

PANEL 2

State-Movement Dynamics: Opposition, Cooperation, and Co-optation



MA. GLENDA S. LOPEZ-WUI

This discussion paper aims to examine the dynamics between the state and the movements that are the subjects of the study of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development-Philippine Research Team. The movements studied are those on debt relief, fair trade, global taxation, anti-corruption, and international trade rules and barriers. To characterize these movements in the Philippine context, the efforts of civil-society groups involved in these issues were examined. For the movement on debt relief, the Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) was the empirical focus. Although FDC's advocacy has evolved over the years, the case study mainly focuses on its handling of the debt issue during its early years. In the case of the movement to change international trade rules and barriers the Philippine case study examined the efforts of the Stop the New Round Coalition (SNR); the one on fair trade focused on the Philippine Fair Trade Forum (PFTF); while the study on anti-corruption dealt with the Transparency and Accountability Network (TAN). The case study on global taxation, in particular the Tobin tax movement, shows that there are no civil-society groups that mainly focus and have coherent agenda on the issue.

This presentation attempts to share the findings of the case studies with regard to their interaction with the state. The discussion tries to explain how interaction with the state takes place. It also attempts to explain the means of interaction utilized by civil-society groups, as well as factors affecting the relationship. The concluding part briefly assesses the outcomes of the interaction, and provides some explanations for the results.

CREATING AND TAKING ADVANTAGE OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES

Interaction with the state is largely made possible by the ability of civil-society actors to create or take advantage of opportunities presented by the political environment. These opportunities are manifested in the opening of access to participation, shifts in ruling alignments, availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and among elites. In the cases studied, civil-society groups played significant roles in the opening of these political opportunities. Allies were converted to their sides and access to government processes was opened up largely because of their efforts and credibility.

The significant political opportunity is provided by the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, which opened up democratic space for civil-society participation in government processes. The role of civil society vis-à-vis state processes is elevated no less in the 1987 Constitution that was crafted as a result of the 1986 uprising. The constitution states, "The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation" (Article 2, Section 23).

The availability of influential allies sympathetic to their causes provided much opportunity for civil-society engagement of the state. Through these allies, spaces for civil-society participation were created, which paved the way to enable civil society to influence policymaking. These allies are also tapped by civil society to get information needed for their research and advocacy.

The Freedom from Debt Coalition (FDC) has developed a working relationship with a core of senators and some representatives who are reliable supporters of the coalition's agenda. One very close ally was Senator Alberto Romulo who filed bills in the Senate reflective of the advocacy of FDC. FDC also cultivated contacts within certain government agencies such as the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), the Commission on Audit, and the Department of Budget and Management, which provided information crucial to crafting FDC's advocacy.

SNR was also able to bring to its side significant allies in government. In Congress, its allies include the chairman of the House of Representatives Special Committee on Globalization and WTO, Representative Herminio Teves, and Akbayan party-list representatives Loretta Ann Rosales and Mario Aguja. Allies are also found among legislators whose regions are troubled by the entry of foreign products as a result of WTO-related trade policies. Through these allies, resolutions were filed at the House of Representatives and the Senate to examine the benefits and disadvantages resulting from the entry of the Philippines into the WTO to objectively and comprehensively advise the national government on appropriate measures. In the executive branch, SNR allies include Department of Agriculture

then-Assistant Secretary Segfredo Serrano and Department of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Edcel Custodio.

The presence of supporters in anti-corruption government offices were also utilized by TAN to advance its agenda. Then-Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo was an ally whose support led to the conduct of the popular anti-corruption project, Lifestyle Check. Nonetheless, TAN has yet to tap potential allies in Congress such as the party-list representatives with anti-corruption agenda.

The opening of access to participation in government offices is also an opportunity utilized by civil-society members. In the earlier years of its campaign, FDC actively participated in the Senate Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions, and the Foreign Debt Council, which was formed to conduct hearings in different parts of the country and gather people's opinions on the debt issue. The latter was formed by the Senate after it overrode Corazon Aquino's veto on the debt cap.

In the case of SNR, openings for its participation are provided by the House of Representatives Special Committee on Globalization and WTO, and the ad hoc consultative bodies such as the Task Force on WTO Agreement on Agriculture Renegotiation (TF WAAR). In the case of TAN, the network has also taken advantage of the openings provided in government offices such as the Office of the Ombudsman and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. TAN has several collaborative projects with these offices.

