Democratization as De-monopolization and Its Different Trajectories: No Democratic Consolidation without De-monopolization

HEEYEON CHO

Introduction

This paper aims to construct an alternative theoretical framework to analyze the complex conflict and crisis in the process of so-called democratic consolidation or postconsolidation.

Conflicts and crises are witnessed in most of the "success" cases of democratic transition such as in Taiwan, South Korea, and Thailand. These countries, regarded as having gone through democratic transition and democratic consolidation, experience diverse kinds of conflicts and crises. Thailand went into a "reverse wave of democratization" with the military coup d'etat in September 2006. There was also a breakdown in the Chen Suiben government in Taiwan. The Roh Moo-Hyun government in South Korea enjoyed only ten percent of support from its people in the last stage of its rule. Given that the process of democratic consolidation was hailed as a success in all these three countries, these developments provide a theoretical and empirical challenge to the existing consolidation discourse, which regarded such developments as temporary counterflows to democratization.

This also raises another question: Is it possible to go beyond Western theories of democratic transition or consolidation in an alternative theorization using experiences of democratization in many Asian countries? Where can these be found? This paper explains the character of the complex conflict and crisis in the process of transition to democracy, consolidation, and postconsolidation. The cases of South Korea and other Asian countries will be used to propose a new analytical frame. Particularly, this paper seeks to create a new frame to explain the dynamics in the progress of "democracy after

Heeyeon Cho is director of the Center for Globalization Studies, The Democracy and Social Movements Institute and dean of the NGO Graduate School, Sungkonghoe University.

ASIAN DEMOCRACY REVIEW Vol. 1 (2012): 4-35 ISSN 2244-5633

democratization" (Choi 2005) that is easily missed in existing theories on "democracy transition" and "democracy consolidation."

O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) divide the process of transition to liberalization, democratization, and socialization in the late 1980s. Most of the succeeding analyses on democratic transition focused on liberalization and democratization, and the diversity of transition experiences. The meaning of socialization has been left ambiguous and overlooked in terms of its relation with transition and consolidation. Adopting a perspective of "radical democracy" that differs from O'Donnell and Schimitter's, this paper sheds new light on the concept of socialization/de-monopolization, positing that there is no consolidation without socialization.

In this paper, the postcolonialist perspective to the study of democratization of the Third World will be applied, using the experiences of Korea and other Asian countries, rather than existing Western theories of democratic transition and consolidation.

A dictatorial regime is defined as a specific combination of political monopoly and economic-social monopoly rather than a system of political oppression. Based on this, the weaknesses of the existing theories of democratic transition and consolidation will be discussed and an alternative theorization of democratic transition will be proposed.

Theoretical Background and Reevaluation of Existing Studies

Defining the Period of "Postdemocratic" Transition

How can the period of "democracy after democratization" be defined? There can be a gamut of periods such as democratic transition, postdemocratic transition, consolidation, and postconsolidation. The concept of "postdemocratic transition" will be used in this paper.

Existing democratic transition and consolidation theories have usually assumed three phases: liberalization where oppressive authoritarian measures are weakened or abolished, and primary steps for opening up are taken to bring in democracy; "democratic transition" in its narrow sense where a democratic system, including free elections, is introduced and practiced; and consolidation where free elections and democratic institutions are established. "Democratic transition" in this context means the period after democratic institutions, including free elections, are effected and through such a process, competition in democratic institutions is accepted as irreversible by all political actors.

If we take the Schumpeterian minimalist definition, the process of democratic transition means the in-setting process of electoral democracy with fairness, competitiveness, and regularity guaranteed.[1] The problem is how to empirically separate the so-called consolidation from democratic transition. There are a variety of middle zones between the two and there are various means to identify the empirical standards for consolidation. Huntington (1991), for one, emphasizes regularity, which means free elections must take place twice in a row. Based on this definition, consolidation in South Korea took place in 1992. Many Asian countries other than South Korea have witnessed a streak of free elections at least twice. According to Gunther et al. (1995), the period of consolidation is the time when an alternation in power between formal rivals takes place. For South Korea, Thailand, and Taiwan, the period of consolidation should fall between 1992 and 1997. The given standards so far tell us that South Korea and Taiwan have gone through a period of consolidation or stabilization. If consolidation means settlement or stabilization of democracy, it also means that these countries are suffering chronic conflict and crisis even after consolidation. In this paper, the period after the introduction of democratic institutions will be considered as "postdemocratic transition" and be taken to be a reference point for analyzing cases of democratization in Asia including that of South Korea. This postdemocratic transition thus includes the periods of consolidation and postconsolidation.

The Discourse of Democratic Transition, Contemporary Theories of Consolidation and Some New Insights

The discourse of democratic transition and consolidation explains the "third wave of democratization" in many different ways.[2] Analyses have been broadened by Linz and Stepan (1978), and O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986a, 1986b, and 1986c), who expanded analysis on the area of comparative study of democratic transition. Huntington (1991) provides an overall picture of democratic transition while Przeworski (1991) presents the dynamism of democratic transition combining structure and behavior. Studies focusing on rehabilitation and conversion were developed into studies on "consolidation," which deal with the complex process after democratic transition. Since Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela (1992) who wrote about controversial issues of consolidation, there have been ample studies on consolidation, which include Gunther et al. (1995); and Diamond et al. (1999). Studies on postdemocratic transition or postconsolidation were

done by Diamond (1999), who discusses the "fourth wave of democratization,"[3] and by Linz and Stepan (1996).[4]

Most American and Western analyses have contributed to understanding the formal and procedural aspects of the democratic transition process from authoritarianism to democracy. They have also shown the limits and weaknesses in explaining the nature and factors of many "yet-to-be consolidated" or of "non-consolidated" cases with recurrent conflicts and crises. If democratic consolidation is verified by the "settling down" of elections, such that the "'democratic game' has become the 'only game in town'" (Linz 1990,156), how can conflicts and crises become recurrent and chronic even after such a period? What are the nature and factors after consolidation and post-consolidation?

From this perspective, some views of established studies on the nature of consolidation and on consolidation itself can be categorized as follows. First, there is a view wherein consolidation is limited to "institutional consolidation" such as elections and not any broad institutionalization. In this sense, Linz and Stepan (1996) think there should be institutional consolidation in civil society, political society, economic society, the rule of law, and the state apparatus. Gunther et al. (1995) count the following as "indices of institutionalization": the power alternation among competing groups, broad support and stabilization during severe economic crisis, successful control and punishment for insurgents in a limited area, systemic stabilization during a rapid and radical restructuring of the political party system, and the absence of politically relevant anarchic parties or social movements. Such conceptualization of consolidation is limited to basic institutional consolidation such as elections and does not include the broader institutional sector.[5] In this paper, this view is termed as an "institution-centered" mindset, which is commonly adopted in related studies.

This institution-centered approach falls short of explaining the South Korean experience. South Korean society is facing worse conflicts even after high-level institutionalization—evidenced, for example, by the creation of the National Human Rights Commission—has been achieved. Thus, it brings to fore the task of finding a new analytical concept for explaining the structure and dynamism of consolidation, or of "democracy after democratization," with the South Korean democratic transition as reference.

