supervising tourism enterprise zones.

It must be noted that from the 1970s to the present, tourism has evolved from being state-run to private- and market-led industry (Cruz 2009; Domingo 1998). During the martial law period in the 1970s, excessive government intervention and exclusion from tourism policy and development marginalized private enterprises.[4] But this would change, as neoliberalism would soon be embraced by the state to

remedy the country's ailing economy. Given the corruption and the profligacy of the Marcos regime, toward the end of the decade the government had incurred massive external debt; and in the early 1980s, multilateral agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, agreed to adjust the loans on the condition that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) be adopted to strengthen the economy (Broad 1988). SAPs liberalized the economy through foreign investments, promotion of new exports, and drastic reduction of tariffs, quotas, and other restrictions on imports (Bello 2001; Gössling 2003; Mowforth and Munt 2003; Shah 2013; WHO 2015). Following International Monetary Fund-World Bank prescriptions, tourism became part of an export strategy (Chavez 1999) and is grouped with other growth sectors (along with export-oriented industries and nontraditional agricultural exports), which were believed to stimulate rapid growth based on the comparative advantages of Third World countries (Brohman 1996). Foreign and private entities' involvement in the tourism industry became more entrenched in 1995, when the Philippines committed to liberalize its tourism and travel-related services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services of the World Trade Organization (WTO Secretariat 1999).

However, while neoliberalism aims to create a free market, encouraging investments and competition, this only means that transnational companies have freer access to domestic markets and elite investors are given much incentive. Ultimately, although tourism is expected to be a development catalyst for developing countries, accrued benefits depend on where most of the profits go and who controls the industry (Badger et al. 1996 cited in Holden 2013). According to Sharpley and Telfer (2008), tourism in Mexico, Thailand, the Seychelles, and Fiji has proved to be a driver of development, but failed elsewhere in the developing world, despite providing a source of foreign exchange earnings and employment. Oftentimes, local needs are sacrificed to give way to tourism. Gössling aptly observed: "Tourism development often satisfies the economic interests of international and national groups of actors while local development needs are only partially and too often inappropriately met" (2003, 17). And while tourism could preserve culture and nature, it could also be instrumental in their destruction. Trade-offs are part of the equation in developing countries promoting tourism.

To examine the relevance of Gössling's view in the Philippine context, the study chose to scrutinize the tourism and agricultural

landscapes in the coastal town of Nasugbu, Batangas. It is part of the Philippines' place marketing as Asia's beach capital (DOT 2009). Its long coastline streaked with multiple coves, coupled with its proximity to Manila—approximately seventy-three kilometers away from Manila or a two-hour car drive via the Manila-Cavite and Ternate-Nasugbu Highways[5]—makes it a popular weekend retreat. Its viability as a tourist destination did not escape the attention of the national government. In 1975, Nasugbu was designated a tourist zone through Presidential Proclamation (PP) 1520.[6] This status was reiterated and fortified in 2007 through EO 647[7] pronouncing Nasugbu a special tourism zone (STZ). These proclamations made Nasugbu part of the state's priority areas for investment and infrastructure development. Its local government was made to coordinate with the NTO and urged to formulate its own comprehensive tourism master and land use plans. With the private sector enjoying tourist zone incentive packages, beach resorts and leisure communities began to proliferate in Nasugbu. These set the minds of its local government officials to the idea that tourism is key to the town's development. However, before being groomed as a tourist destination, Nasugbu is first and foremost an agricultural municipality. Its coast provides abundant marine resources, while its rolling terrain yields various crops, providing livelihood to its population. Since agriculture and tourism use the same resources of land and marine waters, Nasugbu has become a seat of disputes between farmers and fisherfolks on the one hand and landowners and resort developers on the other.

In Natipuan, one of Nasugbu's barangays and the study site, residents are being evicted due to tourism development. These residents are migrants from nearby towns whose population started from a few families and grew by exogamous marriages and the coming of new settlers. While some families settled here to find farming lands, others relocated here after being displaced by the construction of a golf course and a gated residential enclave in Laurel, Batangas. They migrated here thinking that nobody owns the lands since these are situated in a mountainous area. Most residents subsist through various livelihoods. During the wet season they depend on rain-fed agriculture while raising cattle and fowls. Throughout the dry season they live by charcoal-making and construction work. Fishing supplements their diet. Forty years and four generations later, they were being evicted by JAKA Investments Corporation (JAKA). This was also the story of Nasugbu farmers in the barangays of Hacienda Looc, who were bought out and

harassed to give way to a leisure community being developed by SM Investments Corporation (SM). JAKA and SM are companies that hold various business ventures and are owned by politically influential economic elites. JAKA is owned by a senator's family. Besides property development, it has businesses in food, investment and securities, logistics and distribution, personnel and security services, and lumber. Meanwhile, SM is owned by the country's richest man as reported by *Forbes* in 2015, and has investments in banking, property development, and retail business (Blankfeld 2015; JAKA 2012; SM 2015).[8]

This wrestle over land is only one, albeit the most consequential, of the many tensions experienced in the Nasugbu landscape. Add to these the development tensions in the construction of a tourism highway instead of village roads, rights and welfare of tourism workers being waived to give special treatment to guests, and budget allocation and marine resource management favoring tourism over agricultural development. Backed by national and local policies, the policy biases shaped the tourism landscape of Nasugbu—its sun-sea-and-leisure side—while pushing agriculture out of the frame. Yet, this landscape representation is being contested by the solidarity and narratives formed by farmers.

(Critical) Landscape as Ideological Concept and Site of Social Reproduction

Landscape studies in geography have evolved from Carl Sauer's cultural landscape to contemporary approaches. Sauer claimed that cultural landscapes are the physical outcomes of the interaction of cultural groups with their natural environments (Hoelscher 2009). These landscapes, along with natural ones, are what draw tourists in. Thus, in tourism literature, landscapes pertain to objects of leisure and how tourism modifies them (Bell and Lyall 2002; Carneiro, Lima, and Silva 2015; Wall 2003).

Landscapes are not only material manifestations of man's actions but also representations of his values and aspirations that structure and symbolize his surroundings (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988). Hence, from Sauer's cultural landscape, landscape has become a way of seeing, an ideology that carefully selects and represents the world so as to give it particular meaning (Mitchell 2000; Cosgrove 1984). Accordingly, landscapes are sites of struggle with multiple interpretations by those who access them. As Harner (2001, 661) astutely articulated: "Landscape

is a contested terrain full of conflicting meanings from opposing classes, between those who had control and those who now seek to assert their power." Tourists see landscapes as refuge from their everyday activities, investors as business opportunities, and locals as home and workplace (Cunningham 2009; Daugstad 2008; Wall 2003). However, among these, one view is privileged. This dominant view is then naturalized in the landscape, reflecting and incorporating the desires and fears of the surrounding hegemonic society (Mitchell 2000). It is the hegemon's view which is believed to be true. It is the hegemon who has the power and the means to reproduce its representation through various state apparatuses.

In the case of Nasugbu, the hegemon is the alliance of the local government and the private sector. The private investors see the landscape as a profitable enterprise, and this serves well with how the government sees the landscape, as something to manage toward development. For the government, the private sector's profitable enterprise is equated with development. To support this rationale, the government creates a conducive environment for these enterprises to prosper; hence, the formulation of the statute proclaiming Nasugbu as a special tourist zone. Complementary to this, through the mass and social media, tourism developers tout Nasugbu's beaches as haven for fun and relaxation. In establishing Nasugbu as a tourism landscape, it has overshadowed the fact that 79 percent of its rolling terrain and coast provides livelihood to its farmers and fisherfolks (Municipality of Nasugbu 2003; Palafox Associates 2003).

The use of critical landscape could assist in understanding the conflicting meanings embedded in the landscape.[9] Its proponent, geographer Don Mitchell, argued that not only what is visible in the landscape should be examined but also what is concealed (Dubow 2009). This is a radical way of reading landscapes, a departure from the previous concept that meanings arise from what one noticeably sees in the landscape. Landscapes are produced under particular historical conditions and by constant motions of social relationships and social struggle that are suspended both in the landscape's image and material form, making them concealed and naturalized (Bender 2001; Mitchell 1996). The present view of the material landscape is not enough to convey all that has taken place in its production. Before reaching its current state, the landscape has undergone processes of control and modification by various actors based on their interests (thus, the contested representations). All of these are invisible to the spectator.

Map 1. Location map of Nasugbu, Batangas.

Map 2. Location map of Batangas, Philippines.

Map 3. Map of the Municipality of Nasugbu. Areas in grey are the study sites: Barangay Natipuan and Hacienda Looc (composed of Barangays Papaya, Looc, Calayo, and Bulihan).