In the case of the PFTF, its engagement is usually with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Among other agencies, DTI was responsible for linking fair trade organizations to the Philippine Exporters Confederation Inc. Through this linkup, PFTF is able to campaign for the adoption of fair trade principles and practices among the country's biggest exporters. The Department of Science and Technology and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority have also provided assistance to fair trade organizations in the areas of technology development and management.

To complement the use of formal processes, civil-society groups also utilize informal means of intervention. This is particularly evident in the cases of FDC and SNR, which have held rallies and pickets in places like the grounds of the Senate and Congress, and the business district of Makati to get the attention of concerned officials and other sympathizers. Civil-society groups also hold informal dialogues with officials to get their agenda across government. The media (print, television, and radio) are also widely used by civil-society groups for their advocacy. The Internet is also widely utilized to disseminate information on their causes and gather support.

FACTORS AFFECTING STATE-CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT

Popularity of the issue

The popularity of an issue can affect the receptiveness of government actors to civil-society engagement. In the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA uprising, the debt issue was both a contentious and popular issue. It enjoyed the support of not only the middle class but also the elements from the grassroots, judging from the initial

membership of FDC that included organizations from the marginalized sectors as well as those from the national democratic movement. Because of the belief that Marcos and his cronies mostly benefited from the loans contracted during the dictatorship, FDC's positions gained wide acceptance. Among the positions taken by FDC in the early years of its founding in 1987 are the need to implement a moratorium on foreign debt-service payments until acceptable terms on the country's capacity to pay are drawn; to disengage from loans that did not benefit the people, particularly those tainted with fraud; and limit foreign debt-service payments to no more than 10 percent of export earnings to enable economic recovery. Moreover, many government officials from Congress and the executive branch supported FDC's positions on the debt issue, and welcomed the coalition's engagement in formal processes.

Corruption is also a popular issue, at least among the country's power wielders. The two People Power revolutions in the country were launched on the platform of corruption. This issue is one of the most abused weapons that contenders use against each other in every electoral contest, from the presidential down to the barangay levels. Although the political leadership may not be serious in fighting corruption, it has to pay lip service to the issue and make a show of doing something about the problem. Because the issue of corruption is hugely popular, it would be political suicide on the part of the leadership not to embrace it. Hence, every administration has anti-corruption programs and offices that civil-society organizations (CSOs) can access for their advocacy.

Compared to corruption and debt, the issues of international trade rules, fair trade, and the Tobin tax are yet to gain popular support. The pressure on state elements to embrace the issues, therefore, is not as pronounced. Hence, compared to corruption and debt, the three latter issues have fewer supporters (at least those who have spoken for the civil-society causes) in the state corridors.

Technical capability of civil society

The technical capability and resources of CSOs are also factors that set the direction of the interaction with the state. This is particularly evident in the policy-making processes in government.

FDC has earned the reputation as the NGO expert on the debt issue. In its earlier years, legislators often cited FDC researchers in the bills they sponsored. Worth mentioning are the researches conducted by a research consortium put together by FDC that aimed to identify illegitimate or corruption-tainted loans in response to years of government inaction on identifying fraudulent debts. The consortium investigated six well-known cases of fraudulent loans, including the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. The studies were also often referred to in hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Banks and Financial Institutions. The authors were also often invited to share their findings to the Committee.

The technical expertise of SNR is also illustrated in the lobby work it conducted in Congress. Its efforts led to the filing of House Resolution 1122, which sought an inquiry into the status of negotiations and commitments of the Philippine government in the lead-up to the Cancun Ministerial. Members of SNR are also given permanent seats in the government ad hoc consultative body TF WAAR.

The expertise and capabilities of TAN as well as its members are also widely acknowledged by government actors. For example, the studies conducted by its members (e.g., Social Weather Stations, Institute of Popular Democracy) are often cited in some government offices' own studies on corruption. Also, through the efforts of TAN via the Ombudsman and Supreme Court Appointments Watch, the Judicial and Bar Council (which is responsible for the trimming down of nominees to the bodies) instituted changes in the process of selecting appointees to make it more transparent.

However, the case is different on the issues of the Tobin tax and fair trade. The case study on the Tobin tax concluded that civil-society groups in the country have not formed a coherent agenda on the issue because of the complexity of the subject. Regarding fair trade, members of the movement have yet to launch a cohesive policy agenda. The case study cited "resource limitation in terms of expertise/know-how, money, and time" as reasons for the absence of a policy agenda. In addition, donor support for some organizations prefer specific activities that can be undertaken as fair traders, and policy advocacy is not a priority area.