This institution-centered view is based on the premise of Western democracy wherein the range and level of democratic institutionalization have already been broadened. The debates between O'Donnell (1996a; 1996b) and Gunther et al. (1996) and between Carothers (2002a; 2002b) and O'Donnell (2002) have shown a multi-linear system going only toward

Western democracy, even though they take into account the complicated dynamics of various types of democratic transition. This is why it is necessary to come up with a new frame for analyzing democracy and democratization. Another problem comes up when the question of whether or not the Left regime in Latin America is one of the "yet-to-be consolidated" phenomena. The dynamics of such democratization is missed out in the existing consolidation literature.

Second, some views attribute the delay of consolidation to the persistence of nonconsolidation factors and the increasing gap between the formal and informal dimensions (political culture and favoritism, for example) in various sectors. Gunther et al. (1995) take the matter of consolidation to be "institutional expansion," particularly that of formal institutionalization, and tried to introduce an informal dimension or the issue of "quality" of democracy. For instance, they try to find the factors for the gap between formal rules and actual practice (involvement in corruption, etc.), the lack of horizontal accountability found in state agencies or people in charge, and the delegative trend in politics. Their analysis can be considered as an effort to apply, beyond quantitative and institutional aspects, qualitative aspects of the process of consolidation. It has merit in looking into the gap between democracy in developed countries and in developing countries as a quantitative, not a categorical, difference. Their analysis thus seeks to find the "qualitative aspects" of democracy that deters consolidation in the dimension of informal culture, which have limits. The particularism discussed by O'Donnell (1996a) appears both in old authoritarian regimes and in newborn democracies, which indicates that it is not necessarily a reasonable explanation for nonconsolidation.

Third, there is a point of view that sees compromise between moderate groups (extreme groups excluded) as the core aspect of consolidation. This is a "pact"-centered view, which has also been an issue in the democratic transition discourse. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski (1991) point out that in a conflict situation surrounding the conversion to democracy, the pact between the ruling elite and the opposition elite is very important, igniting debates. Some have even expressed the opinion that a demobilization of the masses, including the destitute, is needed in a postdemocratic transition where a compromise between the elites are crucial for democratic consolidation, while strategic mobilization of the masses is needed in the early phase of democratic transition (Hipsher 1996).

The study by Gunther et al. (1995) also discusses on these kinds of changes in the political situation. In their analysis of five indices of institutionalization (successful control and punishment for insurgents, absence

of politically relevant anarchic parties or social movement, etc.), they show a similar view that the exclusion of extreme resistance and the compromise among mainstream groups are the basis for consolidation (Gunther et al. 1995). In this context, the resistance of minority groups, such as in the Aceh case in the democratization process of Indonesia or the southern minority ethnic groups of Thailand, is regarded as having to be controlled and managed. Compromise is reached between the old political group and the new one, while other sociopolitical groups, including local resistance groups, are considered as mere "guests," not the subject of the consolidation.

But it would be very difficult to elicit the complicated process of consolidation if it is simplified as a matter of contending elite groups, although power alternation by diversified and competing political groups and nonconfrontational coexistence are important. This could be seen as an "elite-centered" viewpoint. In the process of democratic transition, the strategic behavior of political elites, whether from the ruling or opposition side, is the only important thing. Thus, related studies have overwhelmingly focused on the elites' actions and roles, and even under some limits, such studies have their merits. But the masses can sometimes set the limits in which the elite can move; mass action or mobilization interacts with those of the elites, and in some full-fledged conjuncture, the demobilization of the masses even changes the extent of compromise between ruling and opposition elites in a democratic space (Gunther et al. 1995). In the processes of consolidation and postconsolidation, the masses (viewed as an organizing actor in the social movement or civil society in a broad sense, and diverse sub-subjects within the movement) are considered an independent variable.

Fourth, there is a viewpoint wherein the absence of consolidation is a matter of "power" of dominant political groups in a dictatorial regime. Carothers (2002a) points to the absence of political pluralism including a continued dominant party system. He says that the existing democratic transition discourse is built upon the following wrong premises: a) all nations, once out of dictatorship, should be considered a nation in democratic transition; b) democratization has a tendency to progress in phases; c) election is the same as democracy; d) the conditions of states under transition (economic level, political history, institutional heritage, sociocultural tradition, and other "structural" traits) cannot be deciding factors in opening or influencing the outcome of the democratic transition process; and e) the democratic transition is being implemented on the condition of a consistent state (2002a). He points out that most of the countries under democratic transition are in a gray area where they are "neither dictatorship nor democracy" and they are not headed toward democratic transition in an orderly fashion,

revealing diverse systems (Carothers 2002a). These states have similar characteristics, such as as feckless pluralism and the continuation of dominant-power politics.

In the case of South Korea, the country experienced worsening crisis even ten years after the dominant political party system was dissolved. The democratic governments of Taiwan and Thailand are fraught with the same kinds of problems.

In this sense, as pointed out in the compromise-centered viewpoint, politics between institutional and political professional groups, or the power issue between them, cannot fully explain the complicated nature of consolidation and postconsolidation. Power between political groups is not only a purely political phenomenon but is also closely related to socioeconomic power because in the political arena, a specific "political" group is situated in specific socioeconomic interests. Thus, democratic transition cannot be brought about only in the political dimension—politics should be treated as power relations, and power as a matter of society in a broader sense.

This paper will try to devise an approach with which democracy is not seen narrowly only as a political matter or a matter of political power but as something with relation to state and society in its broad sense. There is a need for a new viewpoint of democracy, which should be society centered. This paper, to restructure the frame to analyze consolidation and postconsolidation beyond the institution-centered and politics-centered perspectives, will try to structure a society-centered frame that focuses on the social character of power and the historical and structural character of democracy.

Reexamination of Discourses on Democracy: The Relation between Democratic Transition and Democracy Theories

Any analyses on democratic transition or consolidation include specific definitions and regulations of democracy. Any alternative theorization to the dominant theories on democratic transition must thus include an alternative definition and regulation of democracy. This can be done by examining three dimensions of democracy: dispersion of power, democracy as a formation out of various social and class struggles, and democracy as being "society-centric."

Dispersion of Power as Core of Democracy

Proposition 1: The rational core of democracy is not just elections, the rule of law, or the guarantee of basic human rights, as assumed by formal theories

of democracy. But, more importantly, it is power sharing or the dispersion of powers.

Currently, the regulation of democracy implicated in democratic transition or consolidation discourse can be categorized as follows. First, the kernel of democracy is the election. A fair and regular election is presumed as the core facet of democracy. The second is the rule of law. This means that laws established in the democratization process are equally and fairly applied to individuals of the democratic community, that inconsistency in law and practice is minimized, and that the democratic rule of law is established (O'Donnell 1996a and 2002). The third is human rights. The human rights perspective puts forward the quality of democracy (Vargas et al. [2004] can be a good example). There is another view that puts human rights in the center (UNDP 2004) where Marshall's (1964) concept of expansion of civil rights—from civil rights and political rights to social rights—is used, and divides citizens' rights into rights of political, civil, and social citizenship. It also empirically observes how much such expansion was implemented during the democratic transition process.

