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TWSC at Forty: Multidisciplinary Research and the Challenges to the Center

On 5 February 1977, Professor Francisco "Dodong" Nemenzo, Jr., then dean of the College of Arts and Sciences in the University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman, along with other concerned faculty and intellectuals, launched the Third World Studies Program as a research unit of the college. This was during the height of martial law under President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the Philippines, when there were restrictions on free speech and discussion, when dissent was stifled. The Third World Studies Program was conceptualized as, to quote its founding director, Randolf "Randy" David, "an incubator of progressive ideas and a refuge to the dwindling number of irreverent scholars, dissident intellectuals, and social activists, wherever they may come from, and whatever cause they may champion." It was a fulcrum of active, multidisciplinary discussion.

Forty years later, the program had advanced into a full-fledged research institution, the Third World Studies Center (TWSC), duly recognized as such since 2000 by UP's highest governing body, the Board of Regents no less. Its mission and vision are as follows: "The TWSC envisions itself as the premier social science research center of the University of the Philippines. It is committed to analyze and develop critical, alternative perspectives on Philippine, regional, and global issues grounded on academic research in the best tradition of scholarly practice. Its mission is to promote progressive scholarship and action for change by undertaking pioneering research on issues of national and international concerns; create spaces for discussion and dialogue; publish original, empirically grounded, and innovative studies; and build a network of activist-scholars and public intellectuals.

From a multidisciplinary perspective, TWSC focuses mainly on, but not limited to, the following areas of concentration: political economy and globalization, social movements, authoritarianism and democratic governance, peace and human security, culture and identity, and (new) media and technology." This follows the original aims that led to the founding of the program in 1977, and continues on to this day. The TWSC has a fixed staff, office space, a regular operating budget, and is now a part of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (one of the colleges formed after the tripartite division of the old College of Arts and Sciences in 1983). It publishes a regular journal, *Kasarinlan*, as well as other academic publications and monographs. It holds regular fora and public lectures. It hosts research fellows and assists them in their fieldwork. For undergraduate students, it offers, in particular, internship opportunities that allow them to tackle social issues through video documentaries. And of course, its research staff, besides giving shape to its publications (be it print, online, or multimedia), contribute their own pioneering and relevant research projects.

To commemorate the ruby anniversary of the center, TWSC decided to host a two-day international conference on 9–10 February 2017 at the Asian Center, UP Diliman that would both reflect on the center's past as well as highlight its contributions to scholarly and intellectual work in multidisciplinary platforms. Funding for the conference came from the UP Office of the Vice President for Academic Affairs, the UP Diliman Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research and Development, and conference registration fees. Professor Alfred W. McCoy, who has had a long and productive relationship with the center, was invited as keynote speaker. Past directors were asked to share their experiences and discuss how the center grew during their respective terms. Former and current fellows were asked to contribute recent studies on a variety of topics. The response to our requests to participate in the conference was extremely positive, and the conference had two plenary sessions, four simultaneous sessions for its twelve panels, and saw the premiere of TWSC's historical video documentary *Tranvia: Ang mga Riles ng Kamaynilaan* (Tranvia: The Railways of Metro Manila). It was also an occasion to pay tribute to Dodong Nemenzo, the founder of TWSC. The two days of academic sharing and discussion were both productive and provocative, and provided many approaches to a wide and diverse range of contemporary problems and issues. The papers were all new, reflecting the state of the art, cutting edge research methodology and interpretation for which

the center has long prided itself. In the course of the two days of presentation and discussion, the conference served as a reunion of scholars, both established and emerging. It thus fulfilled another aim of the center, that of providing a meeting space—a forum—that encourages critical and alternative paradigms.

This issue of *Kasarinlan* provides highlights of the conference. The lead article is Professor McCoy's keynote paper, "Global Populism: A Lineage of Filipino Strongmen from Quezon to Marcos to Duterte." This paper looks at Philippine politics as epitomized by three presidents who wielded immense power but left a bloody trail of violence. McCoy shows that violence was very much a part of building political power since the time of President L. Quezon. The cases of political violence he cites are almost forgotten by today's generation (if they were at all aware of them), but do illustrate how institutionalized violence by the state has long been a part of Philippine politics. Beyond simply presenting the Philippine experience, McCoy shows how populist rule today has deeper roots and that the Duterte phenomenon is similar to other administrations in other countries. His prognostications for the Duterte administration provoked discussion and through its publication should spur further thought.

If the main backdrop in McCoy's paper is the United State's imperial march, the next article by Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt (a former TWSC visiting research fellow) and Jacque Hersch, refers to the rise of its current rival in the world stage: China. Schmidt and Hersch's "The Orient Express and Late Development," which was also presented in the TWSC conference, provides a macro perspective of Western and Asian engagement, from the period of initial contact to the present rise of China. It is a sweeping reexamination of past interpretations of the so called Age of Exploration and early Western contact with China, characterized by Eurocentric perspectives, and presents an alternative view of the emergence of China into the global economic world from the 1970s to the present. This has important implications for interpreting present-day geopolitics and geoeconomic domination.

From prefiguring globalist tendencies, the next two articles offer a scalar shift and a study in contrast: a socialist state suffering from symptoms of capitalist malaise and a democratic one constantly challenged by a communist insurgency.

Olivier Jacques, Danielle Labbé, and Clément Musil's paper, "Shortcomings of an Idealized Urbanity: Ghost Urban Areas and the Asynchronous Territorial Development of Hanoi," shows how urban

planning by strong governments can be flawed. In striving to modernize, the Vietnamese government's attempt to provide new and modern urban areas to relieve congestion in older cities was subverted by profit-driven speculation and a slew of unexpected economic problems. The result: half completed or unbuilt urban centers sparsely populated because promised services never materialized. The cost to agricultural output and the agrarian sector has been significant, as formerly rich farm lands were converted to non-performing lands or fallow. Ghost towns in China are quite well known, but by closely studying the Hanoi experience, factors leading to such costly failures in Southeast Asia is pioneering research.

Joshua Eastin's "Conflict Calamities: Natural Disasters and the CPP-NPA" provides an interesting correlation between typhoons, earthquakes, and other natural calamities and the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) in the last decade. He explains why NPA raids on Philippine government forces increase in the wake of disasters, amidst attempts to bring in relief. His argument that the CPP-NPA takes advantage of the failure of government (due to politics) to bring in adequate and non-discriminatory aid is convincing and should be taken seriously. The use of examples from other parts of the world, particularly Latin America, indicates that the Philippine case is not unique, and that natural disasters can serve to bolster anti-government movements. The research for this paper was done partly while Eastin was a visiting research fellow at TWSC and was presented in the TWSC conference.

All these articles explore different topics and methodologies, again highlighting the multidisciplinary base of the center's critical engagement with salient political and socioeconomic issues. And yet, despite having different foci and methodology, all papers in this issue are products of substantive empirical research. And although they focus on the Philippines, or China and Europe, or Vietnam, the conclusions and interpretations have a wider application, and can be used as models to view other similar experiences elsewhere in the world.

The papers are followed by the presentations of TWSC's former directors. All highlighted TWSC's contributions to critical scholarship in the Philippines. The directors spoke of their involvement in TWSC, some of their personal memories of the center, and research agendas during their respective terms. They looked back, and in doing so fleshed out the history of the center, noting changes and continuities while they were at the helm. Discussed were prevailing conditions

through the years, and how research interests and programs broadened through the years, but never distanced themselves from the center's original aims. The former directors—Randolf S. David, Maria Serena I. Diokno, Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem, and Maria Ela L. Atienza—also looked toward the future, and how the center can further enrich the social sciences in the Philippines and beyond. These presentations can serve as the basis for a fuller history of the center, reinforce its present status, and provide directions for the future. We also included here the proceedings of a short tribute to Dodong Nemenzo, which took place on the first evening of the conference, from which we learn his significant and enduring influence on other leaders of UP.

Two reviews and a commentary conclude this issue of *Kasarinlan*.

The first material reviewed is the book *Changing Lives in Laos: Society, Politics, and Culture in a Post-Socialist State* edited by Vanina Bouté and Vatthana Pholsena. Professor Matthew Santamaria's deft evaluation of the various scholarly works that formed the volume justifies his assessment of the book as "a most contemporary look into what has been happening to this rather under-examined nation-state at the heart of continental Southeast Asia." Hopefully, our publication of Santamaria's review encourages further in-depth inquiry on the country from scholars in the Philippines and the rest of the world.

The second review is of Wataru Kusaka's *Moral Problems in the Philippines: Inequality, Democracy and the Urban Poor*. Wataru was a visiting research fellow of the center when he was doing the research that led to the present book. Hansley Juliano provides an in-depth review of this incisive and important contribution to present day sociopolitical analysis. Juliano has direct knowledge of what he speaks of, having been active in nongovernment organizations critical of the government. The review—and the book—nicely tie up with Professor McCoy's keynote address and some of the other papers in this issue.

In an incisive commentary, Barbara Politsch examines six documentaries produced by TWSC, together with the University of Montreal. The joint production of short documentaries highlighting current issues in the Philippines began in 2011, and all have been shown publicly in UP and the University of Montreal. The documentaries are also all available in TWSC's Youtube channel (https://bit.ly/2tt5XsB). Some have won awards in documentary film competitions, or have been screened in international film festivals. Filmed and edited by students from both Canada and the Philippines

under the auspices of TWSC's staff and professionals, the five documentaries reviewed tackle different aspects of Philippine socio-economic realities. Using audiovisual methods is a novel means to convey deep-seated problems, and as the reviewer notes, has been very successful. There have been other documentaries made since 2014, continuing the new venture into alternative presentation of profound and sometimes conflicting issues.

While the topics of the papers and reviews in this issue may seem diverse on the surface, they are tied together by the basic aims of the Third World Studies Center. They deal either with understudied subjects or examine well-covered subjects in novel ways. In publishing this issue, it is hoped to further disseminate the fruits of the TWSC's fortieth anniversary commemorative conference. In spreading these findings, arguments and conclusions, it is hoped that further discussion will be stimulated, and so too newer research into causes of today's complex problems—and further the search for appropriate solutions to these.✺

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For this issue, we would like to welcome a new associate editor of *Kasarinlan*, Ruth T. Siringan, also a TWSC research associate.

Global Populism:
A Lineage of Filipino Strongmen
from Quezon to Marcos and Duterte

ALFRED W. McCOY

ABSTRACT. The rising global phenomenon of populism has been framed as a reaction to the unmet promises of globalization in nominally democratic nations. Rodrigo Duterte has similarly been positioned along this trend. This article traces the lineage of Filipino strongmen from Quezon to Marcos and Duterte and shows that they emerged through juxtaposition of skilled diplomacy and local controls. This situates Duterte at an intersection of global trends and local political tradition, beyond the flat application of the term populism to the Philippines. Studying these Filipino strongmen reveals the role of performative violence in projecting domestic strength and a complementary need for diplomatic success to demonstrate international influence. These overlooked aspects of global populism can be used to speculate about the political fate of populist strongmen in disparate corners of the globe.

KEYWORDS. Manuel Quezon · Ferdinand Marcos · Rodrigo Duterte · populism · strongmen

INTRODUCTION

In the last years of his martial law dictatorship, President Ferdinand Marcos sanctioned some 2,500 extrajudicial killings, and during his first months in power President Rodrigo Duterte has presided over 7,000 such executions for his drug war. Are these simply senseless murders, or do they have some larger significance that can help us understand the sudden proliferation of populist leaders in nominally democratic nations around the globe?

The rise of Duterte as a populist strongman not only resonates deeply with his country's political culture but also reflects broader global trends that make his blunt rhetoric and iconoclastic diplomacy seem unexceptional. After a quarter century of globalization that followed the Cold War, displaced workers around the world began mobilizing politically to oppose an economic order that privileged

corporations and economic elites. Emerging with a surprising speed and simultaneity from the margins of their respective societies, a generation of populist leaders gained influence by giving voice, often with violent or virulent inflections, to public concerns about the social costs of globalization. Whether the politics were leftist like the Kirchners in Argentina or deeply conservative like Erdogan in Turkey, the resulting populist regimes often shared a "serious backlash" against the "highly inegalitarian" impact of neoliberal economic policy marked by deregulation and open markets (Aytaç and Öniş 2014, 41–59).

Reflecting these global trends, just 19 percent of Americans polled in July 2016 believed that trade creates more jobs despite numerous economics studies showing otherwise, while an earlier survey of public opinion in forty-four countries found that only 26 percent of respondents felt trade lowers prices. Adding to this skepticism about the benefits of trade, Chinese imports eliminated 2.4 million American jobs between 1999 and 2011, closing plants for furniture in North Carolina, glass in Ohio, and auto parts and steel across the Midwest (Goodman 2016). As nations worldwide imposed a combined 2,100 restrictions on imports to staunch a similar loss of jobs, world trade started slowing and actually fell during the second quarter of 2016 for the first time during a period of economic growth since World War II (*New York Times* October 30, 2016).

Across Europe, hypernationalistic parties like the Danish People's Party, French National Front, Greece's Golden Dawn, Alternative for Germany, Sweden Democrats, UK Independence Party, and others won voters by cultivating nativist reaction to these global trends. And in the most visible rejection of global integration, the British public voted, in June 2016, to quit the European Union. Simultaneously, a generation of populist demagogues gained popularity or power in nominally democratic nations around the world—notably, Norbert Hofer (Austria), Marine Le Pen (France), Miloš Zeman (Czech Republic), Viktor Orbán (Hungary), Geert Wilders (Netherlands), Vladimir Putin (Russia), Recep Erdogan (Turkey), Donald Trump (United States), Narendra Modi (India), Prabowo Subianto (Indonesia), Thaksin Shinawatra (Thailand), and Rodrigo Duterte (Philippines) (Ashkenas and Aisch 2016; Lyman 2016).

"Demagogues are still emerging, in the West and outside it," observed Indian essayist Pankaj Mishra, "as the promise of prosperity collides with massive disparities of wealth, power, education, and status" (2016, 46–54). Giving weight to those words, the Philippine economy grew by a sustained 6 percent per annum from 2010 to 2016,

but the number of the poor remained largely unchanged. Just forty elite Filipino families on the Forbes's wealth ranking controlled 76 percent of this growth, while a staggering 26 million poor struggled to survive on a dollar a day as development projects, accelerated by this economic expansion, were evicting many from their squatter shacks and subsistence farms (Agence France-Presse 2013; Sicat 2016; Yap 2016).

To explore the ideology that underlies the appeal of these demagogues, rhetoric scholar Michael J. Lee analyzes populism as a movement that, above all, defines the national community by both "shared characteristics" and a common "enemy," much like the Nazis excluded certain groups by race. Just as American prairie populists of the 1890s once demonized banking, so their contemporary counterparts are "systemic revolutionaries battling present perversions on behalf of past principles." Finally, populist movements exhibit, Lee argues, a desire for "apocalyptic confrontation . . . as the vehicle to revolutionary change" through "a mythic battle" (2006, 357–64).

With a similar emphasis on inclusion and exclusion, political scientist Jan-Werner Müller argues that "the tell-tale sign of populism" is leaders who "claim that they, and only they, represent the people." That claim is "always distinctly moral" with the result that populists, once in office, purport to act in the name of the "real people" and "will not recognize anything such as a legitimate opposition" (Müller 2016). Somewhat more succinctly, Cas Mudde defines current populism as "an ideology that separates society into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite,' and that holds that politics should be an expression of 'the general will' of the people" (2016). Taking that division further, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue that populism "emphasizes faith in the wisdom and virtue of ordinary people (the silent majority) over the 'corrupt' establishment," while defining those ordinary people through "nativism or xenophobic nationalism, which assumes that the 'people' are a uniform whole" (2016, 6–7).

Although seemingly universal in depicting the way populist demagogues often rely on violent rhetoric, this literature omits their actual violence and its potent political symbolism that frequently accompanies contemporary populism. For over a decade, Russia's Vladimir Putin, the likely progenitor of this recent resurgence of populism, has demonstrated his bare-chested power by murdering opponents—memorably, a lethal spritz of polonium 210 for KGB defector Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006, shooting journalist Anna Politkovskaya outside her Moscow apartment that same year, a

fusillade for opposition leader Boris Nemtsov in downtown Moscow in 2015, and four fatal bullets for defector Denis Voronenkov on a Kiev sidewalk in March 2017 that Ukraine called "an act of state terrorism." While some killings exhibited clever attempts at concealment, several prominent victims—the politician Nemtsov and the journalist Politkovskaya—were gunned down right in Moscow, apparently to amplify Putin's aura and silence any would-be opponents (Kramer 2016, 2017).

In Turkey, the Islamic populist Recep Erdogan has projected his personal power by staging a bloody repression of the Kurds in 2015–2016 that displaced five hundred thousand people and by purging, in the aftermath of an abortive military coup in mid-2016, fifty thousand officials, including academics, teachers, and military. In Erdogan's vision of his national community, the Kurds are a cancer within the body politic whose identity must be extinguished, much as his forebears excised the Armenians (Cumming-Bruce 2017; MacKinnon 2017).

In 2014, retired general Prabowo Subianto came close to capturing Indonesia's presidency with a campaign theme of strength and order that resonated with some of the most luridly visible violence in that country's fraught political history. Back in 1998 when the regime of his then father-in-law Suharto was trembling at the brink, General Prabowo, as commander of the elite Kopassus rangers, reportedly staged the kidnapping-disappearance of a dozen student activists, the lurid rapes of 168 Chinese women to incite racial violence, and the burning of over five thousand buildings in Jakarta that left more than a thousand dead (McIntyre 2005, 187; Fabi and Kapoor 2014; Richburg 1998; Liljas 2014).

In the closest parallel to Duterte's drug war, the Thai prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra launched his "red shirt" populism in 2003 with a campaign against methamphetamine abuse that prompted the police to carry out 2,275 extrajudicial killings in just three months (Human Rights Watch 2004, 9–12; Mydans 2003).

In America, President Trump's populism has directed its violence outward with a drone blitz of unprecedented intensity on Yemen in March 2017 against what he called a "network of lawless savages" and its virulence inward by branding Mexicans as rapists, by demanding the death penalty for drug dealers, and by branding Black inner cities as a "catastrophe" of spreading violence—resonating with the white fears of eclipse that sparked, in earlier generations, mob violence and lynchings (Blake 2017; Reuters Staff 2017; Ferdinando 2017; BBC 2018).

Even a cursory review of these cases from around the world indicates that we cannot understand populism solely by looking skyward into the ether of ideology, but should also look down to ponder the meaning of all this blood on the pavement. Offering a revealing instance of this global phenomenon, violence has long been a defining attribute of Philippine populism—in particular, through the way that Filipino leaders combine the high politics of great-power diplomacy and the low politics of performative violence, with corpses written upon and read as texts.

Among this contemporary generation of global populists, President Duterte seems somewhat exceptional in both his blunt defiance of the world order and the unalloyed brutality of his social policy. Yet no matter how extreme he might seem, Duterte, like any national leader, still lies at the intersection of global trends and local political traditions in ways that invite exploration of both his historical antecedents and contemporary politics. To schematize this analysis, we will thus explore two intersecting political axes, seeking to understand how, within a single, synchronous moment in world history, global forces produced this cohort of generally similar populist leaders, yet probing, through diachronic depth, to see how one of them has arisen within a particular historical tradition that gives resonance to this virulent rhetoric and political violence.

In the eighty-year history of the modern Philippine state, just three presidents—Manuel Quezon, Ferdinand Marcos, and Rodrigo Duterte—have been adept enough to juxtapose geopolitical calculus with manipulations of local power to gain extraordinary authority. All three were men of their respective eras, shaped by global political currents. Like others who led anti-colonial liberation struggles, Quezon was both a statesman and would-be president-for-life; Marcos was, in his greed and brutality, similar to the autocrats who emerged across the Third World in the succeeding authoritarian age; and Duterte's mix of machismo and narrow nationalism seems typical of this current crop of anti-globalization populists.

Yet while practicing a domestic politics with deep cultural roots, all three were equally skilled in manipulating the dominant world powers of their day, using the consequent international imprimatur to reinforce their domestic authority. As the world lurched toward war during the 1930s, Quezon's leadership of the independence movement complemented Washington's decision to shed its strategic responsibility for the defense of the Philippines. During the Cold War decade of the 1970s, Marcos won Washington's support for his authoritarian rule

by posing as a mediator who could contain nationalist opposition to the US military bases. Amid rising superpower tensions over the South China Sea, Duterte played upon subliminal popular resentments toward America to distance himself from this historic alliance, allowing him to extract resources from both Beijing and Washington.

Apart from a shared ability to navigate the great power politics of their eras, these successful Filipino strongmen also offered a promise of order, projecting an aura of personal power that appealed to their country's impoverished masses. Focusing on this element of their ideological appeal cuts against the grain of the dominant themes or tropes in modern Philippine historiography and highlights an issue long overlooked in the country's study: the popular need for order. With its inherently conservative view of the people as willing to accept almost any government—colonial or national, authoritarian or democratic—that offers peace and prosperity, the study of order contradicts the thrust of nationalist studies, which tends to view the masses as innately revolutionary, yearning for liberation and struggling against oppression (Agoncillo 1956; Ileto 1979).

These strongmen also gained support by their ability to mediate the contradictions, the structural flaws if you will, in the Philippine polity. Since its emergence as a Commonwealth under US colonial rule in the 1930s, the Philippine state has faced a recurring tension between a nominally strong central government, headed by an empowered executive, and local elites who control their provincial peripheries through economic assets, political office, and extralegal violence.

To control the centripetal pull of its provincial peripheries, Manila has developed—in addition to conventional electoral and economic maneuvers—some extraordinary political mechanisms that both amplified the violence and, paradoxically, provided mechanisms of state control. Reaching out from the country's epicenter, Manila has exercised a supple strength over the sprawling archipelago and its volatile peripheries, particularly the Muslim south, by deputizing a panoply of parastatal elements—bandits, warlords, smugglers, gambling bosses, militia chiefs, special agents, forest concessionaires, planters, industrialists, and vigilantes (Sidel 1999, 146–47; Hedman and Sidel 2000, 108, 172–73).

Though many are at best quasi-legal and some are outright outlaws, these fragments of the state are not mere aberrations but are integral facets of the Philippine polity. Instead of fulfilling Max Weber's requirement that it claim "the monopoly of the legitimate use of

physical force within a given territory," the Philippine state seems to sanction a virtual oligopoly on armed violence. This informal devolution of coercive authority has also allowed these Philippine variants of what Weber called "autonomous functionaries" to privatize police power, producing recurring incidents of spectacular abuse that have periodically weakened legitimacy of executives implicated in these excesses (Gerth and Mills 1946, 81–83).

Such delegated authority comes with high costs—political violence, environmental degradation, and systemic illegality. Such endemic violence by politicians' private armies can grind on unnoticed for years until it erupts in iconic incidents, such as the burning of Ora Este, Ilocos Sur, by a private army in 1970 or the Maguindanao massacre of fifty-seven victims by the provincial governor's militia in 2009.[1]

Whether charismatic like Quezon, authoritarian like Marcos, or acquisitive like Estrada, most successful Philippine presidents over the past eighty years have found ways to manipulate this substrate of provincial violence for either election or effective administration. Those with a military background (Quezon, Magsaysay, and Ramos) have relied on the armed forces to control provincial violence; those with more exclusively electoral experience (Quirino and Corazon Aquino) allied with provincial power holders to exercise an extralegal coercion and control; while both Marcos and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo used the military for extrajudicial killings and local warlords for electoral violence. As governments from Quezon to Marcos and Duterte indicate, control over this localized violence is a defining attribute of Philippine executive power and a requisite for any would-be Filipino strongman.

QUEZON'S COMMONWEALTH

As leader of the Senate (1916–1935) and Commonwealth president (1935–1942), Manuel Quezon was the first Filipino politician to integrate all levels of politics into a synergy of power. To control the

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1. Supreme Court, Republic of the Philippines, People of the Philippines, petitioner, v. Hon. Mario J. Gutierrez, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Camilo Pilotin, Francisco Piano, Delfin Piano Pedro Patao, Vicent Crisologo, Camillo Plano, Camilo Patao, Pedring Plano, Isidro Pugal, Antonio Tabuldo, Lorenzo Peralta, Veneracion Pacleb, Antonio Plano, Fermin Pugal, Carlito Pugal, Flor Plano, Erning Abano and eighty two (82) John Does respondents. En Banc, G.R. Nos. L-32282-83. (1970). Accessed January 22, 2017. https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1970/nov1970/gr_32282_83_1970.html; Tran 2009.

local vote banks that determined legislative elections, Quezon devoted considerable energies to the mastery of provincial rivalries, seeking always to maintain two equally balanced factions at a peak of conflict that would allow his intervention and manipulation. Quezon once confessed to an aide that "90 percent" of his dealings with politicians involved the disposition of patronage for such manipulations (Gwekoh 1971, 385).

One of Quezon's close allies, Senator Claro Recto, once described him as "a master of political intrigue" who could "excite envy, distrust, ambition, jealousy, even among his own loyal followers . . . He played Roxas against Osmeña, Yulo and Paredes against Roxas, . . . the Alunan group and the *plantadores* [sugar farmers] against the Yulo group and the *centralistas* [millers] in the sugar industry, dominating both by means of the loan-giving and loan-denying power of the Philippine National Bank" (1971, 394). Since most Manila politicians based their power on provincial vote banks, these manipulations of local leaders allowed him the means to control national politics, and both elements in turn strengthened his hand against the US High Commissioner or his superiors in Washington, DC.

During the independence debates of the early 1930s, Quezon used his growing dominance over Philippine partisan politics to manipulate these colonial superiors, a success that, in turn, reinforced his authority over Filipino politicians. To reduce Philippine agricultural imports during the Depression and meet the US military's concern about the archipelago's vulnerability to Japanese attack, Washington played upon the persistent Filipino agitation for independence to translate these domestic concerns into colonial policy. By negotiating terms of independence that both pleased his nationalist constituency and American patrons, Quezon marginalized his political rivals and emerged as the country's unchallenged leader (Berry 1981, 50–60; Friend 1965, 100–101, 126–48).

In the 1935 elections for a transitional Commonwealth executive, Quezon triumphed through a synergy of US support, bureaucratic manipulation, and local interventions conducted via the colonial police, the Philippine Constabulary (PC). As leader of the entrenched Nacionalista Party, Quezon's main opposition came from General Emilio Aguinaldo, the former president of the defeated revolutionary republic. After his surrender to the US authorities in 1901, Aguinaldo had returned to his native Cavite Province where he became a local political boss through large landholdings and leadership of the revolutionary war veterans. Although his national campaign was weak,

Aguinaldo's command of a local constituency capable of violence posed a serious threat (Sidel 1999, 56–61).

With the presidential campaign on the horizon, Quezon's first move was an attack on Aguinaldo's provincial power base. In late 1934, as the general prepared his presidential campaign, agriculture secretary Eulogio Rodriguez Sr., a close Quezon ally, suddenly discovered the general's arrears on a twenty-year-old government loan for the acquisition of a former friar estate in Cavite Province. In one of the very few instances of prewar land reform, Secretary Rodriguez summarily stripped Aguinaldo of all but 344 hectares and then distributed the bulk of his lands to the tenants (Soriano, del Castillo, and Alfonso 1982, 257–61).

During the campaign, constabulary officers provided Quezon with personal security, public order, and covert controls over volatile provinces. Just a month before the elections, PC headquarters sent Quezon a report detailing "political undercurrents" with data culled from units across the archipelago that were conducting partisan operations to support his candidacy (MLQ, unsigned letter to Manuel Quezon).

After the campaign began in June, Aguinaldo, the candidate for the National Socialist Party, soon realized he would be crushed by Quezon's formidable machine and reacted angrily, publicly charging fraud and privately threatening murder. Just days before the voting on September 15, the Quezon-controlled *Philippines Herald* denounced Aguinaldo and the other leading opposition candidate, Bishop Gregorio Aglipay, declaring that "their very breaths smell of assassination." When Quezon won a crushing 69 percent of the vote against Aguinaldo's 17 percent and Bishop Gregorio Aglipay's 14 percent, the general attacked his rival's "abuse of power" and refused to concede (Hayden 1955, 387–92, 409–18, 426–29; Gleeck 1998b, 36).

In the election's bitter aftermath, Aguinaldo threatened assassination, armed uprising, or both. In a confidential report to its superintendent, the Constabulary's Intelligence Division described the "high tension" at a September 21 meeting of the general's National Socialist Party in Manila, with speakers "lambasting the entire government machinery in having coordinated smoothly to defeat GEA [General Emilio Aguinaldo]." When Aguinaldo spoke, claiming that the government had stolen fifty thousand votes from his final tally, the "irresponsible elements present . . . murmured, '*Ayan ang mabuti, revolucion na!*" [That's good, it's time for revolution!] (MLQ, confidential memorandum).

Just two days later, the Constabulary's confidential Agent 110 called on the deputy intelligence chief, Capt. Jose P. Guido, to warn that Aguinaldo was plotting an assassination attempt against Quezon (MLQ, Capt. Jose Guido). A week after that, the Constabulary's Cavite commander reached a similar conclusion during an otherwise "cordial" visit to Aguinaldo at his home in Kawit. Speaking with great indignation, the general said, "the only way to free the government of undesirable officials and save the people from suffering, hardships, and miseries is to put down President Quezon." By the end of this visit with Aguinaldo, the captain reported: "I could infer or read that he is nursing a sinister or evil design to assassinate President Quezon" (MLQ, Capt. Severo C. Cruz).

The main threat came from the hundreds, sometimes thousands of General Aguinaldo's supporters, many members of his Veteranos de la Revolucion, who met nightly in the yard of his Kawit mansion just south of Manila. Addressing five hundred supporters who gathered there on October 1, the speakers were, according to Constabulary spies, particularly incendiary, leading the crowd in shouting, *"Mag revolucion na"* [It's time to rebel] (MLQ, memorandum for—superintendent). At another meeting, a prominent Aguinaldo follower swore to kill Quezon and asked the crowd, "Who else will volunteer to give his life away if I fail?" According to a PC spy, over five hundred agreed to a roar of approval. Although the general disavowed these death threats, he moved ahead with plans to mobilize fifty thousand angry followers to protest Quezon's inauguration on November 15 (Hayden 1955, 429–30, 433–34; Gleeck 1998b, 36).

Under constant threat of assassination, president-elect Quezon surrounded himself day and night with Constabulary security. His limousine moved in an armed cavalcade. The palace grounds swarmed with guards. He slept aboard the presidential yacht anchored in Manila Bay. To quiet the violent bombast at Aguinaldo's house, a Constabulary detachment occupied the general's hometown, checking buses for guns and taking the names of those who attended the nightly meetings. After Quezon pleaded with Governor-General Frank Murphy to intervene just three weeks before the inauguration, the American met privately with Aguinaldo and, through a mix of blunt threats and his famous Irish charm, persuaded him not to disrupt the inaugural proceedings (Hayden 1955, 429–35; Gleeck 1998b, 36–41; Gleeck 1998a, 3, 377–80, 491–92; MLQ, letter from E. Aguinaldo; MLQ, Major M. N. Castañeda).

After a peaceful inauguration, President Quezon assumed a statesmanlike posture toward the Constabulary, but could not escape the executive's habit of using this force as the strong arm of central authority. The contradiction between the Constabulary's role as an apolitical national police force and its partisan uses as an extension of executive authority would deepen as the attenuation of colonial authority left this unsheathed sword in the hands of successive Philippine presidents (McCoy 2009, 362–66).

Politics under the Commonwealth was truly a system in symbiosis, operating, whether by inclination or design, with a political economy that allowed Quezon's every move to reinforce his ultimate goal, the accumulation and perpetuation of power. It was not a system built without effort or free from restraints. By 1940, Quezon had destroyed all elite opposition within and without the Nacionalista Party and marginalized Pedro Abad Santos of the radical Frente Popular in Central Luzon.

Quezon's greatest triumph, the 1941 elections, demonstrated the extent of his control over the legislature and its base in provincial politics. At the Nacionalista Party's convention in August, despite some grumbling "in private over their emasculation," the delegates accepted Quezon's list of the twenty-four senatorial candidates without a single dissenting vote. Under Quezon's earlier constitutional amendment, the senators now ran at-large on a national ticket that uprooted them from independent regional bases and thus made them beholden to executive patronage (McCoy 1989, 122–25). Although Quezon had thus made the Senate an extension of his executive authority, he still used local loyalties to ensure election of hand-picked candidates. The strategy was successful and all twenty-four of his nominees were elected to the Senate in November 1941 (US State Department, "Convention of the Nacionalista Party").

In these same elections, the Nacionalistas also won ninety-five of the ninety-eight Assembly seats. Party control was stricter and local factionalism less pronounced than in the 1940 gubernatorial elections since only seven ran as "rebel candidates" in defiance of Quezon. The State Department explained that "the degree of victory is due to the impregnability of the party machine achieved by various devices such as that of block voting" for a party ticket, an innovation in the 1941 elections (US State Department, "The Elections of November 11, 1941").

Unfortunately, for Quezon, the US independence legislation that had established the Commonwealth also provided an American High

Commissioner to serve as the US president's personal representative in Manila. Since the commissioner was the only real barrier to the Philippine president's unchecked authority, the most intense political battles of the Commonwealth period revolved around Quezon's efforts to obviate his imperial watchdog's ill-defined authority.

Whether the High Commissioner was friend or enemy, Quezon was relentless in undercutting his authority. In defense matters where lines of authority were muddled, Quezon played his military adviser General Douglas MacArthur against Commissioner Frank Murphy, using the general's extensive Washington contacts to deal directly with the US Army. In matters of trade, Quezon avoided negotiating with Commissioner Paul McNutt by winning President Roosevelt's support for a joint executive commission, the Joint Preparatory Committee on Philippine Affairs. Finally, Quezon neutralized Commissioner Francis Sayre's opposition to his domestic legislation by dragging him into public debate and outmaneuvering him in bureaucratic infighting with his superiors (McCoy 1989, 140–55).

By controlling both external relations with Washington and the country's volatile provincial politics, Quezon emerged as the first powerful Filipino leader, creating a template that other would-be strongmen would eventually follow.

PROVINCIAL WARLORDS

Only three years after independence, the 1949 presidential elections marked the first appearance of armed violence as a defining feature of the country's politics. Before the Second World War, the Constabulary had enforced strict controls that restricted politicians to registered handguns. During the Second World War, however, both conventional combat and anti-Japanese guerrilla operations littered the archipelago with loose firearms that provincial politicians amassed after the war to form private armies.

To check the Constabulary and thereby allow their provincial paramilitaries free rein during elections, these nascent warlords pressured Malacañang Palace to restrain its Constabulary commanders. Since local leaders could deliver blocs of votes whose sum was often the margin of victory in national contests, presidential candidates had to court these provincial warlords and incur compromising political debts. From the perspective of a healthy democracy, several of the presidents who followed Quezon did not handle the Constabulary's

unsheathed sword wisely or well. But from a less normative analytical perspective, a president who could not manage this provincial violence deftly, like Elpidio Quirino, would fail, and a presidential aspirant who apparently could, like Ramon Magsaysay, would succeed.[2]

In the first years of this new regime, Governor Rafael Lacson of Negros Occidental was one of the first provincial politicians to discern the republic's structural flaw and played upon it to win a de facto political autonomy from the central government. The resulting political violence soon became a national scandal under President Quirino, an elite politician of Quezon's generation who lacked the military experience to control provincial violence, and suffered a consequent loss of political authority. By 1948, Governor Lacson had accumulated the iconic elements of postwar Philippine politics: "guns, goons, and gold." On the pretext of checking communist infiltration, Lacson formed one of the first private armies, which soon expanded into a force of 130 special police (SP) and 59 provincial guards. To fund this ad hoc force, Lacson drew upon diverse sources—municipal taxes, formal provincial appropriations, and national pork barrel from the Presidential Action Commission on Social Amelioration (PACSA) (Negros Occidental Provincial Board 1950b; Abueva 1971, 140–41). Significantly, all the soldiers in Lacson's private army were, in some way, agents of the state.

Such a small force of 190 men could not have been effective had it faced serious opposition from any of three possible rivals: the municipal police, the security forces attached to the province's many sugar mills, and, of course, the Constabulary. With a mix of deft maneuver and brute force, the governor subjugated each in succession. In the 1947 local elections, Lacson had won de facto control of the municipal police by manipulating the mayoral elections. Two years later, after terrorizing the rival political faction that owned the province's sugar mills, Lacson raided several factory compounds and confiscated their arms, effectively neutralizing this industrial security force (El Civismo, May 23, 1948; Liberator, October 29, 1949).