Pressures from global institutions

Pressures coming from multilateral institutions can also affect the dynamics of state-civil society interaction, specifically the reception of the state to civil-society advocacy. On the debt issue, the dictates of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank practically tied the hands of the presidency on how to address the problem. Hence, despite calls for debt moratorium or selective payment, government has consistently opted for automatic appropriation for debt servicing to accede to the wishes of IMF-World Bank.

In the case of SNR, the biggest threat, of course, is the World Trade Organization (WTO); the government's commitments to the institution have dictated the parameters on how government should react to the coalition's advocacy. Essentially, the coalition opposes a new round of trade negotiations; further WTO trade and trade-related liberalization; and the incorporation of the "new issues" of investment, competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation into the WTO agenda.

SNR also demands that government reveal in detail its position in WTO negotiations, as well as the disclosure of issues being taken up in the international body. These issues should be revealed and debated in public because they affect people's livelihood, among others. The manner in which the government comes up with its WTO-related policies is reflective of how negotiations are conducted in the international trade body, where only an elite group of experts is involved and where there are no built-in mechanisms for nongovernment organization's participation.

However, in the anti-corruption campaign, the anti-corruption discourse is generally accepted by international bodies. This in a way puts pressure on the government to institute measures to sanitize the bureaucracy. For example, as a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, the government should actively pursue anti-corruption measures at both the local and global levels. Unlike in the two earlier cases, therefore, government's commitment to a multilateral body facilitates rather than hinders civil society's advocacy.

On the issues of fair trade and the Tobin tax, however, there are no multilateral institutions to which the government has committed, which could affect its actuations toward civil-society advocacy.

CONCLUSION

This discussion paper has shown the various factors that affect civil society's engagement of the state. One of these is the ability of civil society to open or access political opportunities in state processes. These political opportunities are exemplified in the presence of government allies sympathetic to their cause, as well as openings in formal venues where civil society can engage government. These formal venues were widely utilized by civil-society groups involved in the debt, fair trade, and corruption issues. Besides the formal processes, informal means like the holding of pickets and rallies, as well as the utilization of the media were resorted to by civil-society organizations to get popular support and bring across their agenda to government.

The case studies show that state engagement was mostly felt in the issues of debt, corruption, and international trade rules. There is minimal engagement in the issue of fair trade, and none at all in the Tobin tax. The technical capabilities as well as the policy-making agenda of civil-society groups involved in the three earlier issues largely explain the presence of engagement. The limited state engagement in fair trade is explained by the fact that policymaking is not yet a priority agenda among its advocates, while the absence of a civil-society group primarily focusing on the Tobin tax explains the absence of the engagement in this area.

The "popularity" of the issue, at least among a significant segment of the middle class, also has a bearing on the receptiveness of state actors to civil-society engagement. Among the five issues, debt and corruption are relatively more popular than the others; hence state actors are more receptive to civil-society engagement in these areas. The problems of international trade, fair trade, and most especially the Tobin tax have yet to seep into the consciousness of a significant segment of the population.

In civil-society mobilizations aiming to influence policymaking, engagement is more manifested in the legislative than in the executive arena, as illustrated in the cases of FDC and SNR. The advocacies of these groups, particularly debt, have gained quite a number of advocates among legislators. Despite legislative support, however, the imprimatur of the executive is needed to advance civil-society agenda because these are mainly "executive issues." FDC and SNR were only able to penetrate the legislature but not Malacañang. Hence, if one were to assess the engagements based on whether the objectives of the civil-society groups were realized (e.g., debt payment moratorium and repudiation of tainted loans for FDC; and opposition to further WTO trade and trade-related liberalization, and transparency in the crafting of trade policies for SNR) then we can say that they were not successful. Malacañang's commitments to global institutions, particularly to the IMF-World Bank and WTO on the issues of debt and international trade,

respectively, have practically tied the hands of the executive on how to deal with the issues.

Reactions



JOEL ROCAMORA (EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR POPULAR DEMOCRACY):

Let me start with a caveat: there are limitations if we confine the analysis only to these case studies. One of the paper's conclusions is that the interaction of social movements is greater with the legislature compared to the executive branch. That may be true for the three movements discussed. There are some cases in which civil society's interaction with Malacañang is direct and substantive. Members of Congress who interact with civil society on certain issues tend to be discreet about their work. On the other hand, from the vantage point of civil

society the crossover to the executive provides avenues for interacting with Malacañang. Observably, the interaction of these civil-society groups with Malacañang is not quite transparent.