This regulation, although it holds the rational kernel of democracy, still ignores another important democratic core to elucidate the complex of post-democratic transition. With regard to this, this paper will focus on power divergence and dispersion of powers. The dispersion of powers as the core component of democracy was devised by early modern political thinkers. For them, the dispersion of powers guarantees the freedom and rights of the people, the ruling principle that separates state power into legislature, executive, and judiciary branches and puts these three under three separate state institutions, so that no individual or group has more power than is needed for their proper function and so that there is balance among powers.

This dispersion of powers has been understood to be an institutional principle of two or three branches of power, or as a passive protection to protect the freedom and rights of individuals from infringement. This dispersion should be given a more positive and active reinterpretation. The dispersion of powers as the core of democracy can be regarded as an active principle to counter power concentration and monopolization, and propose its dispersion and de-monopolization. In this perspective, democratic transition should not only be the establishment of regular elections but the process of a specific power de-monopolization. The process should be the contents of the "socialization" that O'Donnell and Schimitter (1986) said.

When discussing the dispersion of powers, power does not only mean political power. It also refers to economic and social powers. In this sense, the target for power divergence should also include the Marxist concept of

economic power and, beyond that, social power. The power divergence and sharing consistent with Dahl's (1989) concept of polyarchy should not be seen only as "power sharing among elites," particularly "political power sharing." The relations should be discussed in a broader sense with the following matching relations: a) the monopoly of political power (political monopoly) versus sharing and divergence of political power; b) monopoly of economic power (economic monopoly) versus sharing and divergence of economic power (equality); c) monopoly of social power in a broad sense (social monopoly) versus sharing and divergence of social power (pluralism).

Democracy as a Formation out of Various Social and Class Struggles

Proposition 2: Democracy is not a political system but a historical formation that continuously recreates itself out of various social and class struggles.

If Proposition 1 discusses the statics of democracy, Proposition 2 deals with its dynamics. In this perspective, democracy is not a political system but a historical formation that continuously recreates itself out of the process of various social and class struggles. Democracy is defined as having free elections, parliamentary democracy, and checks and balances such as three co-equal branches of government as its institutional assets, and its contents and quality are in a relative and changing system ruled by the social- and class-struggle relations of various social groups. The combination of political and socioeconomic monopolies was previously mentioned, and there are multilevel social and class struggles within the combination.

Democracy based upon the *esprit* of the "self-rule of people" is an institution in which all members of a given polity can equally participate in the process of social and political decision making in the society. If politics is defined as related to how resources and rules are distributed, produced and established, democracy means an institution where people (the subject and object of politics) are directly involved.

Democracy constitutes the institutional format of politics since modern times, and modern politics carried out in the institutional format of democracy has various qualities. There is a "minimalist" perspective of democracy including Shumpeter's (1943). There is also another perspective in which democracy should be expanded and "maximized." The former definition of democracy is simply the exisence of free elections, free press, and a general vote. In the latter definition of democracy, the "procedural" ideal of people's self rule and the people's social demand are realized. In this sense, democracy

is the arena in which diverse social forces compete, and a particular quality of democracy at a particular time is decided by the outcome of these struggles.

In short, democracy at a particular time exists according to the way it includes a relation of politics and society at a particular level. It is continuously reproduced according to the process of the social and class struggles, and to the level at which civil society and the people become the subject.

Beyond "Institutional Politics Centrism" toward "Society Centrism"

Proposition 3: Democracy should not be regarded as a political phenomenon but a relational phenomenon of politics and society. Politics in a democracy should allow formerly excluded diverse political groups in a dictatorial regime to re-emerge

Democracy should not be regarded as institution-centric, as the democratic transition and consolidation discourse does, but as a "relation between politics and society" or "(institutional) politics and social (movement)." Politics is ignited by "social" change and represents it, so in conflicts surrounding democratic transition or consolidation, attention should be given to society or the relation of politics and society first, rather than politics itself.

Theoretically, in the American tradition of pluralist politics, the masses are identified as consumers of political goods, or the active masses are identified as outside engagers who push their political and economic interests forward via collective pressure. This viewpoint makes the border between politics and society absolute and marginalizes the masses, who are the subject of politics, to become mere consumers of politics.

Politics is incessantly redefined in its relation with society, and the territory of politics and non-politics are variable according to social dynamics. Society is not the object that politics must represent, but an independent variable that changes politics. In this sense, after democratic transition, the newly rehabilitated politics is defined by conflict and crisis where particular political groups (anti-dictatorial political groups, for example) seek to change the contents and territory (the borders) of politics and society, not only to restore institutional politics.

A particularly structured politics under a dictatorial regime, in which the masses have accustomed themselves to a particular political environment, faces crisis as the oppositional awakening of civil society and the masses as the subjects rises up. When this occurs, there appears to be a widening gap between (existing dictatorial) politics and (oppositionally activated) civil society as civil society gets into a 1process of restructuring the established

politics. This is the kernel of the democratic transition discourse. In this process, activities defined as non-political in the previous dictatorial regime become internalized and integrated. Through this kind of restructuring of politics, the consent of the masses is becomes based on new democratic politics. This process is not procedure dependent as it does not predetermine the outcome of the change. The dynamic interactions between dominance and resistance, institutional politics and social movements, politics and society, and politics and civil society determines its outcome as it is an "open" process.

The "political" is not singular but plural and exists in diverse forms, with institutional poli tics as just one of them. The democratic transition process from dictatorship is where the plural political that was oppressed under the dominant political during dictatorship expresses itself. The once monopolized boundaries of "the politic" are restructured with the outcome of a new social self-organizing. In this process the diverse and repressed sub-subjects return to the political arena and "the political" they express is represented in institutional politics. The democratic transition or consolidation discourse basically sees institutional politics as fixed while ignoring the change in the formation of the politic and narrowly focusing on the re-emergence and internalization of political groups that were banned during dictatorship. In other words, these discourses only focus on the expansion of institutional politics and not on the "reformation of politics." This is why democratic politics should be regarded as a transition toward a plural politics.

Under dictatorship, institutional politics is oppressed, and in the arena of institutional politics only a top-down-controlled politics is permitted. This politics is combined with a particular socioeconomic relation. Dictatorship means a particular political monopoly combined with a particular socioeconomic monopoly. This means that dictatorship does not only mean the exclusion of other political forces running a monolithic political system, but also the creation and reproduction of a particular socioeconomic monopoly. This reproduction keeps the demands of the diverse socioeconomic sub-subjects from joining the political arena and becoming representatives as political subjects.