Sources: GADM and PhilGIS

Cartography: Hazel M. Dizon

What is seen and given representation is the end product, which has been successfully molded according to the wishes of the dominant group. Therefore, it is imperative to trace the history and examine the social relations and social (re)production that made and transformed the present landscape in order to challenge its hegemonic representations.

To decode the tourism landscape of the Philippines, the tourism zone of Nasugbu, Batangas, serves as the study site. The social relations that produced it and its historical context are examined. Socioeconomic processes within its institutional and organizational settings arising from social relations are revealed to understand how landscapes are created and maintained (Le Heron 2009). The landscape has representations, the meanings of which vary depending on who views them. The groups or classes who are the actors in the social reproduction have differing perspectives due to their own ideologies. Therefore, if representations of landscapes and the features attached to them are contested, so with the kind of development the tourism landscape embodies. Since the state is the ruling institution and one of the producers of dominant thought, it is imperative to know its economic and governmental policies and how these translate to, affect, and result in changing or modifying the present landscape that tourism and agriculture share in the lands of Nasugbu.

Methodology, Study Sites, and Limitations of the Research

Nasugbu has both tourism and agriculture as economic activities, thus fitting for the study. Located southwest of Manila and facing the West Philippine Sea, Nasugbu is one of the coastal municipalities of Batangas, Philippines (maps 1–3). Two agricultural settlements in the town of Nasugbu served as primary study sites. These settlements are located in the mountainous area of Barangay Natipuan and have experienced land disputes. During the course of the research, particularly while looking at secondary data, the land dispute in Hacienda Looc was referenced both by reports and by research participants (APC 2012; Church Peasant Conference 1997; Corpuz 2004). Thus, Hacienda Looc's experience with land dispute is cited throughout this paper as part of the Nasugbu tourism landscape.

Field research in Barangay Natipuan and interviews in government offices took place from 2010 to 2013. As part of reconnaissance and via purposive sampling, survey interviews were carried out with thirty households to review their land tenure, livelihood, and housing and

settlement history. Afterward, through snowball sampling, four key informants were identified for semi-structured, in-depth interviews. These informants have stayed long enough in the village to see significant changes in the landscape. The interviews were focused on impacts of tourism development and how social relations facilitated these. It must be noted that their answers were more economic in nature than cultural. Thus, in this landscape study, the residents' sense of place is based more on their fear of losing their livelihood and habitation than the sentiments of being uprooted from the place they grew up in.

To see the social relations among the different actors and how they are linked to government policies, semi-structured interviews with local government officials and officers were carried out. Data such as land use plans, development plans, and physical and socioeconomic profiles were collected from various government offices. Local government laws and ordinances regarding tourism were identified and were related to existing national policies that promote tourism. These were supplemented with secondary data from online media reports. Through secondary data, and validated through the interviews, a history of the lands of Nasugbu is reconstructed to trace and contextualize its changing landscape.

At the onset of my fieldwork, I did courtesy calls to, sought the permissions of, and interviewed the mayor of Nasugbu and the barangay captain of Natipuan. There was no need to solicit the permission of the military to conduct fieldwork since they were not visibly present in my primary area of study during that time. Later, in my interviews with the residents, the military and insurgents were mentioned. I tried to confirm their presence, in particular those of the insurgents, with the barangay captain and the municipal administrative and tourism officer. The latter neither confirmed nor denied it, while the former believed that insurgents were not present in her barangay. I also sensed that they were hesitant to talk about this, and I did not insist; else, it might have jeopardized my interviews and fieldwork. Meanwhile, armed men in Hacienda Looc had a strong presence, as gleaned from news reports. Data on Hacienda Looc were based on secondary sources since they were meant more as a support to the case of Barangay Natipuan, thus no field interview took place.

The Lands of Nasugbu: History of the Material Landscape

The land and coast of Nasugbu have provided its residents food, livelihood, and recreation. However, in the past decade, significant changes have happened due to tourism. While tourists have gained access via a newly constructed highway, the managements of subdivisions, vacation houses, and resorts have restricted the movement of the residents, farmers, and fisherfolks. It has become impossible to use the shortest routes to go to the beach and fish. Security guards are stationed to prevent the locals from peddling their harvested produce to tourists. In Natipuan, residents from the agricultural settlements are being displaced from their homes and livelihood. In November 2005, JAKA sent notices of eviction and, in 2006, filed a case of unlawful detainer against the residents. The residents expect JAKA to develop a tourism facility since it has developed properties before in Laurel, Batangas, for the same purpose. Said development also displaced residents in the process (Resident 32, pers. comm.).

Natipuan is only one of the barangays that has land use conversion. Much of Nasugbu's lands are being converted to commercial use, which are accompanied by changes in ownership. During the Spanish colonial period, the vast hacienda of Nasugbu was leased by the king of Spain to Spaniard Don Fernando de Araya. After the lease expired, it was sold to a Spanish *mestizo* before it was finally acquired by the Roxas family, who used it as a sugarcane plantation. In the early 1970s and over a period of ten years, the Roxas family decided to sell some of their landholdings (Municipality of Nasugbu 2008; Palafox Associates 2003; Villacrusis, n.d.). Many well-known families and politicians currently own lands in Nasugbu. According to the residents, the business families of Puyat and Concepcion, and politicians such as the Legardas, Angaras, Ermitas, and Enriles, are landowners in Nasugbu. Even former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo owns land in Nasugbu, as seen in her 2008 statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (Jaymalin and Romero 2008; Arroyo 2009). In particular, Enrile's land in Natipuan was purchased from the Roxases (Virginia Sapico, pers. comm.). In his 2011 statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth, his Natipuan property was declared to have been acquired in 1972 for a mere total price of PHP 1,000; in 2012 it had a current market value of PHP 36,786,661 (Ponce Enrile 2012; PCIJ 2004).[10]

Still, the Roxases remain a substantial landowner in Nasugbu. Some of their holdings have been invested in property development under Roxas and Company, Inc. (RCI), including two high-end

residential resort communities and a residential subdivision (Roxaco Land Corporation 2011). The resorts are jointly known as Punta Fuego, a part of which is in Natipuan. The Roxases also had sugar plantations in nine barangays until 2014, when the Supreme Court finally decided in favor of agrarian reform beneficiaries (*InterAksyon* 2011). The Roxases plan to convert some of the firm's remaining agricultural lands into industrial, commercial, and residential use (Montealegre 2012).

Up in the northern part of Nasugbu, another hacienda, covering Barangays Calayo, Bulihan, Papaya, and Looc, is also in the midst of a dispute due to land use conversion. The Dolor family owned Hacienda Looc until the 1970s when the land was distributed to thousand of farmers who were given emancipation patent through PD 27[11], certificates of land transfer in the 1990s through EO 229[12] and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). However, due to Nasugbu's land use plan and its being declared a tourism zone through PP 1520 and EO 647, it was concluded that Hacienda Looc would be of better use if converted into an agritourism complex. The government auctioned the land, and it was acquired by Manila South Coast Development Corporation, a subsidiary of SM. The certificates of land transfers were cancelled, and a leisure community—consisting of residential condominiums, villas, residential lots, and hotels, collectively known as Hamilo Coast—is now operating in place. Thus, the agrarian dispute in Hacienda Looc has been greatly affected by government laws and policies. While PD 27, EO 229, and CARL have granted the farmers their right to the land, this was taken away by PP 1520 and EO 647.

Sociopolitical and Economic Relations

Conglomerates JAKA, SM, and RCI are the leading leisure community developers in Nasugbu. They are owned by prominent families who have political ties. The family of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile owns JAKA, the Roxas clan owns RCI, and the Sy family owns SM. While JAKA was the highest election campaign contributor of Senator Enrile (PCIJ 2016), the owners of SM and RCI were once officially appointed to oversee Nasugbu's tourism development. Meanwhile, local government officials enjoy a certain amount of autonomy due to the ratification of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). It has decentralized powers, responsibilities, and resource management from the national government. This gives the mayor much authority to manage his

town's resources and personnel. During the data gathering for this study, Antonio Barcelon was on his third consecutive term as Nasugbu mayor. During his first term, Nasugbu was designated as an STZ and he was the one who identified the barangays that were considered priority tourist areas (TIEZA consultant, pers. comm.). Municipal officers interviewed for this study were coterminous with him. The Barcelons also held multiple electoral positions in Nasugbu. In fact, the barangay captain of Natipuan, Virginia Sapico, is his cousin.

When JAKA claimed ownership of its land in Nasugbu, the residents still hoped that they had a chance to keep it. Since the disputed area is in the mountains, the residents asserted that they never knew anyone to have had owned the land where they have lived for over forty years. However, they recognized that it was not theirs either since they do not have land titles. JAKA offered the residents a relocation site and PHP 5,000 for each family to build their house. Twenty-three of the original 113 families accepted this. The majority who remained reasoned out that the amount was too small to buy materials for their houses, and no arable fields were offered for their farming.