When Congress deliberated on the coco levy funds and the war in Mindanao, members were divided into three types: the civil-society type, the political-operator type, and the technocrats in the middle. Depending on the issue, the civil-society type, more often than not, had an advantage: they had enough clout to pull the technocrats to their direction. Today, the problem is that those belonging to the civil-society type then no longer work in government. They are now unable to carry on advocacy work in the legislature. Because of their absence, legislative support for their causes has waned.

The second point I want to make is that although the term "social movement" is appropriate, the three movement campaigns in the paper show that organizational form is important. The internal dynamics in the coalition plays a major part in engaging the state, as it influences the repertoire of contention raised by the movements. Perhaps this is not pronounced in the anti-corruption movement, but in any case, it is a sensitive issue. In the case of FDC, a major change took place in the character of the coalition as a result of the change in leadership a little over a year ago.

The third point I want to raise has to do with the role of party-list groups in the House of Representatives. Only a few party-list groups whose members are progressives have managed to win seats by sheer numbers, but there are some groups that, from the vantage point of social movements, play a significant role in policymaking. In terms of numbers, the progressive party-list members of the

House are not quite significant. They are more powerful in terms of substance, as these progressives are more conscious of the kind of role they play compared to others who seem to be only joining the bandwagon. Party-list group Akbayan, for example, sees itself as the spear point of social-movement campaigns and advocacies in the House of Representatives. This identity affects the way the group operates in the legislative arena, the nature of their interaction with the state in general.

In the current round of impeachment hearings in Congress, Professor Randolph David made one interesting point. He said that political parties are ineffective because other political institutions are also underdeveloped and tend to be dominated by oligarchs. The burden is now placed on social-movement groups, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and people's organizations (POs) to initiate the needed social reforms. The situation that David cited rings true in the Philippines because of the weakness of institutions that are supposed to aggregate public interests and carry them to the level of policymaking.

Interestingly, David's argument is disproved by some social-movement groups. These groups tend to believe that reform advocacies are best carried out by political parties, which compels them to build one. These political parties that stem from movements form party-list groups that manage to gain a position and a voice in Congress.



JORGE TIGNO (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY
OF THE PHILIPPINES [UP]-DILIMAN):

The theme of this paper on state-movement dynamics is premised on the idea that states do not operate in a vacuum. The state requires institutions to point out things it is doing wrong. Earlier, Dr. Rocamora pointed out the role of political parties in bringing about a better policy-making process, but since we have a weak party system they cannot fully accomplish their roles. That is where social movements or civil-society groups come in.

First, we have to make an epistemological distinction between civil-society groups or organizations, and social

movements. A civil-society organization is different from a social movement. A movement is made up of several organizations and tends to be nebulous in its organizational structure. The paper, however, does not make that kind of distinction; in fact, the paper uses the terms interchangeably. I think there needs to be a distinction if the research intends to examine the dynamics between the state and civil-society organizations. On the other hand, to focus on the social-movement dynamics is another track that the research can pursue.

I shall now move to my next point. The context for understanding state-movement dynamics should also include a discussion on the nature of civil-society

organizations in the Philippines, how they operate, and how they function. Article 2, Section 23, of the constitution states, "The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation." This provision has serious implications on NGOs. As it is worded, the provision implies that the state would be allowed to form NGOs—which has actually happened, given the provisions in the Local Government Code and its translation into actual outcomes. This can have an impact on the NGO's integrity and independence. For example, there are cases of local NGOs established by family members or relatives of local government officials. How could you expect government to protect public trust if officials could openly use NGOs to wield power? I would rather that the formulation be "the state shall *not inhibit* the formation of non-governmental, community-based or sectoral organizations ...". Such reformulation would provide a more positive policy environment.

The third point relates to the different indicators of engagement. One indicator is the people in government, particularly within the legislature, who are receptive to the propositions of CSOs. But we should be careful whether we are actually referring to the movement or to the organization. Another indicator would be the openness of some government offices to the involvement of CSOs or social movements in policymaking. However, I think this begs some questions, such as "what factors account for the receptiveness of some legislators and government agencies to social movements or civil-society groups?" Note that some agencies such as the *Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas* (Central Bank of the Philippines) and the NEDA are not as transparent as Congress.

I would like to briefly illustrate the popularity of the issues carried by the social movements being studied in this project. According to the Social Weather Stations (SWS) surveys in 1997, at least 43 percent of the respondents thought that foreign debt is a larger problem than before. Only 18 percent felt that the debt problem is a smaller problem than in the previous year. This shows that even as far as 1997, foreign debt has been a major issue. In the case of corruption, it is even bigger: 53 percent of the survey respondents said that corruption is a major problem in the country. With respect to the issue on international trade, only half of those that said corruption is a major issue said it is as popular as corruption. Thus I would like to see the intricate link between the popularity of an issue and how government tackles it.