To maintain his local monopoly on violence, Governor Lacson required, above all else, the acquiescence of the national government and the neutralization of its Constabulary. During the first two years of his local terror, the local Constabulary command had opposed the governor's excesses, producing a succession of dramatic clashes. In the closing weeks of the presidential campaign of October 1949, however,

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2. For a fuller discussion of this period, see McCoy (2009, 379–85).

Figure 1. "Easier said than done." *Source: Philippines Free Press*, September 17, 1949.

Lacson's SP arrested twenty members of the Constabulary's elite Nenita Unit at the hacienda of an opposition senatorial candidate, and brutally tortured these troopers and their captain before locking them in the provincial prison for the next three years on spurious charges of possessing illegal firearms.[3]

These incidents epitomized the systematic violence that made the 1949 presidential elections, in the words of foreign and Filipino observers, "a national disgrace" and "the most fraudulent and violent in democratic history" (Liang 1971, 311). From the outset, the campaign was a tight contest between the wartime president Jose P. Laurel, who still commanded a strong following, and the incumbent Elpidio Quirino, whose unpopularity and unlikely election was

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3. Rafael Lacson v. Hon. Luis R. Torres, Philippine Supreme Court, G.R. L-5543, Annex B; *Philippines Free Press*, July 12, 1952.

Figure 2. "Peaceful election!" *Source: Philippines Free Press*, November 12, 1949.

captured in a cartoon from the *Philippines Free Press* (September 17, 1949, 1).

   In eight key provinces across the country, armed goons harassed the opposition's political rallies. So intense was the intimidation in two provinces, Lanao and Lacson's Negros Occidental, that the Commission on Elections recommended, in the weeks before election day, suspension of voting and imposition of Constabulary control—suggestions the president ignored. Among the 3.7 million votes cast nationwide, some 41 percent of Quirino's 485,000-vote margin of victory came from Negros Occidental (200,000) and another 28 percent from Lanao (140,000). Though Quirino won only 51 percent of the ballots cast nationwide, Lacson delivered an incredible 92 percent of his province's vote for the president, thus producing the winning majority. In its subsequent investigation, the House Electoral Tribunal found evidence of systematic terrorism in Negros Occidental and voided the results in two of its congressional districts (*Philippines Free Press*, January 27, 1951; Abueva 1971, 140–42; Agpalo 1992, 245–47; Landé 1965, 66; Sidel 1999, 109).

After single-handedly assuring Quirino's election, Governor Lacson could have asked the president for almost anything, whether timber concessions, lucrative import concessions, or a radio broadcast license. But instead, the governor demanded and the president conceded him a veto over Constabulary assignments to Negros Occidental, retaining those officers who supported him and transferring any who did not. With the state's monopoly on violence thus neutralized by this seemingly modest concession, Governor Lacson unleashed an unchecked violence against his local rivals (Landé 1965, 66; Elpidio Quirino Papers).

Through such blatant politicization, the local Constabulary command soon backed Governor Lacson's bid to take control over otherwise autonomous municipal police (Negros Occidental Provincial Board 1950a, 1950c). In its formal "Plan to Check the Spread of Subversive Activities," the Constabulary detachment in Negros required that "the supervision of all police agencies will be undertaken by the Provincial Governor with the [Constabulary] Provincial Commander assisting him" and authorized the formation of neighborhood vigilantes under local police chiefs "directly responsible to the Provincial Governor."[4] Under such pressure, the Provincial Board voted to merge all municipal police into a unified provincial command under Lacson's direct authority (Negros Occidental Provincial Board 1950c).

With both the Constabulary and the municipal police neutralized, Governor Lacson used his private army to attack his local political enemies, the Yulo-Araneta group. Aside from its personal and purely factional aspects, this rivalry was, in large part, a continuation of the prewar planter miller conflict—with Lacson, himself a sugar farmer, leading the Negros planters against the Araneta milling interests. Through his alliance with President Manuel Roxas (1946–1948), Negros financier J. Amado Araneta had maneuvered the postwar reconstruction of the sugar industry to take control, directly or indirectly, of six of the province's ten sugar mills—unprecedented power over the local economy. Increased concentration of mill ownership intensified the planter-miller conflict and provided Governor Lacson a broad base of support among sugar farmers for a "reign of

4. People v. Lacson, Criminal Case 3220, Bacolod, Negros Occidental, Lieutenant Colonel Nicolas Jabutina.

5. Interview with Inocencio Ferrer (Negros Occidental second district congressman, 1957–1965), buried alive by Governor Lacson's Special Police, Manila, December 10, 1974; interview with Marino Rubin (mayor of Pontevedra, 1947–1951) whose house was machine-gunned by the SP, Pontevedra, August 2, 1975.

terror" against his factional rivals, which included machine-gunning the house of a municipal mayor.[5]

To break the Yulo-Araneta faction's mass base among the province's working class, Lacson formed a tactical alliance with the region's militant union, the Federacion Obrera de Filipinas (FOF), first using it to challenge the Yulo-Araneta faction's company unions and then, when that work was done, banning it from the province (Tejida 1975; Nacion 1975; Valera 1975).[6] With his monopoly on violence now complete, the governor grew even more violent. In February 1950, his SP arrested prominent opposition politician Inocencio Ferrer, beat him badly, and buried his still breathing body in a shallow grave on Lacson's own plantation.[7]

At the start of the 1951 local and legislative elections, Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay dispatched over a thousand troops, two hundred Marines and nine hundred Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) cadets, to prevent another round of violence in Negros Occidental (*El Civismo*, October 7, 1951; November 11, 1951). Despite their presence, investigators later found fifty-one instances of intimidation by the SP—including beatings, random gunfire, and, most disturbingly, the murder of Moises Padilla, candidate for mayor in the town of Magallon.[8] Taking Padilla's candidacy as a personal affront, Governor Lacson insisted that the Constabulary absent itself from Magallon during the elections, and the provincial commander, Captain Marcial Enriquez, complied. Two days before the voting, Lacson denounced Padilla as a communist at a public rally in Magallon and on election day, November 13, ordered his arrest. For the next three days, the SP tortured him publicly on the plazas of four nearby municipalities. On November 16, the SP shot him fourteen times before dumping his body in a shed near the town of La Castellana, making no attempt to conceal the crime.[9]

But this time the governor had gone too far. The next day, Defense Secretary Magsaysay flew to Negros accompanied by the publisher of the *Manila Times*, Joaquin Roces, and his star reporter, Benigno

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6. Interviews with Guillermo Tejida, Central La Carlota, June 27/28, 1975; Crisanto Nacion (president, FOF, Central La Carlota), Bo. Crossing, La Carlota City, July 26, 1975; and Loreto Valera (factory manager, Central La Carlota), La Carlota City, October 23, 1975.
7. Lacson v. Torres, G.R. L-5543, Annex B; interview with Inocencio Ferrer, August 2, 1975.
8. Lacson v. Torres, G.R. L-5543, Annex A.
9. People v. Lacson, Criminal Case 3220.

Figure 3. The body of Moises Padilla, November 1951

"Ninoy" Aquino Jr. Arriving at Magallon after dark, Magsaysay climbed
the stairs to a wake where Padilla's body lay face down to expose the
congealed blood, bullet holes, and wounds of torture. One photo of
the clothed body showed the left hand upturned toward the camera to
reveal a raised wound in the palm, akin to Christ's stigmata from the
nails that held him to the cross. When local doctors refused to do an
autopsy, Magsaysay flew the body back to Manila for a military funeral
with full honors. At each step in this political calvary, publisher Roces
clicked his camera and reporter Aquino jotted down quotes—producing
a sensational story for the front page of the *Manila Times* that stirred
public condemnation. Despite the outpouring of anger, President
Quirino seemed reluctant to suspend Governor Lacson. "Mr.
President," Magsaysay advised, "the people are so outraged by the death
of Moises Padilla that they are ready to stone Malacañang Palace." After
an embarrassing delay, government prosecutors filed murder charges
against Lacson, and the president finally suspended him (*Philippines
Free Press*, August 28, 1954; Abueva 1971, 201–3; Quirino 1958, 79–
80; Merritt 1953, 33–34; Joaquin 1986, 221–23).

    At Lacson's trial, a close associate of the martyred Moises Padilla
testified to the central role that Captain Enriquez had played in the

Figure 4. "Equal justice." *Source: Philippines Free Press*, October 4, 1952.

governor's reign of terror. Asked why he did not complain to the Constabulary, the witness replied, "The law was being handled and exercised by the SPs in their hands alone." Asked if the Constabulary had refused to enforce the law, the witnesses stated: "Yes, in all instances, the Provincial Commander never pays attention . . . [to] any complaint of aggrieved persons . . . during the time of Captain Enriquez."[10]

Realization that the president had compromised the Constabulary, a force synonymous with the state's integrity, dismayed the Filipino public. Two years later in the 1953 presidential elections, Magsaysay, now running as the opposition candidate, brought campaign rallies in towns across the Philippines to an emotional peak by stretching out his arms as if bearing an invisible corpse and saying, "I held in my arms the bleeding symbol of democracy: the body of Moises Padilla" (Abueva 1971, 202–3, 254–55; Quirino 1958, 116; Merritt 1953, 34; Joaquin 1986, 224). After Magsaysay's triumph in the November

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10. People v. Lacson, Criminal Case 3220, testimony of Narciso Dalumpines, November 26, 1951.

Figure 5. "Election violence." *Source: Philippines Free Press*, October 10, 1959.

balloting, the courts suddenly accelerated the Lacson case. In August 1954, the governor was sentenced to death for the murder of Moises Padilla, a penalty later reduced to life imprisonment (*Philippines Free Press*, August 28, 1954).[11]

Despite some significant reforms under Magsaysay, the politicization of the Constabulary that had fostered these provincial warlords continued and the potential for political violence thus remained. Indeed, during the 1960s, many provinces would again witness the fusion of public office with private militia, indicating that the tension between central authority and provincial violence had persisted as a defining attribute of Philippine politics.

Marcos Regime

After a twenty-year career as a conventional party politician, President Ferdinand Marcos combined national resources and provincial violence

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11. In the mid-1960s, Lacson was released from prison and returned home to Negros where he retired into obscurity.

Figure 6. "Portraits of senator and congressman as warlords." *Source: Philippines Free Press*, November 14, 1970.

to accomplish something unprecedented in the history of the Philippine Republic: reelection. During the 1969 campaign, Marcos stumped vigorously, reaching even remote villages to personally place a check for PHP 2,000 in the hands of each barrio captain, obligating them, within the country's political culture, to use every possible means to deliver a winning margin. This strategy cost the Marcos campaign an estimated USD 50 million, far more than the USD 34 million Richard Nixon had spent to win the US presidency just a year earlier (Bonner 1987, 76–77). In the aftermath of this costly flood of cash, the Philippine peso lost half its value, government services were slashed, and the economy contracted (Thompson 1995, 34–35; Noble 1986, 79–80).

The 1969 campaign also produced incidents of political terror of the sort not seen since the 1951 elections. With the Constabulary now under the command of Marcos loyalist Vicente Raval, the PC Special Forces orchestrated violence in four swing provinces that left forty-six dead (Thompson 1995, 35–37, 192–93; Wolters 1983, 166–67; de

Quiros 1997, 46, 66–67; Seagrave 1988, 218–19). In its ruling on these violations, the Supreme Court was particularly critical of what it called the "rape of democracy in Batanes," a remote island where the Special Forces allowed motorcycle-riding goons, dubbed the "Suzuki boys," to coerce a winning margin in the congressional race for a close Marcos ally (de Quiros 1997, 66–67). Bolstered by force and fraud, Marcos scored a crushing victory of the kind not seen since Quezon's 1941 landslide—specifically, winning 74 percent of the presidential vote, eighty-six of one hundred House seats, and eleven of twelve Senate seats being contested (Seagrave 1988, 218).

In the aftermath of these elections, a family dynasty in Ilocos Sur pursued a political vendetta against local enemies, producing an incident iconic for both its brutality and its executive complicity. Since this troubled province was adjacent to Marcos's own Ilocos Norte and its local warlord was his political ally, the president's victory may have encouraged these events. As Marcos rose through the Senate to the presidency, his close friend Representative Floro Crisologo had tightened his grip over Ilocos Sur—building a private army of three hundred men, a monopoly on the province's electoral offices, and a vice grip on its main cash crop, tobacco. To ensure payment of an informal tax to his political machine, Crisologo's private army maintained a "tobacco blockade" on the national highway, stopping every southbound truck to check for receipts. The Constabulary could have easily swept away the Crisologo roadblock were it not for the reputed intervention of General Fabian Crisologo Ver, chief of presidential security and the congressman's relative (Mijares 1976, 151; Luis "Chavit" Singson, interview by the author, June 1974).

In mid-September 1969, the Crisologo goons gunned down a former Bantay municipal mayor, and a month later prosecutors indicted the congressman's son, Vincent Crisologo, chief of the family's private militia, for ordering the crime (*Daily Mirror*, October 15, 1969). In the elections' aftermath, political reprisals continued in the town of Bantay as the Crisologos retaliated against two villages, Ora Este and Ora Centro, for supporting the opposition's candidates. In May 1970, Vicente Crisologo led a hundred armed men into these villages and burned both to the ground, killing an elderly woman who was caught in the flames. During the attack, residents pleaded with the provincial PC commander, but he "ignored . . . appeals to stop the arson." In its front-page coverage, the Manila press carried moving photos of survivors sorting through the ashes of their devastated homes

(*Manila Times*, June 3, 1970; *Daily Mirror*, June 7, 1972; Robson 2002, 8–12).

Outraged by such a blatant display of warlord power, forty-two civic, religious, and youth organizations formed Operation Bantay to demand an impartial investigation (*Manila Times*, June 13, 1970). Despite his alliance with Congressman Crisologo, President Marcos ordered charges filed against his son Vincent for arson (*Manila Times*, June 3, 1970). Such unrestrained brutality by a private militia, apparently operating with the president's tacit approval, challenged the republic's legitimacy among both student activists and Manila's middle class.

Only five months after the Bantay burning, Ilocos Sur offered a revealing coda to this political violence. Reportedly angry over his unsatisfactory share of the spoils from the president's victory, Representative Crisologo stormed into the palace where he "berated both Marcos and Ver for grabbing the lion's share of the proceeds of the tobacco monopoly" and "threatened to expose the entire operation." Just a few weeks later, in October 1970, as Crisologo knelt during Sunday Mass at Vigan's baroque cathedral, two unidentified men emerged from a confessional booth, shot him point-blank in the back of the head, and then disappeared out of the cathedral door (Mijares 1976, 151; *Manila Times*, October 19, 1970).

In September 1972, as this hard-won second term came to an end, Marcos used a mix of US support, central power, and provincial controls to suspend Congress and declare martial law. The military quickly disbanded 145 private armies, two for each of the country's sixty-seven provinces, and confiscated 523,616 firearms, one for every fifteen adult males, leaving the president with a momentary monopoly on violence (Marcos 1977, 222). Three months later, on January 15, 1973, a Constabulary firing squad executed Chinese drug dealer Lim Seng, with photos splashed across front pages and footage shown on television and movie theaters (de Quiros 1997, 437–38; Ocampo 2016). Indicating Marcos's simultaneous appeal to the moral crisis over drug abuse and his use of the Manila Chinese as a unifying populist enemy, Lim Seng was the first and last person publicly executed during the fourteen years of martial rule.

On the external side of the political equation, Marcos used the issue of military bases to win support for his authoritarian regime from three successive US administrations. When President Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, however, his emphasis on human rights roiled an

already fraught bilateral relationship. Complicating matters further, Marcos pressed so hard for increased US payments that George Kennan, a senior strategist, advised "immediate, complete, resolute and wordless withdrawal" (Bonner 1987, 205–11). While his daughter Imee publicly denounced the bases as "clear evidence of our being American stooges" and his wife Imelda visited the Soviet Union to seek an alternative to US aid, Marcos played the statesman and broke the impasse, after three years of negotiations, by agreeing to annual US compensation of USD 500 million (Berry 1989, 163–217, 236–37; Paez 1985, 71–73). "We had to choose between using our bilateral relationship for human rights objectives," US negotiator Richard Holbrooke told Congress, "and using it first for putting our military facilities on a stable basis" (Bonner 1987, 23).

President Reagan's administration embraced the dictator, inviting him to Washington for a formal state visit in September 1982. Even as the regime plunged into crisis after the 1983 assassination of ex-senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino Jr., Washington refused to contemplate alternatives. US military aid to the Philippines doubled to USD 70 million in 1985, a signal seen in Manila as support for the regime's limitless lien on power. Most importantly, through the World Bank and private banks, the United States led the First World in granting Marcos loans that eventually totaled USD 26 billion. The largesse extended the life of the regime by providing it with a steady inflow of cash to offset the funds wasted by its erratic plunder of the nation's economy.

With Washington generally silent about his regime's excesses, Marcos could pursue two mutually reinforcing strategies to transform his dictatorship into a dynasty—the destruction of any potential opposition and the construction of a ruling coalition. At the outset of martial law in 1972, for example, political power in Iloilo City, then the nation's fourth largest, was divided among three contenders: Vice President Fernando Lopez, Congressman Fermin Caram Jr., and Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. Through deft maneuvers reminiscent of Quezon, Marcos was skillful in the use of dictatorial powers to force the submission of these volatile provincial elites.

Originally Marcos's key patrons in his successful 1965 and 1969 presidential campaigns, the wealthy Lopez brothers had a falling out with Marcos in 1970–1971 and began using their media empire in an attempt to break the president. After declaring martial law, however, Marcos used his extraordinary powers to break the Lopez family. As a

self-appointed dictator, Marcos had no need for a vice president and effectively abolished the office, stripping Fernando Lopez of his authority. To preempt any counter moves, Marcos arrested the heir apparent to the family's corporate crown, Eugenio Lopez Jr., on capital charges of plotting to assassinate the president. The martial law regime then stripped the Lopez companies of their media licenses and allocated their facilities to Marcos relatives and cronies. Marcos classmate Roberto Benedicto occupied the Alto Broadcasting Station - Central Broadcasting Network (ABS-CBN), and Imelda's brother Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez expropriated the presses of the *Manila Chronicle* to publish his own *Times Journal*.

From exile in the United States, the family's leader, Eugenio Lopez Sr., resisted the sale of his leading asset, the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), until he could no longer withstand Marcos's multifaceted pressures. By slashing an electricity rate increase from 36.5 percent to 20.9 percent, Marcos reduced the company's profits and hence its value. After a mysterious explosion erupted in one of MERALCO's substations, the Marcos press charged that Lopez himself was responsible for the sabotage. With a tacit assurance that his son would be released from death row in a military stockade, Eugenio Sr. signed over a USD 300 million corporation to a Marcos-controlled foundation for a nominal payment of USD 1,500. But once the papers were signed, Marcos broke his promise and refused to release the hostage (Mijares 1976, 184–81, 191–92, 197–204).

Marcos used similar tactics to crush Iloilo City congressman Fermin Caram Jr., a lawyer whose main asset was the country's third domestic airline, Filipinas Orient, first licensed to fly in 1964 over the opposition of the flag carrier, Philippine Airlines (PAL).[12] Although Caram himself was a Marcos ally, he or his wife had somehow offended the First Lady. In a move that was supposed to rationalize the airline industry as part of his martial law reforms, Marcos granted Philippine Airlines a domestic monopoly and abolished Filipinas Orient. After PAL expropriated Filipinas Orient's aircraft, the government charged Caram with plundering the firm and won a court order freezing all his assets.

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12. Philippine Air Lines Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, and Filipinas Orient Airways, Philippine Supreme Court G.R. No. L-24219, June 13, 1968, accessed January 30, 2017, http://www.asianlii.org/ph/cases/PHSC/1968/338.html.

Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, Iloilo City's "hero of the masses," was a more elusive target. As former jeepney driver and professional machine politician, Ganzon's only capital was his charisma. In the months before the declaration of martial law, Iloilo City was the scene of a spectacular gunbattle for control of the docks between two rival clans of waterfront toughs who were allied with Caram and Ganzon. In March 1972, Mayor Ganzon's car was ambushed and riddled with bullets on Iloilo's main street, killing four of his bodyguards (Leichter 1975, 55–59). After the declaration of martial law, Marcos's military intervened in this waterfront war and arbitrarily charged Ganzon with murder. Convicted of a capital crime by a regional military tribunal, Ganzon was allowed to appeal to the commander-in-chief, President Marcos, who proved remarkably slow in deciding the case. Over the next few years, Ganzon was allowed to leave the military stockade periodically to circulate among his followers, urging their support for the president.

Apart from thus breaking established provincial elites, Marcos also worked to change the composition of the country's regional and national leadership. He damned the provincial politicians as "warlords" and used his martial law powers to strip them of their arms and offices. He denounced Manila's wealthy families as "old society oligarchs" whose privileges and power stood as a barrier to economic progress. At the very outset of martial law, Marcos destroyed the fortunes of the prominent entrepreneurs, like the Lopez and Jacinto families, thereby silencing "Manila's 400" and facilitating plunder of their corporations one by one over the next decade. Assets confiscated from erring old society oligarchs were quietly transferred to a new economic elite of family, relations, and Palace retainers. By the end of the decade, *Fortune* magazine would describe the new Philippine economy as "crony capitalism" (Kraar 1981).

A 1980 study of 453 Philippine corporations by Fr. John F. Doherty, SJ, found that the Marcos reforms had produced an enormous concentration of wealth. Since over 98 percent of all sectors had "four or fewer companies controlling 35 percent of total sales," profits were excessive. For example, the coconut industry, dominated by crony Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, had a profit ratio of 111 percent. Significantly, these 453 companies were controlled by only eighty-one individuals who could be divided into three groups: previous unknowns close to the First Family who "had expanded their corporate empires at a fantastic rate"; a pre-martial law

elite closely allied to the regime; and another pre-martial law elite who had to "endure periodic harassments" and were forced to "keep the semblance of loyalty" (Doherty 1982, 12–33).

The impact of crony capitalism upon the Philippines should not be underestimated. Through manipulation of finance and regulatory agencies, Marcos transferred control of the country's major primary industries to individual cronies—coconuts to Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. and Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile; sugar to Roberto S. Benedicto; and bananas, among others, to Antonio Floirendo Sr. Many used this largesse to build up fragile conglomerates involving control over banking, primary industry (agribusiness, logging, and mining), manufacturing, transport, and service industries, notably tourist hotels. Whenever possible, crony capitalists reinforced their economic power with control over the government agency charged with regulating their industry. Several also acquired political dominion over the provinces where their industry operated, producing a high concentration of power. There were, therefore, two countervailing thrusts to the Marcos centralizing reforms—a relentless repression of local power holders and a simultaneous devolution of regional control to regime allies who often controlled armed militia.

The former ambassador to Japan Roberto S. Benedicto is an apt example of a crony capitalist. A close Marcos friend from their law school days at the University of the Philippines in the late 1930s, Benedicto became the regime's plenipotentiary for sugar, then the country's leading export industry. By the late 1970s, Benedicto had enormous power over the industry through a combination of private and public agencies. As owner of two major private banks, he dominated nongovernment sugar finance. As chairman of two government regulatory agencies—the National Sugar Trading Association and the Philippine Sugar Commission—he controlled all sugar marketing, all research, most bulk warehousing, and the operations of several large sugar mills (*Sugarland* 1977, no. 1, 26–27; *Sugarland* 1977, no. 3, 15; *Sugar News*, August 1974, 271; *Sugar News*, April 1976, 124; *Sugar News*, July 1977, 163; *Sugar News*, September 1977, 248). In addition to his nominal ownership of the nation's largest television network and a leading Manila newspaper, Benedicto became the palace's plenipotentiary for the sugar region, Negros and Panay islands, where he appointed mayors and parliamentarians—who were in turn allied with resurgent warlords invested with command of anti-communist militia. During the first decade of martial law, Marcos's cronies thus

integrated national economic assets with regional political power, eliminating most legal opposition to his regime in the provinces.

Shaken by major political and economic crises between 1981 and 1984, the Marcos coalition quickly lost its dominion over the provinces as once powerful cronies began losing the fortunes they needed to finance electoral mobilization. In May 1984, opposition candidates captured one-third of the seats in Marcos's new parliament. After all his candidates lost in the Western Visayas, Benedicto was ousted from the ruling circle. Instead of the broad coalition of the dictatorship's early years, Marcos now depended upon the First Family, particularly First Lady Imelda; a reduced coterie of cronies, most importantly Eduardo Cojuangco Jr.; and his Armed Forces chief of staff, General Fabian Ver.

The 1984 elections thus marked a turning point in Marcos's relations with the provinces. Marcos's popular support had largely eroded, leaving a mass base comprising his native Ilocos region, the indigenous cult Iglesia ni Cristo, a demoralized Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party machine, and rearmed regional warlords—including Armando Gustilo (Negros Occidental), Ramon Durano (Cebu), and Ali Dimaporo (Lanao) (McCoy 1987, 9–33).

Shaken by major political and economic crises of the early 1980s, a Marcos regime once proud of its "constitutional authoritarianism" staged a spectacle of extralegal violence. In the last years of martial law, Marcos unleashed his internal security forces to subdue the population with terror, producing about 77 percent or 2,520 of the 3,257 extrajudicial killings under martial law. These "salvagings" dumped the victim's remains, scarred by stigmata of torture, in public places so passers-by could read a transcript of terror in the wounds. In the capital, with only four thousand police for six million residents, the metro government deputized hundreds of "secret marshals" to shoot petty criminals on sight, producing over thirty fatalities during the program's first month, May 1985. In the countryside, the Constabulary tried to check communist insurgency by arming 110,000 local militia as of 1982, flooding Mindanao with Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) that soon degenerated into what their chief later called "private armies . . . for the personal aggrandizement of the local warlord" (quoted in McCoy 2009, 405n38; for a detailed discussion see McCoy 2009, 397–416).

To control the five provinces of the Western Visayas region, for example, crony Benedicto had, during his ascendancy, worked through intermediaries like the north Negros warlord Armando Gustilo. As a

reward for his dominion over the seven towns along the island's north coast, Gustilo was allowed to revive his private army as an official CHDF unit. When Benedicto fell from favor after his humiliation in the May 1984 elections, Marcos became increasingly dependent upon Gustilo to control Negros Occidental and was forced, over a two-year period, to grant him a de facto immunity from outside interference. As shown at Escalante in September 1985 when they massacred twenty-eight demonstrators without provocation, Gustilo's three hundred militia, many of them CHDF, used their formidable arsenal to terrorize the civilian population without Constabulary interference. As the February 1986 elections approached, Gustilo dictated the terms of his support to the president—specifically, exoneration for the Escalante massacre; new automatic weapons for his militia; and, in the final preelection session of the parliament, a legislation making his north Negros fiefdom a separate province. Moreover, Gustilo challenged Benedicto's control over the sugar industry, using his new influence to capture key regulatory agencies. Thus, Marcos had come full circle, beginning as a centralizer and ending dependent upon resurgent provincial warlords the equal of those he had destroyed at the outset of martial law.

Yet such performative violence was capricious and highly contextualized, proving effective at the start of martial law when people had yearned for order and ineffective at its close when Filipinos wanted to recover their freedom. By the time the critical presidential elections arrived in February 1986, Marcos lacked sufficient provincial support to win by a convincing majority. Moreover, the Cold War was waning and Washington's interests were quietly shifting to support emerging democracies worldwide, creating an opening for antiauthoritarian movements around the globe. Reversing the dynamic that had driven his political ascent, a combination of Marcos's attenuated local controls and Washington's fading support would prove a fatal combination for the regime, which famously collapsed in February 1986.

Davao City and Duterte

Like his predecessors Quezon and Marcos, Rodrigo Duterte gained his extraordinary power through the juxtaposition of international patronage and local power. Yet unlike any of his predecessors, Duterte pursued his entire political career in local government—in his case,

Davao City, which was a site of exceptional violence that left a lasting imprint on his political persona.

Davao's descent into extreme violence began in the early 1980s when the communist New People's Army (NPA) made it the site of a new urban guerrilla warfare strategy. Starting in the late 1970s, the NPA experienced a sustained expansion that, by 1985, had built a national army of fifteen thousand regulars with a mass base of one million and armed presence in sixty-three out of seventy-three provinces. In 1977, there were only seventy NPA encounters with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); but in 1984, there were some 3,500, with 75 percent of those initiated by the guerrillas who were, in the view of the US Defense Department, just three or four years away from winning a "strategic stalemate" from government forces (US House of Representatives 1985, 557–77, 593–637). Moving beyond its fifty-eight rural "fronts," or local operation commands, the NPA established a laboratory for urban guerrilla warfare in Davao City on southern Mindanao Island. As NPA "sparrow units," or liquidation squads, moved into this city of one million, Davao's murder rate doubled to eight hundred in 1984, including 150 police. The rebel presence in the city was so strong that they considered it "a liberated zone" and their control over its sprawling Agdao district so complete it was known as "Nicaragdao" (*Asiaweek*, September 13, 1985, 6–18; Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1988, 23–25).

While the NPA was spreading into the suburbs of Davao City in 1983–1984, military intelligence units seeded deep penetration agents (DPAs), or "zombies," inside anticipated recruitment zones. Since NPA strength in Davao grew rapidly from an estimated 1,000 in 1983 to 2,680 in 1984 (*Asiaweek*, September 13, 1985, 6), the screening of recruits became perfunctory and the local NPA began to suspect that military agents were penetrating their ranks. Whether the infiltration constituted a real threat or was inflated by military disinformation, the NPA overreacted and slaughtered hundreds of its own members. Indeed, one informed Western military observer stated that, according to his contacts in the AFP, there had been few if any DPAs in Mindanao—just clever disinformation to prompt internal liquidations.[13] By the time the Communist Party could restrain the cycle of accusations, trials, and executions that had spun out of control, the Davao front had collapsed. Many genuine cadre sought refuge from the slaughter

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13. Interview with a Western military attaché, Manila, January 9, 1988.
14. Interview with Luis Jalandoni (foreign representative of the National Democratic Front), telephone interview from Sydney to Utrecht, May 30, 1987.

with local military units.[14] "By April 1986," reported one group of foreign observers, "Davao was a counter-revolution waiting to happen" (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1988, 25).

Once the Marcos regime fell in February of that year, the AFP, encouraged by both US advisors and Filipino elites, announced a rhetorical reemphasis on counterinsurgency. Denied support from general headquarters in the capital, local military commanders, largely in the Visayas and Mindanao, devised their own ad hoc tactics that drew upon AFP counterguerrilla doctrines dating back to the anti-Huk campaign of the 1950s.

Starting in July 1986, the Davao Metropolitan District Command chief, PC Colonel Francisco Calida, recruited NPA returnees and local criminals to transform a small group called Alsa Masa into mass vigilante organization. With financial support from the city's business community led by presidential adviser Jesus "Chito" Ayala and firearms from the military, these vigilantes, who soon numbered in the thousands, coerced countless residents in outlying slums to affiliate, and conducted numerous extrajudicial killings of suspected communists. Lending a lurid quality to this violence, their spokesman Juan "Jun" Pala Jr. broadcast anti-communist rants almost daily on local radio, saying, "Just one order to our anti-Communist forces, your head will be cut off. Damn you, your brains will be scattered in the streets" (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1988, 23–38). When I visited Davao in 1987 to interview Jun Pala and investigate his death squad, this remote southern city had an air of utter hopelessness.

It was in this fraught conjuncture of national regime change and localized violence that Rodrigo Duterte, the son of a local elite family, launched his political career, first as appointive vice mayor of Davao City in 1986 and then in 1988 as the elected mayor, the first of seven terms that would keep him in office, on and off, for another twenty-one years until 2016. His first campaign in 1988 was hotly contested and Duterte won with only 25.7 percent of vote, barely beating his rivals, including the president's anointed favorite Zafiro Respicio with 24 percent and the vigilante radio host Jun Pala who captured 18.3 percent. The city that Duterte inherited was then in remarkably poor shape—a million poor squeezed into squatter slums, capital flight, rampant kidnapping, and endemic violence between the NPA sparrow units and the Alsa Masa death squad. With rival assassins roaming the streets doing one-bullet kills in broad daylight, the city had an aura of

utter desolation (Gutierrez, Torrente, and Narca 1992, 146; Mydans 1987; Curato 2017b, 9–10).

As the nation's economy slowly recovered from the drag of Marcos's mismanagement, Mayor Duterte proved an apt local booster whose tax breaks and pro-business policy produced growth for Davao City that reached 9.4 percent in 2014, the highest for any Philippine region. Violence also played a central role in his campaign to restore order to this sprawling city whose population was growing toward two million. After he announced a crackdown on petty crime in the mid-1990s, there were 1,424 documented killings in the city from 1998 to 2015, most attributed to the Davao Death Squad (DDS), which reportedly operated under his patronage. Taking a leaf from Jun Pala's playbook, Mayor Duterte used his weekly television show to read off the names of reputed malefactors, some of whom became victims of the DDS ("When a Populist Demagogue Takes Power," Chen November 21, 2016; Quimpo 2017, 152–56; Reyes 2016, 114–15, 124). According to the Philippine Senate testimony by a former death squad member, the group numbered five hundred and, apart from liquidating drug dealers, also eliminated the mayor's political rivals, notably the broadcaster Jun Pala who had parlayed his notoriety into a city council seat. For years leading up his assassination in 2003, Pala began his daily radio broadcast by saying, "This is Jun Porras Pala, who remains the voice of democracy in [Mayor Rodrigo] Duterte's reign of terror. *Maayong buntag* [good morning]" (Villamor 2017c;de Jesus 2016; Labiste 2005; Pulumbarit 2016).

Campaigning for president in 2016 on a law-and-order theme, Duterte sparked a surge of populist support that, as Walden Bello put it, was "bubbling up from below" and won by a wide margin of six million votes. "If by chance that God will place me there," he promised at the start of his presidential campaign, "watch out because the 1,000 [people allegedly executed while Duterte was mayor of Davao City] will become 100,000. You will see the fish in Manila Bay getting fat. That is where I will dump you." But there was also historical resonance to this violent rhetoric that lent political depth to his campaign. By praising Marcos, promising to bury his body in the Heroes' Cemetery, and supporting the candidacy of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. as vice president, Duterte identified himself with a lineage of populist strongmen epitomized by the old dictator. Accordingly, on his first day in office, Duterte's handpicked police director, Roland dela Rosa, ordered his force to unleash an aggressive attack on drug trafficking. In the hundred

days that followed, the Philippine National Police and allied vigilantes killed over 1,400 alleged drug users, frequently leaving the bodies on city streets (Chen 2016; Curato 2017b, 6–8; Gonzales 2016; Coronel 2017, 170–73).

During his first six months, before the police murder of a South Korean prompted a brief suspension, the tally for Duterte's drug war reached seven thousand bodies dumped on the streets—sometimes with a crude cardboard sign reading "*Pusher ako*" (I am a pusher). Frequently, the victims' faces were wrapped bizarrely in the brown packaging tape that had been the signature of the DDS, much as Marcos's salvaging victims showed the stigmata of torture. After ordering a resumption of the antidrug campaign in March 2017, Duterte brushed aside complaints about human rights abuse, telling police that if they killed their accusers, "I will pardon you" (Berehulak 2016; Villamor 2017d, 2017a; Human Rights Watch 2017, 3, 4, 15, 17, 55, 61, 90; Mogato 2016; Chen 2016; Reyes 2016, 121). To justify these extreme measures, Duterte issued inflated claims that the country was becoming a "narco-state" with 3.7 million drug addicts. Although official figures showed only 1.8 million users for a modest drug abuse rate of 1.69 percent (compared to a global average of 5.2 percent), Filipino voters still identified illegal drugs, along with poor wages, as their top concerns (Curato 2017b, 21; Quimpo 2017, 148–51).