When the remaining residents resisted relocation efforts, JAKA filed a complaint of unlawful detainer against them. Unlawful detainer is a legal action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds it even after the complainant demanded him/her to vacate. Thus, if JAKA wins this case, the residents will be evicted from the property and can even be made to pay compensation for litigation expenses and for the use and occupation of the said premises (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70, Section 17). Meanwhile, JAKA security guards roved around the villages, prohibiting the construction of new houses and threatening residents in efforts to drive them away. In response, the resident farmers formed their organization, and looked for a lawyer to defend them. They also solicited the help of their barangay captain (village head) and the mayor. They had different experiences with their former and current barangay captains. When asked what they think of their barangay leader, they instead answered in a roundabout way that if it were the former barangay captain Jaime Alonzo, they might have had more support. The first time they were threatened with eviction, the former barangay captain stood his ground in favor of the residents and even refused bribes from the developer's men (Resident 31, pers. comm.). This was different from the stance of the current barangay captain Sapico, who identified that her role was merely to relay the compensation offer of the developer in exchange for the disputed land (Sapico, pers. comm.).

Mayor Barcelon had the same stand as his cousin. He said that he should not take sides and that the case should be left for the court to decide (Barcelon, pers. comm.). The only assistance that his office could provide was access to legal documents available in the municipal office that were needed in the case. The TIEZA coordinator observed that this was a well-measured way of dealing with the residents because elected officials see them as "votes"; thus, they do not totally oppose nor support their cause (TIEZA consultant, pers. comm.).[13]

Local officials of Nasugbu are not new to land disputes between farmers and developers. For the last fifteen years, land disputes in the town have been frequent. Because of this, the Sangguniang Bayan (Municipal Council) passed Nasugbu Municipal Resolution (NMR) 110[14] in 2004. The resolution requested the House of Representatives to reverse the proclamation of Nasugbu as a tourist zone as decreed by PP 1520, using the justification that it was primarily an agricultural land. Though Mayor Barcelon approved the resolution, nothing came out of it. According to former municipal councilor Juner Villarin (pers. comm.), it was probable that Mayor Barcelon did not follow up the resolution with Eileen Ermita-Buhain, the district representative in Congress during that time. Congresswoman Ermita-Buhain is the daughter of then-executive secretary Eduardo Ermita, the one who attested to the signing of EO 647 by President Arroyo. Three years after NMR 110 was passed, Nasugbu was declared an STZ where the mayor himself identified the barangays that should compose it (TIEZA consultant, pers. comm.). This was despite the fact that there were existing land disputes between tourism developers and the peasants in the municipality.

Tourism activities prevail in Nasugbu because of the hegemonic belief that tourism stimulates development more than agriculture. Nasugbu's elected officials, particularly the mayor and Natipuan's barangay captain, subscribe to this belief. Mayor Barcelon had this to say:

> With the current state of the Philippines, [the production of] our traditional products, like coffee, abaca, sugar, are dying . . . If you are familiar with what happened in Mexico and in other Latin American countries, which we have the same traditional products with, it was tourism that made them rise to development . . . [15] (Barcelon, pers. comm.)

Barangay Captain Sapico echoed the same view:

> It is better when there is tourism . . . If there would be establishments, there would be jobs. Is not that the start of development? How could you develop if you just depend on charcoal making, cultivating a few crops? (Sapico, pers. comm.)

Thus, when JAKA and its partner, Sta. Lucia Land, Inc., applied for a permit to develop the property in Natipuan for residential and commercial subdivisions, its approval was endorsed by the Municipal Council and, as a matter of procedure, expressed in a municipal resolution. The resolution states that the Municipal Council, as empowered by the LGC to process and approve development plans, stamped its approval because "the project shall promote and enhance progressive development of Nasugbu, especially in residential tourism and leisure estates development in consonance with the master development plan" (NMR 159-2011).[16]

Other than the subscription to the development prospect of tourism, patron-client relations also existed between the tourism developer in Natipuan and the local government of Nasugbu. The tourism developer in Natipuan has strong political ties. JAKA's founder, Juan Ponce Enrile, has been elected senator four times (1987, 1995, 2004, and 2010), even holding the Senate presidency twice (2008–2010, 2010–2013). As a senator, he had discretionary funds through his Priority Development Assistance Fund that could be utilized for infrastructure or community projects. Meanwhile, the Municipality of Nasugbu was diligent in requesting funds for road construction projects from senators, congressmen, the provincial governor, concerned line agencies and offices, and even from the Office of the President. As said by the municipal administrative and tourism officer Emerito Bordeos (pers. comm.), they never let a year pass without roads being constructed, as this was one of the requirements to attract tourists and tourism investors. Senator Enrile was one of the politicians they frequently asked for funding support. In 2011 and 2010, for instance, two municipal resolutions were passed regarding the funding of two roads under his office, amounting to PHP 13 million.[17] The Municipal Council and Mayor Barcelon declared Senator Enrile a distinguished son of Nasugbu because he "has distinguished himself as a genuine public servant with a deep concern for the welfare of Nasugbu by allocating funds for the development projects of the locality" and this "magnanimous gesture . . . can at least be compensated by making him part and parcel of this municipality" (NMR 99-2011).[18] Two months after Senator Enrile was "adopted" as

a son of Nasugbu, NMR 159 (2011) was signed and approved by the Municipal Council and the mayor. This was the municipal resolution mentioned above that approved JAKA's application for a residential and commercial subdivision.

Another way of developing the tourism landscape of Nasugbu, and making the farmer residents accept this transformation, is through the collaboration of the government and the private sector, as seen in the case of Hacienda Looc. The national government officially involved the business sector in this endeavor when tourism developers were appointed as members of the eminent persons group (EPG). The creation of the EPG is mandated through EO 647. According to the municipal administrative and tourism officer (Bordeos, pers. comm.), the president appointed the EPG members who were chosen based on their knowledge and interest in making tourism a sustainable development in Nasugbu. He added that the members of the EPG are owners of big development companies but claimed that they were unknown to him. In a separate interview, the TIEZA consultant revealed that members of the EPG were prominent personalities from private entities; and during the Arroyo administration, two of the appointees were Teresita Sy-Coson of SM and Santiago Elizalde of RCI. He added that being owners of leisure destinations, they were in the best strategic position to oversee tourism development in Nasugbu (TIEZA consultant, pers. comm.). Having been appointed by the government, these private developers have gained authority to shape the landscape of Nasugbu.

During their appointment, SM was already developing the first phase of Hamilo Coast in Hacienda Looc. While SM was busy buying out lands from the farmers, SM's corporate social responsibility (CSR) arm, SM Foundation, was also busy doing community projects in the area. It has provided day care centers, resources for livestock raising, agricultural trainings, and one-month vocational courses on massage and manicure-pedicure in Hacienda Looc (APC 2012). In an interview with the municipal agricultural officer Rhodora Agapay, she confirmed that SM Foundation funded their vegetable training program in the four barangays. For her, this was a fortunate intervention since the Municipal Agricultural Office budget from the local government unit (LGU) was not enough to implement its program. It relies on the assistance of the Department of Agriculture and the private sector, such as the SM Foundation, to accomplish its mandate (Agapay, pers. comm.).

SM has also pledged that the phased developments at Hamilo Coast will be ecologically sustainable through renewable energy—that is, through solar power, proper waste management, and the conservation and preservation of biodiversity of marine life, flora, and fauna in the area (SM 2015). Among the conservation activities were mangrove planting, upland tree planting, and supporting the Bantay Dagat (Sea Patrol) (*Philippine Star* 2009b). Bantay Dagat are civilian fisheries patrol volunteers who guard marine protected areas (MPAs) against trespassers. Private developers and their CSR arms, like Hamilo Coast, SM Foundation, and Punta Fuego Foundation, support Bantay Dagat since the local government lacks funds for implementing conservation activities (Conservation International 2010). According to the municipal environment and natural resources officer Mildred Sanchez (pers. comm.), aside from Bantay Dagat, the resorts also guard the MPAs since most of the conserved areas are "inside the territories of their resorts" and need preservation for the enjoyment of their guests.

Barangay Natipuan also accepted financial support from private tourism establishments. In interviews in 2010 and 2012, the barangay captain of Natipuan said that they received financial support from the resorts. During tourism's peak season in summer, resort owners give monetary honorarium to barangay *tanod* (village guardians). The barangay also solicit funds from wealthy residents of the leisure communities during fiestas. The barangay captain claimed that she was neutral, siding neither with the developer nor with the residents. Nevertheless, she favored tourism because it generated jobs and brought funds through the collection of real property tax (Sapico, pers. comm.).