With regard to the role of civil-society groups, the nature and extent of the dynamics of the leadership should be brought up in the full version of the paper. The paper may examine the dynamics of the organization's leadership and how it is able to influence the policy-making process.

Again, it should be noted that the paper only looks at specific social movements. The cases involved in the study may be regarded as snapshots of the whole process. Based on my experience as a political scientist, I can already foretell that it would be difficult to establish a positive or negative engagement between states and social movements. In any case, the paper should show the dynamics more fully in their particular contexts.

Finally, let me refer once more to the guide questions for this panel: What are interventions used by social movements in engaging the state? How integral is the involvement of social movements to the policy-making process? The paper can

provide more substantive answers to these queries by identifying the factors that contribute to the success or failure of the interaction between state and social movements.

Open Forum



AMADO MENDOZA JR. (DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY, UP-DILIMAN):

First, I would like to address one important gap in the paper. In trying to point out the changing state-movement dynamics, the critical variable would have to be the nature of the regime itself. Given an authoritarian setting, the most likely dynamic is adversarial. Ideally, it should be transformative—CSOs partnering with the state in order to advance the body politic. The second point is related to media framing, which I find applicable in this session.

Allow me to cite a case. During the 1987 Constitutional Commission, we

expected the military bases to be one explosive issue, but found that the constitutional provisions on the national patrimony and economic coalitions on private ownership were far more popular concerns. I believe theatrics, the dramatization of the issue in the mass media, has been significant in popularizing those issues.

Lastly, I think the paper should highlight the synergy between or among social movements. In some cases, members of one movement or their family members sit in the board of several coalitions. That should be a factor in explaining the political dynamics within movements. The paper can account for personal relationships that are integral to state and civil-society linkages.

EDUARDO TADEM (ASIAN CENTER, UP-DILIMAN):

I wish to propose an additional dimension on civil society and state relations. The interaction between state and civil society is also a battle of ideas, which brings the discourse to the ideological sphere. However, it should be expected that the relationship would be a bit more complicated because contending ideas take place between civil society and the state as well as within civil society, or among civil-society movements. In this context different ideologies interact, struggle, and battle with each other. It would be interesting to look into this dimension.

JOSEFINA FLORES (SMALL BUSINESS GUARANTEE AND FINANCE CORPORATION, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY):

I am a government bureaucrat but I admit that I do not occupy a comfortable position in government. My exposure to civil-society movements is very limited. Having been part of this two-day forum, I realize that there is a lot for me to explore and study. People from the bureaucracy can learn from civil-society organizations especially in doing advocacies. Indeed, the government shares with CSOs the need to push for advocacies, or programs as we call it. But one limitation in government is the lack of emphasis given to research. There is a dearth in data and research-based information, which somehow weakens our programs.



What struck me most is the paper's analysis of three popular issues. The paper avers that social movements tend to be successful when they find sympathetic allies in the legislative branch of government. My questions are as follows: Is the linkage to the legislative branch really necessary at all times? Are there other strategies adopted by CSOs that enable them to successfully push a popular or even unpopular issue?

I think the strategies of the movements that were presented have shown that issues which are not popular in the media but important to particular sectors can be pushed, whether at the national, transnational, or international level.

GLENDALOPEZ-WUI:

I think one relatively unpopular issue is that of international trade. The SNR case study mentioned some means and strategies that were utilized to gain allies or sympathizers in the legislative body. The SNR case is an example of an unpopular issue that was successfully carried over to the legislative agenda through the movement's initiatives.

JOEL ROCAMORA:

I would like to comment on the point that Professor Tadem raised regarding the ideological discourse of state and social-movement dynamics. This is really fascinating especially since NGOs operate in a space of multiple discourses. There are different discourses at work in applying for funding proposals, in writing narrative reports, even in speaking about the organization's advocacy, some contradicting one another. The picture becomes more complex in an international NGO, where discourses generated by NGOs from post-industrial societies with different political and socioeconomic systems affect the discourse of their Philippine counterparts.