Human Rights Watch declared this drug war a "calamity," but even after six months and thousands of killings, a resounding 85 percent of Filipinos surveyed were still "satisfied" with the policy. Urban sociologist Nicole Curato finds an explanation for this contradiction in the elusive duality of Duterte's rhetoric. By demonizing the drug menace, both users and pushers, he employed what Curato called a "populist logic of painting a 'dangerous other'" who are "considered enemies that should be eradicated." Indeed, in a speech just five days before his inauguration, Duterte said, "The problem is once you're addicted to shabu, rehabilitation is no longer a viable option. If I couldn't convince you to stop, I'll have you killed." Simultaneously, however, he offered people hope for "the future as something that is within realm of their control" by quickly fostering a semblance of social order (Curato 2016, 100-107; Macaserto 2016). "An ordinary worker . . . goes home every night and for the first time when he passes through the narrow streets of his . . . shanty," Curato explains, "he does not see any more drunkards or people smoking on

the streets or children just left there, abandoned. He sees clean streets, peaceful at night" (Villamor 2017e; Chen 2016; Reyes 2016). For citizens troubled by petty criminals and addicts, Duterte's tough talk, Curato argues, offers a "promise of justice" and "stability in an otherwise fragile context" (Curato 2016, 101–2). If we move beyond the rational realm of policy to the emotions of performative politics, each bullet-ridden body left sprawled on a city street seemed a fulfillment of the president's promises of order and progress.

Just as he has used the spectacle of violence to consolidate his domestic base, so Duterte has proven equally skilled in playing upon great power rivalries to strengthen his international position. In the midst of rising tensions over the South China Sea between Beijing and Washington, Duterte improved his country's bargaining position by moving away from the close strategic alliance with America toward a more neutral position.

At the ASEAN conference in Laos in September 2016, Duterte reacted profanely to President Obama's oblique criticism of the thousands of extrajudicial killings under his ongoing drug war, saying, "Who does he think he is? I am no American puppet. I am the president of a sovereign country and I am not answerable to anyone except the Filipino people. *'Putang ina mo'* [Your mother's a whore], I will swear at you." That outburst led Obama to cancel their bilateral meeting, opening a breach between the leaders that resisted repair (McKenzie and Liptak 2016).

In challenging Obama, Duterte was playing upon an underlying Filipino ambiguity toward America. Filipinos have an abiding affection for the United States, with 92 percent expressing approval in the 2015 Pew poll—by far the highest of any country in the world, including America itself (Pew Research Center 2016). But Filipino admiration coexists with layers of antagonism, even resentment, arising from this century-long alliance. The relentless US colonial pacification during the Philippine-American War (1899–1902) killed two hundred thousand in a population of just seven million, leaving a "postmemory"— that is, a "trans-generational transmission of traumatic knowledge"— marked by strong nationalism inflected with resentments ready to surface at any slight (Wolf 1961, 360; Hirsch 2008, 103–28). As America's bastion in the Western Pacific on the eve of World War II, the Philippines became a twice-fought battleground, suffering the utter devastation of its capital Manila and a million deaths in a population of just sixteen million (Rottman 2002, 318; Steinberg 1967, 113–

14). During the forty years of the Cold War, the presence of the massive US bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field produced recurring incidents with poor Filipinos, shootings and sexual assaults, that highlighted the country's compromised sovereignty, leading the Philippine Senate to reject a renewal of the bases agreement in 1991 (Bengzon and Rodrigo 1997, 19–21).

A month after this diplomatic contretemps in Laos, as US and Philippine marines landed on a rain-swept Luzon beach in one of the twenty-eight joint military maneuvers held every year, Duterte stated: "This year would be the last. For as long as I am there, do not treat us like a doormat because you'll be sorry for it. I will not speak with you. I can always go to China." Within days, Philippine defense secretary Delfin Lorenzana announced that joint naval exercises in the South China Sea were henceforth suspended. Ever optimistic, the US State Department noted that there still was no formal abrogation of mutual defense agreements and, critically, no suspension of American access to five Philippine bases proximate to the South China Sea (Associated Press 2016).

In October 2016, Duterte used his state visit to Beijing for a rapprochement with China. "Your honors, in this venue, I announce my separation from the United States . . . both in military, but economics also," he announced to a burst of applause from an audience of officials in Beijing's Great Hall of the People, the symbolic seat of China's ruling Communist Party. Evoking the populist tropes of inclusion and exclusion at the Philippine-Chinese trade forum that same day, October 20, Duterte opened his speech by asking, "What is really wrong with an American character?" Americans are, he continued, "loud, sometimes rowdy, and they have this volume of their voice . . . not adjusted to civility . . . . They are the more forward commanding voice befitting obedience." Evoking some deep Filipino racialist tropes, Duterte then mocked the flat, nasal American accent and rued the time he was questioned at Los Angeles Airport by a "Black" officer with "black" uniform, "black shoes," and "black" gun. Moving from rhetoric to substance, Duterte quietly capitulated to Beijing's relentless pressure for bilateral talks to settle the South China Sea dispute, virtually abrogating Manila's recent slam-dunk win on that issue before an international court (Demick and Wilkinson 2016; DU30 News 2016).

China reciprocated. Between Beijing's usual rituals of smiling girls with flowers and marching soldiers with bayonets, President Xi Jinping

proclaimed: "China and the Philippines are neighbors across the sea and the two peoples are blood brothers." Sealing that bond with cash, Beijing signed deals giving Manila USD 22.5 billion in trade and low-interest loans (Demick and Wilkinson October 20, 2016).

After US elections in November 2016, Duterte tilted back a bit toward Washington, quickly congratulating president-elect Donald Trump on his victory. Struggling to contain North Korea's nuclear threat, President Trump reciprocated, telephoning Duterte in April 2017 to praise his "unbelievable job on the drug problem" and dismiss Obama's concerns about the thousands killed. As talk turned to Kim Jong-un's missile tests, however, the transcript reveals Trump flexing his nuclear muscles in a vain effort to shake Duterte's reliance on China (Paddock 2016; Department of Foreign Affairs 2017; *The Intercept* 2017). Despite Trump's aggressive courtship, Duterte still downscaled joint military maneuvers sharply that May, cutting the forces mobilized by half (*VOA News* 2017). His fulsome love-song serenade of Trump during a November 2017 state visit to Manila notwithstanding, Duterte did not change his apparent decision that China's economic power, not America's military might, was the key to his country's security (Timm 2017).

By his unprecedented affront to one US president and his sedulous courtship of another, Duterte gained freedom of maneuver to maximize concessions from rival superpowers. Without strong popular support from his populist rhetoric and the intimidating spectacle of this extraordinary violence, his de facto abrogation of the country's maritime claims and defiance of a close ally would have risked a political backlash, a military coup, or both. For the time being, however, his deft juxtaposition of international maneuvering and local bloodletting has made him a latter-day Philippine strongman, with no apparent check on his power (Bello 2017, 81–87).

CONCLUSION

As these historical cases indicate, application of the term populism to the Philippines seems flat, lacking in analytic resonance, without adaptation to local context. By balancing great power patronage with performative violence, executed in ways that seemed to promise order and progress, both Marcos and Duterte gained, for a time, strong control over their disparate polity.

Yet for Marcos and his successors, this recurring balance would prove a delicate one. As his power weakened in the last years of martial rule, Marcos's attempt at control by violence stripped of any promise for a better future backfired, coinciding with a shift in Washington's priorities that accelerated his decline. In like manner, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo tried to placate Washington by becoming a resolute ally in the Global War on Terror while using paramilitary death squads to cripple left-wing activism by over a thousand extrajudicial killings. But these deaths were simple assassinations, devoid of any populist promise that would appeal to the masses, bringing both UN condemnation and rising domestic opposition that crippled her authority.

While Duterte's antidrug campaign and its killings continued beyond its first six months, the *New York Times* reported that "fear and distrust . . . gripped many neighborhoods of Manila" as residents grew "wary of talking to each other, unsure who among them are the police informers." With local officials compiling "watch lists of drug users" from anonymous informants including police and surrendered suspects, 73 percent of those surveyed in March 2017 were "worried" that they or someone they knew would be killed. For the first time, there was slippage in popular support for the drug war as its net approval declined to 66 percent. Simultaneously, a network of Catholic Church safehouses sprang up for those fleeing this crude surveillance. "With just a name and a photo, they'll kill you," Rosario Perez, the mother of two sons who had gone into hiding, told the *New York Times* (Almendral 2017; SWS 2017).

Shifting to the international level, Duterte's emergence as the latest in the lineage of Filipino strongmen reveals two long-term global trends—one political and the other geopolitical. When examined in a geopolitical context, the rise of Duterte and, by inference, that of his populist counterparts around the globe is a manifestation of an epochal change: the unraveling of the world order that the United States has maintained for the past seventy years.

In the decades following World War II, the United States exercised its global hegemony through a network of presidents and prime ministers that served as Washington's loyal "subordinate elites." As the Third World decolonized during these same years, political power moved upward from countless colonial districts, where local elites, like tribal chiefs or maharajas, had long served as instruments of imperial rule, to the executive mansions of a hundred emerging nations. During the Cold War, obeisance was the order of the day, and

those leaders who harbored nationalist or anti-American sentiments often became the target of CIA-sponsored coups, electoral manipulation, or, when required, assassination plots (Reilly 2009, 344–59).

But now as bipolar power becomes multipolar and developing nations develop, America's hegemony has proved, like Britain's before it, to be a "self-liquidating concern," allowing once subordinate elites like Duterte to become unimaginably insubordinate and weakening one of Washington's key means of control on the Pacific littoral and beyond (Brendon 2010, xviii–xx, 660–62). Thus, Duterte, unlike Marcos, could defy US human rights policy with impunity to litter city streets with corpses that offer mute testimony to his power and promise of order.

More immediately, this study of Filipino strongmen past and present reveals two overlooked aspects of this ill-defined phenomenon of global populism: the role of performative violence in projecting domestic strength and a complementary need for diplomatic success to demonstrate international influence. By seeing how skillfully they balance these critical poles of power, we can speculate about the political fate of populist strongmen in disparate corners of the globe.

In Russia's case, Putin's projection of strength by the murder of his domestic opponents is matched by unchecked aggression in Georgia and Ukraine—a successful balancing act likely to extend his hold on power for the foreseeable future (*The Economist* 2016). In Turkey, Erdogan's wholesale repression of ethnic and political enemies has complicated his bid for entry into the European Union and his alliance with the United States against Islamic fundamentalism—diplomatic barriers that could ultimately slow down his bid for unchecked domestic power (Aydintasbas 2016; Kingsley 2017). In Indonesia, ex-general Prabowo Subianto failed in the critical first step of building a domestic base because his call for order resonated discordantly with a public who could recall his earlier bid for power through an eerie violence that had once roiled Jakarta with hundreds of rapes, fires, and deaths (Bachelard 2014; Croft-Cusworth 2014). In Thailand, Prime Minister Thaksin's play for exceptional authority through violence and populist development collided with two rival power centers, the monarchy and the military, prompting a coup in 2006 that ended his term after just five years and sent him into an endless exile (Walker 2006). In America, President Trump's populist fusion of military violence against Islamic enemies abroad and rhetorical virulence

against a racial other at home runs the risk of military reverse and mass opposition that could limit his bid for exceptional executive powers.

In the Philippines, President Duterte's great power diplomacy has the potential to weaken his domestic authority. Although a simple clash of executive egos sparked the diplomatic rupture between Duterte and Obama, the geopolitical consequences are potentially profound. Along the four thousand miles of the Pacific littoral, the Philippines alone sits astride the South China Sea, providing the optimal strategic position to check China's claim to those international waters. President Duterte lacks the authority, and probably even the ambition, to completely abrogate the strong ties to America built so painstakingly and painfully over the past century.

Just six months after his dramatic tilt toward Beijing, Duterte made a sharp correction in an apparent bid to placate a restive military not shy about intervening in the political arena. In March 2017, his defense minister Delfin Lorenzana, a career officer who had played a key role in developing the current military alliance with America, sounded the alarm about Chinese naval explorations on Benham Rise, a resource-rich area inside Philippine waters (Department of National Defense, n.d.; Magosing 2017). When Duterte insisted he had granted Beijing permission, both his defense and foreign secretaries objected openly, prompting one legislator to file an impeachment petition (Viray 2017; Cepeda 2017; Heydarian 2017). Seeking to still the damaging controversy, Duterte soon surprised critics by ordering his military to strengthen their forces on islands in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines. "Duterte has faced massive backlash over his appeasement-sounding remarks over Benham Rise and Scarborough Shoal," explained one Filipino analyst (Villamor 2017b). Further weakening the Philippine position and augmenting the aura of crisis from Manila's perspective, the Trump administration reduced and then, for months at a time, curtailed all US naval patrols within twelve miles of Chinese-occupied islands in the South China Sea, including the politically sensitive Scarborough Shoal (Cooper 2017).

But should Manila's balancing act fail to rebuild working relations with Washington in ways that will defend its maritime zone, then a six-year hiatus in the alliance would allow China to consolidate its military position in the region's waters and make its de facto claim to the Philippines' exclusive zone in the South China Sea an undeniable reality. If public opinion tires of his spectacle of violence and its pervasive sense of threat, as it once did of Marcos, then Duterte's de

facto abrogation of his country's claims to the South China Sea's rich fishing grounds and oil reserves could risk a popular backlash, a military coup, or both (Heydarian 2017).

By studying the Philippines as a manifestation of this worldwide trend toward populist leadership, we gain a sharper sense of the recurring juxtaposition of skilled diplomacy and local controls required for the emergence of a Filipino strongman. And by tracing the potent symbolism of mangled bodies—outrage over Moises Padilla's corpse, satisfaction at Lim Seng's execution, anger at Marcos's salvagings, and approval of Duterte's many dead—we can grasp something of the shifting significance of raw physical violence within the complex, ever-changing currents of Philippine politics.✿

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The Orient Express and Late Development

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ABSTRACT. The demise of the Soviet Union, which was celebrated in the Anglosphere as the triumph of US supremacy, gave rise to different paradigmatic interpretations of the evolution of the world. The bulk of the evolving mainstream discourse was agenda-driven and projected a continuation of the US hegemony of the global capitalist system. Two theses stood out in the context of the post-Cold War. The first was the optimistic assumption encapsulated in the notion of "the end of history," which projected a world having arrived at the last station based on the victory of liberal democracy and continued US hegemony. The second was the counter-assumption of the thesis of *The Clash of Civilizations*, which rejected the harmony interpretation of international relations and considered the future contradictions and conflicts to be related to cultural, not to say civilizational, antagonisms. The evolution of the world order in the past few decades demands a theoretical shift explaining the transformation, which takes into consideration the geostrategic and geopolitical ascendency of Eurasia and the Eastern Asia-Pacific hemisphere as well as the relative decline of the hegemony of the Anglosphere. Understanding the process at work makes it imperative to include the historical perspective. In this context, the growth of China and India as powerhouses in the world political economy cannot be exclusively defined as exemplars of catching up or late development but by the notion of "return of history." After a long period of self-centered development, they are gradually reinserting themselves in the world system and reemerging into their former dominant status prior to the eighteenth century and the Western imperialist intrusion in the East. The aim of this paper is to explore and explain the economic and political consequences this ongoing transformation will have for the future of geopolitical and geo-economic domination of the West.

KEYWORDS. late development · capitalism · Eurocentrism · hegemony

INTRODUCTION

Turmoil and geopolitical/geoeconomic transformations are taking place at such a speed that it is difficult for analysts to interpret the scope of the changes involved. This is especially the case even though global neoliberalism and rentier capitalism have been adopted, to a larger or lesser extent, by all countries in the world, as the universal geo-economic strategy.

Under these circumstances, the tasks facing scholars of the various social and cultural disciplines cannot be overestimated. This is especially the case since transformations have taken place that weakened alternative socialist ideology and praxis. Playing a significant role in this evolution was the demise of the Soviet Union and the transition to "socialism with Chinese characteristics" following the death of Mao Tse-tung. Former ways of interpreting capitalism, imperialism, and socialist construction have not yet recovered from the victory of neoliberalism. Consequently, the way the existing world order is framed determines comprehension of the ongoing contemporary processes, which are bound to affect the shape of the future global landscape.

Methodologically, such an assessment cannot be a neutral endeavor carried out by objective research since the researchers themselves are products of specific intellectual environments and sociopolitical norms. The attempt by the German sociologist Max Weber to establish *Wertfreiheit* (value-free) social science was duly deconstructed in the 1960s by the Swedish development economist Gunnar Myrdal as well as others. They argued that neutrality in social sciences is impossible to obtain, and that this ought to be acknowledged by researchers.

It is of importance, in this context, to realize that economic history, like other social sciences, is dominated by competing ideology-driven agendas reflecting power relations affecting our consciousness. The dilemma is related to the fact that history evolves as an objective process that is interpreted ideologically and normatively. George Orwell formulated awareness of the forces at work in conceptualizing reality and world development in the novel *1984* when he wrote, "Who controls the past . . . controls the future: who controls the present controls the past" (chapter 3).

Seen from this angle, the authors of this paper do not pretend to present a foolproof neutral interpretation of the evolution of capitalism. The ongoing historical process pointing to a decline of Western dominance of the capitalist world system and the rise of Asia demands a reconstructed interpretation of the accepted wisdom concerning historical capitalism as the product of the "European miracle." The alternative narrative to the hegemonic discourse concerning the trajectory of Western capitalism is still in its infancy but has been regaining heuristic validity based on the evolution of the Asian challenge.

THE HISTORICAL RISE OF CAPITALISM

In our view, the analysis of the historical rise of capitalism has to take its point of departure in the dialectical relationship between the "West" and the "Rest," which took shape from the very beginning. Even though this methodological assumption has not resonated well in the European cultural sphere, it ought to be considered pivotal to the endeavor of establishing an epistemology of the global political economy.

In this context, it is worth remembering that no less a figure than the legendary Adam Smith acknowledged, in his volume *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), that Europe had been a latecomer in social development compared to the "Middle Kingdom" and that both entities were moving along the same trajectory.

Influenced by this understanding, Smith realized that contact to the non-European world had implicitly been the determining element for the emergence of the capitalist world system: "The discovery of America, and that of the passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, are the greatest events recorded in the history of mankind" (quoted in Frank 1998, 13). It is interesting to note that simultaneously he expressed skepticism with regard to the rewards this contact would bring to the non-European peoples. Modern economic history has not invalidated this insight.

> To the natives, however, both of the East and the West Indies, all the commercial benefits, which [could] have resulted from these events have been sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned . . . What benefits, or what misfortunes may hereafter result from these great events, no human wisdom can foresee. (quoted in Frank 1998, 13)

On the other side of the ideological divide and almost two hundred years later, Marx and Engels in their pamphlet *The Communist Manifesto* would be a bit more specific concerning their estimation of the importance of this externality in the development of capitalism in Europe:

> The discovery of America, and that of the passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope, opened up fresh ground for the rising bourgeoisie. The East-Indian and Chinese markets, the colonization of America, trade with the colonies, the increase in the means of exchange and in commodities generally,

gave to commerce, to navigation, to industry, an impulse never before known, and thereby to the revolutionary element in the tottering feudal society, a rapid development . . . (Marx and Engels 1958, 35)

Regarding the consequences of the expansion of European capitalism to the other parts of the world, the "fathers of communism" showed a more sanguine attitude than Adam Smith who had expressed serious doubt:

The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization. The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. (Marx and Engels 1958, 38)

Whether these apparent expressions of support for European capitalism's expansion and formation of a capitalist world system should be seen as completely representative of Marx's later conceptualization of non-European formations' evolution is a question that needs to be posed and discussed. However, as a revolutionary anti-capitalist, Marx had conceptualized the task as not only to describe reality but to transform it.

This perspective opened the way for changes in his understanding of the expansion of capitalism and the fate of the non-European societies in the transition to post-capitalism. In the first position, as exemplified by the manifesto, we are presented with a positive win-win narrative concerning their incorporation in the world system. Later, having concluded that colonialism not only did not contribute to the development of the productive forces of the colonies but actually prevented their development, Marx had reached the conclusion that they had to liberate themselves from this dependency. As d'Encausse and Schram (1965) pointed out, this pioneered the "dependency" theoretical construct, which projected reliance on own forces and independence. That is the strategy of "de-linking" as formulated and

promoted by the *dependentistas*, including Andre Gunder Frank, against the advice of modernization theory, which considered a closer relationship to the capitalist core nations as the remedy to underdevelopment (Rostow 1961). The point to keep in mind, in the Marxian context, is that Marx himself had underwent an evolution from originally accepting or even praising the extension of European capitalism on a world scale to a position of opening a path for emancipation of the peripheral societies. Kevin B. Anderson who studied the bulk of Marx's works and publications on his approach to European colonialism and the struggle for independence arrives at the following interpretation:

> Over the years, I will argue, his [Marx's] perspectives on these societies evolved. In the 1840s, he held to an implicitly unilinear perspective, sometimes tinged with ethnocentrism, according to which non-Western societies would necessarily be absorbed into capitalism and then modernized via colonialism and the world market. But over time, his perspective evolved toward one that was more multilinear, leaving the future development of these societies as an open question. (Anderson 2010, 2)

EUROPEAN ETHNOCENTRISM AND EUROPE AS LATECOMER

The reason for bringing in the legacy of European ethnocentrism in the discussion of societal development in the context of the international system of capitalism is to challenge the dominating discourse and inherent ideological conceptualizing of the "European miracle." This perspective, which implicitly and explicitly ascribes cultural superiority to Europe, degenerated into an approach whose critiques defined as "Eurocentrism" and "Orientalism." In other words, concepts that were developed in the description and probing of the European colonialist mentality and praxis, encapsulate an assumption of European "exceptionalism" in the interpretation of the history of non-European societies through a European or Western prism (Wikipedia, n.d.; Sered 2014).

Unfortunately, for the evolution of politics, European socialists or Marxists were not immune to this approach. While Max Weber focused on a Europeans' superior rationality and non-Westerners' lack of it as an explicatory element, Marx emphasized the difference in the

state of development of the existing precapitalist societal structures. In the beginning of his analysis of the origins of capitalism in Europe, Marx reached the conclusion that decentralized European feudalism had been best suited to effectuate the transition than the state-centralized societal formations and their non-conduciveness to capitalist property relations whom he thought could be found in the "Asiatic Mode of Production" (d'Encausse and Schram 1965).

The variant Eurocentric ideological approaches were insidiously infected by cultural arrogance, which has survived till today and is used to rationalize and give the West's relations to the Rest a twist of philanthropy.

According to critics of Western colonial oppression and exploitation, both Europeans and non-Europeans were subjected to an ideological framework that assigned the role of shaker and maker of modernity to Westerners while the peoples outside Europe were consigned to passivity and recipients of modernity. In this worldview, the reason the "Rest" suffered from stagnation was due to the survival of traditionalism. Under these circumstances, the "*mission civilisatrice*" became "the "white man's burden." This framework evolved into what J. M. Blaut names "diffusionism" or, more precisely, "Eurocentric diffusionism" whose main tenet

> is the theory of "the autonomous rise of Europe," and sometimes (rather more grandly) the idea of "the European Miracle." It is the idea that Europe was more advanced and more progressive than all other regions prior to 1492, prior, that is, to the beginning of the period of colonialism, the period in which Europe and non-Europe came into intense interaction. (Blaut 1993, s. 1–2)

It would not be an exaggeration to affirm that the contemporary dominating mind-set in the West is influenced by a similar arrogance that expresses itself in the ideological construction that considers the spread of Western modernity as a positive good. This interpretation consequently allows for the present instrumentalization of Western values and ideals in the implementation of benevolent dominance over the non-Western world; regime change, export of democracy, liberal interventionism, etc. are all part and parcel of the strategy of establishing a unipolar world order under the leadership of the United States. The ideology of human rights served some of Washington's deepest ideological needs, as Harold Lasswell showed in the 1927 study

Propaganda Techniques in the World War that "more can be won by illusion than coercion" (222, quoted in Peck 2010, 3).

In this context, it is not uninteresting to point out that while Eurocentric diffusionism has become a component part of the Western narrative that is constructed around the assumption of moral superiority, the political scientist Samuel Huntington had reached a more realistic understanding of this problematique in his volume *The Clash of Civilizations*:

> The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion (to which few members of other civilizations were converted) but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do. (1998, 51)

Even though the European transition to capitalism was, largely, made possible by the relations that were established with the outer world especially after 1492, it is of importance to point out the complexity of the international political economy that followed. The "discovery of America" became the beginning of the gradual process of European expansion, especially in the Americas and Africa. Not to forget, this expansion was not born out of economic mechanisms alone.

From the latter part of the sixteenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, a transatlantic triangular trading pattern was established. This pattern, which was based on slave trade as the pivotal element, tied the three geographical regions organically together. With time, African slave labor in North and South America, plantation agriculture, and mining as well as shipbuilding and transport contributed to the merchant capital formation and accumulation and the weakening of European feudalism. At the same time, the surplus derived from the transatlantic trading relations enabled Europe to engage in economic intercourse with the Asian sphere. As the development economist Paul Baran put it, the paradox was that Western Europe had been poorer in terms of natural resources and less developed economically compared to China or India prior to the industrial revolution in Britain.

> Hence the drive to procure tropical produce of all kinds (spices, tea, ivory, indigo, etc.) that could not be obtained nearby, hence also the effort to import valuable products of Oriental skills (high quality cloth, ornaments, pottery, and the

like), and hence finally the wild scramble to bring back precious metals and stones that were in short supply at home. The resulting far-flung trade, combined with piracy, outright plunder, slave traffic, and discovery of gold, led to a rapid formation of vast fortunes in the hands of Western European merchants. (Baran 1962, 138–39)

The international division of labor which thus emerged on the basis of the contact between the transatlantic regions and deficit trading with Asia (China and India) eventually led to the globalization of European modernization. However, it is not to be forgotten and in contradiction to the Eurocentric interpretation of world history, Europe was a latecomer to the then more advanced "Asiacentric" centers of economic development. Seen in historical perspective, China's and India's growth story may not be defined as a catch-up but rather as a comeback. After long periods of self-centered development, they are gradually reinserting their economies to the former dominant status they had in the world before the eighteenth century, when they represented approximately half of the world's gross domestic product (GDP) (Maddison 2001).

The trading relations between Asia (mainly China and India) and Western Europe were determined by the fact that Europe at that time did not have the capacity to expand exports of European goods to cover the balance-of-payment deficit. This is where silver as a means of payment gave Europe an advantage. Nevertheless, as Frank points out,

> despite their access to American money to buy themselves into the world economy in Asia, for the three centuries after 1500 the Europeans still remained a small player who had to adapt to—and not make!—the world economic rules of the game in Asia. (1998, 185)

It was thus by transforming Western Europe's socioeconomic backwardness into a geo-economic advantage, permitting the transfer of economic surpluses generated in the Americas and Africa into a means of payment covering the commercial deficit with Asia, that Europe obtained momentum. As stated by Frank:

> In terms of world historical reality and development, it was really (only) American money that permitted the Europeans to increase their participation in this mostly Asian-based productive expansion of the world economy. (1998, 262–63)

Britain's socioeconomic and political conquest of India should not be underestimated as a basic element of the miscarriage of modernization in the Indian subcontinent as well as contributing to the demise of China's economy by extra-economic means (i.e., political and military). The transition of merchant capitalism—which depended on colonialism—to industrial capitalism (first in England and then in Western Europe) depended on sabotaging the competition of more advanced producers, especially of textile manufactures and other wares.

In this context, it is significant to recognize that until the mid-eighteenth century, it would appear according to various sources that India had been the world's biggest exporter of textile manufactures. Similarly China had since antiquity reached a high-quality production of manufactures (silk and porcelain wares), serving markets in different regions of the world (Europe and North Africa). The "silk road" that originated in the beginning of the Christian era remained a major trade route for more than two thousand years. This observation by Amiya Kumar Bagchi (2005, 136–37) weakens the assumption of Karl Polanyi that prior to the "great transformation" in Europe during the nineteenth century, there had been no market relations nor a division of labor over long distance anywhere in the world (Frank 1998, 18). As a matter of fact, from the beginning of British rule in India, "trade was used as the chief conveyor belt for the remittance of the tribute extracted from the Indian empire to Britain" (Bagchi 2000, 122).

Before the growth of machine-based manufactures in Britain, China and India were the two most important suppliers of manufactured goods to the world. For the upcoming industrial revolution in England, it was essential to neutralize the assets of competitors to Britain as well as to Europe to the extent possible. It could be argued that just as the Americas' native populations and African slave labor paid a high price for the accumulation of merchant capital and the weakening of feudalism in Europe, the sabotaging of the industrial potential of China and India was needed to make industrial capitalism possible in Britain. The strangulation of the industrializing process was the price that India and China paid for the rise of British industrialization (Hersh 2010, 31).

The process of deindustrialization of the two Asian economies followed the imposition of tariffs on Indian exports to England and forced the Chinese government to import opium to cover the British deficit in its balance of payment with China—in other words, the

implementation of a variant of economic nationalism through import substitution and export promotion in the best style of Friedrich List's latecomer strategy.

> The decimation of much of local Indian businesses . . . combined with the deindustrialization of major regions of British India, also set back indigenous efforts at building up factory industry. India was turned into the biggest consumer of products of the British cotton mills, which for a long time remained the industry employing the largest number of British workers. China after the first Opium War was also rapidly deindustrialized. (Bagchi 2000, 176)

The German economist accused Britain of hypocrisy for having followed a strategy of protectionism at a time when it was in the process of catching up; and once at the top of the international capitalist economy as the "workshop" of the world, the British government promoted liberalism and free trade (List 1977, chapter 4: "The English")—a path that was avoided by the United States (Alexander Hamilton), Germany (Friedrich List), and Japan (Meiji Reformation) in the takeoff phase of their economic development. In the Japanese case, they coined the phrase "free trade is the protectionism of the strong" (Sideri 1970, 69).

The reasons for the demise of the so-called Asiatic mode of production or the preferable term "tributary system" pioneered by Samir Amin (1985, 194–207) are various. Some were due to internal problems of surplus production, surplus division, and class contradictions. Some of the reasons were related to the Western intrusion in their evolution. Gunder Frank argues that the Kondratieff long wave of economic expansion had run its course and had given way to the "B" stagnation, a development the latecomer Europeans could take advantage of.

> The long "A" phase of expansion that came to an end in Asia in the late eighteenth century and its subsequent (cyclical?) decline offered the still marginal West its first real opportunity to improve its relative and absolute position within the world economy and system. Only then could the West go on to achieve a (temporary?) period of dominance. (Frank 1998, 263)

The period of Western dominance over most of the world did not however translate into the progressive development of the societies in Africa, South America, and Asia. Not only the internal political conditions of these colonial areas were in disarray because of the Western intervention in their evolution, but also the European powers had discovered the advantages to be obtained from overseas colonies. The competition that arose because of the search for extraterritorial control led to imperialism and wars of redivision.

Concerning the fate of the extra-European populations of the world, the "mission civilisatrice" and the "white man's burden" were ideological constructions with the aim of presenting a benevolent type of subjugation of the non-European outsiders. The fate of the colonial victims was a condition that was given serious consideration in the West by the various dependency positions in development studies. The dilemma of these people was clearly expressed by one of its pioneers, Paul Baran:

> Thus, the peoples who came into the orbit of Western capitalist expansion found themselves in the twilight of feudalism and capitalism enduring the worst features of both worlds, and the entire impact of imperialist subjugation to boot. (1962, 144)

THE RISE OF THE EAST

In this connection it is interesting to note that Japan, as the only country to industrialize and develop during the West's conquest of Asia, benefited from the comparative advantage of being poorly endowed with natural resources and therefore avoided being colonized. This allowed the country a breathing space to create a strong economy and military to defend its territory and later to grow into an imperialist power itself. Seen in light of the critique of Eurocentrism, Japan was proof indeed that, contrary to Max Weber's thesis on the importance of Protestantism for the development of capitalism, a non-Western society was reaching core status in the capitalist world system.

Related to the evolution of the imperialist world order that emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century was thus, in the East Asian context, the rise of Japan as a latecomer to economic development and simultaneously a player in inter-imperialist world (dis)order. The defeat of the Russian

imperialist power by non-European Japan in their war of 1904–1905 was seen as an encouragement to the cause of emancipation from European dominance throughout Asia. Regional Pan-Asianism and the idea of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" under Japan's leadership did appeal to some Asian leaders who were motivated ideologically by resistance to European colonialism. Even nationalists such as Sun Yat-sen in China, Subhas Chandra Bose in India, Sukarno in Indonesia, and others expressed support for this project.

Japan's victory over the Russian fleet in May 1905 inspired a whole generation of nationalist leaders from Atatürk in Turkey to Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru in South Africa and India, respectively. They saw this battle as the first time for centuries that a non-European country defeated a major Europen power. The spirit of revolt and anti-Western ethos was born and the hope of national self-determination and independence spurred the upcoming anti-colonial revolt. This is well captured by Pankaj Misrah:

> It mattered little to which class or race they belonged; the subordinate peoples of the world keenly absorbed the deeper implications—moral and psychological—of Japan's triumph. (2012, 3)

Likewise, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the Soviet attempt to implement a non-Western-dictated socialist construction resonated among politically aware anti-imperialist students in most Asian countries. Although the Soviet Union came to develop a strategy of building "socialism in one country," links were created in a worldwide movement nurturing and encouraging resistance in Asia against both Western and Japanese imperialism prior to World War II.

The attempt by Japan to balance its ambition of competing with Western imperialist powers while simultaneously imposing itself as the leader of Pan-Asianism could not become dominant as Japanese imperialism was ruthlessly interested in developing economic growth in the region to exclusively serve its interests. Consequently, resistance to imperial Japan was a determining factor that led to the victory of the Chinese communist party in the civil war with Chiang Kai-shek.

In contrast to Western imperialist strategy in the colonies and dependencies, the Japanese did exploit their economies but at the same time nurtured a certain industrialization in some of the countries that had come under its control—for example, in Manchuria and the

northern half of Korea. The imperialist Japanese strategic development thinking operated within the paradigm of the "flying geese" in the 1930s.

The notion gained renewed use during the 1960s in the attempt to explain the phenomenon of the "capitalist developmental state" in the export-oriented model of the East Asian newly industrializing nations (Japan and the so-called newly industrializing countries or NICs: mainly Taiwan and South Korea).

It is undeniable that the economic development and industrialization taking place in East Asia from the 1960s onward was implemented based on the Japanese model of the "capitalist developmental state." While modernization theory encouraged former colonies to follow the path of liberal American development, the countries of Asia began "looking East" (i.e., to the statist sociopolitical pattern), which Japan had originally started. The results at the regional level were impressive. This was recognized in an important document published by the World Bank in 1993 with the title *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*:

East Asia has a remarkable record of high and sustained growth. From 1965 to 1990 the twenty-three economies of East Asia grew faster than all other regions of the world. Most of this achievement is attributable to seemingly miraculous growth in just eight economies: Japan, the "Four Tigers"—Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan—and the three newly industrializing economies of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. (quoted in Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2000, 2)

To succeed, however, the export-oriented strategy of the "capitalist developmental state" strategy needs markets. Seen in this light, it may be argued that it was access to the American market that made this "miracle" possible. The reasons for the opening of the US market were both economic and political. Politically, giving NICs access to the US consumer market was meant to create a counter model to the example of the Maoist self-centered development model and prevent the "danger" of the spread of socialism from becoming a reality. The economic motivation was to keep production costs in the United States from inflationary tendencies. The American position accepted the fact that these countries were not liberal as far as foreign investment was concerned, having institutionalized some form of capital control (Hersh 1993).

In a certain sense, it can be said that already during the Mao era, China's socialist construction was dictating the American economic development strategy toward East Asia as well as the US geopolitical engagement in the region: containment of China, Korean War, Indochina War, military coup in Indonesia, counterinsurgency warfare (Thailand, Philippines), etc.

Seen from Washington, the results of World War II could be interpreted as having created dangers and opportunities for establishing American supremacy over the other nations of the West (including Japan). In the Eurasia land mass, the Soviet Union had survived the onslaught of Nazism and together with the Western powers had defeated the German geopolitical challenge. Following 1945, socialism as an alternative to capitalism was put on the agenda. The social contract in most of Western Europe was in turmoil first, after World War I, then the Great Depression and thereafter World War II. Keynesian economic policies (welfare state) and the recovery of Europe gave the United States the advantage of gaining access to markets. At the same time, the United States attempted to follow a strategy of containment of Russia by excluding it from the war recovery program.

SOCIALISM IN ASIA

The defeat of Japan and the victory of the Chinese revolution transformed Asia and framed US foreign policies in the region. Reconstruction of the Japanese economy and acceptance of the industrialization of East Asian NICs strengthened the political regimes that had arisen in the former colonies. In doing this, the attempt to contain Asian socialism was successfully carried out, especially if taking the military conflicts (Korean and Vietnam Wars) into consideration. The Korean War pitted the Chinese "volunteers" against the US military.