The aforementioned CSR activities could possibly gain the tourism developers triple points in their favor. One, the CSR activities could soften the resistance of the farmers against tourism projects. Farmers could be more accepting of the changes since social services and livelihood resources are provided. Two, the tourism developers have manufactured an altruistic image of themselves by doing their share of CSR as projected through the media. The general public is informed of the activities as reported in numerous newspaper articles and in their company websites, burying reports about the land dispute (see, for example, De la Cruz 2010; Garcia 2011; Lesaba 2011; *Philippine Star* 2009a, 2009b; SM Foundation 2015). Lastly, they have fostered good relations with Nasugbu's LGU by funding projects and programs that are originally the latter's responsibility. However, according to the anti-landgrabbing peasant movement Asian Peasant Coalition, these were

forms of bribery to soften the people's resistance against tourism development in their place (APC 2012, 2015).[19]

State Policies and Local Projects: Conflicted Development

The belief that development arises from the tourism landscape of Nasugbu has been conditioned and (re)enforced by the state's multiscalar tourism development plans. After identifying Batangas as one of the priority areas in the 1974–1977 Tourism Four-Year Plan (DOT 1974), Nasugbu was proclaimed a tourism zone in 1975. In a response to the 1991–2010 Philippine Tourism Master Plan's call for comprehensive master plans for tourism areas, the 1997 Regional Tourism Master Plan for Southern Tagalog[20] was drawn, wherein the coastline of Nasugbu was identified as a destination for water sport enthusiasts (NEDA CALABARZON 2004). Meanwhile, the 2004–2010 Regional Development Plan for CALABARZON (wherein Batangas is included) was formulated in accordance with the 2004–2010 Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP). In this Regional Development Plan, Nasugbu is listed as part of the Beach Resort Cluster that would cater to domestic and East Asian markets (NEDA CALABARZON 2004). The reiteration of Nasugbu as an STZ through EO 647 in 2007 was a response to the call of the 2004–2010 MTPDP's creation of tourism zones. Upon the expiration of the 2004–2010 MTPDP in 2010, the Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016 and the 2011–2016 Philippine National Tourism Development Plan were drawn up. The latter has placed Nasugbu as part of the Nasugbu-Looc-Ternate-Cavite Tourism Development Area (DOT 2011).

The image of Nasugbu as a tourism zone has been successfully established through various development plans and statutes. It also gave the local authorities the impression that tourism is the key to their own development. The municipality has formulated not only its comprehensive land use plan, where tourism areas are identified, but also its own tourism development plan. Furthermore, in its municipal profile for 2010, tourism is listed as its lone priority development thrust.

The translation of multiscalar development plans into statutes, policies, and infrastructures illustrates the continuing construction of the tourism landscape in Nasugbu. From these, the creation of the tourism landscape in Nasugbu threatens to annihilate its agricultural landscape since they utilize the same resources of land and marine

water. This section cites the fulfillment of tourism requirements in Nasugbu and how these have displaced the development needs of agriculture, creating tensions between the respective sectors. The infrastructure development and prezoning and titling of lands for tourism priority areas are national projects that aim to remove barriers to investments as stated in MTPDP 2004–2010 and in Tourism Act of 2009 (NEDA 2004). Funding for local government initiatives that promote tourism then follows, such as that for peace and order operations or the opening of MPAs to tourism operators.

The conversions of agricultural land to tourism use in Natipuan and Hacienda Looc are facilitated and legitimized by various laws and tourism plans. The MTPDP 2004–2010 pronounced that lands with high potential for tourism shall be prezoned and titled in order to reduce the lengthy land acquisition and conversion process. In accordance with MTPDP 2004–2010, the Tourism Act of 2009 (Section 61, p. 26) was promulgated, which states that lands identified as part of tourism priority areas, including tourism enterprise zones, are exempted from CARL (Republic Act 6657) and from the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (Republic Act 7279). Thus, the declaration of Nasugbu as an STZ has given its local government a stronger justification to privilege access to land that caters to tourism.

Putting up zones not only for tourism but also for industrial and commercial purposes is hardly new in the country. It has just become sophisticated over time. In the 1970s and 1980s, development plans and policies identified economic zones, industrial estates, and tourism zones. This approach is a regional strategy of developing selected growth centers as a way of optimizing the benefits from infrastructural investments (Intal 1995). However, this has also fostered land speculations and land banking, often converting agricultural lands leading to the displacement of peasants (Corpuz 2002; Church Peasant Conference 1997; Kelly 1998).

Agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) are not spared from this process.[21] In fact, CARL, where CARP is anchored, has hastened the process of land conversion (Corpuz 2002; Kelly 1998). In Section 65 of CARL, it is stated that when land ceases to be agriculturally productive, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value if it is used for residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, then reclassification of the land can be authorized by the Department of Agrarian Reform. This resulted in land speculators and real estate and



Map 4. Alternative routes going to Nasugbu. Four hours is needed to travel by bus from Manila to Nasugbu via Tagaytay. An underground tunnel has been constructed that connects Nasugbu to the existing Manila-Cavite Expressway, which runs from Ternate to Manila. This new route reduces travel time to two hours. The mountain rocks of Pico de Cero were blasted to give way to the underground tunnel.

tourism developers buying out farmers, making the land idle, and converting it later to other use (Kelly 1998, 2000). Meanwhile, landowners who do not want to lose their land convert their farms into corporations and opt for CARP's stock distribution scheme, making their tenants stockholders.

The LGC has also made land conversion easier for developers. Through the LGC, the LGUs are given a certain level of autonomy, devolving functions and responsibilities that were once being handled by national government agencies, including resource management. To manage their resources, LGUs are required to draw their comprehensive land use plans, classifying their municipality into different districts: residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, tourism, etc. Through an ordinance, the LGU can reclassify up to 15 percent of its agricultural land base on its economic viability in comparison with other use (LGC, Section 20). The decision to reclassify land use is left to the local officials, particularly mayors, whose decisions can be swayed by monetary considerations (Kelly 2000). The president can also authorize conversion of agricultural lands to tourism development areas as per EO 124 (1993).[22] In the case of Nasugbu, after the formulation of its comprehensive land use plan and tourism development plan, it was the mayor who identified the barangays that are to be part of Nasugbu's tourism priority areas (TIEZA consultant, pers. comm.).

Unbalanced prioritization of infrastructure has added fuel to the contested development in Nasugbu. The construction of the PHP 860 million Nasugbu-Ternate Tourist Road is a testament to the government's prioritization of tourism. It passes through the coastal barangays of Nasugbu, including Natipuan and Hacienda Looc. It has shortened travel time from four to two hours by passing through the Pico de Cero Mountain via a 303-meter underground tunnel connecting the coastal towns of Ternate (Cavite) and Nasugbu (Burgonio 2013; DPWH 2009; *GMA News* 2011; Pico Sands Hotel 2016) (map 4).

Though the resident farmers are privileged to have the Nasugbu-Ternate Tourist Road passing by their place, they are still deprived of good roads that lead to their village. While the Tourist Road is asphalted, the path leading to them are rough roads (see figure 1). The path going to Natipuan is two hundred meter of rugged, undulating terrain. According to Resident 32 (pers. comm.), the residents themselves plowed the path to make it more passable for them and their carabaos. During rainy days, the rough path becomes muddy and poses a threat to residents due to the slippery stones scattered throughout the road. Schoolchildren even bear the embarrassment of wearing soiled uniforms.

Figure 1. Left is the Nasugbu-Ternate Road while the photo on the right is the road going to the study site. Photographs: Hazel M. Dizon, July 2012.

While the Tourist Road has provided larger access and an alternative route to industries, residential areas, and tourism destinations, it has been built at the expense of communities and the environment. The R-1 Expressway Extension Project, to which the Tourist Road is connected, traverses the Bacoor Bay through a combination of reclamation and viaduct works (UEM-MARA Philippines Corp. 2011). It has demolished 7,500 hectares of corals and mangroves in Manila Bay, displaced 1,000 urban poor families, and has felled 4,000 trees (Lazaro 2009; Corpuz 2004). The relentless undertaking of reclamation projects in Manila Bay since the 1970s is suspected to be linked to storm surges along the entire stretch of the bay from Cavite to Bataan due to the change in the movement and flow of the waters inside the bay (Hicap 2011).

Constructing infrastructures in priority tourism areas is mandated by the Tourism Act of 2009 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Tourism Act of 2009, Section 54, p. 84). The 2004–2010 MTPDP also emphasized the prioritization of infrastructure projects that are "strategic and critical to stimulate trade and investments," including roads and airports for tourism hubs (NEDA 2004, 77). Accordingly, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH 2005) expects the Tourist Road to "pave way to the recognition of the tourist hubs and world-class resorts which attract the foreign and domestic tourists." President Aquino echoed similarly, "This will further boost tourism in Cavite and Batangas" (Burgonio 2013).