There is an almost unquestioned assumption that all NGOs speak for the poor. In reality, there are differences within organizations based on the background of the members. But that is just one set of discourses. Another set pertains to the degree to which government policy tends to be dominated by donors, whether multilateral or bilateral, especially if it concerns economic policy. Discourse at the government level is really neoliberal, especially on matters of macroeconomic policy. It is very difficult to tell the difference in the discourses of the IMF and World Bank, and the Department of Finance and NEDA. In trying to influence policy, the organization should be able to distinguish the different sets of discursive practices.

Many NGOs have not yet abandoned Marxist, Leninist, or Maoist thought. That can complicate advocacy work especially at the grassroots level. It is difficult to bring sustainable development or gender and development issues to rural or urban poor communities. One of the biggest problems in the relationship between NGOs and POs—or more broadly, social-movement groups—is precisely that progressives in civil-society organizations do not recognize separate and distinct discourses in which they operate.

RAUL SEGOVIA (CITIZEN'S ALLIANCE FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION):

Based on my experience in advocacy work, I noticed that NGOs and POs proliferate whenever the government fails on some aspect of governance. Does this condition possibly hold in the case studies that were mentioned? Also, in the presentation, I found that there is no discussion on the state engagement with more disruptive movements. I look forward to a discussion of some movements that are usually not popular or well-known but heavily infringe on the political thinking of the government.



JOSEPHINE DIONISIO (THIRD WORLD STUDIES CENTER, UP-DILIMAN):

Earlier I explained that the research project is also trying to document how social movements in the Philippines define terms such as “civil society,” “social-movement organizations,” and “civil-society organizations.” The project seeks to capture the emerging definitions based on how practitioners in the field are using them. Of course in the academe, these things have already been explored and defined. The literature, for example, makes a distinction between social movement (which is a more aggregated group) and civil-society organization (which is a more discrete or distinguishable expression of a social movement). A civil-society organization has multiple expressions—it could involve coalitions and networks, issue-based organizations, or NGOs.

The term “civil society” has various strands of definitions. The term has a theoretical history too, as Professor Tigno pointed out. Also, from our discussion

earlier, there is still the narrow view that simply defines civil society in opposition to the state. This view is theoretically backed by Marx's debate with Hegel on state and civil society. Recent literature on civil society has viewed the concept using a societal model that distinguishes between state-civil society and business-interest civil society. That development may or may not be true in the Philippines, but this theoretical development implies that we need to go beyond a simple binary framework. It also implies that the conceptual definitions evolve with organizations. I believe one way to chart emerging definitions is found in one of the objectives of this project, which is to look at campaign networks of each social movement under study.

Yet again, we should also make a distinction between civil society and civil-society organizations. CSOs are discrete expressions of the term "civil society." The same goes for the term "NGO." NGOs should not be interchanged with civil society or social movements. In the 1970s and 1980s, NGOs were referred to as support institutions because they were supporting mass-based movements. When globalization dominated social discourse, the term civil society gained currency. The name was adopted to signify that NGOs no longer support institutions of mass movements.

Through the study, we hope to make sense of the gradations and the evolution of the terminologies that have been raised for discussion. At this point, I would like to acknowledge the comments thus far, especially the comment on the necessity of trying to cull from each of the five case studies the specificity of the situations that contextualize state and movement dynamics. I mentioned in my introductory remarks that each individual case study attempts to historicize the work of a particular movement. Definitely, we would be able to identify nodal points on the growth and development of each of the organizations. Based on the suggestions raised in this panel, we will also try to explain what those turning points are, and how they are related to state actors and institutions.

TERESA ENCARNACION TADEM (THIRD WORLD STUDIES CENTER, UP-DILIMAN):

I would like to address the question of our colleague from the government by calling on Sharon Quinsaat, the case study researcher-writer on the movement in changing international trade rules and barriers. Perhaps Ms. Quinsaat can share with the body how SNR was able to bring an unpopular issue such as international trade to the attention of government officials, and gain support in the process.



SHARON QUINSAAT (THIRD WORLD STUDIES CENTER, UP-DILIMAN):

The Stop the New Round Coalition is a consortium of groups whose advocacies center on the issue of trade liberalization. Specifically, the coalition strongly protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO)-driven international trade rules that were drafted during the Fifth

WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico. At the time of the Cancun ministerial, according to an SWS survey, only 27 percent of the population knew about the WTO. The debate took off during the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) ratification in 1994 but lay low a little after. It gained resonance again in the 1999 Battle of Seattle, but given the limited media coverage in the Philippines, the only ones who were aware came from the activist community.