The potential alliance between the two socialist giants (Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China) did not materialize. Mao Tse-tung addressed the expectation that the forces of socialism could challenge the Western powers during a visit to Moscow in 1957:

In the struggle between the socialist and capitalist camps, it was no longer the West wind that prevailed over the East wind, but the East wind that prevailed over the West wind. (Mao Tse-tung 1957)

The split between the two socialist countries concerned the feasibility and strategy of socialist construction and ideology, as well as

geopolitical differences. The attempt by Moscow to establish a kind of US-USSR "bipolarity" through the policy of "peaceful coexistence" did not take into account the interests of socialist countries such as China. From the Chinese perspective, the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute revolved around the strategic project of blocking "bipolarity" and replacing the exclusive US-USSR relationship with a "multipolar" arrangement including China.

The conflict between the two socialist powers gave the United States a geopolitical opening too good to be true. The Soviet Union fell into a big power trap when Henry Kissinger arranged the Nixon-Mao meeting in Beijing, which contributed to a normalization of US-Sino relations and the recognition of the People's Republic of China as one country to the dismay of Taiwan. Furthermore, some years later the Soviet Union was provoked into intervening in Afghanistan to protect a secular regime against an ultrareligious movement organized and paid for by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan's intelligence agency (Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Kolko 2002, 47; Ibid. 48-49).

These anti-Soviet initiatives led to a rapprochement between Beijing and Washington. Playing the Chinese card led not only to a breakdown of Soviet-Sino relations (the two countries had a military border confrontation) but also to a complete overhaul of China's development strategy away from the Maoist model of self-centered development and delinking from the capitalist world economy to its reentrance (relinking!).

Over the years, these developments led to an immanent quest for self-rule (*swaraj*), a national aspiration; in the case of India, a struggle for independence and socialism emerged. India became an independent state in 1947 after resisting the British colonial power that had been exploiting the country and draining its wealth for centuries. Like Mao, Gandhi himself rejected industrialization, centralization and bureaucratization, and production for profit but praised the peasantry, "villageism," and local self-reliance.[1]

The anti-imperialist overthrow of the British was conducted by what may be coined the biggest popular mass movement in the world. Gandhi was sidelined and Nehru's policy emphasized planning,

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1. It is interesting to note that India's communist parties did not share this vision. On the contrary, they were more oriented toward the emerging working class, pro planning, a centralized state, etc. See the discussion in Omvedt (1993, 12).

centralization, and nation-building but still with a considerable state-owned sector. The following decades saw a similar growth pattern in India and China under centralized control and nationalist ideology, and both economies shared a number of similar socialist features.

During decolonization, the term "Third World" defined India, China, and the developing countries while the Second World War was the socialist Soviet bloc and the First World was the rest (i.e., Western Europe and the United States). Third Worldism sought to displace the East-West conflict with the North-South conflict and attempted to establish a progressive and in many cases socialist national and progressive liberation agenda through the Bandung and Non-Aligned Movement, which at the same time rejected to take any position during the Cold War. These anti-capitalist movements and events took place during the golden age of capitalism—noted by high growth rates in the West under Keynesian regime—which lasted until the neoclassical counterrevolution in the beginning of the 1980s (Toye 1987).

In the neoliberalistic era in which we have been living for the past generation, it is often forgotten that the socialist experiments had built on conditions they had inherited from previous historical periods of their societies. The attempts to transform production relations in a manner conducive to the increase of economic surplus and distribution were characteristics of the ideas that challenged the projection of capitalism in the context of development. This thrust could certainly be observed in China during Maoism. As a Chinese scholar reflects:

> It was in their ability to meet "basic needs" of the greatest majority of the population that China and other historical socialist states distinguished themselves from the rest of the peripheral and semi-peripheral states in the capitalist world-economy. (Li 2008, 31)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the introduction of capitalist economics in China have led to a defeat of (imperfect) socialism both as an ideology and praxis. Simultaneously, the apparent victory of "actually existing capitalism" with the imposition of global neoliberalism on a world scale contained the seeds of its own future dilemma.

Geopolitically, the refusal of the West to accept post-Soviet Russia as an equal partner in the US-led world political order had the consequence of reactivating nationalist forces in that country. The expectation that the rise of a pro-Western neoliberal Russian oligarchy,

under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, would be able to impose itself was an American hubris. Instead of working for the creation of the project of a Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok (including the landmass of Eurasia), the neoconservative dream of US "full spectrum dominance" became a component of American foreign policy. Seeing the former Soviet superpower transformed into an impotent giant contributed to the rise of Russian nationalism. The dismantlement of the Yugoslav Federation and the regime change in Beograd was the wake-up call for an important segment of the Russian elite. The American regime-change strategy against regimes not approved by Washington forced a strategic rethink within the Kremlin, which became led by Vladimir Putin.

It is within this paradigm that the Russian strategy of resistance to US dominance should be comprehended—be it in Eastern Europe (Georgia, Ukraine), the Middle East (Syria), or in the renewal of the Russian-Sino alliance including the Eurasia project.

Concerning geo-economics, the initiative of neoliberalism to launch a strategy of globalization was an attempt for the US financial and economic elite to expand its field of activities in the world. Not in the wildest dreams of the post-Maoist leadership could the outcome of the opening of China to the world (read: American) capitalism have been grasped. Essentially the convergence of US economic interests and Chinese pragmatic considerations contributed to the transformation of a large economy—previously based on socialist production—into the world's workshop. The attraction of China to the advanced capitalism of the United States was based on expectation of market size and low production costs. Taking advantage of potentially attractive possibilities and responding to the expectations of US financialization of the economy and the outsourcing of production to low-production-cost areas turned China into the world's second economic power.

What needs to be realized in this context is that this process was not an exemplar of economic self-reliance on China's part. The former exclusion of China from the world economy, which had been promoted by the United States, broke down as a result of internal pressures and expectations of neoliberalism in America. Following this line of thinking, the return of China to the world economy was thus promoted by the hegemonic power.

In other words, the globalization of neoliberalism that opened a window of opportunity for export-led economic growth based on low production costs, which post-Maoist China could instrumentalize, was not entirely "made in China." In the opinion of David Harvey:

> The spectacular emergence of China as a global economic power after 1980 was in part an unintended consequence of the liberal turn in the advanced capitalist world. (2005, 121)

Not only did China draw benefits from turning to the implementation of statist neoliberalism and export orientation as well as receiving foreign direct investments. But the country that became a major creditor of US debt was an anomaly to the normal functioning of the global economy. Keep in mind that China's integration in the international division of labor contributed to the viability of neoliberal globalization. In the words of Minqi Li: "China's transition to capitalism has played an indispensable role in the global triumph of neoliberalism" (2008, 91).

Both the US elite and perhaps the Chinese Communist Party leadership overlooked the problem that was bound to arise with the inclusion of such a big economy in the capitalist world. Even under the presidency of Barack Obama, there was increasing concern at the rise of China and the geo-economic implications of its attempt to lead regional economic and trading relations in East and Southeast Asia. The election of a Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States may represent a retrenchment from neoliberal globalization. During the electoral campaign, he became a spokesman for economic nationalism with the intention of "making America great again."

While the Obama administration focused on geopolitical considerations of trying to oppose Russia on the "grand chessboard" by punishing Kremlin for its policies in the conflict in Ukraine and in the Middle East, Washington simultaneously tried to engage China on the geopolitical/geo-economic level by adopting an aggressive position toward the Chinese attempt to integrate the Asian region in a non-Western-dominated cooperation sphere. Russia and China seem to be united in the project of Eurasia that would exclude the United States and include European countries who want to join.

The Obama administration's dual strategy of fighting wars in the Middle East while posturing against Russia and China simultaneously only served to strengthen the tacit geopolitical and geo-economic alliance between Russia and China. There is a historical irony in the fact that while both these nations could not form a viable front against imperialism as socialist states, they are now forced to do so in order to resist Western (US) pressures and confrontations.

As mentioned, while the Obama administration was opening two fronts in its confrontation with China and Russia, the Trump

administration seems to be focusing on China while playing the "Russian card" (on Henry Kissinger's and Zbiegniew Brzezinski's advice) in order to test and reduce the Sino-Russo alliance.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The capitalist world system came about as Europe expanded in the world after the discovery of the Americas and the passage to the East Indies via the Cape of Good Hope. The "European miracle" has been interpreted by Western historiography through the prism of Eurocentrism.

The critique of the Eurocentric approach is making inroads in the ideological problematization of the mind-set that has assigned superiority to the European experience.

We saw that new research has revealed that Asia (principally India and China) as well as other civilizations were not lacking behind Europe at the discovery of the Americas.

The gap between Europe and Asia grew first as a result of the industrial revolution in England and the deindustrialization of India and China through Britain's political measures of protectionism.

Prior to the industrial revolution in England, Asian produce were very much in demand while European products had difficulties finding markets in Asia.

The tribute of Africa and the Americas to Europe was imposed and institutionalized through the triangular trade patterns, which depended on African slave labor in the Americas as well as genocide of the native populations.

The economic surplus thus created was in part used to pay for the balance-of-payment deficit that England had incurred with China. Silver imported to Europe from the Americas was thus paid to China. The Opium Wars were intended to force China to accept opium as payment for England's deficit.

The downturn of the Asian economic development was due to both internal and external factors. According to Gunder Frank, the weakening of the Asian economies was due to the Kondratieff long wave downturn, which occurred while England (as well as others) was gaining access to Asia and colonizing India.

The development of Japan can be considered as counterproof of the thesis of Eurocentrism. The Japanese empire escaped colonization and built its strategic industrialization by delinking from the Western-

dominated world economy before becoming itself a member of the imperialist group of nations.

Following World War II, the reconstruction of Japan's economy was based on the strategy of protectionism from the world economy while depending on foreign markets, mainly in the United States.

Implementation of variants of the "capitalist developmental state" allowed the industrialization of the newly industrialized countries. American East Asian strategy accepted these strategies as a counterforce to socialist construction in China and elsewhere.

The victory of the Communist Party in the Chinese civil war reinforced the prospect of socialism in the Soviet Union and China. However, this did not lead to a common front against Western interventions and wars in Asia.

The Sino-Soviet split opened a window of opportunity for the United States in its confrontation with socialism. By playing the "China card," the United States administered a strategic defeat on the Soviet Union. The Soviet intervention in the Afghan civil war, which had been stage-managed by the intelligence agency of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, weakened the Soviet Union further and probably led to its demise.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the entrance of China to the world economy gave the United States geopolitical advantages in attempting to establish world hegemony on the basis of "full spectrum dominance" as promoted by neoconservatism.

The opening of China allowed neoliberal globalization to gain access to both the Russian and Chinese economies. The Russian economy was privatized leading to a radical downturn. In China, neoliberalism was accompanied by foreign direct investments and having access to the American market for the Chinese export-oriented economy.

The revival of Russia's political system and its return on the world scene as a political/military power offers resistance to the US-proposed geopolitical world order. The Chinese economic miracle is finding American resistance to the further growth of China's geo-economic power, which is in the process of helping nations escape the US economic dominance in Asia and other parts of the world.

EPILOGUE: THE ECLIPSE OF THE US-DOMINATED WORLD ORDER

The analysis of Eurocentrism has shown that the argument could be made that even Karl Marx could be accused of Eurocentrism to the

extent that he considered capitalism as capable of releasing productive forces on a level never seen before. This is clearly expressed in the *Communist Manifesto*.

But both authors of the *Communist Manifesto* as anti-capitalist political scientists expressed the dialectical notion that the inclusion and development of the Chinese nation while reinforcing capitalism in the short term would threaten it in the longer term. In an article written in 1853, Marx made the point that "now, England having brought the revolution of China [transition to capitalism], the question is how that revolution will react on England, and through England on Europe" (Marx, n.d., 18).

The age of Atlanticism is drawing to a close and a new multipolar order is emerging. The self-perception among the political class in Delhi and Beijing ultimately emphasizes not only their position as great powers but essentially reinserting their role as global leaders in determining international affairs in the near future. This compelling evolution nurtures the scenario of a completely different vision of the future world order.

Some commentators note that the beginning of the twenty-first century will be remembered for the rapid decline of the United States' unilateralism and the "reemergence" of a multipolar world where India and China restored Delhi's and Beijing's rightful places first as regional and then as global players with huge implications for global economics and security. If these tendencies continue, it ultimately spells the end of the three to four centuries of global domination of the Atlantic powers. How such a process will evolve is one of the most important future questions for the world system. Although suffering from "imperial overstretch," the United States remains the hegemonic military superpower, but its options are becoming more and more limited both geo-economically and geopolitically, and Washington's room of maneuver appears to be shrinking due to the shift in economic gravity and the concomitant challenges from Asia.

The paradox of the inclusion of ever-large areas of the world into the sphere of international capitalist relations is a problematique that has not been entirely grasped by social scientists, including those in the socialist tradition. Applied to the rise of China in the context of the present crisis of capitalism, we can see the contours of a possible future perspective that reduces the Eurocentric approach. Although not the direct cause of the crisis of the global system, the growth and development of China and emerging economies reflect a historical shift

within the system that will influence the difficulties encapsulated in a resolution. Seen in this light, the insight expressed by Friedrich Engels in 1894 in a letter to Karl Kautsky can prove to be more topical than it was then.

> It is again the wonderful irony of history: China alone is still to be conquered for capitalist production, and in so doing at long last the latter makes its own existence at home impossible . . . (Engels, n.d., 346)

It is not our intention to engage in an intense theoretical discussion with regard to this important dialectical process of inclusion of noncapitalist (or peripheral) societies in the world system of capitalism. It can nevertheless be pointed out that, because of their spatial dimensions, the participation of China and India in the international division of labor and global capital accumulation process cannot but raise questions as to its consequences on the domination of the system by the core nations (principally the United States).

Although a work in progress, this evolution represents an earthshaking potential which the contemporary world will have to come to grips with. The world system economist Minqi Li raises the question in the following manner:

> With the "rise of China" and the "rise of India," the semi-periphery will become a geopolitical bloc that includes the world's majority population as well as the bulk of the world's economic output. The rise of the semi-periphery, by undermining the traditional three-layered structure [core, semi-periphery, periphery], is likely to prove to be fundamentally destabilizing for the existing world-system. (2008, 176)

This possible outcome of the "great transformation" being played out in world capitalism appears to reinforce the theoretical position of Rosa Luxemburg contra Karl Marx regarding the "modus vivendi" of the global system. It is interesting in this context to recall her argument that capitalism had always depended on access to the labor force, resources, as well as markets of noncapitalist formations to its functioning. In other words, the exploitation and inclusion of peripheral areas satisfied the needs of the core nations while simultaneously leading to a blind alley for capitalism itself:

> The general tendency and final result of this process is the exclusive world rule of capitalist production. Once this is reached, Marx's model becomes valid: accumulation, i.e. further expansion of capital, becomes impossible. Capitalism comes to a dead end, it cannot function any more as the historical vehicle for the unfolding of the productive forces, it reaches its objective economic limit. (Luxemburg 1972, 145–46)

While this paper makes the case that the Eurocentric world system is being challenged not by a direct anti-capitalist transformation, it would be foolhardy to prognosticate the future. Much too many elements (unknown knowns) have to be factored in the equation. Human historical development is not preordained and much depends on the class struggle in each country and the choices of ruling elites. Nothing is preordained.

This applies of course to the ascension of China to the position of second economy in the world system. Although it is obvious that this rise has affected the domestic Chinese society as well as the workings of the international economy, it would be wise to keep in mind the fact that huge problems remain. We can conclude this analysis by quoting George Aseniero:

> If China succeeds in dealing with [its] problems, the world will have to deal with the enormity of that success: the global economy has largely accommodated the NICs, but the full-scale industrialization of the dragon economy will be certain to destabilize the global balance of power. If China fails, and plunges into chaos instead, the world will have to deal with the horror of that failure. Either way, it is the dragon—not the East Asian tigers, the Japanese flying goose, or the American eagle—that will spell the future of the Pacific Rim. (1996, 193) ✿

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Shortcomings of an Idealized Urbanity: Ghost Urban Areas and the Asynchronous Territorial Development of Hanoi

OLIVIER JACQUES, DANIELLE LABBÉ,
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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the recent emergence, on the periphery of Hanoi, of large real estate projects that began construction during the 2000s but have now remained unfinished or, even when completed, largely uninhabited. These "ghost urban areas," as the local press calls them, epitomize some of the problems which emerged in Hanoi when a model of urban development that aimed at realizing an imagined urban future, formulated by state planning agencies, encountered the highly speculative reality of Vietnam's property market. Ghost urban areas reveal how the state's planning orientations and discourse—conveying ideals of urban "modernity," "civility," and particularly "synchrony"—instead generated dysfunctional, incomplete, and disconnected places. Based on a survey of thirty-nine ghost urban areas, a cartographic analysis, interviews with key actors, and a critical study of policy documents, this paper reveals multiple scales and forms of what we call "asynchronous territorial developments." Around Hanoi, these developments involve vast tracts of agricultural lands forcibly appropriated yet left fallow, planned infrastructure and amenities that stay unbuilt for indefinite periods of time, and housing units transacted multiple times among speculators but have remained largely uninhabited and out of reach for a majority of urban households. Ultimately, we interrogate how these various territorial asynchronies, both generated by and plaguing ghost urban areas, shape their livability and inhabitants' experience.

KEYWORDS. ghost towns · land resource · peri-urbanization · speculation · Hanoi

INTRODUCTION

The appearance of so-called ghost cities in Asia has garnered a great deal of media attention lately. In recent years, the emphasis has mainly been on China (e.g., *Daily Mail Reporter* 2010; Yung 2014; Shepard 2015), although ghost cities also emerged in other parts of East and Southeast Asia at various points in the last three decades, such as in the wake of

the 1997 Asian economic crisis (e.g., Sheng and Kirinpanu 2000; Sajor 2003; Firman 2004). What is less well known is that an analogous phenomenon has recently emerged in Vietnam. On the periphery of Hanoi, the city on which this paper focuses, several large real estate projects were approved and began construction during the 2000s but have now remained unfinished or, even when completed, largely uninhabited. The domestic press refers to these places as "abandoned projects" (*dự án bỏ hoang*) or, using an especially potent neologism, as "ghost urban areas" (*khu đô thị ma*).

A small number of studies have explored the ghost city phenomenon in developing East and Southeast Asia, with a focus in recent years on China (e.g., Chi et al. 2015; Woodworth 2012; Sorace and Hurst 2016). Much of this literature takes either a descriptive approach to the study of ghost cities (attempting to quantify, characterize, or map them) or propose financial-economic analyses emphasizing the role of property bubbles and their underlying causes (financialization of real estate, lax domestic credit policies, rampant speculation, etc.). We acknowledge the value of these approaches and recognize that ghost cities throughout rapidly urbanizing Asia are often outcomes of the speed and relative newness of development, coupled with the inexperience of development companies and market volatility (cf. Mera and Renaud 2000).

In this paper, we suggest that a fuller understanding of the ghost city phenomenon in developing East and Southeast Asia requires a broadening of analytical perspectives. It calls, in particular, for greater attention to the mediating role of the state during successive stages of the urban development process. In positioning the state more centrally in the analysis, we agree with conceptualizations of Asian urbanism as a phenomenon shaped by governmental attempts to put urbanization, particularly the urban space production processes, in the service of nation-building objectives (MacKinnon 2011; Yooil 2012; Shatkin 2017). In line with this view, we apprehend failed enclave urbanism through the notion, put forth by Sorace and Hurst (2016, 305) in reference to China, of the "ideological commitments" by states to rapidly modernize national territories and society by gearing rapidly growing cities toward an imagined urban modernity.

In what follows, we explore the relationship between this ideological commitment and the emergence of ghost urban areas in Hanoi. We do so through the lens of the ideal city discourse put forward by the state (and to an extent by developers too) to foster and

justify the particular form it wishes Vietnam's planned urban expansion to take. In taking this approach, our purpose is less to characterize Hanoi's failed peri-urban enclaves (although we do sketch a portrait of the phenomenon) or to identify the financial and economic factors that led to them (although we take these factors into consideration). Rather, we interpret Hanoi's ghost urban areas as one of the most problematic expressions of a vast state-led project to put the post-*đổi mới* urbanization process in the service of national development and modernization, notably through the production of master-planned communities.

In this paper, Hanoi's ghost urban areas are understood as failed outcomes of a model of urban development central to state planners' urbanization-as-modernization strategy, the so-called new urban areas (*khu đô thị mới*—hereafter NUA). These are large-scale peri-urban land redevelopments dominated by the residential function, which may also include commercial spaces, high-rise office towers, private amenities (e.g., schools and medical clinics), and exclusive recreational spaces (e.g., golf courses, fitness centers). NUAs are mainly developed for profit by private corporate actors (sometimes in partnership with local governments). Most projects are geared toward the rising professional and middle classes, although some of them include resettlement and social housing (Labbé and Boudreau 2011; Tran 2015).

For two decades now, the post-reform Vietnamese state has been promoting this model as a means of encouraging domestic and foreign corporate actors to build large, mixed-use compounds and infrastructure at the periphery of existing cities. These new peri-urban spaces are meant to accommodate growing urban population, produce more and better infrastructure, and ultimately make space for a new urban-industrial economy. NUAs' role, however, goes beyond these functional and economic transformations. Within broader national modernization ambitions pursued by the Vietnamese state, NUAs also ought to act as catalysts and receptacles of an imagined urban modernity.

Various ambitions are entrusted to NUAs to realize this goal. Among them, NUAs are expected to assemble the conditions of a so-called urban synchrony (*đô thị đồng bộ*). Put simply, this means that the vast estates planned and built on the city's periphery should rise from the ground fully formed rather than incrementally. By the time residents move in, they should find a functionally balanced and complete living environment that meets all their needs while also being socially and technically in sync with the rest of the city. The case of

ghost urban areas, explored in the rest of this paper, shows that, in contrast to this purported role as vectors of urban cohesion and completeness, NUAs can—and do—generate various socio-spatial disconnections and shortcomings.

We call this phenomenon "asynchronous territorial development" and show that it is multiform and multi-scalar. A first and most obvious material-functional asynchrony is observable in large ghost projects that have forcibly appropriated and leveled vast tracts of agricultural land without redeveloping them. Such idle projects are not only wasting productive croplands but also failing to produce the infrastructure and amenities needed by preexisting peri-urban populations. On a smaller scale, a similar form of material-functional asynchrony is observable within those projects that are largely built but where occupancy rates are very low and basic services lacking. Another form of aesthetic-cultural asynchrony emerges from the promotion of selective enclaves of new lifestyles, leading to social estrangement from the existing, vernacular city. Finally, a financial-economic form of asynchrony results from rampant speculative practices that keep NUA housing out of reach of a majority of urbanites. This influences owner-occupiers' views of their living environment, which they tend to assess through exchange rather than use value criteria.

Ghost urban areas are certainly not representative of all NUAs. These deviant cases instead epitomize the gaps that have opened up between the ideal city imagined by the state and the actual urban spaces produced on the urban periphery. The exploration of these gaps (or asynchrony) in this paper relies on data collected as part of a wider project on Hanoi's peri-urban development conducted between 2013 and 2016. This includes a database of Hanoi's NUAs, which allowed the identification of thirty-nine ghost urban areas. Through secondary documents, field visits, and a survey questionnaire administered to occupants, we characterized each of these projects in terms of land surface and usage, completion and occupancy rates, and planned versus built infrastructure and facilities. We further draw on interviews conducted with a dozen individuals involved within local and national governments, the real estate industry, and academia and with owner-occupiers in three of Hanoi's most problematic ghost urban areas.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Part 1 discusses key components of the Vietnamese state's ideological commitment to modernize the country through planned urban developments. We focus, in particular, on the notion of "urban synchrony," a key element

in the official urban modernization agenda that new urban areas are supposed to realize. Part 2 sketches a portrait of Hanoi's NUAs. Using the case of ghost urban areas, we show how this predominant model of urban development fails to meet the state's ideal city discourse. We demonstrate that an asynchronous city is emerging around Hanoi with deficiencies that cut across scales: from the micro-local shortcomings of individual projects to macro-territorial land wastage on the metropolitan scale. Part 3 explores the skewing of housing markets spurred by NUAs and its effects on owner-occupiers' mind-set. This discussion focuses on the urban experience of households inhabiting three of Hanoi's most dramatic and dysfunctional ghost urban areas.

Ultimately, we show that the modernizing ambitions entrusted by the state to NUAs could simply not withstand the highly speculative and corrupted reality of Vietnam's property market. In this context, the state has tended to confine its role to the discursive realm. Incidentally, weak state controls during project implementation and commercialization have allowed speculative practices to have a much greater influence on the structuring of Hanoi's periphery than the modernity and synchrony ideals that NUAs were supposed to deliver.

URBAN MACHINES THAT WORK

The central governments of developing Asian countries have long linked planned urban development to overarching agendas of national modernization (Woodside 1998; MacKinnon 2011; Yooil 2012). Since the 1980s, many national governments in the region fostered the production of large master-planned communities, effectively renewing the parameters of this modernization-urban planning linkage (Phillips and Yeh 1987; Shatkin 2017; Keeton 2011). In the context of extremely rapid economic growth and integration into a global economic system, national governments used this strategy to enroll corporate actors in a state-backed experiment with global influences, private forms of planning, neoliberal modes of governance, new forms of citizenship, and the production of new urban built forms (Shatkin 2017; Roy and Ong 2011). As they "rose in the East," to borrow Keeton's (2011) words, central states tried to use "Asian new towns" as a means of channeling and mediating global capitalist forces while continuing to pursue national modernization ideals.

The NUA model of urban development in Vietnam is no exception. In the 1990s, as urbanization began to accelerate, state planners

formulated and entrenched this new model of (peri-)urban development into the national planning framework. New urban areas rapidly became an important component of large cities' master plans. Echoing arguments put forth by states elsewhere in the region, Vietnam's national leaders and government planning agencies (the Ministry of Construction in particular) argued that this new urban development model could solve important problems faced by Vietnamese cities. NUAs, these actors explained, would not only help relieve housing shortages but also, through land-based-financing methods, serve as a leverage to upgrade and expand infrastructure (especially roads) (see Labbé and Musil 2014 for further discussion).

Hanoi's planning authorities did succeed in attracting investments in the production of NUAs, and avoided to further burden the state's limited budget. During the 2000s, over two hundred projects were licensed on the province's territory. While a majority of projects were invested by domestic firms, many of them indirectly tapped into foreign capital. In that sense, the Vietnamese state managed to channel global capitalist forces into a new urban form. As mentioned in the introduction and further discussed in the next section, the NUA model of urban development is not only meant to generate more housing and produce new and better infrastructure around existing cities. This model is also—and perhaps as importantly—expected to engineer a new, modern urban future. Planning authorities did much more poorly on that front. But before we get into that discussion, let's first describe the state-defined ideals that NUAs were meant to materialize.

An Urban Ideal Triptych

In both policy texts and the media, this transformative purpose of NUAs is most often conveyed by three ubiquitous terms: "modern/ modernity" (*hiện đại*), "civilization/civility" (*văn minh*), and "synchrony" (*đồng bộ*). These terms are regularly used to characterize the ideal Vietnamese city imagined by the state. In fact, their pervasiveness in policy documents has turned them into a prominent triptych of urban ideals, or ideological commitments toward a better urban future, made by Vietnamese planning authorities in view of a rapidly urbanizing population.

NUAs are but one of the many mechanisms used by the state to foster the two first components of the urban ideal triptych—that is,

modernity and civility. A wide range of state-led development plans, programs, and campaigns seek to modernize and civilize various aspects of the nation, from its economy to its customs and culture. NUAs, however, play a specific role in the state's vast national betterment enterprise: they are envisioned as a means to modernize the Vietnamese space-economy by turning agrarian territories into areas for urban-industrial usage (Van Suu 2009a). They are also seen as the vectors of a new "urban civility" (*văn minh đô thị*), fit for the post-doi moi era (Harms 2009, 2014a). As explained by Harms (2009, 183), urban civility campaigns in Vietnam have long sought to construct the moral parameters of the "civilized" or "cultured" person. More recently, these campaigns also championed the idea of "urban order" (*trật tự đô thị*) to mitigate unmodern urban forms and practices (e.g., self-built housing, street vending, the parking of vehicles on sidewalks, etc.).

It is nevertheless the third component of Vietnam's triptych of urban ideals, the so-called quality of urban synchrony (*đồng bộ đô thị*), that new urban areas ought potently to actualize. The Vietnamese term "*đồng bộ*," translated in this paper as "synchrony," combines two closely related ideas: "*đồng*," which refers to the action of bringing similar individual units together, and "*bộ*," which refers to the articulation of different elements so that they function as a whole, like soldiers forming an army or the built components of a machine.

The ideal of urban synchrony can be traced back to the earliest policy texts about NUAs and has since remained an important guideline in the state's discourse about this model of urban development. At the most basic level, this notion entails the compliance and compatibility of projects with official urban development plans. It also calls for the production of complete neighborhoods wherein housing areas are served by all the "technical infrastructure" (roads, energy and water provision networks, etc.) and "social infrastructure" (schools, clinics, public spaces) needed "to ensure a stable life and convenient living and working conditions for the people" (Hanoi People's Committee 2001). All of these components further need to be built in full, simultaneously, and on time. Moreover, synchronized projects need to have "efficient" and "sustainable" connections not only internally but also with the rest of the city (Ministry of Construction 2008b).

The language of urban synchrony put forth by the state is further relayed by developers. It regularly features in the promotional materials

Figure 1. First master plan of the Splendora NUA with caption "Vietnam's new sun rises from the west."
Source: Developers.

that they produced to advertise their projects to buyers. For instance, the promotional website of the Nghia Đô NUA emphasizes the "high value" of its "works and architectural space synchronization" (HICC1 2011). The North QL32 NUA is similarly marketed as a "different ideal living space . . . because it is a complete urban area with modernly synchronized technical infrastructure, social infrastructure, [and] landscape architecture" (Lideco 2016).

An Ideal City Away from the Existing City

As suggested by the above-cited ads, the notion of urban synchrony goes beyond the objective of developing functional urban environments by ensuring that the various parts and functions of NUA projects are built simultaneously and assembled like clockworks. Lurking behind these functional intentions is the promise of a reformed urbanity—a new (modern and civilized) city that will avoid the shortcomings and dysfunctions (or asynchrony) of the existing city. As promised in an advertisement for a large redevelopment project to the West of Hanoi called Splendora, NUAs will be like a "new sun" rising on Vietnam's urban future (see figure 1).

The promise of a new urbanity is expressed through implicit and explicit rejections of the urban conditions that prevail in the inner city and in unplanned peri-urban zones. In both developers' advertisements and state policies, NUAs' "modernist logics of planning, efficiency, order, and 'urban civility'" (Harms 2016, 21) are contrasted with the "other" urbanities of the inner city and its self-built edges, condemned as retrograde, uncivilized, and asynchronous. Already by the mid-1990s, Hanoi's planning authorities issued a document that specified how NUAs would avoid replicating the weaknesses of the existing vernacular city. To this end, this document required that new urban areas (a) be high-density neighborhoods but less so than the overcrowded city core, (b) develop infrastructure and green spaces (lacking in the inner city) that meet international planning standards, (c) have their roads entirely constructed by developers rather than by local inhabitants as in self-built urban zones, and (d) avoid pitfalls faced by the Soviet-inspired collective housing built prior to the reforms by carefully coordinating the integration of a diversity of functions within projects (Hanoi People's Committee 1995).

Another telling example of this approach is found in a 2008 circular (15/2008/TT-BXD) of the Ministry of Construction (2008a)

that stipulates what is an exemplar (*kiểu mẫu*) NUA. The listed criteria
insist on the importance of a controlled aesthetic, calling for uniform,
ordered, and harmonious buildings (art. 3a); aesthetically balanced
green spaces and street trees (art. 2e); and regulated outdoor
advertisement boards (in terms of positioning, size, and color) (art. 2i).
All of these characteristics stand in obvious opposition to the supposedly
unaesthetic vernacular built forms of the existing city with its
hodgepodge of architectural styles, self-constructed billboards, awnings,
and porch roofs.

        Here again, developers echo state planners' discourse. The rejection
of the existing city is a selling point in their marketing of NUAs. To give
only one particularly telling example, an ad for the NUA Splendora
states: "Our goal is to build a convenient new city for transportation
with synchronous design; a distinction compared to the old-quarter,
the center of Hanoi" (Splendora 2016). A few developers have in fact
pushed this desire for distinction beyond negations of the vernacular
Vietnamese city by promoting their projects as "Westernized" living
environments. For instance, three projects on the city's southwestern
periphery (respectively called Mỗ Lao NUA, Phu My-Dream Home,
and the Goldsilk Complex) are marketed as constituting a "European
space in the heart of Hanoi." The Splendora project mentioned above
is similarly heralded by its developer as "on par with economic centers
such as New York, a center of fashion and culture as Paris, a center for
tourism and recreation as in Dubai or Sydney; a symbol of global life"
(Splendora 2016).

        In these examples, social and urban distinctiveness is bolstered by
developers with images of sophistication and wealth, aspirations that
dovetail neatly with the ideals of modernity and civility promoted by
the state. However, rather than synchronizing the new planned
environment with their milieu, these distinctive living environments
generate a form of cultural disconnection, an aesthetic estrangement
from the rest of the city. As Waibel (2006, 47) puts it: "The ambivalent
wishes of simultaneous distinction from other societal groups and
integration into a specific lifestyle or peer group are served by the new
urban areas, which are developing into selective vanishing spaces within
the city."

        In these different ways, the NUA model is branded as the promise
of a better urban future—one that reorders the existing city by negating
it. In new urban areas, state and developers pledge, homogeneity will

organize, planning will supersede spontaneity, and civility will generate new lifestyles fit for a developed nation. Assessing whether this Vietnamese triptych of urban ideals is in fact realized by NUAs is a challenging task, especially given the vague and largely immaterial character of the Vietnamese notions of modernity, civility, and synchrony. As we will see in the next section, a portrait of Hanoi's ghost urban areas begins to delineate tangible scenes of asynchrony between the built form and these ideological commitments.

Hanoi's Ghost Urban Areas: Portrait of an Asynchronous City

Between 1994 and 2015, 252 NUA projects were approved on Hanoi's territory (see figure 2). The deployment of this model of urban development across the province was particularly intensive between 2003 and 2009. Nearly half of Hanoi's NUAs (129 projects) were approved during this urban property boom. Echoing the earlier experiences of other cities in developing Southeast Asia (e.g., Sajor 2003; Mera and Renaud 2000; Sheng and Kirinpanu 2000), Hanoi's boom was spurred by a combination of factors including years of sustained national economic growth, deregulation of the commercial banking sector, and the country's entry into the World Trade Organization, which was followed by massive private capital inflow into the country.

NUAs became attractive investment opportunities for foreign and domestic investors, as demonstrated by the large number of projects approved during the six years of the boom. However, when both domestic credits and foreign capital inflows suddenly dried up, in 2008–2009, investors and developers had no choice but to dramatically slow or scale down NUA projects. By the late 2009, the construction of many redevelopments had come to a full stop, leaving entire sectors unbuilt or with only bare-shell buildings.

The ghost urban areas of Hanoi are, in large part, the result of this property market bust. At the time of our survey, in the summer of 2016, about a third Hanoi's NUAs were still under construction while another half had yet to break ground. Within the remaining projects, a small subset (about thirty-four) could be considered completed. The rest were either under construction or, as is the case with the thirty-nine ghost urban areas portrayed in this section, had seen their construction halted and were standing idle. These stalled projects shed a crude light

Figure 2. Thirty-nine ghost urban areas in Hanoi (black), amongst 252 NUA projects approved between 1994 and 2015. *Source:* Authors

on the ways in which a volatile economic environment derailed the state's ambitions to use planned property development as a means of modernizing the country's cities.

Inside Ghost Urban Areas: Phantom Materiality and Visible Absences

The uninhabited residential units in ghost urban areas are perhaps the most visible marker of the erosion of NUAs' intentions, as originally defined by state planning agencies. As shown in figure 3, by 2016, only 56 percent (or thirty-nine thousand) of all the residential units planned

Figure 3. Planned versus built, and built versus occupied housing units (divided by housing types) in the thirty-nine ghost urban areas of Hanoi. *Source:* Authors.