The establishment of MPAs in Nasugbu through NMR 23 (2009) has marginalized the fisherfolks, while providing access to tourism developers. The ordinance was passed to protect marine biodiversity and to ensure the sustainability of marine resources that provide livelihood to fishermen and food security of the community. Fishermen are restricted from the MPAs to preserve and rehabilitate spawning grounds of fish. Despite the good intention, there are practical drawbacks. To avoid the MPAs, fishermen have to go farther away as MPAs are near the coastlines. Fishing far in the ocean requires a larger boat, which small fisherfolks cannot afford. Small boats, which are weak against the strong winds of the open seas, are prone to accidents. At such distances, fisherfolks also encounter big commercial fishing boats with trawls that they cannot compete with. "Those trawls of big fishing boats are the ones that hurt small fisherfolks," complained a resident (Resident 31, pers. comm.). While fisherfolks are left with little or no catch at all and with limited alternative livelihood, tourism

Table 1. Programmed appropriation and obligation by object of expenditure for 2010, Office of the Mayor/General Fund, Municipality of Nasugbu

Object of Expenditure	Amount in Peso
Other Maintenance & Operating Expenses	
Cultural & Historical Presentation	100,000.00
Youth & Sports Development	400,000.00
Nutrition Program	1,755,000.00
Barangay Affairs, Conditions & Operations	200,000.00
Traffic Maintenance & Enforcement	1,560,600.00
Tourism, Promotion & Development	1,214,700.00
Zero Waste Management Program	1,676,800.00
Peace and Order	2,515,200.00
Municipal Disaster Program	30,000.00

Source: Culled from the Annual Budget Report, Municipality of Nasugbu, 2011.

operators gain advantage. In effect, tourism operators acquire exclusive access to MPAs, where tourism activities like diving and snorkeling are allowed. Fishermen caught fishing in MPAs are apprehended by the Bantay Dagat and resort watchers.

The prioritization of a sector can be seen in the resources allocated to it. In the case of agriculture in Nasugbu, the Municipal Agricultural Office's budget is limited; thus, their services are limited as well. According to the municipal agricultural officer (Agapay, pers. comm.), Natipuan was not part of their program because they do not have enough agricultural technicians to oversee the area. Since the appropriated budget for them was not enough, they depended on politicians for infrastructures such as farm-to-market roads and footbridges, while agricultural and fisheries programs were being sourced from the Department of Agriculture and from private entities such as SM Foundation. Because of the limited budget, they had narrowed down their programs to three barangays for irrigated areas and two for upland rice production out of the forty-two barangays of Nasugbu.

Aside from the general fund of every municipal office, the Office of the Mayor appropriates additional funds for programs that it deems important. Looking at the 2010 budget of the Office of the Mayor, there was no allocation for agricultural purposes but only for activities that were vital to tourism investment such as historical presentations, traffic maintenance and enforcement, a zero waste management program,

Table 2. Barangay Natipuan's expenditures program for 2012

Program/Project/Activities/Description	Amount in Peso
Administrative and Legislative Services	1,060,499.26
Peace and Order Services	522,180.00
Health and Nutrition Services	335,336.00
Day Care Services	16,500.00
Agricultural Services	0.00
Infrastructure Services	0.00
Implementation of Development Projects (20% of IRA)	267,620.00
Sangguniang Kabataan (Youth Council) Projects (10% SK Share)	390,820.70
Implementation of Projects/Activities for Unforeseen Events (5% Calamity Fund) Program	139,499.07
Gender & Development Fund	139,499.07
Total Barangay Expenditures	2,902,904.10[a]

Source: Appropriation Ordinance No. 01, 2012, Barangay Natipuan.

[a] Total computation should be PHP 2,871,954.10, but figure used in the table is the amount reflected in the ordinance.

peace and order, and tourism promotion and development (see table 1).

This situation is mirrored down to the barangay level. According to the barangay captain, they had no programs for agriculture because of their limited budget. Looking at their barangay expenditure program for fiscal year 2012, second place in their budget appropriation went to peace and order services, an aspect that is important to tourism (see table 2).

The prioritization of tourism through the various legislations and policies and their translation to local programs and infrastructural projects have been transforming the landscape, gradually edging out agriculture.

Tensions Triggered, Hegemonic Representation Contested

The prioritization of tourism has brought tensions in the landscape. While the government has formed and implemented policies and projects and tourism developers have provided environmental preservation activities and alternative livelihood trainings, negative impacts of tourism development are palpably present. In 2012, the

Asian Peasant Coalition held an international solidarity mission in Hacienda Looc and documented the plight of the farmers. According to the report (APC 2012), the people's sources of livelihood had narrowed down. Before the inception of the Hamilo Coast project, the people had enough food. There was enough land to plant and harvest from, and the shores near their homes were rich in marine resources. At the onset of the project, the fisherfolks could no longer fish freely as Hamilo Coast guards disallowed them to fish where a boundary line was built. Kaingin or slash-and-burn for charcoal making was prohibited. The reduction of farm lots resulted in meager income for the families. There were a number of employments in the resort, but these lasted only for a few months. The project also disturbed the environment, consequently affecting the livelihood of the locals. When construction started, soil erosion and siltation were experienced, causing damage to crops. Since then, fish catch also diminished. The locals believed that these were results of the project's earthmoving activities and cutting of trees.

Locals are also vulnerable to visitors' unruly behaviors. While there were no cases of maltreatment and molestation done by tourists in Barangay Natipuan, an act of lasciviousness was reported in Hacienda Looc. In June 2012, a female hotel receptionist of Hamilo Coast complained to the Nasugbu Police that a Pakistani guest touched her private parts (Police Officer 1, pers. comm.). The Women and Children's Protection Desk police officer who handled the case relayed that it took the complainant a day before she decided to seek police help. The hotel management discouraged her and gave false promise of getting hold of the Pakistani guest that would prevent him from leaving the country (Police Officer 2, pers. comm.). This incident indicates that tourist facilities are willing to protect their guests more than their workers.

Despite the CSR activities of the tourism developers in Hacienda Looc, there were farmers who did not give up their land. They experienced harassment and intimidation. According to the APC's international solidarity mission report (2012), farmers have been harmed and killed by alleged hired goons and security guards who were on the payroll of the developers. Military personnel were also deployed in the area because of the increasing tension between the developers and farmers. Ever since the deployment of all these armed elements, farmers have reported several instances of their houses being stoned and doors being rapped at night by masked and heavily armed men. There

have been illegal searches and indiscriminate firing by drunken security guards, hired goons, and military personnel, as well.

The farmers in Natipuan had the same experience, albeit to a limited degree. Because of their resistance to leave the land, they were accused of being insurgents. The residents believed this to be a ploy to instill fear so that they would eventually be forced to leave. The military camped at their barangay hall. The first time they camped, two of the male residents were summoned, threatened, and interrogated on the whereabouts of insurgents. The wives of the male residents asked the help of the barangay captain, but all she did was refer them to other members of the barangay council. As Resident 32 (pers. comm.) recounted:

> If they cannot get you to admit anything, they give threats. We were really afraid, so we went to the barangay captain and asked for help. All she did was refer us to others: "Go to Lorna." "Go to Mercy." "Go there." But she is the barangay captain . . . Ana [wife of the resident summoned by the military] was already crying. [The barangay captain] did not help us. [So I said,] "Let us just go home; we would not get any help from her." So we just went home.

In 2011, elements of the Philippine Air Force camped at Natipuan, frightening some of the residents. Some of the armed men positioned themselves near a communal toilet, thus women were not able to use the facility. A year after that, four men visited and accused the residents of being associated with the insurgents. They introduced themselves as officials from Malacañang wearing civilian clothes, big boots, and military haircuts. They threatened the residents, saying that if they will not cooperate with the government, they will be abducted (Resident 32, pers. comm.).

Military presence in the area was discreet to visitors. During my fieldwork, there were no military checkpoints to indicate they were there. However, it seemed that from news articles and from the interviews with the residents, the military was doing its rounds in Batangas due to the alleged presence of insurgents (Ozaeta 2010; PNA 2012; Silverio 2011). In separate interviews with the village head and the municipal administrative and tourism officer, I tried to confirm the presence of the insurgents, but both said that their place was peaceful (Bordeos, pers. comm.; Sapico, pers. comm.). The local government officials seemed to downplay the existence of rebels in their town, understandably because this might negatively affect tourism. Security,

after all, is one of the factors that tourists consider in choosing a destination (Sönmez 1998).