In the process of democratic transition as formal democracy is rehabilitated, diverse politics, including one which was in control and under repression, comes back and forms into a struggle. In a democracy there is also a struggle around the contents and boundaries of politics. There will be a surge of diverse social politics beyond the limits of the expanded institutional politics, during which various oppressed social sub-subjects appear, to make

democracy an arena of struggle for plural politics in the process of democratic transition.

The process of rehabilitation and consolidation of democracy does not only mean a process in which the once oppressed and excluded political forces re-emerge in institutional politics and engage in a struggle with past dictatorial political forces. It also means that diverse socioeconomic sub-subjects participate in institutional politics bringing changes to the nature and boundaries of politics, as well as the contents and boundaries of democracy.

Unless there is a multi-level restructuring of politics that represents society, there can be no consolidation of democracy. In this process, diverse socioeconomic sub-subjects that were excluded from the political arena and their demands and interests are integrated in the agenda of institutional politics, which we could call advanced socialization. This should be the meaning of socialization of democracy.[6]

An Alternative Theorization of Post-transition

Let us discuss then, based upon this reformulation of democracy discourse, how the alternative theorization of the discourse on democratic transition and consolidation should be developed.

Formal and Substantial Formation of Democracy

Proposition 4: The transition from dictatorship to democracy can be divided into the formal formation of democracy (introduction of democratic institutions) and the substantial formation of democracy (social formation of democracy).

We have seen the problems inherent in unilinear or multi-linear viewpoints. Through the transitional course of uni- and multi-linear transition to democracy, Western society is regarded to be at a high level of democracy and non-Western and newly born democratic societies as at a low level of democracy. This is, as a matter of fact, only a particular viewpoint of political modernization.

Democracy can be divided into formal and substantial formations of democracy. The formal formation means a particular fluctuation from democratic transition and consolidation, while the substantial formation is the fluctuation after a period of consolidation. The former is the process in which democratic institutions, including elections, are introduced; the latter is the process in which a formation of the substantial contents of democracy (through class and social struggle) in the frame of the introduced democracy

is established. It is important to note that there is no difference between western and nonwestern democracies, and between the developed and developing countries under a substantial formation of democracy. All societies are continually struggling around this formation of substantial democracy and struggle.

If democratic transition is a struggle for the introduction or initial establishment of democracy, consolidation is not only the establishment of democracy, but also a process of social reformation in the political frame of democracy. This social formation of democracy continues in every society, and there can be no difference of quality between Western and non-Western democracies, and between developed and developing countries.

Democracy does not develop from a backward state to an advanced state following a linear path. It is rather a social formation process with its qualitative contents determined by the relationships between dominance and resistance, state and civil society, dominant groups and sub-subjective groups.

Historically, the West sees democracy as a structurally moving process determined by the correlation of dominance and resistance, and dominant groups and sub-subjects. It was not, in any sense, realized through the way in which its fixed contents were predetermined and then implemented. The objects and range of suffrage and eligibility for election, for instance, have constantly been changed. The majority of women have not been able to enjoy both even after the 1789 French Revolution, and were only able to take part in both since 1944.

The cognitive gap between the model of Western democratic transition, which has been developed for hundreds of years, and non-Western society's democratic transition and consolidation since 1980s should be interrogated. In European democratization, the process in which the late nineteenth century's mercantilist dictatorship has improved into democracy covers 200 to 300 years. According to Huntington (1991), the "first wave" began in the 1820s and this, through the experience of fascism, meets with a new wave near the end of the World War II. Western society has not only experienced this big reverse wave but also other small reverse waves till the present democracy was established. In France, it took more than 150 years after the Revolution to establish its present democratic system. They had to go through Republicanism and monarchy alternately until after World War II. This historical background demonstrates that it is not proper to define non-Western society as undemocratic giving it only a short period of democratization process. In this sense, democratic transition and consolidation is not an introduction of a new fixed institution, but a process of determining

Figure 1. Relation among the Political, Economic, and Social Monopolies



the constitutive contents of the democratic institution, or of creating democratic social formation.

Substantial Formation of Democracy: Combination and Arrangement of Political Monopoly and Socioeconomic Monopoly[7]

Proposition 5: The substantial constitution of democracy is determined by how political monopoly and socioeconomic monopoly are combined.

Dictatorship is a particular combination of political and socioeconomic monopoly—as you see in the figure 1—and the conversion to democracy is a process in which a particular political and socioeconomic de-monopolization takes place interactively.

In economics, monopoly means a persistent market or industry situation where there is only one provider of a product or service, usually a dominant firm or enterprise without competitors entering its market or industry. This notion of economic monopoly can be expanded to contemplate political or democratic phenomena. In this context, political monopoly means a persistent situation wherein only one individual or political group has command over political resources (particularly state power or political power in general),

dominating in such a way that there can be no competitors. Other than political monopoly, there can be a social monopoly, which is a persistent situation wherein only one individual or political group has command of social resources and dominates in such a way there can be no competitors.

It should be noted that these economic, political, and social monopolies are reproduced in a certain combination. Economic monopoly exists in combination with particular political and social monopolies. Political monopoly does not only mean a particular individual or group monopolizes political resources but also has a monopolistic status over socioeconomic resources. Social monopoly does not only mean a situation in which one individual or group dominantly controls diverse social resources (prestige or respect) but also a situation in which political and economic powers are unequally distributed along the boundaries of society's diverse social demarcation line.[8] A particular social group (based ethnicity, sex, religion, locality) that monopolizes (or occupies) a particular social demarcation line controls political and economic powers. For example, a dominant group in an ethnic demarcation line exists as a group with monopolized political or economic power, in which the difference at the social demarcation lines exists as discrimination.

Dictatorship usually means political monopoly, which exists in combination with a particular socioeconomic monopoly. In this paper, dictatorship (whether or not in the sense of "state corporatism") is a regime combining particular political and socioeconomic monopolies, and democratization is a process of their destruction, rearrangement, and reformation. Democratic transition is the process in which a political form—dictatorship—is changed into another form—democracy—and at the same time, a conflictual process focused on the reformation of the political monopoly structure and the reformation and rearrangement of the socioeconomic monopoly that has been fixed under a dictatorship.

Everyday crisis ensues from the increasing gap between the entrenched interests and newly-created demands in civil society. Democratic conversion reproduces and strengthens this instability. If multi-level monopolies installed by the old regime are not dismantled, constant crisis and instability after democratic conversion results. This means deep conservatism remains deep seated in the political, economic, and social order of society. This trend of persistence of the old monopoly in a transformed form is strengthened by the international conditions of neoliberal globalization. The problem is in the process of resisting dictatorship because there is no unifying manner of resistance among the diverse sub-subjects since the awakening of civil society as an outcome of democratization. The "maximized demand" in the name of democracy thrives and this crosses against the "minimalist" reality, which

eventually comes out as crisis-ridden and unstable "democracy" after democratization.