Figure 4. Developed versus undeveloped land (divided by housing types), built versus unbuilt residential land and public amenities. *Source:* Authors.

in ghost projects had been built. By then, 47 percent of these built units were unoccupied, a rate that reaches a confounding 65 percent if we only consider single family housing types. This represents a total of over nine thousand uninhabited townhouses and detached houses called "villas" in Vietnam.

These low occupancy rates can partly be explained by severe infrastructural deficiencies. Taken as a whole, 25 percent of the land allocated to Hanoi's ghost urban areas lack a proper road network (see figure 4), a situation that greatly limits access to them. Such infrastructural shortcomings match assessments by the domestic press according to which some NUAs have become isolated and disconnected from the rest of the city (Anh and *VnMedia* 2012). This situation is aggravated by the fact that two in every five ghost urban area projects are fenced, gated, or both. Other shortcomings plague portions of these projects where a functional road networks has been built. Most importantly, less than half of the land originally planned in these zones for nonresidential buildings and amenities (e.g., offices, schools, hospital, commercial areas, green spaces, etc.) was developed at the time of our survey.

These absences greatly reduce ghost urban areas' livability. A survey questionnaire administered to 141 residents shows that a vast majority deplore the lack of public services, facilities, and infrastructure in the NUA where they live. Many mentioned the discrepancy between the current situation and the developers' promises of complete and synchronized urban places, as advertised in master plans and promotional materials. Residents also resent the lack of public facilities in their vicinity and complain about having to rely instead on unofficial services and amenities such as small private kindergartens, noodle shops, or fresh vegetable stalls informally set up by neighbors in their houses or by temporary occupants and squatters in unoccupied buildings.

The situation in ghost urban areas echoes broader infrastructural shortcomings observed in the rest of Hanoi's NUAs. Here again, the reality of project implementation betrays the state's ideals and discourse about NUAs' unique ability to produce functionally "complete" urban environments. A critical assessment of the production of amenities and infrastructure in purportedly completed NUAs, conducted by the Association of Cities of Vietnam, concluded that "none . . . have used land according to approved plans, especially with regard to basic [physical and social] infrastructure systems like schools, medical facilities, markets and space for community activities" (Vu 2011, 1).

Moreover, as experts interviewed for this project remarked, when social infrastructure do get built in NUAs, they often take the form of private and exclusive services instead of the public amenities originally planned. This situation is not only problematic for the residents of deficient NUAs but also for surrounding populations living in spontaneously urbanized zones, which state planners originally expected would be able to access the amenities and services featured in NUAs' master plans (interviews, Hanoi, December 19 and 21, 2016).

"Wasted" Productive Landscapes

Another major discrepancy between the state's territorial synchrony ideals and the actual implementation of NUAs concerns the land conversion process. Most of Hanoi's NUAs are built on large tracts of forcibly appropriated farming land situated in densely settled territories. We estimate that, over the last two decades or so, land-grabbing for these redevelopments has dispossessed approximately 130,000 households of access to croplands on which they held use rights. Taken alone, the ghost urban areas identified in this study occupy 1,490 hectares and have prevented approximately 7,400 households from having access to croplands. Yet, at the time of our survey, nearly 80 percent of this once productive agricultural territory was either leveled but unbuilt (937 hectares) or occupied by uninhabited housing units (213 hectares).

As the recent literature on land takings for urban development in Vietnam shows, agricultural land expropriations destabilize preexisting socioeconomic dynamics, leading in many cases to the impoverishment of the surrounding peri-urban populations (Van Suu 2009a, 2009b; DiGregorio 2011; Labbé 2015). For peasants, this situation is harder to bear when the project for which they lost their land stays undeveloped or uninhabited for extended periods, as is the case with ghost urban areas. Years after years, as emphasized in the domestic press, these people watch the rich and productive lands (*bờ xôi ruộng mật*) that they used to farm lying unused and yet they cannot bring it back into cultivation, if only temporarily, since developers purposefully level fields and destroy their irrigation systems as soon as they get their hands on them (VIR 2015; Đai doàn ket 2014). In the words of a Vietnamese blogger, ghost urban areas "are turning agrarian territories into dead land regions (*vùng đất chết*)" (Lê 2015).

In his work on Ho Chi Minh City, Erik Harms (2012, 2014b) has described the process of state-sponsored peri-urban land redevelopment

as "clearing the wastelands" (*khai phá đất hoang*). "Lands slated for development," he writes, "are imagined and described as empty wastelands even when they are already inhabited and being used for productive purposes" (Harms 2014b, 313). Bui et al. (2010) similarly argue that Vietnamese policies treat farmlands as an underused or low-yielding resource whose full value can only be unlocked by redevelopment into more profitable urban-industrial functions. As Labbé (2016, 154) puts it, the state's discourse on the need to make space for projects such as NUAs seeks to diminish "the harm done to the dispossessed . . . by suggesting [that their use of the land] was of little good anyway."

Planning authorities give away peri-urban agricultural land to developers and, in doing so, put an end to associated livelihoods in the name of functional efficiency and economic modernization. The official discourse on NUAs negates vernacular territorial dynamics by turning attention away from the needs of peri-urban population and, instead, toward the potentialities of purportedly empty spaces. But as demonstrated by the case of ghost urban areas, the reality of project implementation is at odd with this justificatory discourse. In an attempt to explain this problematic outcome, the next section discusses the capitalist market logic embodied by ghost urban areas and ways in which it eroded, co-opted, and ultimately stripped NUAs of their ability to materialize the state's ideals of urban modernity, civility, and synchrony.

SPECULATING ON URBANITY: THE FINANCIAL UNDERSIDE OF NUAS

Hanoi's NUAs are not only socially and spatially laid out as isolated (sometimes gated) enclaves of new urban expectations. They also feed into what we could call a market asynchrony that orients housing production away from the needs of the vast majority of Hanoi's households. To understand this situation, we need to look at the role of the rampant real estate speculation practices that have defined the urban property market, which reemerged in Vietnam during the reforms. As we will see, hundreds of abandoned houses have become capitalist accumulation spaces—with hundreds of housing units being actively transacted by actors who will never live there. The material and psychological outcomes of these speculative practices pushes NUAs' urbanity further away from the state's ideals (see figure 5).

Figure 5. A street scene from the Lideco NUA (with 9.71 percent occupancy rate). Visible are two types of unoccupied units—bare shell (left) and plastered (right, background)—but also unbuilt fallow land at the forefront. The streetscape clashes with the imagined Westernized (European) environment promoted by the developers. *Source:* Authors.

Supply/Demand Asymmetry

In an environment marked by corrupted and lax planning controls
(Labbé and Musil 2014), the central and local states in Vietnam have
been, by and large, unable to control problematic developer behaviors.
This includes a tendency to produce NUA properties meeting their
own financial interests and those of property speculators rather than
complying with planning policies or developing accessible or livable
places for future user-occupiers. Three main problems have emerged in
NUAs in general and in ghost urban areas in particular that demonstrate
weak state controls during the implementation and commercialization
of projects.

    The first problem concerns the unaffordability of housing built in
NUAs. A high-ranking official from the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment (MoNRE) estimates that only 20 percent of the
urban population can afford 80 percent of the housing formally
produced in Hanoi's NUAs (interview, Hanoi, July 5, 2013). Illustrating
this gap, the average annual income per capita in Vietnam was about
USD 1,900 in 2013, whereas townhouses in NUAs were selling at
between USD 1,400 and USD 5,600 per square meter (Hồng and
VietnamNet 2014). Property values in NUAs are so high compared to
the financial capacities of households, a strategist active in the Vietnamese
banking sector remarked, that they have remained unaffordable even
during the major economic downturn of the late 2000s when they
dropped by 40–50 percent (interview, Skype, June 16, 2013).

    The second problem, closely connected to the first, concerns the
type and size of housing units. Because they generated the highest and
fastest return on investment throughout the 2000s, high-end properties
and units with the largest square-footage came to dominate the formal
property market. By the early 2010s, detached villas (120–800 square
meters in size and selling for USD 150,000–4.5 million) and townhouses
(50–200 square meters in size and selling for USD 70,000–1.1
million) proved to be completely disconnected from the average urban
household's purchasing power. Moreover, at the height of the urban
property boom (circa 2006–2008), planning authorities turned a
blind eye on developers slashing down on essential elements of
approved plans that could not be sold. A senior state planner
interviewed for this study explained that these elements included
access and internal roads, public spaces, and schools (interview, Hanoi,
June 13, 2016).

The third problem, discussed earlier, relates to developers' tendency to delay considerably or even forsake the construction of amenities and infrastructure in NUA projects. The result can be glaring as is the case with three of Hanoi's most problematic land redevelopments, the Vân Canh (see figure 6), Lideco, and Geleximco NUAs, to which we shall come back below. These projects have very low occupancy rates and are plagued by major infrastructural shortcomings. They only have small access roads, their inner road systems are incomplete, and they offer few if any amenities. This is despite the fact that their housing production and sales (almost exclusively villas and townhouses) are well under way.

During the property market frenzy of the late 2000s, these problems had limited implications for buyers and developers. As remarked by a local real estate consultant, "buyers' expectations [then] were not oriented toward [actual] real estate products. Rather, homes were seen only as an investment opportunity" (interview, Hanoi, June 10, 2016). Both developers and speculators had lost sight of issues related to the quality of the housing and to the livability of the built environment produced, commercialized, and transacted. But when the property market began to cool down (circa 2009), Hanoi was left with dozens of NUAs offering only high-end and very large housing units completely at odd with the financial means and needs of the vast majority of urbanites looking for an actual place to live.

This is a grave issue not only due to the important housing needs that remain unmet in Hanoi but also in terms of the capital sunk into failed real estate projects. As emphasized in a recent governmental report, as of late Feburary 2014, unoccupied houses represented an estimated USD 4.3 billion on the national scale and USD 4 billion in Hanoi alone (*DtiNews* 2014). As our MoNRE informant emphasized, rather than participating in the strengthening of the national economy, these investments immobilized capital that could have supported industrial development while also wasting precious land resources (interview, Hanoi, July 5, 2013). Worse still, developers' massive defaults on loan repayments since 2009 have shackled state and commercial banks in Vietnam with bad debts that continue to drag down national economic growth to this day (see, for instance, IntellAsia.net 2015).

The Vietnamese state did try to fix these problems, generated both by property developers' behaviors and by the real estate crash of the late 2000s. Since 2009, the Hanoi Department of Natural Resources and Environment has been periodically investigating stalled NUA projects.

Figure 6. An abandoned street of the Vân Canh NUA, with an 11.5 percent occupancy rate. *Source:* Authors.

Since then, it issued decisions to revoke over seventeen million square meters of land but only four hundred thousand square meters had actually been taken back by early 2015 (VIR 2015). In 2013, an economic stimulus package of USD 1.41 billion, controlled by the Vietnamese central bank, offered long-term, low-interest loans to those developers who build new social housing or convert commercial buildings, especially in stalled projects, into social housing. Three years later, less than half of the envelope had been disbursed and most of it had been allocated to the construction of new projects rather than the transformation of problematic ones, such as ghost urban areas (Rodrigue 2016). Moreover, in an attempt to curb speculation, the Ministry of Construction proposed in 2011 to substantially raise property taxes rates on unbuilt lands and unfinished housing, an idea that has yet to be integrated into policy.

None of these public measures have significantly resolved the important problems posed by ghost urban areas in Hanoi. The state indeed seems unable (or unwilling) to control the implementation and commercialization stages of NUA development. This is despite the fact that developers, in implementing projects, obviously strip this model of urban development of much of its ability to attain the territorial cohesiveness and completeness objectives so prominent in the state's general planning orientations and discourse.

Speculation and the Rationalization of Asynchronous Places

The financial component of the asynchronous territorial development spurred by NUAs in general, and by ghost urban areas in particular, also bears upon the experience of actual owner-occupiers. This comes across clearly in exploratory interviews with residents in the three previously mentioned ghost urban areas of Hanoi. These interviews suggest that, rather than criticizing the absence of state-led implementation mechanisms, or simply the developers for failing to produce the ideal urban environments promised in policies and promotional material, residents tend to rationalize their situation by falling back on the exchange value of their property.

The thirteen owner-occupiers interviewed for this study bought their homes after 2011–2012. As discussed earlier, this period was marked by a significant housing price drop. Experts in the real estate sectors told us that speculative transactions then came to a near halt. For a rare moment in the post-reform period, most buyers of NUA

properties in Hanoi then were households looking for an actual place of residence. In contrast to speculators, these future occupiers paid attention to developers' reputation and to their reliability in building NUAs in full and according to approved plans, and cared about the livability of neighborhoods. For instance, one interviewee complained about delays in the construction of a public space near his house. Another lamented the low occupancy rate in his NUA. Another still commented on the poor community life in his neighborhood (interviews, Geleximco NUA and Vân Canh NUA, November 19, 2016).

Contrary to our expectation, such critiques about incompleteness, deficiencies, and absences did not, however, figure very prominently in residents' answers. Obscuring obvious shortcomings of the neighborhoods they inhabit, owner-occupiers' preoccupations tended to concern the profitability of their housing investment. The very urban ideals of modernity, civility, and synchrony seemed to have receded behind financial concerns, generating yet another form of asynchrony on the household scale.

Illustrating this, some owner-occupiers downplayed the discrepancy between the state's propaganda and the developers' marketing slogans, or the specific promises of complete living environments made by investors and the actual reality of inhabiting a ghost urban area. These interviewees told us that these problems are not that bothersome given that they bought their house at a "lower price." This discounted price, they explained, lowered their expectations toward their future place of residence. Moreover, many mentioned that since property values have gone up since they bought their property, they are, in the end quite content with it.

Another telling example of residents' investment-oriented mind-set emerged when we asked them about the uninhabited or abandoned (*bị bỏ hoang*) houses around them. Half of our interlocutors responded that they did not get what we were talking about or else disagreed with our use of the term "abandoned." Some of them in fact corrected us, stating that these houses were not abandoned at all since they had all been sold. This is an apparent submission to the logic of property speculation, a snub to the visible signs of abandonment: empty streets, grass growing on porches, and moss covering the unplastered walls of empty houses.

CONCLUSION

At the entrance of some ghost urban areas surveyed in this study, an ostentatious gateway marks the passage from the "existing city" to a supposedly new, modern, civilized, and synchronized urban enclave. Echoing the triptych of urban ideal so prominent in the state's discourse about NUAs, promotional billboards grace these gates that forecast the beautification processes to come, sketching the spacious contours of an imagined city with new urban functions and lifestyles. Similar to other new town projects that emerged elsewhere in developing East and Southeast Asia, NUAs disseminate the "images, dreams, fantasies and desires of urban modernity [that] have colonized the political imaginary [and] economic circuitry" (Sorace and Hurst 2016, 320). But in the case of ghost areas, these billboards and visions are now weathered; the contours have faded and so is the urbanity promised by state planning agencies.

The failed land redevelopments discussed in this paper may later come back to life, following state sanctions or the next real estate bubble. For now, however, these places reveal some of the problematic outcomes of the state's ideal city discourse with regard to NUAs, places where homeowners would enjoy a fully finished quality home, in a vibrant neighborhood, plugged on performing infrastructure, supplied with adequate services and spaces, and benefiting from easy connections to regional amenities. Few if any of Hanoi's NUAs have fully realized such promises, and ghost urban areas are a long way from there. Instead, these places suffer from a technical-material form of asynchrony: blocks after blocks of bare shell and unoccupied constructions, dirt roads that do not connect, and hectares of erstwhile agricultural land leveled but unused. Such severe infrastructural deficiencies undermine the imagined urban future promised by the state. In the meantime, a peasant visiting the land (and associated livelihood) forcibly taken away from him would only find a few arrivistes enjoying the "the fresh breathable air" of empty streets and the "peacefulness" of numerous abandoned houses (interview, Geleximco NUA, November 19, 2016).

By looking at NUAs through the lens of the state discourse about the ideal city they are supposed to actualize, this paper also revealed less apparent form of aesthetic and socioeconomic asynchrony. NUAs are conceived as enclaves of modernity, with formal and stylistic choices that explicitly negate historical and vernacular forms of Vietnamese urbanity. A strong speculative form of asynchrony is also sustained by

another contextual negation: NUAs ignore the housing needs of urbanites, syncing instead with the financial interests of a highly volatile property market. In the late 2000s, the "property fever" was such that developers and speculators lost sight of the actual use value of homes and quality of urban environments to solely consider their exchange value and investment profitability.

NUAs' "ghostly" feel results from tensions at play when Hanoi's urban environment is speculated upon, when land transformation promises synchronize only with half-baked urban productions, when all shortfalls are still felt as spectral potentialities. Yet, the failures of urban synchrony are rationalized by residents who tightly hold onto their housing investment. Land productivity yields—in its goals, offer, scale, and shape—to the demands of a small economic elite. Urban ambitions toward modernity, civility, and synchrony are then draped under a broad, state-sanctioned, and socio-spatial climate of speculative risks and calculations, outweighing the necessary implementation of such notions as urbanity, community, culture, or livelihoods.

As "new" ruins, ghost urban areas epitomize the velocity of Asia's urban growth: they are prodigious and decadent, excessive and pragmatic, partly innovative but mostly manufactured.

Echoing this view, Antoine Picon (2000) opened his essay "Anxious Landscapes: From the Ruin to Rust" with an outlook on the peri-urban as a "territory of emptiness." Echoing the case of NUAs, mainly designed for speculative purposes, Picon highlights Le Corbusier's ambiguous distress in creating modern environments that would become objects of consumerism. The ghost urban area's incompleteness might in fact be seen as truly modern: functionalism's extreme rationality is reactualized in an environment of economic calculations. Yet the vital pulse of urbanity vanishes when lifestyles are rationalized and idealized, when urban ecologies are ventured and speculated upon, and when the resulting urban form is disconnected from its milieu.

In the meantime, the situation on-site offers a few moments of spontaneous spatial reappropriations: fallow lands turned into vegetable or herb gardens, street corners domesticated by tea stands, informal pathways connecting unfinished roads, or empty ground floors hosting casual billiard parlors and motorbike repair shops. In such scenes, the ghost urban areas of Hanoi appear, once again, to be haunted back by the very patterns of improvisation they vowed to eradicate. On a deeper level, these scenes confirm the urban asynchrony uncovered by this paper: idealistic, rationalistic, or speculative conceptions of space may

fail to acknowledge the city as a space of fluidity and vibrations, a space where multiple unpredictable convergences are in fact the ones that sync with one another.�

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Conflict Calamities:
Natural Disasters and the CPP-NPA

JOSHUA EASTIN

ABSTRACT. This study examines the effects of natural disaster inundation on the internal armed conflict waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army (CPP-NPA) against the Philippine state. Drawing on interviews and ethnographic data and employing insights from the literature on civil conflict, social movements, and environmental security, this study suggests that the Philippines' vulnerability to disaster has provided the CPP-NPA with tactical opportunities to increase attacks against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and has enabled the group to penetrate affected communities to increase civilian collaboration and augment recruitment. In some cases, the Philippine state's institutional architecture for humanitarian relief, which relies heavily on local government units, has abetted this process by enabling local politicians to distribute relief supplies according to political patronage. The effect marginalizes individuals and groups from the political process and enhances the receptivity of the CPP-NPA's anti-state propaganda. The overall impact has been to prolong the CPP-NPA's ability to maintain its revolutionary campaign and increase the group's capacity to wage violence.

KEYWORDS. conflict · natural disasters · CPP-NPA · vulnerability

INTRODUCTION

Environmental disasters and armed conflict have been among the greatest threats to the security and livelihoods of the Filipino population. Although these phenomena are distinct, they are also related: conflict facilitates internal displacement, which can increase disaster vulnerability, and disasters exacerbate poverty and undermine livelihoods, which can provide armed groups with opportunities to expand operations and aggravate conflict. This study is concerned with the latter process. It examines the impact of natural disaster inundation on one of the longest-running insurgencies in the world, the conflict associated with the Communist Party of the Philippines–New People's Army (CPP-NPA). In doing so, this paper aims to enhance theoretical

and practical understanding of the social impacts of natural disaster inundation and the manifestation and management of complex humanitarian emergencies. As a growing body of scientific evidence links global climate change to increases in the frequency and severity of climatic hazards, and as incidents of civil conflict in disaster-prone nations remain high, such knowledge is pressing (IPCC 2014).

This article proposes that the Philippines' high disaster incidence has bolstered the CPP-NPA's ability to sustain itself by creating opportunities for the group to augment membership, wage attacks, and expand operations in disaster-prone regions. The physical destruction and livelihood costs disasters impose and the perceived injustices that arise over post-disaster redistributions of wealth fuel these dynamics. In some cases, the Philippine government's institutional architecture for humanitarian relief has aggravated disasters' impact on conflict by enabling local politicians to distribute relief supplies according to political patronage. The result reinforces victims' vulnerability to disaster and enhances their political and economic marginalization. The overall outcome of these processes substantiates an observation made by a participant in a 2011 focus group discussion held by the government's panel on peace negotiations: "These areas [in the eastern parts of the country], the corridor of poverty, are usually hit by storms and are among the poorest in the country. These are also where the insurgents breed" (OPAPP 2011).

Empirical evidence for this study is drawn from a series of interviews and participant observation obtained during six months of in-country fieldwork from 2011 to 2012, as well as from archival and secondary sources. In total, sixty-five interviews with local policymakers, government and nongovernment organization (NGO) disaster relief workers, members of the clergy, current and former CPP-NPA insurgents, and military personnel were conducted in disaster- and conflict-affected areas of the country.[1]

This paper is divided into four sections. First, I discuss disaster vulnerability and its application as a conceptual framework for analysis,

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1. Interviews were conducted in Metro Manila; in Leyte, Southern Leyte, Northern Samar, Eastern Samar, Western Samar, and Albay Provinces; and in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan Cities. While some of these interviews were designed to collect empirical data, the majority were held to increase my own understanding of the disaster relief distribution process, its politicization, local impacts, and co-option by non-state forces (the CPP-NPA). The manuscript cites interviews in cases where specific information was conveyed, but because not all the interviews were able to provide relevant empirical data that directly inform the paper, the number of interview citations is necessarily lower than the actual number of interviews held.

with attention to the links between vulnerability and armed conflict. Second, I discuss the Philippines' experience with disaster, the country's institutional framework for disaster response, and the ways in which institutional corruption and patronage politics at the local level have subverted these institutions to enhance political discrimination of vulnerable populations. I then analyze how the intersection of these phenomena—disasters and political discrimination—has created opportunities for the CPP-NPA to perpetuate its revolutionary campaign. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of CPP-NPA activities in Quezon Province in 2004 and 2005 during Tropical Storm Winnie to provide a firsthand account of how the CPP-NPA operationalizes its strategy to build local support for its movement.

NATURAL DISASTERS, LIVELIHOODS, AND ARMED CONFLICT

An individual's livelihood concerns the "activities undertaken to translate resources—whether environmental or human—into a means for living at the group or individual level" (Matthew, Halle, and Switzer 2002, 15–16). Evaluating natural disasters' effects on livelihoods is critical to determining their impact on armed conflict because livelihood losses and rising insecurity can increase the likelihood that individuals might join or support a war effort (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; Justino 2009; Lichbach 1995; Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). Indeed, Ohlsson calls livelihood losses the "missing link" between "poverty and environmental factors to conflict" (2000, 3). He argues that the speed with which they occur can condition the risks they pose. Rapid losses pose greater risks because large numbers of newly unemployed young men are more susceptible to the motives and incentives that can encourage and sustain organized, anti-state violence (Ohlsson 2000; see also Urdal 2006).

   Natural disasters can devastate livelihoods, especially among those who rely on agriculture for subsistence and production. Too little rainfall can cause drought and exacerbate desertification. Too much can lead to flooding, which can wash away fields, inundate crops, and encourage erosion and landslides. Strong winds and rainfall associated with typhoon storms can destroy entire agricultural sectors. Typhoon Yolanda cast these dynamics in stark relief when the 2013 storm reduced coconut fields to rubble and ruined rice production across Eastern Visayas. Unfortunately, threats from storms like this are only expected to increase as global climate change increases the variability of the El Niño/La Niña Southern Oscillation and intensifies the pace of

the water cycle—the system of evaporation, condensation, and precipitation that cycles water through the hydrosphere (Jose 2009; Durack, Wijffels, and Matear 2012; Latif and Keenlyside 2008). These processes are expected to reduce the value of and access to environmental resources, which can restrict income generation; magnify poverty, inequality, and marginalization; foster migration and displacement; and reinforce the risk of future economic hardship (IPCC 2014).

While disasters can threaten livelihoods, a household's level of vulnerability determines the threat's magnitude and consequences. Vulnerability comprises exposure and sensitivity to environmental phenomena, and a household's capacity to cope with crises when they occur (Deligiannis 2012; IPCC 2001). Exposure reflects the likelihood that individuals will experience a hazard: households located in close proximity to a floodplain or on a degraded hill slope are at greater risk than those on high, stable ground. Sensitivity constitutes the degree to which household livelihood strategies are vulnerable to disruptive shock. Agricultural livelihoods are especially sensitive because of their high reliance on ecosystem services for production. Finally, the opportunities individuals possess to adapt to environmental hazards, and the larger social, political, and economic factors that shape and constrain these opportunities, determine coping capacity. Wealth and the ability to diversify means of production can increase a household's capacity to manage a crisis, because savings expenditures and livelihood adaptation can hasten recovery. Similarly, a government's competence in disaster response and its capability and willingness to provide humanitarian support can determine the length and scale of the crisis phase. When crisis management institutions are inept, or when relief and reconstruction assistance are provided according to political patronage or other non-need-based criteria, the result can increase the disaster's scope and magnitude.

The most impoverished individuals and those least capable of livelihood adaptation are also the most vulnerable: they are the most likely to experience disaster; the most likely to rely on environmentally sensitive livelihoods, like farming, for income and subsistence; and the least able to recover when disaster strikes. Communities that are politically marginalized—those who lack the power to influence political decision-making and the distribution of public goods—face acute risks, because they are less likely to receive relief assistance and less capable of challenging grievances that arise over a disaster's causes and consequences (Raleigh 2010). When a disaster occurs, the impact can instigate or

reinforce a vicious cycle of insecurity and vulnerability and exacerbate anti-state grievances. In conflict-contested regions, the outcome can prolong war (Kahl 2006; Raleigh 2010; Eastin 2016).

Linking Disasters and Civil Conflict

When a natural disaster undermines livelihoods, the opportunity costs of joining or supporting an armed group should decline and individuals' willingness to participate in conflict should rise (Lichbach 1995; Wischnath and Buhaug 2014). Lost livelihoods can also increase the costs of abstaining from conflict when economic insecurity reduces an individual's ability to isolate themselves and their family from conflict violence in war-torn regions. Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) demonstrate that the threat of civilian victimization through indiscriminate violence or erroneous targeting can make abstaining from conflict a costly choice. A disaster's destruction and its effects on livelihoods only magnify these costs, increasing household exposure to both conflict processes and environmental hazards (Barnett and Adger 2007). In contested areas, affiliation with an armed group can provide access to resources—information, access to income, protection from looting and bandits, for example—that can reduce exposure and mitigate future risk. Justino's (2009) work on the micro-foundations of armed group support corroborates this view. She finds that both poverty and a high risk of experiencing conflict violence increase the likelihood that a household will join or support an armed group to protect their current economic status.

A disaster's impact can also motivate individuals to support armed resistance when the politics of resource distribution foments anti-state or intergroup grievances. Disasters can stimulate grievances when they create or catalyze perceptions of social injustice. Justice is elusive because what constitutes fair play can vary; however, a vast body of research suggests that "justice is central to people's evaluations of social situations" (Tyler and Blader 2003, 349). Perceptions of social justice should be especially important in generating legitimacy for political institutions that render resource-allocation decisions in times of crisis. If victims believe the state handles a disaster situation fairly given situational constraints, or if a disaster opens new economic opportunities, such as work in reconstruction, access to new construction materials, or relocation to new housing, then they might be less likely to harbor grievances that persuade them to engage in or

support subversive activities (Tyler 1988, 1994; Tyler and Huo 2002; Tyler and Blader 2003).

Two types of political decisions matter in this context: those that can facilitate a disaster and those that manage its consequences. First, when citizens believe that corrupt or discriminatory political decisions cause or aggravate a disaster, these events can serve as focal points for insurgent propaganda and recruitment. For example, in Peru, taxing and violently targeting multinational logging and mining firms have gained the Shining Path popular support and political traction because these firms are reported to collude with local politicians to gain lucrative contracts, and because their actions aggravate degradation that can increase the magnitude and frequency of local landslides and flooding in nearby communities (Zenn 2012).

Second, disaster management decisions can generate perceptions of social injustice that legitimize dissent if people believe that the relief allocation process is corrupt, that authority figures withhold goods, or that they provide relief according to political patronage, ethnic affiliation, or other non-need-based criteria. The 1972 earthquake in Managua, Nicaragua, enabled the Sandinistas to rise from a minor group to a revolutionary force when claims of Somoza's aid misappropriation resonated with the general public (Olson and Drury 1997). The Sandinistas mobilized civilians and built a powerful political organization on accusations that Somoza enriched himself and his family from the considerable international relief aid that flooded the country. This corruption, combined with the thousands of newly impoverished citizens the earthquake created, empowered the Sandinistas to violently oust Somoza from power in 1979.

If disasters can generate motives and incentives for individuals to participate in conflict, then they can also create opportunities for groups to mobilize them. Armed groups draw members and supporters in roughly three ways: inducement, coercion, and co-option (Weinstein 2007). Inducement concerns a quid pro quo, goods in exchange for allegiance. Subsistence crises can increase the relative value of these incentives, which can prompt individuals to join. Coercion entails the use of intimidation or force to gain compliance. During a disaster, groups can forcibly conscript disaster victims or prevent them from accessing resources necessary for survival, both of which can leave individuals with little choice but to comply. Both of these processes were at work in the wake of the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka when rebels

associated with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam conscripted scores of orphaned and homeless children. In some cases, rebel soldiers forcibly removed children from victims' families. In others, they relied on promises of aid and social support to attract them (Becker 2005).

Co-option entails persuasion and assimilation, and is about "soft power," goal alignment, or "getting others to want the outcomes that you want" (Nye 1990). Generating trust through assistance and resource provision during a crisis can reinforce a group's ability to co-opt reluctant populations. Crucial to this process is the use of propaganda to strategically frame the causes and consequences of the disaster to suit a group's political purposes (Birkland 1998). "Frames are the interpretive packages that activists develop to mobilize potential adherents and constituents" (Polletta and Jasper 2001, 291). Frames can increase the prominence of perceived injustices, crystallize the identity of the agents responsible, and elevate expectations of successful redress through collective action. A rebel group's ability to co-opt disaster victims can depend on their ability to convince local populations of the intentionality of governmental disregard. Success in this endeavor should heighten the motives of individuals to align their goals with those of the group.

Finally, beyond facilitating conflict mobilization, natural disasters can also enable tactical gains for armed groups when they provide opportunities to wage violence against the state. In the Philippines, numerous reports exist of the CPP-NPA exploiting disaster devastation to instigate attacks against the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) (e.g., see Mogato 2017). Most often these attacks occur while the latter is performing humanitarian relief work in disaster-affected locations, in some cases despite a mutually agreed upon ceasefire. Scholarly evidence corroborates these accounts, finding attacks against the AFP from the CPP-NPA and other armed groups in the Philippines to be systematically higher in the aftermath of disaster (Eastin 2018).

Taken together, the combination of rising motives and incentives for conflict participation, opportunities for group mobilization, and prospects for tactical advances suggests that natural disasters have the potential to aggravate or prolong organized armed conflict. The following sections draw on fieldwork, archival and interview data to assess this argument in the context of one of the longest-running armed civil conflicts still ongoing in the world today—that associated with the CPP-NPA.

NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE PHILIPPINES

The Philippine government describes a natural disaster as "a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread . . . losses and impacts, which exceed the ability of the affected community to cope using its own resources" (Republic Act [RA] 10121, 5). Breaking this definition down into its three components—the "disruption" (environmental phenomena), the "losses and impacts" (the community's exposure to the phenomena), and the community's capacity to "cope using its own resources"—provides insight into why the Philippines experiences such high rates of calamity.

Geological and meteorological forces coalesce to magnify the Philippines' susceptibility to naturally occurring phenomena. Subduction zones abut the country's coasts, and geologic fractures and faults span its territory. These factors magnify earthquake vulnerability and render the earth that composes major Philippine landmasses especially prone to landslides. The Philippines also sits directly atop the notorious Pacific Ring of Fire, which is home to more than 75 percent of the world's volcanoes and site of 90 percent of the world's major earthquakes. The country averages five perceptible earthquakes per day and contains eighty-five active volcanoes (Daligdig and Besana 1993).

The Philippines is also prone to climatological and hydrometeorological disturbances. The high frequency of tropical cyclonic activity poses the greatest human threat. The Philippines sits squarely within a major typhoon belt. Around twenty typhoons circulate the Philippine islands each year, eight to nine of which strike land. The rising frequency of the El Niño/La Niña Southern Oscillation contributes to increasing rainfall variability. While oceanic cooling, or La Niña, increases rainfall and exacerbates typhoon risk, El Niño brings warmer and drier weather that can diminish water supplies, degrade topsoil, and heighten the incidence of forest fire and drought (Jose 2009). These incidents are especially harmful to smallholder agriculture because so much of the production relies on rainfall or on fragile irrigation systems.

Human impact on the environment, especially from deforestation, magnifies the adverse effects of these naturally occurring events. Environmental NGOs identify the Philippines as having one of the top ten highest deforestation rates in the world (McDermott 2009). Deforestation is problematic because it increases the risk of flooding,

drought, and landslides, and indirectly strengthens typhoons and storm surges. Logging and agricultural expansion, two major drivers of deforestation, degrade and erode topsoil, which can generate larger and more frequent landslides and increase the silt content of storm runoff. Silt-laden streams choke waterways and destroy coastal mangroves and reefs necessary to protect against typhoons and storm surges. Erosion also prevents water from absorbing into the soil, which increases the speed of storm runoff, and heightens the risk that downstream communities will experience flooding, especially during rainy seasons.

While the Philippine islands are uniquely predisposed to experiencing environmental phenomena, the vulnerability of the Filipino population increases the likelihood that these natural hazards will result in human disaster. One report found that although Japan and the Philippines contain approximately the same number of people exposed to tropical cyclones, a storm striking the Philippines would kill seventeen times more people than one of equal magnitude striking Japan (Ginnetti et al. 2013). The causes tend to build upon and reinforce one another, and include poverty, landlessness, agricultural dependence, and habitation in hazardous locales. In rural areas, heavy reliance on agricultural sectors coupled with unequal land ownership patterns heighten the risk of disaster and diminish people's coping capacity. Of the approximately twelve million Filipinos that rely on agriculture for livelihoods and subsistence, 36.7 percent live below the poverty line, in contrast to the national rate of 22.9 percent (Bureau of Agricultural Statistics 2013). Additionally, the distribution of farm ownership is exceedingly unequal. Farms smaller than one hectare constitute 57 percent of the total number of farms, but only cover 12 percent of the total farm area. In contrast, farms larger than ten hectares account for less than 1 percent of the number of farms, but cover over 17 percent of farm area (PSA 2015).

Furthermore, many of those who are agriculturally dependent do not own land; they rent, tenant farm, or farm surreptitiously. This landlessness and inequality can force farmers to accept pay below subsistence rates, settle in environmentally marginalized areas, and supplement income through illegal and environmentally degrading means such as illegal logging or small-scale mining. Settlement and cultivation in marginalized areas—floodplains and denuded hill slopes, for example—reinforce unsustainable farming practices that further weaken soil structures, result in poor crop yields, and increase the risk of drought and landslide. The combination of these processes reinforces

cycles of impoverishment, exacerbates food insecurity, and heightens environmental degradation, all of which magnify disaster vulnerability.