Not all farmers and residents in Hacienda Looc and Barangay Natipuan withdrew from their homes and fields when the tourism developers claimed the land. While some of the resident farmers accepted compensation offers from the tourism developers, the majority cannot accept losing what they consider to be their land and have made steps to protect their rights. They organized themselves and formed solidarity movements with other peasant organizations and other sectors. The International Solidarity Mission mentioned above was part of the Hacienda Looc farmers' campaign to expose what was happening in their locality. Lobbying earned them the support of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives, which filed a resolution that seeks to look into the reported landgrabbing and harassment of farmers in the hacienda (Dalangin-Fernandez 2014).

The resident farmers in Barangay Natipuan also looked for a lawyer to help them claim the lands. The residents were strong in their belief that they could hold on to the land because JAKA could not present papers proving ownership of the land. Resident 32 (pers. comm.) relayed that they even inquired at the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources if JAKA or the Enriles has the title to the property where they have been living in and tilling. But no such document was found. The only confirmed property that was under the Enriles was the one near the beach, where the latter's summerhouse and abandoned fishpond stood, and which anyone in the village already knew about.

The resident farmers also went to the Municipal Council to make their problem known to the authorities and solicited help. They formed solidarity with other farmers who were experiencing the same plight, such as the farmers of Hacienda Looc. They joined protest rallies with other peasant organizations, claiming their rights to life and to land. According to Resident 32 (pers. comm.), forming solidarity with other peasant organizations was critical because they were the only ones who gave them assistance, particularly in terms of mobilizing participants and moral support. When they held dialogues with municipal officials, farmers from other organizations went along with them, and they reciprocated when it was the other groups' turn. United, they also went to dialogues with national government agencies such as the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

After six years, the resident farmers finally heard the court's decision through their lawyer.[23] They lost the case. The court believed that the case was truly of unlawful detainer since JAKA had presented evidence of ownership of the land and the residents refused to vacate even though they were served written notices of eviction. On the other hand, the residents failed to present any evidence that would prove their right to possess the land. With regard to the counterclaim of the residents, that the case against them should be dismissed since they were already occupying the land long before the land titles were issued to JAKA, the court substantiated that it was not necessary for JAKA to have prior possession of the land to file the suit.[24]

In the end, the one who has the land title is the one who wins. The farmer residents believe that money made the difference. "Of course it is money [that made them win]. Even in Quiapo[25] you could buy a land title," said Resident 32 (pers. comm.). They appealed the case to the higher court but this was not sustained as they do not have the PHP 40,000 needed for the process. Even though they have failed, they are determined not to waver in their cause and will not leave the land until their houses are demolished. They recognized that they do not have legal rights to the land but they believed that they have rights to livelihood:

> We have nowhere to go. We do not have our own land, but are mere farmers tilling somebody else's land. For me, the reason why we are going to fight people like them [who are powerful], is just for the right to livelihood and farming. To live. (Resident 32, pers. comm.)

Findings

The creation and naturalization of the tourism landscape in Nasugbu involved the collaboration of the state and the private sector to the detriment of the agricultural sector. As the liberalization of the tourism industry intensified, the state and the private developers worked in synergy. The state prepared the necessary policies and infrastructure, while the private developers provided the business and capital. The national tourism master plans, drawn regularly since the 1970s, have led to the formulation of a Regional Tourism Master Plan for Southern Tagalog that in turn gave birth to the Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan. From these plans, Nasugbu, twice proclaimed as a tourism zone,

has been prioritized in terms of direct supervision by the NTO. Coupled with this development is the devolution of powers to the LGUs under the 1991 LGC. This empowered the Nasugbu Municipal Council to dovetail infrastructure development, investor packages, and, most importantly, local laws that legitimatized the use of resources for tourism.

With tourism prioritized as recipient of meager government resources, the agricultural sector was undermined. Agricultural lands were grabbed and converted for tourism use, using the justification that Nasugbu was a tourism zone. The Tourism Act of 2009 exempts tourism lands from agrarian reform, and local government officials can reclassify agricultural lands to commercial use as authorized through the LGC. Houses, marine ecosystem, and livelihoods have been demolished and sacrificed for the completion of roads and highways leading to tourist areas, while village roads remain unpaved. Municipal budget has more appropriation for activities that support tourism, while agricultural programs are limited and solicited from other government agencies and foundations. Meanwhile, though the establishment of MPAs is not directly for tourism purposes, it has been used by tourism operators as reason to restrict fishermen from entering the said areas while their guests can freely snorkel and dive within them. The establishment of MPAs has given tourism operators control of access in guise of protecting the areas and doing their share of CSR. To some extent, they treat the MPAs as terrestrial territory that they can own and control especially since they pool their resources into them (Oracion, Miller, and Christie 2005).

While laws and policies lay out the transformation of the landscape, the dominant actors are the ones who ultimately produce and reproduce what they want seen in the landscape. The mass and social media might show that the land and coast of Nasugbu are places of relaxation but these are actually born out of conflict and coercion. The tourism developers in Nasugbu acquired the lands from the farmers by buying them out, using law and violence. Meanwhile, the farmers seek the help of the government—only to be disappointed. Since the officials believe that tourism will bring development to their place, they do not take the side of the farmers and just leave the matter to the legal system. As Knudsen (2012) identified, this kind of response is, in a sense, passive. The officials do not proactively help the farmers but they do not also antagonize them, for fear of losing their votes. They have veiled themselves with neutrality. But being neutral means

maintaining the status quo, wherein the power resides with the moneyed.

It is important to note that the tourism developers in Nasugbu are not only prominent businessmen but also politicians, or have political ties, fortifying their position and power in the landscape. They exert influence through patronage, through the use of discretionary funds for municipal infrastructure projects—a suave way of building good relations with the local government officials while also earning goodwill from the local residents. Deeds such as these are returned as favor either through electoral votes or backing up the politician's business endeavors. Also, to get the farmers and government officials on their side, the developers, through their foundations, sponsor scholarships and various livelihood activities for farmers. These activities and programs are primarily the government's responsibility but are taken over by the developers, branding them as CSR.

The change, though, in the landscape is not easily accepted. Resident farmers are not mere passive actors, hence tensions have surfaced. While some gave in to the various land use conversion strategies, most of them have not surrendered their land. Instead, they organized themselves, challenging the developers and the state. For them, tourism is not equivalent to development. "How could it bring development? Instead of gaining something from it, it deprives us," said Resident 31 (pers. comm.).

Conclusion

Behind the visual pleasure and semblance of development, the Philippine tourism landscape is marred by conflicts. Embracing hegemonic neoliberal policies and treating it as an export industry, tourism is expected to contribute significant growth to the Philippine economy. State laws and policies, infrastructures, and the involvement of the private sector have been in place to create the tourism landscape. However, just as landscapes are seen differently by opposing groups, the representation of the Philippine tourism landscape is challenged since the land and marine water resources that tourism uses are the same resources that agriculture utilizes. The critical landscape optic has been effective in examining the contested landscape and has unpacked the intentions that determined the conflict.

Landscape is both a material construct and a representation with multiple and conflicting meanings. The critical landscape approach

allows for the examination of how these meanings are constructed and struggled over by various actors. Critical landscape has pushed for a more grounded interpretation of the landscape wherein its physical form interacts with an ideological concept. The actors have their own interests and they construct the landscape based on their ideals of how the landscape should be used. In the case of Nasugbu, the idea of development shapes the landscape. While all actors involved see the land and coast of Nasugbu as means of production, they have different notions of what development is and how it should be achieved by using the physical component of the landscape. Thus, tensions between the groups ensue and the kind of development produced in the landscape is contested. In the present case, the agricultural sector is sacrificed to fulfill the interventions for tourism. Impacts of this might not be visible when looking at the image of the tourism landscape, unless the landscape's history is traced and the social relations that produced and reproduced it are revealed, as prescribed by critical landscape. Moreover, when development in the landscape is contextualized, it is necessary to examine the state policies and projects as these are embedded in the state's ideological concept of what development is. These are instrumental in modifying the landscape. In turn, these laws and policies stem from the development discourse that has been put in effect by the Global North. It has been defined according to their standards and could be achieved through interventions they have prescribed, which are essentially market-based (Broad and Cavanagh 1993; Escobar 1995). However, not all economies suit the given formula. Global South countries have compromised their economies in pursuit of this development, and these compromises impact heavily on marginalized groups. It has even come to a point where the prescribed development schemes are questioned if they are morally right, if sacrifices are prerequisites for long-term yields. Tourism is expected to bring employment; but for a place to be viable to accommodate world-class tourism, should its locals be unemployed first? While waiting for the assured benefits of this kind of development to trickle down, the marginalized sectors are already withering away.