The Activation of Civil Society and Self-empowered Subjectivation of People, the Drivers of Democratic Transition, and Consolidation and Postconsolidation

Proposition 6: An activated civil society and self-empowered subjectivation of the people are the fundamental drivers of democratic transition and democratic consolidation and postconsolidation. If under a dictatorial regime there is oppositional activation of civil society, under the democratic transition process there emerges self-empowered activation of civil society. The success of democratic transition depends on this political and socioeconomic reform of the former establishment, which corresponds with changes in the civil society and the peoplehood.

What causes instability in democratic transition and consolidation is the newly activated civil society and the people rising as a subject. Civil society and the social movements that make them cohere is the key to the destruction of the authoritarian regime and ushering democratic transition, consolidation, and postconsolidation. At the individual level, this activation is a process of "making the people a subject."

As seen in figure 2, the dismantlement of political monopoly that has been particularly structured under the dictatorship is caused by the oppositional activation of civil society. This oppositionally activated civil society can be organizationally expressed through a social movement. The rise of nongovernmental organizations as an influential decision maker in politics in the democratic transition of Korea is a good example of such a development.

Dictatorship is a regime in which people's self-empowered subjectivation in the political, economic, and social arenas is oppressed, and the conflicts and challenges from these dimensions are excluded. Against this oppression, the oppositional activation of civil society is advanced, and as an outcome of this activation (for example, the People's Struggle for Democracy on June 10, 1987 in South Korea), democratic transition from dictatorship brings about the rehabilitation of formal democracy. If this process is called democratic transition, then postdemocratic transition is the process in which conflicts in diverse dimensions in the rehabilitated formal democracy emerge. The change of civil society in a formal democracy is a self-empowered activation of civil society, whereby diverse sub-subjects become self-empowered in the formal rehabilitated democracy. And in a given civil and political space, civil society express their demands and interests and organize various kinds of

Figure 2. Relation between Democratization and Change in the Civil Society



collective actions to realize these. Through self-empowered subjectification of the people and activation of the civil society—where various collective and subjective actions take place with each organized class and group to realize their demands and interests—the people, a diverse social sub-subject, go through a change where they critically recognize their identity that was given under the dictatorship. This recognition brings them together to resist against monopolies in the political, economic, and social dimensions of democracy, and to eventually remove these from rehabilitated formal democracy. This is how conflicts melt and change monopolies.

Under postdemocratic transition, there appears multi-level conflicts around these dimensions, thus, for the social settlement of democracy beyond consolidation to be realized, the gap between the activated civil society and politics and the state, or the subjectivated people (and the social movement as its organized expression) and politics, must be overcome at a certain level, and that level should be conceptualized and developed as an index.

Conflicts arise when the first instance of power alternation takes place, and there is a struggle afterward around the established monopolies in the economic and social dimensions in the name of democracy. It is not necessary to suppose that civil society is activated and in the postdemocratic transition

process subjectivated as if on a fixed timeline. In fact, democratic transition and postdemocratic transition are processes of struggle against hegemony by civil society. If the early stage of democratic transition is the time when the progressive hegemony of civil society works well, postdemocratic transition is the time when new problems rise as the old ones disappear, diverse problems that may be different for each country. It is possible for civil society to turn back to conservatism, or to a variety of vicissitudes. Under postdemocratic transition, the strategic practices of conservative and progressive forces have an nfluence on the direction and continuation of the process. This is the environment where, with the subjectivation of civil society, there appears a multi-level divergence of civil society. As in the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, the once oppositional political force becomes the ruling power, and there are a number of problems with their rule, problems which eventually give rise again to pro-dictatorship or conservative forces. This can be called the "activation of the conservative" (Cho 2005). Paradoxically, this means civil society is changed into a competing arena for hegemony. Important is the outcome of the struggle for "hegemony in civil society;" when hegemony goes to the conservative force in multi-pronged civil society, there can be a reversion of the postdemocratic transition.[9]

It is interesting that the bigger the gap between the state and (civil) society, the more "activated" civil society becomes against the state. However, the better the democratization of the state proceeds, the less civil society is mobilized toward one single direction, and the more it is diversified in terms of political orientation. Choi (2005) calls this process a change from "state versus civil society" to "civil society versus civil society."

The "Substantial Formation of Democracy" under Postdemocratic Transition is the Conflict around the Political, Economic, and Social "Limits" of Democracy

Proposition 7: The political limit of democracy is the extent to which the political monopoly constituted under a dictatorship is de-monopolized during democratic transition. Likewise, the economic limit of democracy is the extent to which the economic monopolies are de-monopolized, and the social limit of democracy is the extent to which social monopoly is de-monopolized.

In the democratic transition process from dictatorship, there are multi-level conflicts and struggles. As previously mentioned, under democratic transition, the conflict around the rearrangement of the political, economic, and social monopolies that were established under the dictatorship appears.

Figure 3. Competition after Start of Political De-monopolization in the Democratization



The problem is with the range and nature of the rearrangement. Political monopoly means the political exclusion and oppression of diverse social groups under dictatorship, and political de-monopolization means that diverse social groups are represented and guaranteed participation. Democratization in any form involves de-monopolization. But the level of de-monopolization varies depending on the dynamics of each country. This level of de-monopolization constitutes the political limit of democracy, which again determines the substantiveness of democracy being instituted during a democratic transition. Diverse forces in civil society have conflicts around the set limit. The struggle of the progressives is an important factor that decides the "conservative limit" of democracy, or the "progressive limit" of democracy for the progressives. For example, in 2004 in South Korea, there was a struggle of the conservatives under the Roh Moo-Hyun administration in the form of a campaign for the preservation of the National Security Law, which was against the expansion of the political limit, and the progressive struggle in the form of the anti-impeachment movement, which was against the retrenchment of the political limit. The form of such limits depends on the level of the development of democracy in each society.

Trajectories of De-monopolization

As mentioned earlier, democratization is a multilayered de-monopolization process. This paper argues that how de-monopolization proceeds explains the reason for political instability and crisis under postdemocratization. For convenience, political monopoly and economic and social monopoly will be tackled separately to explain democratic instability and the crisis under postdemocratization.

Figure 3 shows that the democratic consolidation process involves a complex interaction of various factors: types of political de-monopolization, the constraining effects of neoliberal globalization and the mode of its internalization, a conflict between former monopolistic forces and subalterns, and the consequences of economic and social de-monopolization as a result of multilayered competition.

Characteristics of Political De-monopolization: Neo-oligarchy and Post-oligarchy[10]

One factor with various consequences in the overall democratization porcess is how political de-monopolization is achieved, that is to say, how extensive vested rights of former monopolistic forces break up and change. Basically, democratization is the restoration of democratic politics. Dictatorship has undermined the space for democratic politics where various social demands and interests can be represented and expressed. Once a dictatorship collapses and democratization begins, the mechanism of electoral politics works and party politics recovers. Therefore, democratic politics itself becomes a space for competition among various forces. The characteristics of political de-monopolization define the qualitative characteristics of this democratic space.