Disaster Relief and Political Discrimination

If we can gauge a household's vulnerability to disaster as a function of its recovery capacity, then the state's ability to provide relief and reconstruction assistance can partially determine vulnerability. The Philippines possesses a clearly defined institutional framework to deliver support to disaster-affected areas. However, the patronage and corruption that pervade Philippine politics, particularly at the city/ municipal and provincial levels, abet resource misappropriation toward the politically well-connected at the expense of the marginalized and vulnerable. Bankoff argues that there exists "a correlation between natural hazards and the manner in which power is articulated in society that partially explains the widening disparities of wealth . . . within the Philippines" (2003, 84). This correlation exists because

> the political elite and those with family or social ties to them, are able to consolidate and even enhance their financial and political position in society directly through the misappropriation of public money designated for relief and rehabilitation programmes, and more circuitously through the patronage that control over such funds confers upon them. . . . [The] corruption . . . is symptomatic of a 'culture' that permeates all levels of the public service down to relief workers at the disaster site and the voluntary labours of NGOs, though the scale in these latter cases is often petty. (Bankoff 2003, 100)

I advance these arguments to suggest that natural disasters and the political corruption, marginalization, and inequality they provoke provide key opportunities for groups such as the CPP-NPA to mobilize new members and supporters and wage violence against government forces, which in turn enables them to sustain their anti-state campaign.

The following section describes the institutional architecture for disaster response and outlines the ways in which local political leaders can subvert this framework to reward political supporters.

Institutional Framework for Disaster Response

In June 1978, Presidential Decree 1566 established the institutional foundation for disaster management in the Philippines. This measure

created the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC), which until 2010 served as the key institution charged with disaster management in the country. In 2010, RA 10121 modified the NDCC's management structure and renamed it the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC); however, the basic functions remain the same. The NDRRMC operates within the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), an agency created in 1972 with a mandate to protect the public during disasters and emergencies. The OCD administrator serves as the NDRRMC executive officer in charge of policy implementation and disaster management, and functions as the chief advisor to the NDRRMC chairperson, the secretary of national defense. The heads of the four government agencies whose missions most closely align with disaster and disaster relief serve as vice chairpersons. A host of other agency secretaries and bureaucratic and military agents, as well as civil society and private sector representatives, constitute the remainder of the council, bringing total NDRRMC membership to forty-four individuals.

The NDRRMC does not possess its own independent operating budget; its operational funds flow from the various agencies that comprise it, as well as lower-tier Regional (RDRRMC) and Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (LDRRMC). Although councils at all jurisdictional levels emphasize self-sufficiency in disaster mitigation and management, the primary functions of these offices are disaster relief distribution and reconstruction support. In the case of very large catastrophes, such as the eruption of Mount Pinatubo, it is common for the government to intervene and establish separate management operations.

RDRRMCs and LDRRMCs are fashioned after the national-level NDRRMC and operate at lower-level political jurisdictions. RDRRMCs serve the largest jurisdiction, an entire region, but have no administrative power or executive officeholders. The NDRRMC chairperson assigns RDRRMC chairpersons, which at the time of this writing are regional directors of the Philippine National Police.[2] Like the NDRRMC, RDRRMCs possess no operating budget independent of the member agencies. These councils are charged with establishing a Regional Operations Center, implementing policy guidelines, advising LDRRMCs, and submitting recommendations to the NDRRMC.

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2. The regional OCD chief serves as executive administrator of the RDRRMC. In Autonomous Regions, chief executives serve this role, and in Metro Manila, the chairperson of the Metro Manila Development Authority.

LDRRMCs operate at lower jurisdictional levels or local government units (LGUs): the provincial, city/municipal, and barangay levels. The chief executive of each of these divisions (governor, mayor, barangay captain) serves as the chairperson of their respective LDRRMCs. The geographic scope of a disaster's effects determines administrative responsibility for disaster response. City/municipal LDRRMCs manage disasters that affect more than one barangay, while provincial LDRRMCs manage disasters affecting more than one city/municipality.

Funding for disaster relief and reconstruction activities, as well as disaster mitigation and preparedness, originates from national and local disaster risk reduction and management funds, commonly known as "calamity funds." The Congress of the Philippines appropriates national calamity funds under the General Appropriations Act (GAA), subject to presidential approval. The NDRRMC then recommends to the president specific allocation amounts for each of its member agencies. Each agency must allocate no less than 30 percent of the calamity funds for "quick response" to manage crises during emergency periods. At the local levels, LGUs reserve their calamity funds in a similar fashion to their national counterparts. RA 10121, which created the NDRRMC and LDRRMCs, requires that LGUs set aside at least 5 percent of their annual revenue as calamity funds. Of this 5 percent, 30 percent is for "quick response."

Mechanisms for Political Discrimination

LDRRMCs are the most important links in the disaster risk reduction and management framework. Their proximity to the population requires that they "take the lead in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from the effects of any disaster" (RA 10121, 21).[3] This requirement demands that agencies within a local government unit's LDRRMC handle the greatest share of emergency management, including damage assessment, resource requirement identification, and resource delivery. The result is that the lion's share of relief resources (both monetary and nonmonetary) is channeled through LGU chief executives, who are then responsible for distribution to the public. That local officials, via local legislative boards, also possess the capacity to declare a "state of calamity" enhances this power because

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3. This point was also reiterated in the author's interview with Edgardo Ollet, former chief of the NDRRMC Operations Center (OpCen), October 25, 2011.

doing so enables them to release (and request more) money from their calamity funds[4] and empowers them to enter into negotiated procurement contracts.[5]

These powers can be problematic because they provide local officials with tremendous leeway in determining where and to whom to allocate humanitarian relief resources, and with a means for circumventing government procurement regulations.[6] Both of these capabilities can be used as tools to reward supporters or punish defectors. In one interview, a barangay captain in the municipality of Saint Bernard, Southern Leyte, recounted that following a disaster his predecessor routinely refused to ask the mayor for access to calamity funds because the fact that he and the mayor belonged to different political parties implied that his request would be denied out of hand, regardless of the extent of destruction incurred in his barangay.[7] The result is that residents of his barangay were often left with no form of government compensation, relief aid, or access to public goods and services. Additional interviewees reported similar experiences in other disaster-prone areas.[8]

Far from damaging reelection chances, this selective allocation of disaster relief and reconstruction work can help consolidate local officials' power by facilitating personal enrichment and increasing future electoral success through political patronage. Disaster victims who suffer this discrimination can petition officials directly in hope of receiving some assistance. However, these requests often necessitate

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4. In practice, calamity funds can be difficult to access, and in some cases barangay officials have been reported to provide funds out of pocket to assist in relief and recovery. However, personal fund distribution can actually add to the perception of corruption because disaster victims are seen to depend on the largesse of local officials rather than governmental funds (Frago-Marasigan 2014).

5. See Republic Act 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act.

6. In some cases, LGUs have even attempted to enter into procurement mode and access calamity funds without a state of calamity in their region, as well as to falsify calamity declarations, in order to take advantage of these powers (see CA-G.R. SP No. 96611and G.R. No. 147767 for court case records).

7. Author's interview with Danilo A. Galera, November 15, 2011.

8. In conversations with LDRRMC staff members in various LDRRMC offices in Western Samar, Eastern Samar, Northern Samar, Southern Leyte, and Albay, individuals commonly reported that their local mayors often politicized disaster relief for the expectation of future electoral support. Although city councils technically have approval power for fund disbursal, they seldom offer more than rubber-stamp endorsement.

promises of future electoral support, which subverts the democratic process and enhances dependency. For citizens who have the capacity to travel to the municipal center to make entreaties, this strategy can also carry longer-term costs because it can place them at political odds with their respective barangay captains, which can motivate future retaliation. The result for the marginalized and vulnerable can be increased scarcity of basic subsistence resources, with little capacity to improve or challenge the situation. In one rural barangay within Calbayog City, Western Samar, the barangay captain, who requested to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation, recounted in a conversation that because of political disagreements with the current mayor, residents had recently gone for weeks with only minimal access to food and clean drinking water following especially severe flooding. The floods destroyed crops, wrecked harvests, and contaminated the local well with sewage overflow. The only option for consumable goods access required travel to the city proper; however, this option was not feasible for most residents because of high transportation costs and high prices of clean water in the city. The local office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) offered a "one-day survival" package of one kilo of rice and a box of sardines as a token gesture, but these offerings were made selectively and distributed only in the city center, which again was not a feasible journey for many of those affected to make.

Consequences include entrenched poverty, diminished social mobility, greater inequality, and isolation from the state, all of which exacerbate vulnerability and heighten anti-state grievances. Occasionally, public outcry reaches a breaking point and protests emerge. In the months following Typhoon Pablo, which killed over one thousand Filipinos in December 2012, public protests erupted at a local DSWD office in Davao City, and at the junction of the Agusan-Davao Highway in Montevista, Compostela Valley, blocking traffic for more than twelve hours (Dalumpines 2013; Escalante 2013). The stated goal of the protests was to call officials to account for politicization and selective allocation of relief goods, and the government's mismanagement of over USD 450 million of international aid and calamity funds. Although it is possible that political opponents of local officials and agency heads organized these protests to serve their own political ends, the example nevertheless indicates the power that disasters have to act as what Birkland (1998) describes as "focusing events," or focal points for citizen mobilization. Indeed, if these processes can facilitate large-

scale protests, it is feasible that they might also encourage some to take up arms against the state.

Nongovernment and faith-based charitable organizations provide a modest alternative to government support, although resources and organizational capacity are limited. However, for the state, relying on these institutions to provide relief can be problematic because those that conduct this work have, in times past, been friendly with leftist social movements such as the CPP-NPA. The Catholic Church, for example, has established a network of Social Action Centers (SAC) within its parishes across the country following the Second Vatican Council's call for greater church involvement in social issues. Notably, owing to their proximity to and work with impoverished and marginalized Filipinos, SACs have historically been hotbeds for revolutionary discourse, producing a number of CPP-NPA cadres, and assisting with NPA recruitment throughout the movement's history (Caouette 2004; Jones 1989). Another source of assistance arises from non-faith-based civil society organizations, or "people's organizations," such as the Citizens' Disaster Response Centers (CDRC), a network of affiliated disaster support organizations located across the country. These centers provide community-based disaster management, which includes not only emergency response but also disaster preparedness and mitigation training, rehabilitation, and public advocacy. Similar to the Church, the CDRCs have historically been sympathetic to the Left, and have provided disaster relief both to and alongside NPA guerrillas.[9] Indeed, the CDRC's mission statement cites its work with "social movements that address poverty, social inequalities, and extractive, environmentally-destructive practices, policies and systems" as a key organizational goal (CDRC 2018). Carlos Padolina, the CDRC deputy executive director in Manila, suggests that problems that arise when providing support in CPP-NPA-occupied areas only occur when the AFP requests to accompany them on relief missions as an escort—ostensibly for intelligence-gathering purposes. When the AFP makes these requests, the types of work these institutions can conduct can be limited.[10]

Thus, while NGOs can provide a limited alternative to the government, their relationship with the Left in many cases facilitates, or at least does not hinder, the opportunities that disasters and

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9. Author's interview with Carlos Padolina, November 10, 2011.
10. Ibid.

discriminatory politics create for the CPP-NPA. In the following section, I build upon this point to outline how the CPP-NPA, the oldest insurgent group in the country still in operation, exploits the political opportunities that disasters provide to augment its political base and recruit new followers.

FROM DISASTER TO CONFLICT: THE CASE OF THE CPP-NPA

In 1968 in Central Luzon, Jose Maria Sison, a University of the Philippines teaching fellow and activist, founded the Communist Party of the Philippines following his expulsion from the party's communist precursor, Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP). The CPP, the ideological arm of the revolution, espouses a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine to counter the semicolonial nature of Philippine society and the exploitative capitalism and US imperialism that fuel it. In 1969, CPP founders created the New People's Army, the military wing of the party, in order to instigate a peasant uprising, a protracted people's war, which called for the building of a mass base among the rural peasantry. CPP cadres founded the movement's third wing, the National Democratic Front Philippines (NDF or NDFP), in 1973. The NDF acts as the united front organization, the political wing to supplement the ideological and military actions of the CPP-NPA. The NDF consists of a constellation of legal and semilegal institutions including trade unions, faith-based groups, human rights organizations, political parties, and lobby groups that engage in various types of advocacy work, service provision, political alliance building, and other activities designed to strengthen public opposition to the status quo.

At its height in 1986, the CPP-NPA possessed approximately twenty-five thousand fighters and thirty thousand CPP members and had an active presence in sixty-nine out of eighty provinces (International Crisis Group 2011; Santos and Santos 2010). However, a number of setbacks during the latter half of the 1980s and the 1990s reduced its organizational strength. A failure to fully co-opt the political opportunity that Marcos's 1986 ouster provided, internal disagreements over party ideology and political and military strategies, the splintering off of several breakaway factions, and a series of deadly internal purges within the Mindanao fronts all combined to instigate a precipitous decline in capacity and membership (Rocamora 1994). However, in the years following, the movement has regained some of its original momentum through a consolidation and reaffirmation of core principles and

ideologies, coupled with a renewed attention to mobilizing the rural peasantry. Currently, a primary obstacle for the movement stems from difficulties in recruiting educated new cadres to rejuvenate party leadership. A relaxation of recruitment standards has resulted in more instances of abuse than had existed before in the movement, as less ideologically inclined guerrillas exploit their position to coerce and steal. In certain areas, this lack of discipline has caused the local population to eschew NPA involvement, which has damaged its credibility (e.g., see Kwiatkowski 2008).

Nevertheless, the movement soldiers on. The most recent and reliable reports cite the group's strength at four to five thousand (Santos and Santos 2010). What explains this group's persistence? I suggest the CPP-NPA's resolve and capacity to maintain their campaign stem in part from environmental instability and disaster vulnerability in the Philippines, and their ability to successfully exploit these opportunities to mobilize public support. Though the Armed Forces of the Philippines has claimed for years that the movement is waning, evidence regarding the group's capacity to wage attacks against military forces suggests otherwise. Data drawn from Berman et al. (2011) indicate that the number of NPA attacks on government forces have steadily increased from approximately one hundred in 1995 to over one thousand each in 2006 and 2007, the final year of their data collection efforts.[11] Given that the AFP has reported relatively few major military successes in the years since 2007, it is not far-fetched to assume that the NPA has been successful at sustaining or even increasing these operations to the present day.[12]

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11. The data that inform this statistic are drawn from the dataset that Berman et al. (2011) used to conduct their empirical analysis and is described on page 504 of that manuscript. These authors were kind enough to share their dataset with me, which is where I obtained this information and that from Quezon Province referenced in figure 1 later in the text.

12. While the author has been unable to locate reliable, publicly available statistics on contemporary CPP-NPA membership, the group has continually waged attacks on military and CAFGU installations since 2007 and, as of 2017, is showing no signs of halting these actions. Indeed, were the group's recruitment and attack capabilities to collapse, then one might anticipate the group to be more forthcoming with their participation in peace talks and more willing (by necessity) to limit their violent campaign. However, this has not been the case. Rather, the 2017 peace talks have collapsed because of the CPP-NPA's continual engagement with military personnel during counterinsurgency operations.

CPP-NPA Recruitment

Although there exist regional variations in recruitment strategy based on the movement's previous community presence or particularities in local political economy, the NPA traditionally employs a standard set of recruitment protocols throughout the organization (Caouette 2004, 229). Assuming no prior community presence, CPP cadres begin by establishing ties with a local contact sympathetic to the cause. A small number of cadres will then move into the village—often into the contact's own home—to facilitate introduction to other villagers and to gather information about community problems in order to tailor their political message. These cadres, to the extent that security constraints allow, might perform or assist in community services such as education and literacy training, health care, or agricultural work (Kwiatkowski 2008, 241). In exchange, they ask residents to attend small community meetings at night to discuss local issues and the movement's message, and to enable the party to assess the capabilities and willingness of villagers to support the cause. Eager participants are enlisted to recruit others who might also be inclined to engage. During the day, cadres ask receptive residents to participate in group activities designed to encourage cooperation and collective action. In describing this process, "Leonard," a former CPP member who spent several years recruiting, stated:[13]

> We [cadres] would begin by assigning them [villagers] to do small tasks like digging a new latrine or rebuilding an irrigation system. It was important to show them what they could achieve, to get them to understand how to work together. It helped them build trust with each other and with us. After a project was finished, everyone would meet and talk about it. We would ask them what went well and what went wrong. We would ask them what they could have done better. This self-criticism and self-evaluation were very important. . . . Many had never done this before. It taught them awareness, to reflect on their actions and to be critical.[14]

As the rapport builds, the initial meetings develop into longer political seminars and indoctrination sessions that elaborate the movement's message and relate how the ideological adherence to the

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13. "Leonard" is a pseudonym.
14. Author's interview with "Leonard," December 4, 2011.

NPA can empower villagers. Efforts are made to frame these messages in such a way that identifies and accentuates local injustices, names the agent or agents responsible, and formulates solutions, all while conveying the movement's overarching political goals in a way that resonates with the villagers' cultural and normative experiences. The objective is total political indoctrination, and to leave in place a "party branch," a group of individuals fully integrated as activists and awaiting assignment to the various political or military positions within the movement. Once the recruiting cadres complete this process, they move on to other communities, ultimately developing what Rutten describes as "a state-like political organization, loosely centralized, that reache[s] from the national level down to region, district, section, and village, with party committees staffed by local men and women" (1996, 115).

This strategy provides a gateway for the NPA to expand. Its purpose is to establish a presence, attract future CPP cadres or NPA fighters, and develop a foundation for revolutionary taxation that provides funds for the movement to operate. Once this expansion is complete, members work to co-opt or coerce local officials and other non-aligned residents to cooperate with the NPA to provide food, shelter, information, money, and other resources to NPA fighters, and to eschew involvement with the military. When cooperation is not forthcoming, the NPA employs coercive tactics to maintain discipline, exert control, and facilitate resource extraction.[15]

In addition to direct recruitment, the National Democratic Front, the CPP-NPA's united front organization, and its affiliated institutions or people's organizations also work to mobilize a broader political base that includes middle class, business and industry leaders, and politicians. The NDF conducts advocacy campaigns, distributes propaganda, plans strikes and protest movements, works to build legal and political alliances, and performs human rights work—all to advance the cause of the revolution. It has had notable successes at these broad-based mobilizations, particularly within the Catholic Church (Caouette 2004). While the NDF and its affiliates do not engage in the type of direct party recruitment described above, these institutions conduct workshops, perform services, and hold political education seminars that are likely very similar to activities CPP-NPA cadres perform during standard recruitment procedures.

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15. Ibid.

Natural Disasters and the CPP-NPA

A substantial portion of the propaganda the NPA espouses in seminars and in the movement's public communiqués emphasizes natural disasters, environmental degradation, and the need for environmental protection as rationale for the movement.[16] While there are some doubts about the veracity of these claims (Gaillard 2015), a disaster's occurrence can substantiate them because it exemplifies the environmental consequences of political corruption and unchecked corporate expansion and places these concepts in a local context familiar to victims. In this capacity, a disaster can provide a focal point around which to build public support. Political corruption surrounding the disaster's causes and consequences can further enhance the salience of this propaganda, which can increase the disconnect citizens feel toward state institutions and boost the attractiveness of supporting alternatives to the status quo. This corruption can also increase the level of material deprivation in excluded communities, which can decrease the opportunity costs of joining the CPP-NPA.

Providing assistance and reconstruction work in disaster-damaged and excluded areas builds upon these processes by bolstering the public's perception of the CPP-NPA as a movement for the people, despite a long record of exploitation. These actions also provide opportunities for the group to interact with locals in a helpful and constructive capacity, which enables cadres and NPA soldiers to build trust and rapport among residents and supports the movement's efforts to consolidate political support. In areas the NPA has already secured, these actions can rebuild or reinforce community ties that might have frayed during violent military confrontations or while extracting resources from residents. In areas where the movement seeks to expand, providing assistance can provide rhetorical justification for NPA presence and can provide opportunities to hold more indoctrination seminars. In both types of community, these actions can act as tipping points that motivate villagers to join the movement, and can encourage future reciprocal behavior—providing food, shelter, resources, or support to NPA fighters—among those who do not join. "Carlos,"[17] a cadre who has held a high-level position in the CPP Central Committee explains:

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16. For example, a simple search of the word "environment" on the CPP-NPA's website (www.philippinerevolution.net) generated 354 hits that each link to CPP-NPA public bulletins. The words "disaster" and "typhoon" generated 129 hits and 85 hits, respectively (accessed November 15, 2015).

17. "Carlos" is a pseudonym.

In experiences with communities effectively led by or with strong presence of the CPP-NPA and other revolutionary organizations, the people are always very grateful for whatever help these organizations are able to render to them. The CPP-NPA and other revolutionary organizations rendering assistance . . . boost these communities' appreciation and support . . . not only in those times of disaster but further on. They become all the more faithful and solid supporters of the CPP-led revolutionary movement. Disasters may have temporarily economically weakened the mass bases and expansion areas of the CPP-NPA . . . but these organizations' assistance in the relief efforts have politically strengthened them . . . Such activities as disaster relief are able to pave the way for more numerous new recruits, particularly in areas where consolidation is still being developed and in areas of expansion.[18]

Three factors determine when and where the NPA will provide relief and what kind of assistance they can offer: proximity, practical capability, and security.[19] Proximity refers to the location of NPA units relative to the disaster-affected area. NPA units and revolutionary people's organizations affiliated with the NDF are more likely to perform relief operations in communities within or near the areas they inhabit because of their familiarity with the locale's political, socioeconomic, and cultural conditions and physical geography, the latter of which lends them an advantage in defending themselves in the case of a military exchange. Practical capability refers to the NPA's capacity to respond. Because the NPA is a resource-poor group, it often provides services (rather than goods) such as evacuation assistance and repair and reconstruction of farms, fields, wells, houses, and community buildings. In consolidated areas, this assistance can involve mobilizing sympathetic individuals in neighboring communities to assist in these activities. More capable units might have the ability to provide medical and technical support, equipment, temporary shelter, food, clothing, and seeds for replanting. Depending on the relationship between NPA units and government officials in a given area, relief assistance might even include working directly alongside government relief providers, though this is not common. Finally, security refers to the NPA's

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18. Author's interview with Carlos, December 5, 2011.
19. Ibid.

capacity to operate openly without risk of attack from the AFP, the Philippine National Police, or locally sourced paramilitary units (Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units). Security concerns in nonconsolidated and militarily contested areas might necessitate that members who seek to provide assistance disguise themselves as NGO personnel or civilian volunteers.[20] In the case of very large disasters or those that strike in contested areas, it is common for the group to declare a ceasefire (either unilateral or reciprocal with the AFP) so that they might operate with greater impunity; however, to what extent these ceasefires are genuine or opportunistic is unclear.[21] In areas where security concerns dominate and no ceasefire is in place, the NPA might still provide assistance but limit their actions to coordinating communications from a remote location.

The following section details a case that illustrates precisely how the CPP-NPA mobilizes its forces for relief distribution. This anecdote was recounted during an interview with a former NPA commander, "David," who worked in Quezon Province during the time these actions took place.[22] I have supplemented this account with data on Tropical Depression Winnie and from NPA combat activities in Quezon Province drawn from Berman et al. (2011).

Disaster Mobilization: The NPA in Quezon Province

On 29 November 2004, Tropical Depression Winnie, one of the strongest storms of the year, struck the Philippine landmass, killing 1,593 people and generating economic damage totaling almost PHP 750 million (Wingard and Brändlin 2013). Its arrival, the third in a succession of four consecutive storms, caused widespread flooding and landslides, with damage concentrated in and around the municipalities of Real, Infanta, and General Nakar in the northern portion of Quezon Province. These events caused the death of more than 1,400 people and destroyed farms, houses, infrastructure, telephone lines, and other facilities in these municipalities. In some areas, the floodwaters were so strong that many victims were forced to spend days on the roofs of

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20. Ibid.
21. During these ceasefires, it is not uncommon for opportunistic behavior, such as surreptitious attacks (NPA and AFP) or looting of relief convoys (NPA), to occur. Both the AFP and the NPA claim violations with virtually every major ceasefire declaration, and both deny the other's claims.
22. Information about the CPP-NPA's actions in Quezon Province was taken from the author's interview with "David" on May 17, 2012.

nearby buildings (Gaillard, Liamzon, and Villanueva 2007, 261). Authorities calculate that Winnie, along with the two storms that preceded it and the one that followed, caused damage equal to approximately 0.35 percent of the gross domestic product (Virola 2004; Gaillard, Liamzon, and Villanueva 2007).

The night the disasters occurred, NPA forces were gathered near the town proper in Infanta. This proximity, coupled with the absence of military, police, and paramilitary units nearby, enabled NPA fighters to assist victims nearby in evacuating to higher ground. The following day, the NPA unit called a meeting to organize the people in these areas to assist with the rehabilitation of their damaged property. NPA forces divided themselves into teams and proceeded to work on providing security, repairs, production work, and housework. One team helped in repairing the wrecked irrigation system; others in replanting rice, root crops, or vegetables in washed out farms; and another in rebuilding destroyed houses.

Local roads remained impassable for a month after the storms. These conditions meant that other relief providers, including government agencies, NGOs, and private organizations, could only deliver relief supplies as far as Real. To assist, the North Quezon NPA unit communicated with other local CPP branches, NPA forces, and, in particular, their network of aboveground organizations from Real to General Nakar to coordinate the movement of relief goods and building materials and the repair of damaged roads. Once the goods were delivered, the NPA and its affiliates, alongside local residents, assisted with infrastructure repair and rehabilitation. In exchange for the assistance, the NPA used the evenings to hold meetings with the individuals involved in the relief aid distribution and reconstruction work in order to conduct political education seminars for them.

In January 2005, after immediate work was finished, the CPP leadership in North Quezon formed a comprehensive plan for a longer-term response to the disasters' effects. This plan involved establishing a people's organization, an aboveground legal entity, to cover the entire North Quezon subprovince and its three municipalities. Once established, the organization assisted with the more widespread gathering and distribution of relief and rehabilitation support, service provision to distressed communities, and coordination of the individuals and organizations involved from nearby cities, municipalities, and rural barangays in the subprovince. Following its establishment, affiliated individuals solicited food, clothes, household goods, tools, seeds, and

Figure 1. Combat in Quezon Province, 1995–1997.

other resources from local allies, friends, and unaffected communities nearby, as well as provincial and Manila-based disaster organizations and other relief aid sources. Grassroots chapters were established at the barangay level in order to systematize the process. In addition to its relief efforts, this organization conducted education and training and gave financial allowances to the full-time organizers, relief workers, and organizational staff. During this process, the NPA organized *bayanihan* (collective voluntary work) mobilizations to assist in these activities. This campaign lasted for more than two years.

In seeking to build upon these efforts' political and practical successes, the CPP-NPA in 2006 relaunched the organization with the aim of improving local agricultural production. However, by this time the Armed Forces of the Philippines had gotten wind of the increases in CPP-NPA strength in the area, and moved to establish several military detachments and checkpoints throughout the subprovince. The security situation became more tenuous as military hostilities intensified and the AFP began harassing and threatening the organization's officers and members. Because of this, the activists desisted from their activities and the disaster mitigation campaign ebbed to a point from which it has not yet recovered.

Although not conclusive, data on NPA military activities within Quezon Province corroborate the possibility that these actions boosted CPP-NPA strength in the area, at least temporarily. Figure 1 displays

the number of CPP-NPA and AFP soldiers killed/wounded in action in Quezon Province from 1995 to 2007.[23] As figure 1 indicates, combat interactions held a relatively steady trajectory until 2005, the year following the storms—all of which occurred in late November and early December 2004. In 2005, the number of AFP soldiers that NPA soldiers killed or wounded spiked, increasing from 22 in 2004 to 104 in 2005, while the number of CPP-NPA killed or wounded in Quezon decreased from 22 to 16. Although the precise level of support these actions generated is impossible to ascertain, this evidence suggests that these actions had the intended effects, as public support and assistance can be crucial for guerrilla fighters to conduct offensive operations. The decline in AFP killed/wounded following 2005 is likely a result of the AFP's amplification of its counterinsurgency campaign in the province following the realization that insurgent support and presence had grown.

CONCLUSION

This paper discusses the impact that natural disasters have had on armed rebellion in the Philippines with data from the CPP-NPA conflict. It has sought to demonstrate how disasters and the livelihood crises they create have enabled the group to increase public support and participation by providing humanitarian relief and reconstruction support to affected communities, and by tailoring their political message to capitalize on institutional weaknesses in the state's system of disaster response. The result has prolonged the group's ability to sustain itself and enhanced its capabilities in militarily challenging the state. The section detailing the CPP-NPA's activities in Quezon following Tropical Storm Winnie provides a firsthand account of the tactics the group employs in affected communities to gain political advantage and supplements this account with data that demonstrate the potential efficacy of these tactics on the group's ability to wage attacks against the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Moving forward, future research would do well to examine the ways in which the state might diminish the effects that disasters can have on conflict processes. One possibility is to explore how governments might use natural disasters and well-executed disaster relief and reconstruction provision as mechanisms to build public

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23. Data for figure 1 are drawn from Berman et al. (2011).

legitimacy and trust. While one might expect that if discriminatory political institutions can exacerbate conflict in a disaster's wake, and that transparent institutions and depoliticized relief distribution might reduce it, little research exists to support this claim. A second possibility is to explore the extent that state agents—military and police forces—are able to capitalize on the same factors that enable insurgent groups like the CPP-NPA to build support in communities in contested regions post-disaster. The process of providing humanitarian relief, which is often a duty of military forces in war zones, partially corresponds to duties associated with population-centric (hearts and minds) counterinsurgency strategies (Cuny 1989). However, the extent that state military forces capitalize on these processes to improve their own capabilities on the battlefield remains an open question.❈

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PROCEEDINGS
Third World Studies Center
Fortieth Anniversary: Directors' Forum

9–10 FEBRUARY 2017
GT-TOYOTA ASIAN CENTER AUDITORIUM
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY

At forty, the Third World Studies Center (TWSC) gathered in this multidisciplinary conference its vast and resilient network of scholars and public intellectuals, academics and activists, advocates and bearers of unorthodox views from different parts of the globe. The conference aim was twofold. First, it was a time to reflect on the center's enduring history and its contributions to critical scholarship on Philippine, regional, and global issues. The center has encompassed anti-authoritarian scholarship and social movements, peace studies and human security, democratization and critical articulations of the nation, political economy of transnational corporations and the history of mass transit, and digital piracy and cybersex—pioneering research efforts that established the TWSC as a premier social science research center. Second, the conference extended the role of the Center as meeting point for established intellectuals and young, emerging scholars. It renewed a space that fosters the development of critical, alternative paradigms to promote progressive scholarship and action for change. It covered the following themes: political economy and globalization, social movements, authoritarianism and democratic governance, peace and human security, culture and identity, (new) media and technology.

Dr. Alfred W. McCoy, Harrington Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin–Madison was the keynote speaker. There were two plenary sessions, consisting of : 1) the center's former directors and respected scholars whose long academic histories have

included doing research in the Philippines; and 2) the TWSC visiting research fellows.

The following proceedings of the first plenary panel, comprised of former and current TWSC directors, revisited the research agenda and engagements of TWSC in the past forty years, on how it has contributed to the growth of critical scholarship on the Philippines and the Third World. It also discussed how TWSC can further enrich social science inquiries in the Philippines.

RANDOLF "RANDY" S. DAVID (Founding director, TWSC, 1977–1992): TWSC has survived these last forty years. First of all, I really want to express my gratitude and appreciation to TWSC's present director, Dr. Ricardo Jose and the center's tireless team for putting together this incredible gathering of foreign and Filipino scholars to mark another milestone in the life of this institution in which I spent a good part of my academic life—fifteen years to be exact.

The Third World Studies Program was formally launched at a small colloquium during the first year of Dr. Francisco "Dodong" Nemenzo Jr.'s deanship of the College of Arts and Sciences (CAS). The year was 1977 and the so-called New Society of Ferdinand Marcos was five years old. Life under martial law had just begun to normalize. The regime was feeling somewhat more confident in its grip over the country's political system. Opposition politicians, critical journalists, activist professors, and students who had been arrested at the onset of the dictatorship were being released from prison in trickles to demonstrate the return to political normalcy. There was also some relaxation in the travel ban and professors were gradually being allowed to attend conferences abroad after undergoing what we used to call ideological inoculation under the President's Center for Advanced Studies, which used to be housed in this center [Asian Center].

Dodong himself, the new CAS dean, had just been released from prison, and to that colloquium, we had invited four principal guests to its auspicious founding event—all of them dead now—namely: former Senator Jose "Pepe" Diokno, Maris's father, also newly released from prison; the writer Renato Constantino, my father in-law, who had just been freed from extended house arrest; the economist Alejandro "Ding" Lichauco; and the writer-diplomat Salvador "SP" Lopez, the immediate past president of the University of the Philippines (UP), who had been replaced by Dr. Onofre "OD" Corpuz. There were no prepared papers nor lectures. The purpose of that quiet gathering was to get the views of the guests and of the small audience of the UP

faculty on what they thought should be the main concerns of this new program, and what initiatives it might launch, mindful of the restrictive political atmosphere in which the university was still operating.

We thought that the nomenclature "Third World Studies" sounded safe and broad enough to encompass issues that were important to us but would not directly put us in confrontation with the Marcos regime. The concept also conjured a vision of a world divided between two opposing ideological camps—one capitalist and the other socialist—and a third, residual group of newly sprung nation-states that were being pulled toward one side or the other. The term also enjoyed currency in mainstream media, not least because the number of strongmen from Asia, Africa, and Latin America were vying for leadership of this third camp. From Southeast Asia, for example, there were Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia's Mahathir, and of course, our very own Ferdinand Marcos. From Africa—North Africa—the voice of Libya's strongman, Muammar Gaddafi, resonated everywhere, promising to use his country's petrodollars to support liberation struggles against Western imperialism.

"Third World" clearly signified many things to many people. For us, the term perfectly summed up everything we thought was worth inquiring into in order to understand the roots of the country's most persistent problems, namely: mass poverty, gross social inequality, a stagnant economy, and a profoundly corrupt authoritarian political system. At the same time, the concept also sensitized us to the rapidly changing world environment that framed these questions and problems.

I remember how one of the very first research topics that commanded our attention was the concept of the "export processing zone;" a business model that was already being carried out in countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia—the rising tiger economies—and which the Marcos regime wanted to test in the Philippines through the establishment of the Bataan Export Processing Zone in Mariveles. Here, foreign companies were invited to set up factories, offered the most lavish tax breaks, and guaranteed an army of cheap and docile workers. We looked into this model, its pernicious effects on labor rights and working conditions, on the living conditions of the displaced communities, on the environment, and on the national economy as a whole. And we came to the conclusion that these export processing platforms, which were engaged not in the manufacture of finished products, but rather, in the intermediate processing of components for re-export, could not possibly contribute

to the development of an industrial economy. But four years later, to our surprise, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing invited us to a conference on export processing zones. China was obviously fishing for lessons from the experiences of other countries. By 1982, China began building massive export platforms, which became the backbone of its program of rapid economic growth—in effect, really pulling the rug from underneath the radical Maoist movement, which was operating in the Philippines. Export platforms became the key to accelerated technology transfer, access to capital and to markets, and a way of mobilizing a large army of workers who were streaming into China's cities. The Chinese, obviously, saw something that was happening in the world economy, which we could only catch a glimpse of—a small glimpse of—and they acted with lightning speed to seize the opportunity and on a scale no other country could match.

We saw this unfolding phenomenon, signified by export processing zones in the mid-1970s, and called it by the awkward term "transnationalization." From this standpoint of our unyielding vision of nationalist industrialization, we could only regard it as a threat, rather than as something to recognize, prepare for, and possibly seize as an opportunity.

In 1974, the Marcos government began to send Filipino workers to the Middle East and teachers to Nigeria as a show of goodwill and as a way to earn foreign exchange to pay for our oil imports that had, in the meantime, quadrupled in price. Thus was launched the huge labor export program that has sent millions of Filipino workers and professionals to employment destinations abroad and which has grown into the Philippines' largest source of foreign exchange until now. Yet at its inception, labor export in the Philippines was supposed to be no more than a stop-gap measure to tide the country over through a difficult period. By sheer accident, therefore, the Philippines found itself at the birthing of a global labor market that had been made possible by advances in modern travel and communication.

At TWSC, it took us almost a decade before we could take notice of this global shift and begin publishing seminal studies on the social and economic impact of the overseas contract worker phenomenon. One would be hard pressed to find a comparable development in Philippine society that can equal the overall impact of the overseas Filipino worker program on our people's way of life. It is difficult to imagine what other kind of economy can support the countless shopping malls that we find today in nearly every corner of our large

cities and towns. Or what sources of income would have permitted the exponential growth of the telecom sector, the banking sector, and the construction industry. One would need to only take a look at the rapid expansion of tertiary schools in the provinces, offering courses in nursing and information technology to understand where a large chunk of overseas Filipino worker remittances has been going. These schools have created the gigantic supply of English-speaking young graduates from whose ranks the emerging business process outsourcing industry has been drawing its workers. Today, the business process outsourcing industry has gone beyond call centers and has become the second largest foreign exchange earner for the country, next only to overseas Filipino worker remittances.