To broaden public awareness, the coalition embarked on a series of media-framing strategies. SNR tried to present the issue by doing away with technicalities. The coalition framed the issue using the language of democratic decision making; they emphasized the “lack of transparency and accountability” in the newly imposed trade rules. SNR’s strategy of engagement was to demand government’s full disclosure of the policy agreements involving the Philippines since the Cancun ministerial. However, it should be noted that this strategy is not peculiar to SNR. The coalition PabiGATT also used this as part of its opposition campaign following the GATT ratification.

I think SNR as a coalition has been very effective in popularizing its issues compared to the Tobin tax movement. I am not privy to the discourse on the Tobin tax because it is laden with economic jargon. SNR made the issue more palatable so that ordinary Filipinos could relate to the issue.

TERESA ENCARNACION TADEM:

May I call on Mr. Ronald Molmisa to discuss the issue on the Tobin tax, an issue that is not very popular but nevertheless made its way into the legislative agenda.

RONALD MOLMISA (THIRD WORLD STUDIES CENTER, UP-DILIMAN):

The Tobin tax proposal emerged during the financial crisis and the predominance of the neoliberal doctrine in the Philippines. The Tobin tax is mainly a technical issue. Its popularity is mainly limited to the academe and the business sector. In the academe, the feasibility of the tax system in terms of implementation is a highly contentious proposal. Unless the issue is anchored on some mass-based concern and carried by mass-based movements themselves, the issue can never really be turned into a strong public concern. Also, it is difficult to have mass-based movements rally behind the issue unless they fully understand the intricacies of the discourse. It is very hard to pursue the issue; as of now there is no civil-society group that wants to embrace it. The discourse hibernated shortly after the financial crisis. In my case study, I explored some reasons for the issue’s unpopularity, and how the movement tried to work around this problem.

ROMEO ROYANDOYAN (CENTRO SAKA INC.):

My question is on the case study on SNR. What is the basis for concluding that SNR was effective? In what sense was the issue popularized and brought to the level of policymaking?

SHARON QUINSAAT:

The effectiveness of state-movement dynamics or state-civil society engagement is based on different dimensions. Policy outcome is one dimension, in which SNR, unfortunately, was not successful. Nevertheless, the movement is effective based on other dimensions. I will discuss this further in my panel presentation on media framing.

ROMEO ROYANDOYAN:

Do you mean that SNR was effective despite its failure to engage the state?

SHARON QUINSAAT:

What I mean is that SNR was effective in terms of popularizing the issue, but not in terms of engaging the state.

AURORA REGALADO (MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR EMPOWERMENT):

I would like to make a clarification regarding the SNR's effectiveness that is being questioned right now. First, we should not look at the SNR campaign as separate from other global realities, particularly the GATT. Second, the formation of SNR as a coalition owes a great deal from the efforts of other coalitions that came before it such as PabiGATT. If we compare the farmers, the fishermen, laborers, professionals, and government officials in terms of their awareness of the issue, I am sure they have some ideas on the GATT and the economic issues attending it. Thus the success of SNR in terms of popularizing the issue should be cast within a series of efforts of different sectors to educate the public over time. As Professor Tigno pointed out earlier, social movements do not exist in a vacuum; neither does SNR.

ROMEO ROYANDOYAN:

My suggestion for the paper would be to contextualize the efforts of SNR in popularizing the issue. I agree with Ms. Regalado that it is not accurate to attribute solely to SNR the popularization of the issue on trade liberalization. The popularization of the issue, as Ms. Regalado has pointed out, is a concerted effort of other groups concerned about the same issue. This not just includes groups that came ahead of SNR. I am referring to currently existing groups that are not part of the SNR coalition. For example, one of Centro Saka Inc.'s campaigns against the WTO involves the agreement on agriculture. Agriculture-related issues are beyond the scope of SNR; nevertheless, we both work toward popularizing the overarching issue, which is international trade liberalization agreements.

SHARON QUINSAAT:

It should be noted that SNR acknowledges the efforts of groups, past and present, as informing or contributing to the formation of their campaign. In my case study, I

have included the historical antecedents that contributed to the framing of the continuing struggle of the movement, including the strategies used by different groups, and the different protest events on the issue. The other case studies also have that dimension.

CLAUDINE CLARIDAD (GLOBAL CALL TO ACTION AGAINST POVERTY [GCAP]):

I would like to comment on the ways social movements popularize unpopular issues. I agree that the effectiveness of the SNR campaign is partly due to the efforts of other groups or movements working with the same or related issues. In fact, SNR is involved in our fair trade campaign in Hong Kong. We have seen in the Hong Kong Ministerial how different groups employed different strategies to stage their campaigns. In the case of GCAP, we pooled together members of our coalition to sort of put a face to the issue of poverty, which is directly related to the issue of international trade liberalization. I believe that effectiveness is a matter of localizing the issue at the grassroots level, and then synergizing efforts to bring the issue to the local, national, and international arena. Indeed, no organization really works alone; all organizations are ultimately connected by the foremost goal of development for our country.