To demonstrate the characteristics and progress of political de-monopolization, it may be divided into two categories: neo-oligarchy and post-oligarchy. Neo-oligarchic democracy refers to the situation where former ruling forces maintain their monopolistic status even after democratization. Post-oligarchic democracy refers to the situation where the monopolistic status of previous ruling forces constantly weakens, and a relatively pluralistic competition between monopolistic conservatives and anti-monopolistic liberals takes place. Of course, this is just an ideal-type classification and is not necessarily realistic.

In a neo-oligarchy category, political monopoly or vested rights structure does not break up widely and former monopolists' institutional or non-institutional force never weakens. In post-oligarchy, however, the existing

political monopoly breaks up constantly and pluralistic competition takes root politically on a national scale. In the former case, the suppressive state apparatus such as the military, controlled by former monopolistic forces, would frequently face violent responses from resisters. It is exemplified in the persistence of politically motivated massacres in the Philippines and the violent crackdown on ethnic minorities in Indonesia and Thailand. In response, the general public naturally tries to resist such suppression violently, sometimes successfully. However, the resistance seldom leads to organized social movements. In the Philippines, leftists exerted significant influence in the antidictatorship movement. In the democratic transition process, however, the split between those involved in democratization and leftist outsiders prevented postdemocracy socioeconomic reform from taking effect. The same goes for other Southeast Asian countries including Thailand and Indonesia. As Encarnacion Tadem (2008) points out, democracy in the Philippines remains an "elite democracy" even after democratization. Hadiz (2008) believes that Indonesia's decentralization, which is relatively stronger than its other Asian counterparts, has actually strengthened monopolization of power at the regional level.

According to the human rights group Karapatan, (Tupas et al. 2007, 17, in Encarnacion Tadem 2008, 148), by March 15 2007, over 800 leftist activists were killed by the military under the Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo administration. In 2004, Munir Said Thalib a leading Indonesian human rights lawyer of the civil organization, Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan (the Commission for "the Disappeared" and Victims of Violence, or KontraS), was murdered by a former pilot on board a plane (Wikipedia contributors n.d.). These killings show that the suppression by former state apparatuses of social activists still persists.

On the other hand, in the post-oligarchy category, the former suppressive state apparatus and political monopoly go through relatively extensive dissolution and weakening. In addition, former monopolistic forces in the state apparatus and antidictatorship activists coexist, resulting in diversified groups within state institutions. South Korea and Taiwan may be classified under this category.

Economic and Social De-monopolization

Under such distinctive conditions of political de-monopolization, economic and social de-monopolization proceeds. Democratic instability and crisis during postdemocratization depend on how economic and social de-monopolization proceeds. This involves various interacting factors, among

which competition between former monopolistic forces and subalterns is the most important. On one hand, former monopolistic forces try to support and safeguard their vested rights within the democratic space derived from political de-monopolization. On the other hand, subalterns strive to achieve their demands and interests through a more open struggle. Conflict during democratic transition should not be regarded as being just that among political elites. Rather, it is a process involving complex social conflict. Once democratization begins, existing oppression weakens, prompting various political and social forces to appear in the democratic space and defy change. Under political de-monopolization, fierce conflict over economic and social de-monopolization unfolds in the form of crisis—not the stabilization thought to occur during democratic consolidation—which is due to fierce competition between monopolistic forces and subalterns.

Other factors affecting democratization are the effects of neoliberal globalization and the mode of its internalization. First of all, neoliberal globalization marginalizes the demands and interests of subalterns in their competition with former monopolistic forces. How a similar condition of neoliberal globalization is interpreted varies depending on the historical and cultural conditions of each society. For example, South Korea is a very pro-American country and has accepted a Western-style of modernization since the industrialization era of development dictatorship. In this regard, the country has shown a striking tendency to actively imitate and embrace Western-centric neoliberal model. As a result, with the effects of neoliberal globalization, Washington Consensus policies including trade liberalization, deregulation, commercialization and privatization are predominant and accepted. This has something to do with the fact that South Korea is categorized as a post-oligarchy and is located in Northeast Asia, a region characterized by conflicts during the Cold War. South Korea completely internalizes neoliberal policies which prioritize trade liberalization and restructuring for market autonomy since dominant capital groups seeking global capital accumulation enjoy hegemony in the capital market. On the other hand, other Asian nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand see strong conflicts between anti- and pro-American sentiments in each country. For Southeast Asia, which is relatively less pro-American than East Asia, American neoliberalism supremacy is relatively weak, except in the case of the Philippines whose economic policies clearly demonstrate a tendency to lean toward the US's neoliberal policies.

Therefore, tensions result from the internal acceptance of the neoliberal globalization model. Several governments in the democratic transition process, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, embrace and

implement a wide range of neoliberal policies only to bring about destructive consequences. As a result, the anti-neoliberal sentiment of the public in these countries has proliferated. However, such public discontent does not turn into more ideologically based anti-neoliberalism or socioeconomic liberalism. In such cases, an organized social movement fails to develop such sentiment into a hegemonic struggle and fails to become decentralized.

With such factors interacting among each other, a practical result of economic and social de-monopolization is the determination of political uncertainty and crisis in the democratic consolidation process. This is because democratization brings about class conflict issues that have been suppressed under the dictatorship, an example of economic de-monopolization, and racial conflict issues, an example of social de-monopolization. This is also because instability and crisis during postdemocratization are dependent on whether newly democratized political groups embrace such tension and conflict into its democratic institutions, meeting demands of subalterns and resolving their discontent.

When it comes to economic de-monopolization, which is the extent to which economic monopolization established under the dictatorship goes through disintegration, the extent of economic liberalization is important. And the degree to which economic and social de-monopolization progresses during democratization–the extent of equalization–is important as well. The practical aspects of economic and social de-monopolization can be divided into two categories: pluralistic and monopolistic. Specifically, economic de-monopolization can be divided into an economically plural category and an economically monopolistic one. Likewise, social de-monopolization can be categorized as socially pluralistic and socially monopolistic.

First of all, the economically monopolistic category does not see much change in the status of former economically monopolistic forces, many of whom are related to dictators, thus enjoyed economic privilege under a dictatorship. Those forces bolster their monopolistic status and even strengthen their financial footing into a new level after democratization. Currently, the top fifteen families in the Philippines own about fifty percent of its national wealth. In some cases, monopolistic entities change hands. In general, however, former monopolistic forces remain intact, which naturally undermines the improvement in economic conditions of the public. There have been certain achievements such as a decline in the number of people living on less than one U.S. dollar a day. However, there is little improvement in terms of relative poverty or economic polarization.

Next is the economically plural category. In terms of politics, economic pluralism is more likely to exist in post-oligarchic society rather than in a neo-

oligarchic one. After democratization, a partial relaxation of former economic monopoly might bring about a change in corporate rankings or the emergence of new capitalists in new industrial fields. The prime example is the promotion of venture industry led by the South Korean government. But economically monopolistic conditions remain intact even in South Korea, which we have said to be in the course of political post-oligarchy. Also, an anti-dictatorial government with reform liberalism faces the new trend toward economic inequality while wholly accepting neoliberal policies. However, Taiwan has a lower level of economic concentration than South Korea because its development dictatorship brought about relatively higher percentage of small and medium enterprises and lower domination of monopolistic bodies. Taiwan also has recently seen its state-owned enterprises being privatized and taken over by business groups to become conglomerates. Also, the emergence of new monopolistic bodies in the fledgling information technology industry caused stronger economic concentration in Taiwan compared to its development dictatorship period. While economic inequality in the nation intensifies, political democracy-related issues such as the President's involvement in a corruption scandal attracted national attention, which effectively marginalizes the issue of economic inequality.