Clearly, what is upon us is a pattern of social and economic development that has come about largely in response to the contingencies of a global economic system that is far more complex than we could figure out through the prisms of Dependency Theory or the Mode of Production Theory—perspectives which had guided our thinking during the first two decades of the center's existence.

Indeed, there was a time when we had felt compelled to revisit the usefulness of the Third World concept itself in light, not only of the collapse of Eastern European socialism, but of the Soviet Union itself. Perhaps something like a "Center for Global Studies" would have quickly appeased our apprehensions. But there was something in the increasingly popular notion of globalization and modernity that we felt did not quite capture the realities that we face at home: mass poverty, social exclusion, worsening inequality, the growing populist resentment, and the call for strongmen. A "Third World" perspective has had the advantage of keeping us thematically focused on what it means to be consigned to the periphery of world society—even as we try to understand the complex dynamics of a world society that is structurally segmented along modern functional lines, rather than along the old, imperialist spheres of influence.

But at the same time, a world systems view has become a necessary antidote to the nationalist nativism that has, of late, shaped the vision of the growing populist backlash against globalization. It has allowed us to see, for example, climate change as an integral part of our own problems, to identify with the suffering of refugees and migrants across the globe who are being brutalized by the war and tyranny; and to march in solidarity with social movements that are fighting bigotry,

fascism, extremism, racism, intolerance, and other forms of oppression in various parts of the world.

We, the observers of our societies and of the world that we share, have a common cause in bringing about a kinder, gentler, more prosperous, more equal, and more democratic world society. But we are also mindful of the fact that our discourses are very much shaped by the events that we seek to analyze, and no less, by the heritage of ideals we have received from the cultures that we inhabit. All these could be a source of many intellectual blind spots. We need to bring the lenses of the various disciplines together in creative interaction so we can minimize the dangers of being trapped in sterile, academic echo chambers.

That, to me, has always been the function of TWSC—to serve as an incubator of progressive ideas and a refuge for the dwindling number of irreverent scholars, dissident intellectuals, and social activists, wherever they may come from, and whatever cause they may champion. Thank you.

MARIA SERENA "MARIS" I. DIOKNO (Director, TWSC, 1995–2000): My appointment as the director came at a time, which Randy (David) has described, when some colleagues in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy were questioning the relevance of the term "Third World." Of course, some found it outdated, given the end of the Cold War, during which the term was born, and the emergence of new conceptual frames that challenged the once dominant dependency theory and center-periphery frameworks and so on.

Globalization was rising as the new scheme of things, and so, alternative names to TWSC began to be floating, like the "Global Studies Center," which Randy mentioned, and at one time, I also heard "International Studies." I also suspect, although I do not know this for a fact, but I do not know if there was some perception, underlying the question of the term, that the center, as a member of the college, maybe was not relating enough to the college, either in its activities, or with regard to its faculty. Anyway, nothing came out of this fairly quiet exchange of views. If you know, in the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, having a subdued exchange of views is quite unusual and the name of the center remained untouched.

TWSC has always had a research mandate directed to the problem of development, undevelopment, underdevelopment and the accompanying problems of poverty, inequity. But during my time—

and I do not know if things have changed Rico (Jose)—the center had no research funds, either from the college or from the UP Diliman campus, so part of my job as director was to find funds. And since none seemed forthcoming from the university, we took the bold step of bidding for a project, which was offered by, okay, we will admit, the United States Agency for International Development. This project, we rather ambitiously called the "Philippine Democracy Agenda." Now, to be sure, this was ironic and unprecedented on the part of the center, and we thought long and hard about bidding for the United States Agency for International Development project, checking and rechecking the terms of reference, ascertaining without doubt that we had absolute freedom to design and run the project totally on our own without any interference whatsoever from the donor agency, and there was none. Indeed, as it turned out, our biggest challenge was learning to cope with the accounting requirements of the US government. The financial aspect of the project was the unhappiest for me as it also required that the Social Sciences and Philosophy Research Foundation, the foundation of the college, as the recipient of the agency, was in solid financial form, and at the time, the foundation of the college was in a fledgling condition, and I had the unhappy task of balancing that with the financial requirements of the project. In any case, our project did not receive a single negative comment by the US accounting agency. Believe it or not, I received a closure letter all the way from Washington, saying that the project was successfully closed.

If I have gone into some detail about the financial aspect of the project, it is only because there is a lesson or two to be learned from it: that the center needed—I suppose still needs—secure research funding, preferably from the university, rather than outside it, and that financial management is, unfortunately, a requirement of project management, which cannot be easily be assigned to another because of the liabilities entailed. We all want to retire in peace and mine is coming up in a couple of years.

Our "Philippine Democracy Agenda" was partly a response to the upcoming celebration of the nation's centennial in 1998 and the recognition that the work of nation-building was not yet complete—of course, might it ever be? If Randy's time was about the dictatorship, mine was the era of national construction or reconstruction, depending on your point of view. While popular empowerment was the main theme a decade earlier, we were seeing that the process of democratization, which we had all hoped would be transformative and liberating after

we ousted the dictatorship, was not turning out quite so. Hence, we decided to examine three major themes: 1) perspectives of democracy and citizenship in Filipino political culture; 2) Philippine state-civil society relations in policy-making; and 3) the dynamics of and relations within civil society. This was a massive eighteen-month project that resulted in the three-volume work. The third volume was edited by Miriam Coronel-Ferrer, my deputy director at that time; the second volume was edited by our excellent researchers, who unfortunately, have since left TWSC: Marlon Wui and Glenda Lopez—they ended up marrying each other, happily. I worked on the first volume. The books resulted from three major conferences, Baguio, Davao, and Cebu; in which the total of some 140 persons took part. We made every effort to invite participants from different segments of Filipino society, certainly more non-academics than academics took part, and I recall that some of the discussions were quite contentious, exactly the stuff that makes social sciences attractive and worthwhile. Our argument then, which I think remains relevant today, is that civil society is the main arena of our democratic undertaking, both as the author of democratic ideas and approaches, and as the actor in the transformation of these ideas and strategies into action.

Looking back at the action agenda that resulted from the project, much remains to be done, and here's another lesson to be learned: we academics can excel at crafting social agenda, but giving life to the agenda is not only the province of the university, and perhaps, this is the point I wish to end with this morning. As we review the life of the center, we find ourselves thinking again about our present, dim as it seems, and our future. The historian in me seeks to understand why things happen the way they did and the backstory, the silenced narratives that help us understand the picture better. But understanding isn't enough, not in the times we live in. What TWSC has always represented to me is that artful combination of research and advocacy without sacrificing one or the other, and the courage, equally an act of intellect and of citizenship, to state and advance its positions on oftentimes controversial issues. Francisco Nemenzo Jr., the founder of TWSC, once said that it was, I quote, "a refuge for radical academics." I still recall the history modules of the center that we worked on—I was a starting instructor then; Randy was the director—and offered seminars to young people and the numerous talks that the center organized in the height of martial law. The center is no longer a refuge today, but we still need a center that is unafraid to take positions it can defend,

not with alternative facts, but with solid evidence, and following the intellectual standards of critical thought. Above all, we need to reach out to the public outside the academic world, a public that is prepared to question our ways and challenge our most basic beliefs in a technologically-driven arena.

Today's new themes, like populist authoritarianism, are concerns we share not only with developing countries, but interestingly enough, with the most developed ones, so we have now reached the stage where we can welcome the almighty West to the Third World. Thank you.

MIRIAM "IYE" CORONEL-FERRER (Director, TWSC, 2000–2004): When I joined TWSC [as director], by the time of 2000, Maris (Diokno) left. Some of the achievements under Maris's leadership were in the domains of social movements, cause-oriented groups, the language of democratization, civil society, and others. But the discourses were already shifting by that time. These shifts included from socialism and capitalism to social capital, but not yet social media; from anti-imperialism to globalization; and many of our works at that time tried to weave these together. We came up with books that looked at globalization and civil society discourses at the local level. We had summer courses and certificate courses on globalization, human security, and a joint Association of Southeast Asian Nations university network and Korean Association of Southeast Asian Studies conference on regional cooperation and identity-building in East Asia and the age of post-Cold War globalization. Was this shift in language a de-radicalization, or, you know, from very tough social movement/civil society anti-imperialism discourse to globalization? Did it signify a de-radicalization or a sign of the changing times that reflect the weaknesses or the incompleteness of the previous languages of discourse? I think Randy (David) alluded a little bit to the latter in his speech. So that's why, at that time, we already knew we needed to come up with a new edition of the Third World Studies language book. It is a 1990 book called the *Political Dictionary for Community Organizers*. It is a dictionary where all the current terms at that time were defined, but the terms were, indeed, changing. However, we never managed to do that, and it is not too late to produce one now.

So from there, our *Kasarinlan* themes also addressed the key themes of that time. We had an issue devoted to economies influx, indigenous peoples, gender and sexuality, arms and militaries, environment, information technology—IT was a big, new thing—and

the world after 9/11. Of course, 9/11, at the turn of the century, was
one major event. Terrorism was the all-new discourse, the global war
on terrorism. It marked the new epoch in ways different from the
guerrilla-based insurgencies that marked the cold war period too. In
new methodologies, dichotomies were highlighted. So what did we do
in the light of these developments? We organized several conferences.
There was a conference co-organized with the Iraq Solidarity Campaign
Philippines. Even a sit-in conference at the Palma Hall lobby to protest
the war that was going on at that time that followed 9/11, just like in
the old days, you know, discussing the new international developments
that were taking place. Our "Policy Dialogue Series" or "Academe
Meets the Government" also reflected key current issues in Philippine
politics. In 2001, 2002, we had forums like "Bayan Ko after 9/11"
with then Vice-President Teofisto Guingona speaking. Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo's program for the poor, EDSA 3 and beyond, remember? We
had EDSA 2 and then we had EDSA 3; crime and punishment on the
plunder of Joseph Estrada. We had Ruben Carranza, then with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, Department of
Justice officials, and several other members of the UP faculty. So we can
see that these were the themes, and beyond forums, we also staged our
protests.

TWSC at that time became some kind of a hub for mobilizing the
university on what eventually became EDSA 2. We even did a paid ad
and we had a very important paragraph in our paid ad. I cannot
remember the acronym now, but it was a nice acronym that we used
to bring UP closer to the developments to oust Estrada. One paragraph
in that paid ad said, "To Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in a sense, we are
recognizing you as the successor because constitutionally, you are the
one allowed to assume the presidency, but you must make sure that
you will take good care of this," and we know what happened
afterwards. But at least, we warned everyone in our paid ad. We were
not blind to the possible consequence at that time.

Other issues were issues of foreign peace to the country, then and
now, still on top of the national agenda. Remember after 9/11, the
Communist Party of the Philippines and Jose Maria Sison were listed
in the US list of terrorists; and the late Angelo Reyes, then defense
secretary of Macapagal Arroyo, waged a war on the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front, breaking the ceasefire. So we did participate in the
all-out peace campaign at that time, together with the peace networks

that I was also linked with outside and protesting some of these policies.

Our guest lecturers from around the world included people who represented key events of that period. We had Emilia Pires of East Timor. Remember, the violence that happened in East Timor, eventually East Timor becoming independent and we did do something on Burma's role in democracy with exiled Burmese scholars coming in to speak at the university. But let me move now to some of the other themes, we held roundtable discussions with our international fellows. Yes, of course, let us not forget, because I saw some of them today. At that time, we had a lot of Japanese fellows, but again, at the turn of the century, we were already transiting to having more Koreans and some Europeans and North Americans, but maybe very soon, we will have a lot of Chinese, let us see. Yeah, why not? But let me acknowledge some of them. [Akiko Watanabe], one of our fellows who did very good work. Actually, she lived in a Muslim community in Tandang Sora. Her very strict professor required her to live and stay with a professor to do work on the diaspora, the Muslim communities in different parts of Manila, at that time, a very, very new and pioneering study.

Now, a lot of these issues at the turn of the twentieth century are still with us, perhaps for the worse, as the data on armed conflict, for instance, show that the second decade of the twenty-first century has actually brought on more wars. As the rise of state and non-state, to quote Alfred McCoy earlier, "demagogues in their violent rhetoric" have risen, have come to the fore, but I added non-state because demagogues are also found outside the sphere of the state. The language of organizing, of course, we find newer terms, like "fake news," "alternative facts," "drug wars," new protest forms, like the mannequin challenge, Post-it, instead of "Operation Pinta" or "Operation Dikit." You know, Post-it, you post your slogan on the toilet, just using a Post-it, go around, very innovative. Nevertheless, the key tools remain the same for us: critical analysis; vibrant discourse; cohesive and comprehensive synthesis; good, thorough research. Do we need to change our name? What is in a name?

The work with students among intellectuals remain our key arena. Mobilizations in key moments, I think, TWSC was there. And, in any case, they do come quite often here in the Philippines because as we know, Philippine politics is forever a period of interesting times. So I think I will end here and thank you all for this opportunity to see you all again.

TERESA "TESA" ENCARNACION S. TADEM (DIRECTOR, TWSC, 2004–2010): Good morning to everyone. First of all, I would like to congratulate TWSC director Dr. Rico Jose in organizing this conference to celebrate TWSC's fortieth anniversary. There is, indeed, a cause for celebration because through its four decades of existence, the center has served as a research hub, not only locally, but also internationally. It is, therefore, of relevance to revisit the research agenda and engagements of the center as the members of this plenary panel were requested to do by Dr. Jose, and to examine how the TWSC has contributed to the growth of critical scholarship in the Philippines and the third world. More importantly, how it can further enrich social science inquiries in the country. My comments will come mainly from my experience and my involvement in the TWSC as a research assistant when I joined it in 1982 when Randy (David) was the director, and its deputy director from 1987 to 1990, and later on, as its director from 2003 to 2012—fourteen years, one year short of Randy's.

In the 1980s, the TWSC was the pioneer in pursuing research in several social science arenas, among which was on political economy studies. Foremost of this was the center's cutting-edge research on the political economy of Mindanao, focusing on multinational corporations and their local counterparts' involvement in agri-business. The TWSC also embarked on a three-year Southeast Asian regional project on transnationalization, the state, and the people, the first part of which was in 1984, and the second part in 1985. Funded by the United Nations University, it was a regional undertaking, which included academic activists from other progressive institutions in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore. I would consider this as a precursor to studies on globalization, as it examines the country's integration into the world capitalist system and what has been its impact, not only economically, but also politically and socio-culturally.

There was always the search for alternative development and political strategies for social transformation. The United Nations University research project was also a study of authoritarianism in the Southeast Asian region. For the Philippine case study, it examined the Ferdinand Marcos regime, the role of the military, Philippine technocracy, among others. It looked into the people's movements and the problems of the struggle against the dictator and the end of foreign domination.

A third important area of study, which the TWSC embarked on, was the Philippine Left movement, primarily the Communist Party of

the Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front, as well as independent Left formations. The center was at the forefront of publishing debates, which were going on in the Left movement, producing two trailblazing volumes on Marxism in the Philippines. The first came out in 1984 and looked into the relevance of Marxist theory in examining the Philippine political economy and the various stages of the Philippine revolution. The second one, which came out in 1988, touched on the debates, which emerged in the Left movement at the crossroads with the end of authoritarian rule.

As for TWSC's contribution to the growth of critical research, Ricardo Reyes, former secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Philippines executive committee, in an interview I had with him last year, expressed that the TWSC played a crucial role in providing a venue through its lecture discussions, forums, and publications, among others, of the debates, which were going on in the party, as this could not be expressed within the Communist Party of the Philippines. The significance of the studies of the TWSC can also be attested by the following: one, the very well-attended Marxism lecture series, which fed into these two book volumes; second, TWSC publications attracted a vast number of progressive scholars, both local and foreign, who either formally affiliated with the center, or unofficially took part in its activities; thirdly, it developed a community of scholar activists from UP Diliman, UP Manila, Ateneo de Manila University, other academic institutions, and research nongovernment organizations, who proudly bore the title of TWSC fellows, and whose works were also published by the center; fourthly, the TWSC established a pioneering library that became an important resource for progressive and Left-wing works, and utilized extensively by faculty, students, and nongovernment organizations; and fifthly, the center's materials are being used in courses taught in the social sciences and in training programs by nongovernment organization practitioners.

TWSC's contribution to the growth of critical research can also be attributed to its engagement with government officials, an example of this was the center's "Academe Meets Government" series, which was launched in the advent of the 1986 People Power Revolution. The series, which was the first of its kind, invited cabinet secretaries of the Corazon Aquino administration to dialogue with academics and key players in civil society. The proceedings of these forums were published in *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*. The series provided the template, which the university pursued with the succeeding

administrations. These major concerns of the TWSC, when I joined, continued to be primary issues, which are now problematized under the context of the challenges to the democratization process under oligarchical rule. More than a decade later, as the center's director, we continued to see the importance of political economy research as exemplified in globalization and social movement studies. The center has come out with a United Nations Development Programme-funded project, "People, Profit, and Politics: State-Civil Society Relations in the Context of Globalization" and the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development-funded "Localizing and Transnationalizing Contentious Politics, Global Civil Society Movements in the Philippines," a joint project with counterparts in Senegal, Argentina, and Bolivia, and this came out as an international publication of the TWSC staff. Thanks to a grant from the Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program, the center embarked on its research on the impact of globalization on local communities, comparing the Philippine entire experiences, the case studies of which were published in the *Philippine Political Science Journal.*

Democratization studies, in general, and the part of social movements in this process remain to be of importance during the post-martial law period. New dimensions have emerged on the research project on the peace process between the Philippine government with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army-National Democratic Front and the Moro National Liberation Front or the MNLF, which were started by TWSC directors Maris Diokno and Miriam Coronel-Ferrer. In 2010, the center also came out with *Revisiting Marxism in the Philippines* (a selection of essays drawn from the 1984 and 1988 volumes of *Marxism in the Philippines*) and *Marxism in the Philippines: Continuing Engagements* as it continued to examine the concerns and dilemmas confronting the Philippine Left under a new political dispensation. Other new research concerns were on human security and reviving memories of the martial law regime, as in the "Mendiola Narratives," and the research project on an oral history of the Marcos technocrats, a collaborative project with Japanese colleagues.

Much of the relevance of the writings of the TWSC, as well as its publications, I believe, has much to do with the center's role in providing a place for progressive scholars coming from a broad ideological spectrum a venue where their views and ideas could be articulated and debated. This, for me, spelled the relevance of social science research in the center. These views and ideas are not just for

research's sake, but toward providing solutions and alternatives to address current and present problems in Philippine society. When I came in to the center in the 1980s, I noted that its vibrancy and relevance were drawn from the comradeship of scholars, public intellectuals, social movement activists, among others, as well as the local and foreign academic activist networks, like the Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives or ARENA. During the latter part of the martial law period, the TWSC provided a nursing ground for the formation of various important political formations, like Jose W. Diokno's Kaakbay or the Movement for National Independence and Sovereignty; the Independent Caucus, which later evolved into a socialist formation Bukluran sa Ikauunlad ng Sosyalistang Isip at Gawa or BISIG; as well as progressive student organizations as earlier on mentioned by vice chancellor Fidel Nemenzo, the Third World Students' Circle and the Concerned Students of UP.

After the 1986 People Power Revolution, although there emerged other Left research centers, such as the Institute for Popular Democracy—its previous director Joel Rocamora is here—and Focus on the Global South, the TWSC continues to have the unique role of being a progressive center, which is based in the academe. Furthermore, it is not identified with a particular Left bloc. Much of this can be attributed to its founder, Francisco "Dodong" Nemenzo Jr., when he was dean of the UP College of Arts and Sciences, and its first director, Randy David. Because of this, the TWSC plays the distinctive role of a Left research center, which continues to attract progressive scholars and networks from all sides of the Left ideological spectrum. It is this community of progressive scholars and activists, of which the TWSC has been part of, which it has developed and continues to be involved with, that make for relevant social science research. Such an engagement has always been and should remain to be critical, and should continually reflect in the center's pursuit of research projects and other engagements. Thank you.

MARIA ELA L. ATIENZA (Director, TWSC, 2010–2013): Good morning to all of you. I know I am standing between your lunch and the end of this plenary panel, but allow me to share some of my ideas and experiences with TWSC and I'm very glad to be part of this very important activity of the center.

I can say that my formal engagement with the TWSC started as the deputy director of Tesa (Tadem) in 2007 and when I became the director in 2010. But actually in 1988 during the semester break of my

freshman year, I was convinced by my Political Science 11 instructor by the name of Ms. Teresa Encarnacion to join the Third World Studies Students' Circle, so I spent my semester break attending a one-week seminar. So, I got oriented with the activities of TWSC very early in my UP career, and I have participated in a lot of its activities in different capacities.

Now, let me say something about the period from 2010 to mid-2013, when I was the director of TWSC. I was fortunate to arrive at the center at a time when the themes of the center have expanded. At that time, we were already dealing with political economy and globalization, social movements, authoritarianism and democratic governance, peace and human security, culture and identity, and new media and technology, so you can see how the themes of the center have expanded.

Now, for the first major question of this plenary panel, "Has TWSC made contributions to the growth of critical scholarship in the Philippines?" At that time, TWSC, of course, has been driven by the research agenda of the center, as well as the individual research interests of its core team, representing different backgrounds. Earlier, we credited the administrative team of TWSC. I can also say that while directors and deputy directors come and go, what is crucial with the TWSC is the core of the research staff, and I am very fortunate also that during my time as director, I had a very energetic and young team of researchers, and I think most of them are still here. It is still the core team supporting Dr. Rico Jose.

TWSC has also produced some groundbreaking research in different areas catering to the different groups in the country and elsewhere, and it has also engaged with a diverse set of groups within and outside the country. Research has been guided by different research methodologies. Training, advocacy, and exchanges have linked TWSC with different institutions locally and internationally. We were also responding to the mood of the times: the growth of social media and advances in information communication technology; greater opportunities for research dissemination and collaboration here and abroad; more support within UP and outside for research—there were more research funding also from within UP—and worldwide experiments with advocacy and uprisings, such as the Occupy movement and the Arab Spring. There was also the growing prominence of new social movements for the environment and combating climate change; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender movements; and other identity movements.

During my term as director, you will see diversity in terms of our research interests. We had the "Mendiola: Memory and History of Contested Space," "Narratives of the Revolution: An Oral History of the Communist Party of the Philippines," and "Plaza Miranda: History of Violence, Memories, and Pursuits of Truth, Focusing on Narratives and History." We also ventured into textbook and readings production. We had two volumes of the *Third World Perspectives on Politics*, a series of selected and annotated readings for a number of Political Science courses. We are still working on three other volumes. And, of course, Tesa already mentioned the project "Examining the Impact and Responses to Globalization of Local Communities in the Philippines and Thailand." We worked with researchers from Chulalongkorn University, and this was also funded by Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program, headed by Dr. Maris Diokno. We continued the study on human security by focusing on developing a human security index, so we ventured into index development. We produced a draft and pilot tested it first with five municipalities in Luzon and the Visayas, and then we got a UP Diliman grant to do one pilot testing in one municipality in Mindanao. This was our engagement, not only with United Nations Development Programme, but also with the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. It also enabled us to work with a number of province-based colleges, universities, and civil society organizations, and it was a learning experience for us because on the one hand, we were training them to do research, such as doing surveys, fieldwork, and focus group discussions; but in the process, they brought in a lot of their talents and expertise. Even now, we receive inquiries if certain universities, civil society organizations, and students can actually use our questionnaire for their own research. One particular university, Polytechnic University of the Philippines in Mulanay, was also successful in mainstreaming human security as a result of our engagement with them, and they have contributed in developing a municipal plan, focusing on human security and involving the contingent of the Philippine Army in Quezon Province. So we looked at that project as an important engagement with local actors.

We also ventured into more research-based projects using UP funds. We have two research projects here: the "UP Diliman Handbook on Academic and Authorial Integrity" and "Dishonesty and Disgrace: A History of the University of the Philippines' Responses to Alleged Acts of Plagiarism Committed by its Faculty Members." So it's a growing interest that we think, as a research center, we also have to

address, and we feel that we can help the university actually address this particular problem.

From a comparative perspective, during my term, we were also successful in starting, and it is still an on-going project, the "The Asian Democracy Index." Through the initiatives of Sungkonghoe University in South Korea, we became part of the Asian Democracy Consortium. The project has since grown to include not just Southeast Asian and Korean examples or case studies, but we have expanded to include South Asia.

And then, of course, you will also see the interest of our research staff with new, innovative projects, such as "Cybersex in the Anti-Development State: Life Histories and Labor Politics" and "Toxic Biopolitics: Tracing Risk Discourses in the Philippine Cosmetics Industry."

You will also see that in our training and advocacy, we were able to bring in a lot of scholars through the South-South Exchange Programme for Research on the History of Development Social Movements in the South Lecture Series. We have speakers from South Africa and also from Egypt.

We were also trying to develop a draft TWSC charter, where I asked every former director to give their inputs to clarify the relationship of the TWSC with the college, and we also want to establish a council of fellows. But I heard that the college has a different appreciation of this, and to this day, the draft TWSC charter is in limbo.

Let me briefly focus on the question "What can TWSC do to enrich social science inquiries in the Philippines?"

First, I believe that we should continue contributing to public discourse through our many activities by addressing a lot of pressing issues. These include, of course, remembering the lessons of martial law to counter the authoritarian nostalgia, understanding populism and strongmen, conducting public policy debates on a lot of policy issues, like climate change, the death penalty, fake news, charter change, the war on drugs, and others.

Second, TWSC can do comparative research on the following issues: social movements during populist periods, developing countries' experiences with institutional and constitutional reform, peace processes, human security and disaster issues, and other issues that are relevant not only for the Philippines but other countries as well.

Third, TWSC should continue doing research on local and everyday politics as well as engaging and empowering the local, meaning partner institutes, civil society organizations, and even local governments.

Fourth, TWSC must continue developing a culture of research and writing in UP, and also spreading the research ethics and knowledge to all our fellow researchers and teachers in the Philippines.

Fifth, engaging government, both at the national and local agencies, and possibly developing policy briefs and situationers based on our research are important extension activities for TWSC.

Sixth, with the implementation of K-12, it is important to engage Grades 11 and 12 teachers with our research outputs, which we have produced in different formats that can be used as study and teaching materials.

And seventh, going back to the failed—should I call it a failed—TWSC charter? I think in whatever form, it is important to solidify the role of TWSC within the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy and UP as one of the premier social science centers of the university and in the Philippines as a whole where we can provide a space for multidisciplinary, innovative, and groundbreaking research and advocacies for marginalized and alternative perspectives confronting the Philippines and other countries, in search for greater justice, equity, and equality. Thank you very much.

RICARDO "RICO" T. JOSE (DIRECTOR, TWSC, 2013–present): Thank you very much, Ela (Atienza), for that presentation. That brings us up to date. Now, I would just like to close this session, perhaps, by saying I took over in 2013. Ela just dropped by my room and asked if I could take over, and I had not been very active with TWSC up to that point. I had attended a lot of the lectures, I was also familiar with some of the guests, and all of this, and I think I met Alfred McCoy in one of the fora in the basement of Palma Hall. But after she saw me, I asked for some time to think about it, and then Tesa also saw me, and then Tesa's husband too. So all of a sudden, there was a lot of people who were asking me to take over TWSC.

I will not summarize what I have done. I have finished one term, three years, and I am onto my second term now. We have continued many of the programs that they have started. We organized the public lecture series and one of them focused on martial law, because we recognized that the commemorations of martial law were fading fast, and the newer generation—millenials—hardly knew anything about it, and so that is where we started this public lecture series on martial law. And we were surprised at how little the younger generation really knew, and that it was our responsibility to do something about it. That

started because of the move of the College of Business Administration to rename themselves into the Virata School of Business Administration. We were the only organization within UP to actually try to question that.

Recently, with the burial of Marcos in the Libingan ng mga Bayani (Heroes Cemetery), we also held a forum on that, again, one of the few organizations to actually do that. We received a lot of flak from the trolls and it was then that we realized also what trolls were. Our page was taken down within a few hours of our putting the notices out and we realized that this still needs further study: the Internet, social media, and how it is actually being used. People are now talking about the propaganda war being waged in the Internet. That is something we still have to explore, but anyway, as a result of the presentations this morning, I suddenly missed the Faculty Center conference hall, with images of all those conferences that were held there. Intimate discussions, students and faculty meeting each other, and what I observed is that that was an intimate gathering, so I hope we have something like that in the near future. Again, thank you very much for coming.❁

Past and present directors of TWSC. From left to right: Ricardo Jose, Randolf David, Maria Serena Diokno, Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Teresa Encarnacion Tadem, and Maria Ela Atienza.

PROCEEDINGS

Tribute to Dodong Nemenzo, TWSC Founder

9 FEBRUARY 2017
GT-TOYOTA ASIAN CENTER AUDITORIUM
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
DILIMAN, QUEZON CITY

The Third World Studies Center (TWSC) celebrated its fortieth anniversary in 2017. This milestone will not be possible without its founder, Professor Emeritus Francisco "Dodong" Nemenzo. If not for his idea back in 1977, at the height of martial law, to create a subversive space for academics against the Marcos dictatorship, the TWSC will not be here. It was his inspired act of courage that was sustained in four decades by successive directors, deputies, and research and administrative staff.

What started as a program with a collective of activist-scholars under Dodong's office as then dean of the College of Arts and Sciences is now an established academic institution. Through its researchers and networks of scholars, TWSC pursues pioneering researches on political economy and globalization, social movements, authoritarianism and democratic governance, peace and human security, culture and identity, and (new) media and technology. The mimeographed papers of early years led to the founding of *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*, now a highly regarded academic journal. The TWSC's numerous books and monographs are now supplemented with works in documentary filmmaking.

At forty, TWSC continues to strive to be a space for critical scholarship, for researches that question received wisdom at the same time that TWSC reflects on its participation in knowledge creation. This is the scholarly commitment that we hope is worthy of the legacy of an audacious intellect that stands up against brute force and dogma.

In recognition of Dodong's role in founding and nurturing the TWSC in the past four decades, we organized a small tribute for him during the international conference to celebrate TWSC's fortieth anniversary. The tribute was held on 9 February 2017 (Thursday), from 5:00–6:00 p.m. at the GT-Toyota Asian Center Auditorium, Asian Center, University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman. We invited Dodong and his family, and his colleagues from the UP, to be there.

RICARDO JOSE (Director, TWSC, 2013–present): This is a special occasion. Today is the fortieth anniversary of TWSC. It is also the birthday of Dodong Nemenzo. The concept of TWSC was Dodong's idea. Let as start by playing a short video about TWSC. And after that, I will be asking some of you to pay tribute to Dodong.

EMERLINDA R. ROMAN (President, University of the Philippines, 2005–2011; Chancellor, University of the Philippines Diliman, 1991–1993, 1999–2005): Let me start on a light note. I took over as UP president on 10 February 2005. Alfredo Pascual took over on 10 February 2011. And tomorrow, February 10, Danilo Concepcion takes over as UP president. Have you ever wondered why February 10? This cutoff date happens to be the date after Dodong's birthday. Dodong turned seventy on 9 February 2005. I took over as president the following day. And thereafter, the cutoff date has been set every six years of February 10. This may seem trivial but since that time when I took over I have always associated the changing of the guards of UP with Dodong's birthday.

Even before Dr. Nemenzo took over as president of UP, he was already worried and frustrated with UP's seeming drift to mediocrity. While UP at that time continues to be recognized as the country's top university, it was also becoming increasingly clear that it was no longer able to send a clear example of what is superior for the rest of the country. Instead, UP only reflected the conditions of the rest of the country. This was president Nemenzo's lament. The widespread concern was that indeed UP's standards were deteriorating. Perhaps the alarm bells were not ringing loud enough and that UP has started to adopt an attitude of making do or *pwede na*. This was unacceptable to Dodong. When he took over the helm of UP, he was clear about what he wanted to do: stem the so-called drift to mediocrity. Dodong's advantage was that he already knew what was wrong. After all, his entire career has been spent in UP except for periods of time when he went

for graduate studies abroad and when he accepted stints in the United Kingdom and Australia.

He knew what had to be done, and he set out to address the issues of progress. Academic excellence became the main goal. Among his initiatives as president were the revitalization of the General Education (GE) program and modernization. UP's GE program holds an essential place in the education of a UP student. Many consider it as that which gives a *tatak* (mark) UP to our graduates. President Nemenzo has time and again argued that the UP undergraduate education should prepare students for continuing self-education through the GE program, adding that premature specialization at the undergraduate level would only produce half-baked technicians. The revision of the program was among the first items in his agenda for UP. Revitalizing the GE program was met with a lot of complaints, criticisms, even opposition. There was debate throughout the university especially in Diliman, but Dodong had expected that this will happen and was in fact happy that the university was finally back to arguing and debating clearly an important academic issue. You see, there was a time when Dodong had felt that UP had changed. Gone were the days that the University Council meetings provided the venue for the lively discussion of substantive academic issues. Thus, when debates on Dodong's Revitalized General Education Program ensued, he was very glad that once again debates have returned in UP, and the faculty are talking about intellectual work, not about punctuation marks that were lacking in the minutes of University Council meetings. Attention was not only confined to the GE program. President Nemenzo wanted to create an environment that would support the faculty members' intellectual pursuits, improving the faculty profile like providing generous faculty development grants, rewarding excellence by giving generous awards for excellent teaching and research, reviewing tenure and promotion policies, modernizing infrastructure—the libraries and the laboratories—revisiting the university's admission policies, and many others, were among the programs he signed for UP to catch up with other universities in the region and to prepare it for the twenty-first century.

President Nemenzo knew that the job of the president included having to attend to administrative responsibilities like defending the UP budget, especially, facing the members of Congress who took over during budget hearings, pursuing efficiency measures, fund raising, even making sure all toilets are renovated and have running water. No

responsibility was ever too small or too inconsequential for him. That was how fully committed he was to being at the helm of the university that has been his home throughout his entire career.

When I took over as UP president, I had no difficulty deciding on my plans for UP. I saw myself as continuing Dodong's work, taking it further and stirring the university to the next stage. I was aware that continuing his programs, programs that I believed in, would further cement what he had started. I said to myself, "How can one argue against academic excellence?" or "How can one argue against doing what is best for the faculty who are the university's most important resource?"

I knew Dodong from a distance when I first joined the UP Diliman faculty. Already at that time, I learned about him from how people talk about Dodong. And Dodong may not know about this. My first encounter with him was on an Ikot jeepney. I was a mere instructor, and he and I were seated right next to each other. I knew who he was, and I am sure he did not know me. But he struck a conversation with me, and I was thrilled that he even spoke to me. My next close encounter with him was when I became University Secretary and he was the faculty regent. He was going to attend a conference in the United States of America (US) and was having difficulty getting a US Visa. As secretary, I had to contact the US Embassy to help him get one. He had problems alright, and only after repeated attempts did he finally get one. Incidentally, at the US port of entry, he even had difficulty getting in, even with his visa. Anyway, when he came back from the US, he gave me a *pasalubong*, a pack of chocolates. Again, I was thrilled.

These are the little things I will always remember about Dodong, and of course there are many big things as well, among which was working closely with him when he appointed me chancellor in 1999, and when he gave full support in my bid for the UP presidency.

President Nemenzo, we celebrate all that you have given us over the past several decades. We toast to your presence among us, your modesty, and your friendship, your unwillingness to tolerate anything less than excellent, and for never faltering to be fed truths and principles. You have sustained UP and strengthened it by making us realize why UP matters and what matters about UP. Thank you Dodong for all that you have done for UP. We are deeply grateful. Happy birthday.

LESLIE E. BAUZON (Dean, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, 1983-1989): Over the years, I have come to admire Dr. Nemenzo's outstanding powers of thought and analysis, his firm grasp of political science, his unique ability to relate one event with another, and his capacity to relate his field of political science with public administration, history, economics, and other academic disciplines in the social sciences and philosophy. From the time I first met Dr. Nemenzo as a colleague in UP in Diliman, I have fully been impressed with his commitment to the world of culture and civilization, the world of continuing dialogue with other minds and discovery of ideas.