Fine sand, endless blue waters, and exotic marine life are visually consumed and enjoyed by the visiting tourists, while lying in their cabanas and sipping piña coladas. Such a landscape is viewed as a result of development and at the same time hides the misery of farmer residents whose resources are grabbed from them. Only by stripping away this façade can one understand the ensuing contested development

that is reified in the conflictual space of agricultural and tourism landscapes.❁

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Notes

1. PD 189, "Amending Part IX of the Integrated Reorganization Plan by Renaming the Department of Trade and Tourism as the Department of Tourism, and Creating the Department of Tourism with a Philippine Tourist Authority Attached to It in Lieu of Philippine Tourist Commission" (11 May1973).
2. EO 120, "Reorganizing the Ministry of Tourism, Defining Its Powers and Functions, and for Other Purposes" (30 January 1987).
3. The Department of Tourism was later renamed Ministry of Tourism after the amendment of the 1973 Philippine Constitution in 1976.
4. The second development plan of the government, which is the 1976–1980 Tourism Investment Priorities Plan (MOT 1976), emphasized the importance of the private sector in tourism development and even mentioned the incentives they were entitled to, such as tax holidays, profit repatriation, and duties exemptions of imports, such as transportation, spare parts, and goods consumed in the course of services. However, in actuality, the private sector was very dependent on the dictates of the NTO (Domingo 1998).
5. Distance was calculated through the navigation application Waze (www.waze.com). This was also similar to the distance provided by the website of Pico Sands Hotel (2016), which is located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
6. Presidential Proclamation 1520, "Declaring the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and the Municipality of Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a Tourist Zone, and for Other Purposes" (28 November 1975).
7. EO 647, "Authorizing an Eminent Persons Group to Oversee the Sustainable Development of Nasugbu, Batangas Tourism" (3 August 2007).
8. JAKA was founded by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile and his wife, Cristina Castañer, in 1974. His daughter, Karina Ponce Enrile, is currently its president and chief executive officer. Juan Ponce Enrile, a Harvard-educated tax lawyer, has been a

cabinet secretary, congressman, and senator under six presidents. He served as defense minister for sixteen years under the Marcos regime and as administrator of martial law from 1972 to 1981. He has been elected as senator four times and served twice as Senate president. It is alleged that he used his power as defense minister in the 1970s to amass wealth. In 2014, Senator Enrile was indicted for plunder in connection with the use of his Priority Development Assistance Fund. A year after, he was released on bail due to humanitarian grounds, citing his physical condition and his age, which was ninety-one then, and returned to his position as senator (Branigin 1986; JAKA 2012; PCIJ 2016; Senate of the Philippines 2016; Vitug and Hofileña 2015). SM is owned by the Sy family, with Henry Sy Sr. as the chairman and his children, Henry Sy Jr. and Teresita Sy-Coson, as vice chairpersons. From a modest shoe store in 1958, SM is now known because of its chain of malls under its subsidiary, SM Retail, Inc. Meanwhile, its property development is under SM Prime Holdings, Inc. Aside from its leisure community, Hamilo Coast in Nasugbu, it has also aggressively entered into building condominiums, changing the urban landscape of Metro Manila. One of its two banks, BDO Unibank, Inc., holds the highest amount of assets among universal and commercial bank groups in the country as of 2015 (BSP 2015; SM 2013, 2015).

9. In his writings, Don Mitchell does not give a name for the kind of landscape perspective he uses, though he focuses on the political economy of landscape. It was Dubow (2009) who branded Mitchell's landscape perspective as "critical landscape."
10. The total land area of the property was not mentioned in the statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth.
11. PD 27, "Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the Instruments and Mechanism" (21 October 1972).
12. EO 229, "Providing the Mechanisms for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program" (22 July 1987).
13. The TIEZA consultant used the word "*timpladong-timplado*." This means that the actions of the mayor in dealing with the issue were measured in a way that neither the farmers nor the tourism developers would be offended.
14. NMR 110, "Resolution Requesting the Congress of the Philippines to Amend 'Presidential Proclamation No. 1520' and Remove the Municipality of Nasugbu from Its Declaration as 'Tourist Zone'" (10 September 2004) (translated from Filipino: "Kapasiyahang Humihiling sa Kongreso ng Pilipinas na Maamendahan ang 'Presidential Proclamation No. 1520' at Maalis ang Bayan ng Nasugbu sa Deklarasyon bilang 'Tourist Zone' na Munisipalidad").
15. Interview quotes in this paper were translated from Filipino to English.
16. NMR 159, "Approval of the Application for Development Permit for Residential and Commercial Subdivision of Sta. Lucia Land, Inc. in Joint Venture with JAKA Investment Corporation Represented by Exequiel D. Robles" (12 August 2011).
17. These were NMR 52 (14 July 2010) and NMR 185 (2 September 2011).
18. NMR 99 (15 June 2011).
19. Founded in 2003, the Asian Peasant Coalition is an Asia-wide coalition of farmers, landless peasants, fisherfolks, agricultural workers, dalit, indigenous peoples, herders, pastoralists, peasant women, and rural youth. According to its profile, it

represents fifteen million members in thirty-three organizations coming from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, and Sri Lanka. Its membership in the Philippines includes the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines), a democratic and militant national organization that has been active in fighting for the rights of peasants for almost thirty years now (APC 2015; Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas 2015).

20. Southern Tagalog was the former name of the region where Batangas is included. It is now called Region 4A or CALABARZON, which is an acronym for the provinces of Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal, and Quezon.
21. While Hacienda Looc farmers claimed that their lands were under CARP, the ones in Barangay Natipuan were not, as far as Department of Agrarian Reform's online database was concerned. However, the Natipuan residents were in doubt whether the land was private property as it was in the mountains and could be considered forestland, which is not alienable and disposable.
22. EO 124, "Establishing Priorities and Procedures in Evaluating Areas Proposed for Land Conversion in Regional Agri-Industrial Centers/Regional Industrial Centers, Tourism Development Areas and Sites for Socialized Housing" (8 September 1993).
23. In 2006, JAKA filed the case in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Nasugbu and the decision was served a year after. The residents and their lawyer then sought an appeal, which reached the Court of Appeals. Due to financial difficulties, they failed to comply with subsequent proceedings. Thus, in 2010, the appeal was dismissed and the MTC's decision in favor of JAKA was upheld. However, it was only in early 2012 that the residents were fully informed of the finality of the case by their lawyer. In 2013, the court ordered the writ of execution, giving JAKA the signal to take possession of the property.
24. The civil case reference number is purposely withheld to protect the anonymity of the residents.
25. Quiapo is a place in Manila where one can commission forged documents.

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REVIEWS

Proenza, Francisco, J., ed. 2015. *Public Access ICT across Cultures: Diversifying Participation in the Network Society*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press and the International Development Research Centre. 475 pp.

As access to the Internet through mobile devices and personal computers gains greater global uptake, this volume comes with evidence and convincing argument for the continued importance of public access to information and communication technologies (ICTs)—through venues such as cybercafés and telecenters, for instance—in developing societies. Addressing concerns about the impact of ICTs, of which earlier studies offer mere anecdotal evidence, this volume responds with a set of methodologically rigorous research on the diverse impacts of public access to ICTs in ten countries (across three continents): Jordan, Rwanda, China, Cameroon, Argentina, Malaysia, Peru, India, Chile, and Thailand. The broad scope of the chapters and the range of conceptual and methodological approaches present rich data and opportunities for comparing the unique conditions and accompanying impact of ICT access across a number of cultures, shared access models, and settings (i.e., rural and urban). As the chapters in the volume were from studies funded by the Amy Mahan Research Fellowship Program that assess the relationship between public access ICTs and social inclusion, there is a slant toward papers situated in the global South. The impact is assessed not only in terms of access to physical infrastructure but in various aspects such as well-being, learning, social capital formation, employment, and empowerment of marginalized communities, among others.

The first set of chapters examines the impact of public access ICTs on personal achievement and well-being, presenting a view of the positive and adverse outcomes of ICT use. A commendable aspect of most papers in this section is the groundedness of the metrics for assessing impact that are based on user perceptions, self-motivations, and individual life goals—a significant departure from past studies that assess impact using top-down benchmarks that assume and prescribe homogenous goals for all users. The second section covers mostly qualitative research on the impact of public ICT access on social inclusion, connectedness, and organizing processes, seeing users as part of a broader network society. The last section addresses issues on the impact of public ICT access on women, presenting cross-cutting issues of exclusion from public access modalities and experiences of hostility and marginalization. The final two chapters in this section present encouraging outcomes of shared access for urban poor women (in Chile) and female migrant workers (in Thailand) who experience some form of empowerment through literacy training, maintaining and expanding social relationships, and access to cultural entertainment. The synthesis chapter is a crucial addition to the volume as it sheds light on the multiple intersectionalities of the findings from the ten studies, stimulating theoretical and practical insights and reflection. It addresses key questions foregrounding ICT for development research: how users and uses of public access ICTs across cultures are differentiated and similar in their characteristics, and the varying conditions of use and experiences.