Now, let us discuss social de-monopolization. This can be divided into socially plural and socially monopolistic categories. In the former case, the constant progress of de-monopolization eased existing social monopoly, leading to a pluralistic situation. In the latter case, the hegemony of dominating social forces persists.

In the aftermath of democratization, demands and resistance of subalterns erupt against social monopoly which has been specifically established under development dictatorship. For instance, Thailand and the Philippines saw ethnic minority conflicts regarding racial and religious issues. Other examples include regional tensions in South Korea and racial conflicts in Taiwan as well. When the exclusion of ethnic minorities persists in a democratic space, cracks of social division may manifest in the form of a separatist movement. What is crucial is whether or not democratization embraces demands and interests from such separatist movements into the democratic space, resolving them without violence. In that respect, Indonesia's Aceh province is a typical success story, in that the Helsinki Agreement helped legitimize Aceh's separatist rebels, prompting them to compete within political institutions and paving the way for decentralization. On the other hand, the Special Region of Papua suffered fiercer separatist conflicts over minority resistance. Both of these patterns coexist in Indonesia. In the Philippines, the vicious cycle of violent crackdown and armed resistance continues to be unresolved, and may

Figure 4. Diverse Trajectories of Democratization



have worsened. Thailand was also struck by religious and racial conflicts in the south, suffering from the vicious cycle of violent suppression and resistance under the Thaksin government.

On the other hand, both Taiwan and South Korea experienced the development of major social cleavages, such as racial conflicts and regional conflicts, becoming incorporated into the internal systemic conflicts. That is, political parties representing racial minorities in Taiwan and regional groups in South Korea each came to power. In particular, Taiwan's independence issue has taken on a new dimension. Though still conflictual, confrontations between the ruling and opposition parties, and between the Mainlanders and native Taiwanese, as well as issues regarding the Taiwan Strait and independence are no longer considered to be along a single cleavage. In this respect, Taiwan and South Korea may be categorized as socially plural, considering that the dominant social cleavage under a dictatorship successfully developed into internal tensions within their respective systems.

Diverse Routes of Democratization

In sum, the route to democratization differs depending on various factors: characteristics of political de-monopolization under the international impact

of neoliberal globalization; competition between former monopolistic forces and subalterns under a new democratic space; and economic and social de-monopolization–the extent to which demands and interests of subalterns are accepted–as a consequence of such competition.

In classifying the various routes to democratization, figure 4 shows chronic conflict, reverse wave, de-railing and non-hostile coexistence. The most idealistic route might be non-hostile coexistence, where various political forces (e.g., dictatorial monopolistic forces, antidictatorial moderate liberal forces, and radical progressive forces) are engaged in pluralistic competition, and animosities between them are alleviated so that they can coexist to some degree. Yet, stabilized democracy is achievable not by the coexistence of political forces, but by the disintegration of social and economic monopoly, or the achievment of alevel of equalization that is acceptable to subalterns, and by political de-monopolization which facilitates such equalization.

In reality, however, most transition routes constitute a chronic conflict. This route operates under a complex, multi-layered interaction of political, economic, and social de-monopolization, and conflicts persist, moving forward and backward alternately without being entrenched. Conflicts between political forces turn hostile and their political competition is propelled toward excluding the demands of socioeconomic subalterns rather than reflecting the transformation of social and economic monopolies. Consequently, the gap between the new "democratic" politics and society widens, which causes chronic conflicts. That is, the stagnantion of the socialization of democracy prevents socioeconomic causes of conflicts from being removed, thus the democratization process features chronic conflict.

From a strategic perspective, with conflicts and crises being inevitable during democratization, whoever monopolizes the demands of the public in an expanded democratic space determines the route. Therefore, diverse political changes are likely. The same goes for chronic conflict. That is, even if a democratic government led by moderate liberal forces takes office, it will end up facing a chronic socioeconomic crisis. Such a government could turn into various forms such as a neo-conservative government which has previously been ruled by dictatorial conservatives, a moderate liberal government which returns to power through innovation, or a radical government comprised of socioeconomic forces (e.g., a leftist government in South America). However, an emergence of a neo-conservative government may lead to more radical neoliberal policies and is more likely to face another chronic conflict. A reverse wave is a radical case of this. An example would be the case of Thailand which suffered a coup d'etat in September 2006 before its democratization

got back on track. The coup was a case involving chronic conflict, reverse wave, and de-railing.

This process is illustrated by figure 4. Depending on the category, political de-monopolization has an impact. Conflicts between former monopolistic forces and subalterns take shape in both institutional and non-institutional space. As a result, social and economic monopolies break down extensively and vested rights of former monopolistic forces disintegrate. The extent to which demands of subalterns are met will determine the route to democratization. The democratization process in Asia shows that such route could be divided into non-hostile coexistence, chronic conflict, reverse-wave, and de-railing.

Conclusion: For "Socialization of Democracy"

The consolidation of democracy becomes possible only when the democratization of political and socioeconomic monopoly has occured to such an extent that socioeconomic sub-subjects are accepted in the process of democratization. Through this multilevel de-monopolization the "socialization of democracy" can be achieved, and diverse forces can "coexist in non-confrontation" and the social settlement of democracy is possible.

Many Asian countries show us a variety of levels of activation of civil society and the people's sector according to correlations of political, economic, and social de-monopolization. They present cases in which the electoral democracy they achieved through democratic transition as a political struggle does not provide any disorganization or change of economic and social monopolies, and as a result, democracy changes into a new kind of monopoly. Furthermore, there are only rare cases in which diverse sub-subjects enter the political arena, thus the socialization of democracy opens the era of "multipolitics." These countries present complicated cases in which there is continuous conflict and crisis, and sometimes reversion to the conservative course even after democratic transition. This complexity is the empirical phenomena that tell us "there is no democracy without socialization" or that "there is no consolidation without socialization," and "there is democratic consolidation without de-monopolization of the existing monopolies."[11]

Notes

1. Schumpeter (1943) said "a democratic method is an institutional device with which the individual achieves power to decide through a competitive struggle to get the support of the mass" (269).