RAUL SEGOVIA:

I was insisting earlier that somebody has to talk about the underground movement in this session. We seem to ignore that the underground movement tends to infringe on political aspect of life, specifically on state policies.

AMADO MENDOZA JR.:

The reason why the underground movement was not included is because they are *un-civil*. They are engaged in armed struggle, although I have to qualify based on my experience that not all of them do. But how could those engaged in armed struggle be civil? Regardless, we cannot discount the fact that the underground movement is still one form of social movement. It has only slightly receded from popular discourse because civil-society movements opened up a wider democratic space in response to the oppression inflicted by the Marcos dictatorship.

TERESA ENCARNACION TADEM:

The reason why the movement was not included in the project as an individual case study is due to the conflict of ideology. The underground movement has a different view on changing policies and social transformation in general. As mentioned in an earlier panel, democratic discourse does not appeal to the people in the armed movement because it is not radical but reformist.

JORGE TIGNO:

We need to understand the discourse that takes place between the state and this underground movement. I agree that ideologies are very important in

understanding the dynamics between or among NGOs and civil-society groups. As pointed out earlier in our discussion, we should not discount the importance of different discourses at work in different civil-society organizations. About ten years ago, I engaged in a debate with Dr. Remigio Agpalo of the UP Department of Political Science in a conference. I was discussing the role of NGOs at the time and the role they played in transforming the country. If I remember correctly, Dr. Agpalo reacted that what I was discussing was no different from what was already established in literature. He believed the term NGO was only a fancy label.

Now I would like to raise the same question. Are we discussing something that is a unique entity—social movements—or are we just discussing another form of interest group?



GLENDALopez WUI:

The comments that were raised here will be considered in rewriting not only the discussion papers but also the case studies. I hope the question raised by Dr. Tigno on the concept of social movement will be answered in the synoptic paper on all five case studies that will be prepared later.

One of the points raised in this session is the need to include in the discussion paper the dynamics among the members of the social movements. The “battle of ideas,” as referred to by Professor Tadem, within civil-society organizations can also affect how they engage the government. The dynamics can be examined among the members of the coalition—which can be one

dimension—and among movement leaders. We hope this point will help explain the outcomes of the state-social movement engagement.

The questions on how social movements popularize issues and how they turn issues into a legislative agenda are well taken. Admittedly, my paper is too short to accommodate a thorough discussion of how movements frame their issues. The panel on media framing will perhaps address this gap.

As for my case study on the anti-corruption movement, corruption is a very popular issue, but up to now the problem has not yet been solved by government, although there are efforts to curb it.



DENNIS QUILALA (DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY, UP-DILIMAN):

I will now sum up the major points in our panel discussion today. Certain factors that affect state-civil society engagement were identified. These are the popularity of an issue, the technical capabilities of civil society, and pressure from global institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and the WTO.

One of the comments raised on the paper was the limitation of having only three case studies to represent the nature and dynamics of social movements. The conclusion that most state-civil society relations happen between the legislature and also civil

society, according to Dr. Rocamora, is a narrow one. The discussion of state-movement dynamics should include, for example, the relation between the government and the executive branch as it affects social movements. Another limitation is the exclusion of the study of civil-society crossover. Dr. Rocamora suggested that the paper look into the coalition dynamics of the movements that were included in the study because it is likely to influence the repertoire of strategies to engage the state.

Dr. Tigno raised four points in the paper. First, he raised the need to clarify terminologies. Second, he pointed out that the paper should discuss the nature of civil-society organizations in the Philippines as a context for examining state-movement engagement. He also suggested that the paper explore the dynamics of leadership within and among social movements, and the synergy among organizations as a consequence. Finally, he recommended that the paper clearly illustrate how integral movements are in popularizing their issues and moving them to the legislative arena.

Other points raised in our discussions include the identification of the role of party-list groups in Congress; identification of indicators to measure the effectiveness of the social movement in pushing their campaigns, popularizing their issues, and meeting the ultimate objective of achieving the necessary social reforms; accounting for the openness of government on specific issues; and inclusion of the ideological dimension in analyzing the state-movement dynamics.