Overall, depictions of positive implications of ICT access dominate the volume, although several chapters present some negative findings that highlight the "dark side" of access, implying that ICTs are not necessarily liberating. While certain users experience some significant benefits, there remain issues in terms of access inequality, hostility experienced by some users, and problematic use. This includes "excessive use" or "addictive tendencies" in Internet cafés, which was directly investigated in China (chapter 5) and observed in the Cameroon study (chapter 6) where long hours in Internet cafés were found to "thwart academic achievement" (192) for secondary school students. An interesting chapter on cybercafé use in Uttar Pradesh (chapter 10) found that although women benefit from useful information about education or employment from public ICTs, girls or housewives who visit cybercafés are exposed to an "unfavorable environment," where male users watching pornographic materials make derogatory comments

toward women. Women also "become the subject of gossip" (309), especially when their presence in these public spaces is perceived to run against well-entrenched gender norms of staying at home or focusing on domestic responsibilities. Although not explicitly articulated as negative findings, several of the chapters noted issues on various kinds of access asymmetries, dwindling use, or inability to optimize services offered in public ICT access modalities and offered recommendations on how these may be addressed.

One limitation of the studies is the general reliance on self-reports of impact (394)—while this can be construed as a useful way of understanding impact from the lens of the users, questions about the reliability of self-reports have been raised in previous studies, especially as users may have difficulty discerning the direct impact of ICTs in facilitating the perceived benefit or problem. Further, there can be more situated analysis of the play of structures of power and politics in the locale and mechanisms of regulation and control that influence access asymmetries and experience across cultures and contexts—issues that are addressed in the synthesis and in some individual chapters but not too well in others. Analyses of the impact of public ICT access throughout the chapters can also be further situated within a more complex social ecology of Internet access (Horst et al. 2010) given the increasing availability of mobile Internet and personal computers in developing societies. This convergence of various access modalities, where different forms of shared access points cannot be separated from one another and with privately owned communication technologies in defining user experience, will provide the readers with more nuanced understanding of the impact of public access ICTs.

While definitely a solid achievement, the book also does not fully address the questions raised by more critical scholars about the neoliberal discourses of technology and whether or how it perpetuates the interests of dominant economic and political powers (Armitage 1999; Pieterse 2005; Wade 2002). Nonetheless, the volume emphasizes the need to democratize access to ICTs by marginalized communities and address power imbalances and social inequalities that some of these technologies also create or perpetuate.—**Cheryll Soriano**, *Associate Professor and Graduate Program Coordinator, Department of Communication, De La Salle University*

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Claudio, Lisandro E. 2013. *Taming People's Power: The EDSA Revolutions and Their Contradictions.* Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 226 pp.

The 1986 EDSA People Power is widely perceived as a turning point in Philippine political history. Having resulted in the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos, it is often associated with ideas of change and democracy. Such a narrative has formed part of the tapestry of the Philippine imaginary. On the other hand, some scholars view EDSA—named after Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, the national highway that was the main site of People Power—as a "lost revolution" (Coronel 1991), resulting in the restoration of the elite-dominated political system that existed prior to martial law (Anderson 1988). How must one make sense of these contradictions? It is within the context of these competing perspectives that Claudio makes his contribution. He differentiates between People Power "as empirical reality" and as "symbolic construction" (15), and his work focuses primarily on the latter. Making such a distinction highlights the political dimension of representation as a competition for meaning among different actors. Though reality may have its objective dimensions, its interpretation and significance can vary.

In this work, the author deconstructs what he calls the "national myth" (17) of People Power by looking at two different narratives of the event: on the one hand, there is the dominant triumphalist narrative that frames EDSA as a miracle and places the figure of Cory Aquino,

along with the anti-Marcos political elite, at the center of democratic revival; on the other hand, there is also the alternative narrative of the Philippine Left, riddled with a complex history and whose development had been closely intertwined with the anti-dictatorship movement and, ironically, declined along with the overthrow of the dictatorship. To unpack the contents of these narratives, Claudio uses a multivocal approach—that is, he derives discursive patterns from multiple sources not necessarily limited to text. For instance, Claudio conducted interviews with actors who supposedly represent alternative narratives about EDSA, such as some members of the Left movement as well as with farmers in Hacienda Luisita. In his analysis, he also takes a look at selected symbolic spaces that he views as distinct embodiments of these competing narratives. The multiplicity of symbolic spaces representing competing narratives may be understood as a reflection of the fragmented nature of the overall People Power narrative.

The first case study is the EDSA Shrine, an epitome of the dominant People Power narrative. The EDSA Shrine is a Roman Catholic church situated in a prominent location at the heart of the Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue. It is made visible through the tall image of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Such an image frames the People Power narrative in quasi-religious terms. Inside the church, the images fuse together divergent figures of religion and Philippine politics: the Blessed Virgin Mary, former president Corazon Aquino, and Jaime Cardinal Sin, among others. For Claudio, the EDSA Shrine is a clear manifestation of the dominant actors in the Philippine political scene.

The second case study used by Claudio is Bantayog ng mga Bayani, located in a less visible area along Quezon Avenue. Bantayog is a memorial that pays tribute to the activists of the Left who lost their lives in the anti-dictatorship struggle. Claudio notes that the lack of resonance of this narrative compared to the first may be a reflection of the Left's declining influence. He writes, "one can view the general exclusion of the Left's history from public history as a product of its political alienation in 1986" (82). Moreover, Claudio notes "an internal difficulty within the Left of writing its own history" (85) primarily because of its own fragmented past stained by the internal conflict among the members of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

To further highlight the contradictions embedded within the People Power narrative, Claudio's fourth chapter discusses Hacienda Luisita, a sugar plantation in Tarlac owned by the Cojuangcos, Cory Aquino's family. It is also the site of a peasant struggle for land reform,

the "dark side of the People Power narrative" (115). Caught between the two narratives discussed above, Hacienda Luisita is situated by Claudio as a representation of "voices silenced by virtue of the tendency in popular nationalism to forget inconvenient memories" (21) and "an analogue for the Philippine nation as it is a community trapped between the dual imaginaries of people power and National Democracy" (162). In the lifeworld of the hacienda's inhabitants, the conventional People Power narrative is somewhat reversed: Marcos's figure is seen to have more redeeming qualities for the 1985 attempt to cleave the estate from the Cojuangcos; conversely, Cory Aquino is viewed as "Madame Cory," a member of the ruling cacique oligarchy, contrary to her popular EDSA image as a humble housewife.

Situated within the subfield of memory studies, this work demonstrates how the significance of history depends not only on *whether* it is remembered but also on *how* it is remembered. In this sense, remembering can be considered a political act, a platform for contestation. The very act of remembering is conditioned by various political factors. In the case of People Power, Claudio demonstrates how the dynamics of class come into play in the different narratives of the event—that is, the narrative of the Philippine elite remains to be the dominant narrative of EDSA, and the marginalized narrative is that of the grassroots, seen, in this particular case, in the "silenced struggle" (89) of Hacienda Luisita farmers.

In the process of analyzing these divergent discourses, Claudio breaks open some of the key issues in historiography, particularly the frequent tendency to construct a unitary narrative of the past premised on a linear notion of historical development. This tendency may at times be justified by nationalist projects—that is, an attempt at nation building through symbols meant to forge a singular sense of national identity. Unfortunately, such an attempt at nation building may compromise truth: the actual reality of a fragmented past. This idea is echoed and elaborated in another work by Claudio (2013).

To end, Claudio's work also gives some interesting insights on alternative ways of thinking about history, particularly about our own history. This book is a good addition to the existing literature exploring alternative narratives about People Power written by other scholars (e.g. Thompson 1995, Timberman 1991, Wurfel 1988). This work's main contribution is its analysis of symbolic spaces as arenas of discourse, i.e., as representations of competing narratives about the past. As the Philippines approaches the thirtieth anniversary of People

Power (and the end of the second Aquino presidency), it is apt for Filipinos and scholars of the Philippines to embark on a renewed reflection on the significance of EDSA in the development and trajectory of the contemporary Philippine state. However, far from engaging in triumphalism, such reflection must be imbued with a spirit of openness and brutal sincerity in coming to terms with the events of the past. As this book effectively demonstrates, history, as well as the act of remembering, is characterized by a multi-linear and oftentimes fragmentary nature. Moreover, it demonstrates the flaws of unitary narratives meant to create a homogenous understanding of history, to the point of reducing it to mere propaganda.—**Maria Celine Anastasia P. Socrates**, *Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman*

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Notes for Contributors

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