2. Huntington (1991) picked as the first wave of democratization the democratic dynamics being on the rise for a century beginning in 1828, which centered on male suffrage expansion. The second wave is when thirty-five sovereign states were established after World War II with the victory of the Allies. The third one is the wave of democratization in Latin America, Southern Europe, and Asia since the 1970s. These waves each had counterwaves (e.g., fascism in the 1930s, the rise of dictatorships in the 1960s and 1970s), and the new democratizing wave runs back against a counterwave.
3. On consolidation of democracy, Diamond (1999) differentiated rules on one hand and belief and action on the other, as well as the elite and the mass. He also said that for consolidation to occur, there must be democratic deepening, political institutionalization, and regime performance (1999, 74). For regime performance, there are economic and political performances such as continuation of effective government for political institutionalization (1999, 93); and there are strengthening of institutions of governance including the bureaucracy, the legislature, and party and electoral systems. For the deepening of democracy, there is the need for divergence of powers, a weakening of military influences and functions, and re-establishment of the civil-military relation based on democracy (1999, 114).
4. Linz and Stepan (1996) take as the formation of the state and nationhood as independent variables determining consolidation, government before democratization being among the macro variables, and action variables and chance factors being non-macro variables. In addition, they refer to a dynamic civil society, a relatively autonomous political society, the rule of law, a state which is capable of running an effective bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society including a capital market as the variables to confirm consolidation of democracy. Using these variables, they analyzed fourteen countries in Latin America and Southern Europe.
5. Gunther et al. (1995) define consolidation on phenomenal aspects such as "marginalization of extreme groups" or "absence of anti-regime party." Defining consolidation in this paper is based on where the dissolution of the the socioeconomic monopoly on which those extreme and anti-regime groups are based.
6. The conflict and crisis in postdemocratic transition happen because the "from-the-bottom" initiatives from civil society, the people's sector, and social movements de-monopolize political, economic, social monopolies to "socialize" democracy. Socialization is a polysemic notion. Skocpol (1979) differentiates social revolution from political revolution. The socialization of the means of production is an old Marxist proposition, which holds that the situation in which material goods and means of production are not monopolized by one group but shared. If we use the term "socialization of democracy," it means the process in which democratic politics is not monopolized by particular political groups (usually pluralist political groups in polyarchic system) but shared by diverse social sub-subjects excluded from institutional politics (these are the social political subjects different from pluralist political subject). This basically depends upon whether politics functions in the direction of diverse social sub-subjects and social demand in a broad sense, and not a part of reproduction of dominance. The former is the "nationalization of politics," while the latter is "socialization of politics." For further clarification, refer to Cho (2006).
7. The notion of de-monopolization and its contents can be diversified to contemplate equality, decentralization, pluralism, market, etc. As previously mentioned, political monopoly is whether a particular individual or group monopolizes political resources;

economic monopoly exists when a particular individual or group enjoys monopolistic economic resources. Social monopoly includes, in a broad sense, economic monopoly. In a narrow sense, it is a situation in which the access to political and economic resources is blocked along diverse social demarcation lines (ethnicity, religion, etc.), or social discrimination is structured according to particular social demarcation lines. The correspondence of political monopoly is power divergence; of economic monopoly, equality; and social monopoly, pluralism.

8. In a general perspective the division of Korea can be seen as similar to those seen in any society according to particular demarcation lines. Division is a situation in which conflicts in the boundary of social demarcation lines are put under confrontation, thus in such a situation there is a social demarcation line fixated into a confrontational relation. In Korea, this is combined with ideological confrontation and the regional division into South and North Korea.
9. Thailand provides a good example of this case. In the anti-Thaksin struggle, progressive civil society had initiative in the beginning. But with time and with the joining of Thaksin government defectors, including Sonthi, with the royalists, the space for a military coup was created. The anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) came to have a strong conservative force in it. In the anti-Thaksin civil society movement, the anti-Thaksin political factors were combined with anti-Thaksin social factors. The conservative force based largely upon the anti-Thaksin movement called upon the King to solve the crisis of the democratic government, and this provided a good excuse for the coup by the royalist military. This means that the reversion of democracy can either be stopped or not, depending on several factors, among which are the following: level of civil society hegemony, capability of the old social force in engaging with civil society, degree of popular foundation, capability of civil society movement, the mass-mobilizing ability of civil society. In brief, democracy is determined by the formation and configuration of civil society in the process of democratization.
10. For more information, refer to Cho (2008).
11. Text by the author translated from Korean into English by Rebecca Kim.

References

Carothers, Thomas. 2002a. "The End of the Transition Paradigm." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (1): 5-21.

———. 2002b. "A Reply to My Critics." *Journal of Democracy* 13 (3): 33-8.

Cho, Heeyeon. 2008. "Democratization in Asia: Oligarchic Democracy and Democratic Oligarchy." In *States of Democracy: Oligarchic Democracies and Asian Democratization*, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and Eunhong Park. Chinnai: Earthworm Books.

———. 2006. "Universality within us." In *Universality Within Us*. Seoul: Hanul.

———. 2005. "'1987 Regime' and Transitional Crisis of the Democratic Reform Movement in Korea." *Citizen and the World* No. 8, November.

Choi, Jang-Jip. 2005. *Democracy after Democratization–The Conservative Origin of Korean Democracy and Its Crisis*. Seoul: Humanitas.

Dahl, Robert. 1989. *Democracy and Its Critics*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 1999. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Encarnacion Tadem, Teresa S. 2008. "The Perennial Drift to the Right: Transitioning to Democracy in the Philippines." In *States of Democracy: Oligarchic Democracies and Asian Democratization*, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and Eunhong Park. Chennai: Earthworm Books.

Gunther, Richard, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds. 1995. *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

———.1996. "O'Donnell's 'Illusions': A Rejoinder". *Journal of Democracy* 7 (4): 151-9.

Hadiz, Vedi Renandi. 2008. "A Political Sociology of Institutional Change: Local Power in Indonesia." In *States of Democracy: Oligarchic Democracies and Asian Democratization*, edited by Heeyeon Cho, Lawrence Surendra and Eunhong Park. Chennai: Earthworm Books.

Hipsher, Patricia. 1996. "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile and Spain." *Comparative Politics* 28 (3): 273-297.

Hungtington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

Linz, Juan J. 1990. "Transitions to Democracy." *Washington Quartely* No. 13 (3): 143-164.

Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan, eds. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

———.1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. 1992. *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press.

Marshall , Thomas Humphrey. 1964. "Citizenship and Social Class." In *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development*. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1996a. "Illusions about Consolidation." *Journal of Democracy* 7 (2): 34-51.

———. 1996b. "Illusions and Conceptual Flaws." *Journal of Democracy* 7 (4): 160-180.

———. 2002. "In Partial Defense of an Evanescent 'Paradigm.'" *Journal of Democracy* 13 (3): 6-12.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Osvaldo M. Lazzetta eds. 2004. *the Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications*. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. .1986a. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Vol. 1.

———.1986b. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Vol. 2.

———.1986c. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, Vol. 3.
Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: The Political and Economical Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Przeworski, A. et al. 1995. *Sustainable Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Schumpeter, Joseph. 1943. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, London: George Allen and Unwin.
Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. *Democracy in Latin America: Towards Citizens' Democracy*. New York: UNDP.
Wikipedia contributors. n.d. "Munir Said Thalib." *Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia*. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Munir_Said_Thalib.