As teacher, scholar, and administrator, Dr. Nemenzo has committed himself toward helping people around him, to make this world as their very own, and to make his colleagues look beyond their particular role, and see how the issues of this world link to the other world around us. He helped his fellow academics to master the new and to balance the new against the old. I am pleased to say that Dr. Nemenzo has played a crucial role in providing his fellow scholars a perspective designed to equip them, including myself, to live their private and social existence in a meaningful way. He has helped develop the powers of everyone around him for enhanced appreciation and thoughtfulness, seeing relationships, and sharing it in ways that go beyond life's most narrow confines. These powers that we all possess are in turn relevant to the faltering objectives of our private and social existence, to the improvement of human society. I believe that Dr. Nemenzo has succeeded in imbuing these to the minds of his fellow academics. Dr. Nemenzo, to my mind, has provided his colleagues and fellow human beings with his experience of quality scholarship. This passion for scholarship is what he works so hard to impart to the readers of his major publications. I checked his work, and I found a listing of some of his most widely read publications worldwide, for example, "Land for the Landless Program of the Philippine Government," which came out in 1959 (master's thesis, University of the Philippines); "Revolution and Counter-Revolution: A Study of British Colonial Policy as a Factor in the Growth and Disintegration of National-Liberation Movements in Burma and Malaya," which came out in 1964 (PhD diss., Victoria University of Manchester); *The Continuing Relevance of Academic Freedom* that former president Roman mentioned, which came out in 1977 and published by TWSC; *Rectification Process in the Philippine Communist Movement*, which came out in Singapore in 1982; "The Current Philippine Crises and the Immediate Post-Marcos

Future," which came out in 1983; and last but not the least, the publication entitled *The Philippines After Marcos*, published in New York by St. Martin's Press in 1985 (co-edited with R.J. May).

He advocated scholarship that is free from the constraints of prejudice and unexamined assumptions. To this day, he fosters the freedom to choose, to define values and purposes, and to follow them freely, the freedom to follow the imperatives of our own principles. Dr. Nemenzo nurtured that conception of liberation, which has something to do with the sense of connectedness of things. This in turn has to do with going beyond narrow present-mindedness so that we, his fellow scholars, will have the power to build not only the present world but also the world that is unfolding as we face the future.

Allow me to reminisce a little about TWSC during my term as the first dean of the UP College of Social Sciences and Philosophy from 1983 to 1989. At that time, we encouraged shared responsibility and better coordination to best maximize the academic services that we have to offer to our constituents. This was true in the case of TWSC. Under the administrative wing of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, TWSC was allowed maximum autonomy. This was to infuse the existing general program that revisit the role of Western colonialism and its contemporary manifestations in the Global South, along with alternative perspectives to development, including the scholarly contributions from the neo-Marxist, the dependency, and the World Systems theories, other than that offered by the conventional modernization school. The effect of this has been enormously significant particularly in introducing and exposing the students to the concept of committed scholarship through its publications program as well as its periodic seminars and lectures featuring both visiting international as well as local scholars based on their respective researches and publications. If I may declare with great pride and sense of accomplishment as a supporter, TWSC's accomplishments throughout the years have been intellectually reinvigorating, critical, and provocative. The center's projects have included and continue to include researchers that critically explore themes related to colonialism and post-colonialism, alternative development theories, and ethical, political, and economic issues related to or impacted by corporate-led neoliberal globalization, for example, global warming, environmental degradation, labor rights, human rights, and defense of the global commerce from World Bank-induced corporate assault. Moreover, TWSC has conducted and continues to conduct training programs as well as workshops on

alternative curricula for the social sciences courses with a decidedly progressive or a Third World perspective. TWSC has done these in part through year-round lecture series on the Philippines and on the realities both historically and contemporarily in the Global South. During my term, Prof. Randolf David, who is here with us, and toward the end of my term, Dr. Maria Cynthia Rose Bautista observed ably as director and deputy director of TWSC, respectively. I salute Dr. Nemenzo for his role as founder of TWSC and I warmly congratulate TWSC under its current director Dr. Ricardo Jose in upholding the academic excellence of this important center of the national university of the Philippines. Thank you very much for listening and may you all have good health. Good evening.

CONSUELO J. PAZ (DEAN, COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PHILOSOPHY, 1992–1998): You cannot be a UP professor unless you share yourself, meaning you share what you learn, what you experience with your students and the community. Dodong, Thank you very much.

MARIA SERENA I. DIOKNO (DIRECTOR, TWSC, 1995–2000): I think Dodong represents the breed of intellectuals of UP whom we have sadly lost. I was talking recently with colleagues my age, meaning about to retire in a year or two, and we were reminiscing about the times we grew up in the old College of Arts and Sciences. We had the most exciting, the most fascinating faculty meetings, with all the drama and the walk outs. It was wonderful. I was a young instructor, and we would sit on what we call the bleachers portion of the second floor because all of you brave ones would be upfront. We would watch and applaud the debates. We were asking ourselves, "What happened? Where have we, our generation, failed?" Maybe we were not able to reproduce intellectuals like yourself. We missed that very much. When Dodong was dean, he had an eye for spotting young people who were not exactly very conventional, to put it kindly. He called me once before I left to study abroad. He said, "Maris, when are you leaving?" I said, "soon." I had my grant to study. He said, "No, I want my son Fidel to take his history classes under you." I think Fidel was just about to start college at that time when I was a starting instructor. So for a part of the martial law era, I was abroad studying.

Dodong always believed that there could not be a political science without history. He affirmed what we have long known to accept that history is the queen of social sciences. I got to know Dodong in many

capacities. He always made the faculty feel that he was a human being. He did not let us call him "sir." Everyone else, we had to call them sir or ma'am, but with you it was always "you call me Dodong." This is how we grew up in UP, with Dodong around, his constant presence in our discussions.

He knew UP inside-out. You knew how the university ran. Sometimes, as president he also felt like he was a dean, which made things a little bit difficult. When we send the appointment papers to the president, normally we would hope that he would just sign. There were occasions when he would read everything, and the papers would come back to me with "Please issue a memo to the faculty. They are not to use 'PhD candidate.' A PhD is a PhD period." And he spelled period, p-e-r-i-o-d. That meant that I had to tell everyone to put it only when you complete it.

I think best of all, Dodong, your sense of humor is what I found attractive. Even when we were in a midst of a fight, there was always something you could find to remark about, which brought out your essential humanity. Of course I will not forget how you challenged Sonny Osmeña over the budget. We took out a full-page ad because he threatened to cut the UP budget. I think at that time when you used to go to the budget hearings, the senators would not go. Maybe John Henry "Sonny" Osmeña and one or two others would, but most people would just send their staff. The following year, because of your struggle against Osmeña and he lost the election, we were surprised when we attended the budget hearing because all of the senators were there. I whispered to someone, "What happened? How come everybody is here?" They do not want what happened to Sonny Osmeña to happen to them.

We are so happy that you are still with us, well, and getting better. Not too long ago, I asked him, "Are you finally writing your memoir? Are you finally telling us stories that we have long wanted to hear?" He said at that time, "yes but not for public consumption, only for the family." I remember asking him, "But why? You know historians want to know the inside story of things." And you explained to me that as you grow older, you had come to renew friendships with people in various movements whom at one time or another you had very strong differences with. And you do not want to destroy what you have been able to build in your old age by writing a memoir that some of them may find offensive. But, he said, he wanted his family to know, especially his grandchildren, so that they will understand him and his rightful service to our people. Thank you.

RANDOLF S. DAVID (Founding Director, TWSC, 1977–1992): In 1976, shortly after he was released from Marcos's prison, Dodong was elected dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. Election may not be the precise word to use to describe his unique passage from prison to deanship. Although there was an election by the faculty of UP's largest college at that time, Quezon Hall regarded it as a nonbinding consultation. Dodong had to be appointed by UP president Onofre Corpuz and confirmed by the Board of Regents. But in the context of martial law, there was every reason, until the last minute, to fear that the regime would not allow him to be the academic leader of UP's most politically volatile unit. That was before the division of the college, before the vulcanization of the arts and sciences into three separate colleges that they are today. I remember those days as I worked closely with Dodong as dean, serving as officer-in-charge to him many times, and having to deal with very idiosyncratic faculty members in the college. I remember those days when I had to mediate the conflict between Teodoro Agoncillo and the people he did not exactly like.

Academic autonomy, collegiality, and participatory democracy became the bywords of Dodong's five-year deanship. He worked for the university-wide institutionalization and application of these basic values by seeking their incorporation in the revised university code. He worked toward the revision of the entire operational manual of the university. But apart from his advocacy, he sought to stimulate intellectual activity in the College of Arts and Sciences by introducing three new programs through which the college might be able to project its influence upon the country's academic world. The natural science faculty, I remember, came up with the idea of an extramural studies program as a vehicle for sharing new knowledge and perspectives with other tertiary institutions in the country. Its first director was the biologist Ruben Umali. On the other hand, the arts and letters faculty proposed, from out of nowhere, a folklore studies program. Its first director was the literary scholar Damiana Eugenio. The last of these programs was precisely the Third World Studies Program, to be launched in the social sciences faculty, and I was appointed as its first director. In fact, we were not called directors. We were called coordinators, attesting to the provisional character of these programs. But Dodong nurtured these three programs as though they were own his three children. He shared with them the bigger resources of his office. He gave us a room and one research assistant each. We had to raise on our own the rest of what we needed to function as programs. The Third World Studies Program was assigned a windowless room on

the third floor of the Faculty Center between the department offices
of political science and sociology. Believe it or not, our first acquisitions
included a set of wooden display panels and books donated by
Dodong's favorite embassy, the Soviet embassy. The nicely bound
volumes from the Soviet embassy were from the collected works of
Marx and Lenin, all in Spanish. Both donations were left-overs from
a small book fair that have been put together by the Soviet Embassy.
Someone obviously thought that Spanish was the lingua franca of the
country. In time, we began replacing these books with our own
mimeographed publications, original as well as reprints, all printed by
Dodong's office. We called them the Third World Studies Occasional
Papers, the forerunner of the journal *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of
Third World Studies*. Dodong wanted the Third World Studies Center
to serve as common venue for convivial conversations, a secure place for
progressive thinkers, like a common room that we knew in Manchester
for progressive thinkers and activists who were just coming out of
hiding and detention. It was not difficult to do these because all we
needed to perform this function was a coffee maker and all the recycled
furniture we could retrieve from our respective homes. Today, the
TWSC library houses the Filipiniana collection and Marxist library of
the late Daniel Boone Schimmer, a true friend of the Filipino people.
During those years, we asked for nothing from the central administration
because they were not exactly friendly. Counting however on the good
relations Dodong had with then UP's new president Corpuz, his
former mentor, he took care of getting us two additional items for
research assistant, in additional to the one already occupied by Patricio
"Jojo" Abinales. Two former detainees, Rafael Baylosis and Ricky
Esguerra, newly released from prison, promptly filled these up.
Looking back at those years, I suspect that Quezon Hall somehow felt
obliged to support Dodong's modest initiative because the resources
required were miniscule compared to what the national government
and Marcos had been lavishing on the President's Center for Advanced
Studies, or PCAS, the Marcos think-tank that was carved overnight
brutally out of the Asian Center during the term of Salvador Lopez.
The president of the President's Center for Advanced Studies and its
well-paid professors and researchers—they received four times the salary
of the ordinary UP professor—working from a commandeered building
across the campus, gave us a sense of heroic mission amid danger. That
was not easy to match. We churned out papers that provided a
perspective different from the official narrative of what was happening
under the Marcos repressive, developmentalist, technocratic regime.

Dodong was the moving spirit behind this exotic attempt to oppose the regime at the level of ideas. At five in the afternoon, after he was done signing endless bureaucratic papers on his desk as dean of the college, he would cross the street to the Faculty Center and join the conversations of the Third World Studies where what remains of the country's unbowed intelligentsia gathered and drew strength from Dodong's inspiring presence. It is with irony that when the regime fell in 1986, the Third World Studies was tasked by the then executive secretary Ceferino "Joker" Arroyo Jr. of the Corazon Aquino Administration to take over the administration of President's Center for Advanced Studies. And we did. We invaded the President's Center for Advanced Studies like revolutionaries on April Fools' Day, April 1, 1986. I remember Adrian Cristobal who was the director at that time said, "What took you so long? The revolution took place in February, and it is now April. You will love this center, Randy. It is a gravy train." Three months after we were appointed, we recommended its dismantling. That is another story. They raided the library. We were left to retrieve what was stolen from the Asian Center Library. It was all gone. The vehicles were gone. Everything was gone, including the research papers they were supposed to be doing. What remained were the payrolls waiting to be signed by me because they have not been paid since the February uprising. When I looked at the payroll, I nearly collapsed. Half of them were UP intellectuals.

TWSC continued to benefit from Dodong's support long after he had finished his term as dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. At the end of his term, he decided to go on an extended sabbatical leave at the Australian National University in Canberra. Abroad, where I had the chance to visit him, he became the center's most active promoter in the international academic community, encouraging foreign scholars to drop by and do lectures or simply listen to the dissident voices that the center was nurturing.

The university is a graveyard of countless programs that are conceived and established by visionary intellectual leaders but fail to survive the passing of the administration that created them. We were conscious of this when we put up the program. That is the very reason why we resisted the temptation of offering a degree program in Third World Studies. We did not want our students to be stranded in midstream should an unfriendly dean decide to dismantle the program, which was very easy. Indeed, the extramural study program, our twin sister, and the folklore studies program, another twin sister, did not live more than ten years, perhaps confirming the theory that organizations

have, at best, a fifteen-year life span. We are already twenty-five years past the conventional life span of organizations. In fact, there was a time when TWSC was nearly dismantled by a dean who thought that the concept of a "Third World" had become passé. That the center has outlived its staunchest critics no doubt testifies to the ability of its directors, staff, and fellows to reinterpret the center's mandate through various transitions. Still, I believe that no amount of imaginative reinterpretation might have sufficed if the center did not have the unconditional support of a highly committed advocate like Dodong Nemenzo, who made sure when he became UP president that TWSC would become the heart and soul of the university's general education program. It gives me enormous satisfaction to be able to say all of these while Dodong is still with us.

Two years ago as he lay comatose and critically ill battling the aftereffects of a deadly strain of bacterial meningitis, I asked Fidel to accompany me to the intensive care unit of the Philippine General Hospital. I saw Dodong there. He was swollen and bruised all over, and a machine was doing the breathing for him. It did not seem right, I thought to myself, that the life of a man who had given so much of himself in support of progressive causes should end that way, a passé footnote in the history of the Philippine Left. That is why I am very happy, as I am sure everyone in this room is, that we are able to honor Dodong's achievements, remember his role in the formation of TWSC, and celebrate the fullness of his life in academe, when he can hear us, reminisce with us, laugh with us, and bask in the affection, gratitude, and admiration of those who had had the privilege to know and work with him. Dodong, happy birthday. May you and I be around in 2027 for the center's golden jubilee. Thank you so much.

JOSE: Let me mention some other things that I know about Dodong. I also know his family in different areas. The Dodong I knew first was a professor. He was my professor in social political thought. I do not know if he remembers, but I was one of the not so bright students in that class. I do remember Zeno, Machiavelli, and all those things that we had to read in social political thought. Then I knew him as dean of the college. He was there when I entered the college and started teaching. And when he went to higher positions, I also had contact with him, and we would see each other. We would see each other in various official and unofficial capacities. My classmates and I in that social political thought class thought very highly of Dodong as a teacher. In fact, that is one reason why we flocked to the class because

everyone said that he is just one of the best to teach. That is partly what I know of Dodong.

I also knew his wife Ana Maria "Princess" Nemenzo. She was my history teacher in Philippine Science High School. I was not a very good student then either. I would like to give recognition to their son Fidel Nemenzo. I knew him when he was in Japan. He was in my late wife's university. We also had connections. When he got severely wounded in the Welcome Rotunda incident, I think I was there. We knew what happened, and we were very concerned about that. We felt very strongly about the Nemenzo family at that particular time. The family itself has a close connection with me in different levels.

Before I proceed any further, I would like to acknowledge the presence of Chancellor Michael Tan.

We would like to present Dodong with a birthday gift from TWSC. It is a sketch of Dodong delivering a talk. It is by one of our research assistants, Judith Camille Rosette. Dodong, happy birthday!

FRANCISCO "DODONG" NEMENZO (President, University of the Philippines, 1999–2005; Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, 1976–1981): I would like to congratulate TWSC in its fortieth anniversary. I also thank TWSC for remembering my role in its early years of existence. I do not claim to be the founder of TWSC. That honor should be accorded to Prof. Randy David, its first director. He laid the foundation and set the principles and practices that defined its mission. I merely gave the orders and provided the initial funding.

TWSC was born in the worst stage of martial law. Fear was the dominant mood in the university. Fear drew the boundaries of our academic freedom. Intellectuals censored themselves. When I became dean of the College of Arts and Sciences in 1976, I took it as a mission to restore the courage of our colleagues and students. I wanted to create an institutional refuge for subversive intellectuals, what TWSC now calls the scholar-activists.

We should not pose a threat to the dictatorship at the beginning, otherwise we won't ever reach first base. Instead of declaring the true intention of TWSC, I said it was to help implement the four thrusts of Marcos's foreign policy. *Daily Express* made the founding of TWSC a headline story.

We knew that to create a department or any unit in the university, the proper procedure is to do this with the Board of Regents. But we deliberately kept this from the Board of Regents because if you send it

to them, they will most likely [disapprove it]. [So we made it] a program of the dean's office. Fortunately, my predecessors [left ample] discretionary funds. I used the discretionary funds of the dean's office to establish and sustain the Third World Studies Program. It should take on a low profile. We will do our work quietly and publish.

But the secret could not be kept for long.[1] Two French scholars called then UP Pres. Onofre D. Corpuz and asked if they could visit the Third World Studies [Program]. They had read some of its publications and thought highly of them. President Corpus did not even know it existed! So he rightly guessed that if such a thing exists in UP at all, it could only be in the College of Arts and Sciences. So I was forced to admit that there was indeed a Third World Studies Program and claimed that it did not require the Board of Regents approval because it was nothing but a project of the dean's office. I brought the cover story that it was inspired by the speech of President Marcos. Instead of reproaching me, President Corpus suggested that we would have it formally instituted by the Board of Regents. I immediately asked Randy to prepare the necessary papers. Then he decided, indeed a very clever gimmick, to reproduce the foreign policy in the speeches of Marcos and attach the standard cover of the Third World Studies Program. I submitted that as a sample of Third World publications and the regents were duly interested. So the Third World Studies Center (TWSC) was officially established with its own budget and Randy became its Director.

You should give an award to Randy because I think he deserves it more than I do. Some of the centers that I instituted not only in Diliman but also in other parts of the UP System have already disappeared. The idea was to have a small budget and very few personnel. Some of them did not like that. TWSC has a very small budget for research, but has done more than many units in the university, not only in Diliman, but also in Los Baños and the Visayas.

I want to give my special thanks to Dr. Rico Jose, the current director of TWSC, for extending a beautiful invitation. It is such a letter I cannot refuse. Thank you very much to all of you.❀

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1. Due to faulty recording, this section of Dodong Nemenzo's remarks was unintelligible. The editors have taken the liberty to use in this paragraph, and in this paragraph alone, his recollection of the same event which was published in "Proceedings: Third World Studies Center Thirtieth Anniversary," *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* 23, 2 (2008): 96.

Dodong Nemenzo with Alfred McCoy and TWSC staff.

REVIEWS

Bouté, Vanina and Vatthana Pholsena, eds. 2017. *Changing Lives in Laos: Society, Politics, and Culture in a Post-Socialist State.* **Singapore: National University of Singapore Press. pp. xiii + 457.**

To many students of Southeast Asian studies, Laos (officially, the Lao People's Democratic Republic or LPDR) is probably the most unfamiliar and the most enigmatic nation-state in the region. This is so because of its "late reopening" to the world through its delayed entry to the Association of Southeast East Asian Nations in July 1997 and its "late reintegration' to the world capitalist order formalized through its entry to the World Trade Organization in 1998. This tome edited by Vanina Bouté and Vathana Pholsena aims to fill out part of the scholarly void brought about by years of isolation and academic inaccessibility. Indeed, publications on Laos of this multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary kind are too few and far in between. The book therefore follows a few good and comprehensive updates on the country starting with the work of Martin Stuart-Fox (1982), Grant Evans, ed. (1999), and Yves Goudineau and Michel Lorrilard, eds. (2008), among others.

The book is composed of fifteen chapters divided into four parts that roughly overlaps with three domains of knowledge: politics and governance (Part 1: State Formation and Political Legitimation), economic development and social change (Part 2: Natural Resource Governance and Agrarian Change), culture and society (Part 3: Ethnic Minorities Engaging with Modernity); including a part on special problems and trends (Part 4: In Search of Opportunities: Moving Across and Outside the Country). This review will comment on selected chapters distributed throughout the four parts.

In part one, perhaps the most important chapter is that of Martin Ruthie (chapter two), which details the political evolution of the Lao

People's Democratic Republic through the history of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Ruthie traces the beginnings of the party in the Indochinese Communist Party as inspired by Ho Chi Minh; the rise or its early leadership in the persons of Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit, and Chao Sisay; the eventual establishment of the Lao People's Party in 22 March 1955; the rise and early successes of the *Pathet Lao* (Lao State) revolutionary movement; the struggles against the increasingly corrupt and weakened Royal Lao Government; the party's renaming to the Lao People's Revolutionary Party in the early 1970s; and, the eventual founding of the Lao People's Democratic Republic on 2 December 1975. While the 1970s is portrayed as a decade of party expansion and consolidation of its monopoly on political power, the 1980s is seen as a period of normalization of relations with former enemies such as Thailand and China, thereby allowing the increased possibilities of economic relations beyond the Soviet bloc that started its dissolution in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However by its fifth congress in March 1991, the Lao People's Revolutionary Party's founding members' are seen to have entered a period of retreat via retirement or natural expiration. In the same period, the party saw a series of corruption scandals. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges faced by socialist movements is how to formulate policies that engage re-integration into a capitalist world economic order while staying true to its socialist ideals. Most unfortunately, it appears that the Lao People's Democratic Republic is at the brink of failure. Ruthie observes a "shift from patriotic camaraderie to cronyism and nepotism" (42). With the decline of Soviet-style state welfare, Lao society seems to have retreated to patrimonialism where, "in the Lao context . . . is defined as a form of clientelism whereby incumbent revolutionary patrons are relatively free to decide administrative appointments" (43). With this scourge of corruption, Ruthie rightly questions whether "the LPRP [Lao People's Revolutionary Party] simply becomes a facade for power plays between elite families *like the RLG [Royal Lao Government]*, or if the Party will take radical steps to remain loyal to its historic legacy" (52, emphasis mine).

Other interesting works that break new ground are included in part one. Oliver Tappe (chapter three) interrogates the shaping of the so-called "national topography" of Laos through national commemoration and visualizations of the nation-state via monuments and the recognition of historical spaces. This set of state actions is essentially part of a broad political process that incorporates Laos's "Buddhist legacy of Lan Xang, revolutionary heritage, and multi-ethnic solidarity, represented

by the different statues of national 'ancestors'" (75). In the context of Cold-War politics in the region, Patrice Ladwig (chapter four) looks at the conflicted nature of the Lao Buddhist Sangha and its institutions as "zones of ideological conflict, fields of propaganda, covert actions, and counter-intelligence measures" (104). Vatthana Pholsena (chapter five) studies the so-called war generation "whose social identity was defined by the revolution and shaped by its active participation in the construction of a new socialist state in the post-war years of deprivation and poverty" (131) and how this "generational unit" diverged in postrevolutionary ideals and career pathways despite relatively uniform experiences in political socialization. Nicole Reichert (chapter six) looks at the experiences of Lao students and civil servants who were sent to the German Democratic Republic for education or training, where many of them experienced greater freedoms compared to what they have experienced in their homeland, and where many "perceive the integration back into Lao society and their jobs in the state bureaucracy as more problematic than their initial integration into their GDR [German Democratic Republic] life" (158).

Setting the tone of inquiry for part two is Olivier Evrar and Ian G. Baird's (chapter seven) piece that looks at upland-lowland relations since 1975. In Laos, the uplands have been synonymous to shifting "slash-and-burn" agriculture, while the lowlands have been consistently associated with settled wet-rice cultivation. The authors observe that "the most obvious phenomena in Laos has been the unprecedented and massive displacement of highland communities to the lowlands, especially during the last few decades, and the creation of many multi-ethnic settlements in the lowlands or in the uplands adjacent to major roads" (167). This trend apparently started in the 1970s and continued throughout the 1980s when the Lao government relocated many villages in the highlands "in order to keep control of the villagers and cut off supplies to the resistance" (171), a move that led to the near depopulation of "entire upland areas" (171). At about the same time, government also encouraged many inhabitants of the uplands "to come down and to participate in the rebuilding of the country by repopulating the lowlands, refilling partially deserted towns and villages, and to cultivate abandoned fields, after many lowlanders escaped to Thailand" (172). Government schemes have therefore led to huge portions of the population being resettled "with 30 percent of the villages in many districts and up to 85 percent in some areas" (176). The authors point out that starting in the 1990s and more especially so in the early 2000s, the highlands have become economically important

with the Lao government policy of developing depopulated areas through land concessions for the establishment of monoculture plantations of rubber, eucalyptus, cassava, and the like. These developments have resulted in local people not having access to forest and grazing lands. Moreover, even more drastic changes are introduced into the upland areas as government build dams and road systems that improve transborder connectivity. While the authors concede that these changes indeed bring great potential for economic development they "also introduce new threats (e.g. the spread of communicable diseases like HIV [human immunodeficiency virus], illegal migration, drugs and security issues, pollution, and ecological impoverishment)" (187). In summing up, the authors of this chapter note that "upland changes seem likely to leave the majority of the original inhabitants with less control over the lands and resources they previously had, and could therefore threaten their subsistence and cultural reproduction" (189). With this process of disenfranchisement of upland populations, the Lao government is faced with a challenge of legitimacy given its declared commitment to revolutionary ideals and given its officially declared recognition of the multi-ethnic character of its nation-state. This material and ideological contradiction is, of course, found in other Southeast Asian states, and not entirely unique to Laos.

Two other chapters compose part two of the book. The piece by Michael B. Dwyer (chapter eight) looks at the politics of land possession in the context of transnational agribusiness and the production of cash crops. Using statistical data and individual case studies, Vanina Boute's work (chapter nine) looks at the formation of new networks and the development of new forms of social differentiation in the sites of new towns and villages established by successive waves of farmer's migration.

Part three of the book focuses on the concept of identity. Gregoire Schlemmer's work (chapter ten) examines *emic* and *etic* notions of ethnic identity in a country of forty-nine officially recognized ethnic groups with the dominant ethnic Lao accounting for about half of the population. Schlemmer begins his discussion by emphasizing that the concept is highly ambiguous and varies "depending on audiences and circumstances" (251). He notes that in the Laotian language, the term "ethnic" refers "to all ethnic groups except the Lao" (252). People of other nationalities such as the Chinese and the Vietnamese who live in the country are also excluded from this term. As such, ethnicity demographically and politically "constitutes a minority" (252). Schlemmer points out that the categorization of peoples depends

much on how states perceived groups throughout their respective histories. These categorizations also depend on the nature of these states and the types of relations these states have established with their subjects. Ancient chronicles vary in terms of usage of ethnonyms. A dualistic classificatory system based on the Tai (lowland inhabitants centered on wet rice cultivation belonging to *muang* chieftaincies) and the Kha (mountain dwellers centered on shifting "slash-and-burn" cultivation has emerged from these chronicles). When the French came, they adopted these two terms often racializing them. After independence in 1953, a "tripartite classification" system was adopted that placed all groups under the umbrella label of Lao, distinguishing them according to place of dwelling: lowland Lao (Lao Lum), midland Lao (Lao Theung), and upland Lao (Lao Sung). The label "Kha," which had the pejorative meaning of "slave," was conveniently dropped. The regime of President Kaysone Phomvihane decided to do away with the tripartite system, criticizing it as unscientific. From that time onwards, at least officially, an ethno-linguistic system of categorization based on Soviet ethnography inherited from the Vietnamese was promulgated and used. Thus, books on the matter reflect the following categorization: 1) Mon-Khmer (or Austro Asiatic, mainly the former Lao Theung), 2) Tai-Kadai (former Lao Lum), 3) Tibeto-Burmese, and 4) Hmong-Mien or Meo-Yao (former Lao Sung). This however did not stop the general Lao population from using the more archaic classification systems. Schlemmer notes that at present categories of self- identification are quite fluid and that an "an individual can identify himself with different levels of segmentation . . . . Identification that is selected as relevant may vary depending on who is being addressed . . . . A *Pusho* would describe himself as such in interaction with another *Akha*, and as *Akha* in contrast to another *Hani*; but with a *Khmu*, for example, he will present himself as Lao Ko" (259). Compounding systems of classification are, among many others, changing ethnicities based on asylum seeking, in the case of entire families displaced by conflict, adoption of an outsider groom into a bride's family to continue a bloodline or lineage, inter-ethnic marriages, and even residence in multi-ethnic towns or villages where the tendency is to simply assume an ethnic Lao identity. Schlemmer's discussion points to the very sure fact that issues and challenges that relate to ethnicity will continue indefinitely. This reviewer agrees that this notion of identity was and is never a given, that the state and its actions will continue to impinge upon its salience as a uniting factor or as a differentiating factor in this fast-changing post socialist state, and that new patterns of interaction

or engagement with the outside world as well as forces within the nation-state may very well produce new identities that will either produce composites or fragment older classifications. Such is the dynamism of culture in a complex, interconnected world.

Two other chapters comprise part three of the book. The article by Guido Sprenger (chapter eleven) looks at the "Buddhification" of the indigenous spirit religion (*sasana phi*) through a study of ritual. The work of Chris Lyttleton and Yunxia Li (chapter twelve) looks at how the introduction of rubber as a cash crop in the highland regions has led to culture change, mainly through Lao Akha-Chinese interaction.

Part four of the book mainly deals with the phenomenon of migration. The piece by Sverre Molland (chapter thirteen) details the political ramifications of migration and mobility. He astutely notes that resettlement whether "voluntary" or "forced" is "a politics of the domestication of mobility" and that "coerced sedentariness is transformed into unintended out-migration" (341). He then proposes that this out-migration can be viewed as "state failure" that indicates the "Lao government's inability to transform policy intention into outcomes." Relating to Molland's chapter is that of Khabmanivath Phouxay (chapter fourteen), which takes a detailed look at the undocumented Lao migration to Thailand. Here, the narrative of out-migration takes a very human face in the travails of specific individuals who have endured the alienating and oftentimes traumatic experiences in finding livelihood outside their country. Annabel Vallard's work (chapter fifteen), in the opinion of this reviewer, is the most interesting read in this section. She looks at how Lao textiles have penetrated the high-end market for silk products in the world market. As this process of penetration unfolds, she details changes in the social organization of how silk textiles are produced. From single weavers working with looms under their houses, the endeavor has evolved into a network of relations between weavers and traders; and most recently, this phenomenon of production has led to the emergence of dormitory-equipped workshops located in the capital and other main cities where young individual weavers from the countryside are able to experience Lao urbanity and oftentimes find a home away from home. The chapter is indeed a revelation in how much about social change can be learned through an interrogation of the production and trade of an erstwhile traditional cultural artifact.

Anthologies like this one will always be subject to the interests and expertise of their contributors. This fine one by Bouté and Pholsena has provided a most contemporary look into what has been happening

to this rather under-examined nation-state at the heart of continental Southeast Asia. This reviewer hopes that a repeat of this most informative endeavor will produce other anthologies in the future, which will hopefully include the following: more in-depth studies of the present Lao political elite, particularly the members of military; studies of movements that aim toward the protection of human rights and democratization; works that interrogate the effects of engagement within the Association of Southeast East Asian Nations and the increasing pool of external aid; and works that examine the emergent millennial Lao and how they affect the colors and contours of Laotian politics and society.—MATTHEW SANTAMARIA, PROFESSOR, ASIAN CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES DILIMAN

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Wataru Kusaka. 2017. *Moral Politics in the Philippines: Inequality, Democracy and the Urban Poor.* Singapore: National University of Singapore Press; Kyoto: Kyoto University Press. 355 pp.

In the aftermath of the election of Rodrigo R. Duterte to the presidency of the Philippines on 9 May 2016, a flurry of opinions has emerged regarding how the election of an openly brusque, antidemocratic, and politically incorrect leader serves as the final nail in the coffin of what is now retroactively called the "EDSA Republic." The liberal-democratic government structure inaugurated by the 1986 EDSA Revolution (and its immediate offspring, the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been adjudged as having fallen short of its transformative promise.[1]

Among the most vocal proponents of this perspective would be scholar-activist-turned-politician Walden Bello. In writing about the political economy of the Philippines, Bello would constantly refer to the nation's governance being suspended in an "anti-development state" (Bello et al. 2009), hobbled as it were (especially under the

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1. For example, Jose Luis Martin 'Chito' Gascon (a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, now the embattled Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights), would look back sadly on the state of Philippine democracy: "The mistake (of those in EDSA 1) was thinking it was sufficient to remove a dictator…and everything would fall into place… We have seen that that does not happen. We removed the dictator, but we retained the political system." (Gascon, in Chua 2006).

tenures of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Benigno "Noynoy" Aquino III) by long-term institutional problems. Among them would be (a) the pressures of dependency on the United States and the global neoliberal economic agenda; (b) the impunity of the state's armed forces, police, and elite political families (most of whom benefited from the depredations of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos, the man deposed by EDSA 1986); as well as (c) persistent graft, corruption, and normalized fraud across many branches of governance, both at the local and national levels (Bello 2016, 2017).

For some reason, however, there is a very significant silence in this body of literature on the most tangible legacies of the 1986 EDSA Revolution (EDSA 1986): its two sequels in January and May 2001, respectively (colloquially labeled EDSA Dos and EDSA Tres). In contrast to the seeming moral ascendancy of the original, the character of these sequel revolts has come down in history as highly partisan and uncomfortable, the former having led to the deposition of a legally elected president in exchange for another whose tenure led to a significant damage to democratic institutions. It may perhaps explain why Filipino writers and scholars (some of them even played major or minor parts in EDSA Dos) find writing about the topic ambiguous, polarizing, and conflict-stirring. It is probably serendipitous that Wataru Kusaka's recent work, *Moral Politics in the Philippines: Inequality, Democracy and the Urban Poor*, chooses to address this void of voices, cast a probing eye on Philippine society's political forces and public, and hold up an uncomfortable mirror to what Philippine politics has become.

From the preface to the book, Kusaka presents his research puzzle by referring to these two sequel "EDSAs." He points out how they pose a contradiction to his initial assessment of the Filipino polity as a people willing to "rise up and act on their own initiative to reform politics when the state failed to protect their welfare and livelihood" (x). The uncomfortable specter of EDSA Tres casts into serious doubt the "national unity" of the "democratic Filipino people" that supposedly deposed President Joseph Estrada—in *vox populi, vox Dei*.

Kusaka asks whether this division could be demarcated between a specific section of the non-elite and the rest of Filipino society—and their differing sets of values and biases. It is on this note that his book considers the following three questions: (a) "why did the middle class, self-identified as 'citizens,' play [an] ambiguous role vis-à-vis the consolidation and deepening of democracy"; (b) "what type of moral

'we/they' relation would promote or advance democracy"; and (c) whether "this perspective on moral politics offers new insight on why democracy in a stratified society is easily destabilized" (3–4). In addressing these questions, he offers the concept of "dual public spheres," wherein a middle class–dominated "civic sphere" more often than not will clash with the concerns and perspectives of the impoverished section of Philippine society in the "mass sphere" (5).

Kusaka's work deploys this concept at three significant aspects of post-EDSA Philippine politics: the memorialization of the idea and legacies of "People Power," the conduct of elections, and the governance of urban space in Metro Manila—particularly in how it affects the informal settler/"squatter" sectors. Over the course of the book, he makes the following major assessments:

- First, in contrast to the supposedly broad enough space of moral discourse opened by EDSA 1986, EDSA Dos and EDSA Tres did not allow the bridging of divisions in expectations between the civic sphere and the mass sphere, due to the unwillingness of the middle class to acknowledge the reasons behind the masses' predilection for populism (120).

- Second, the middle class's prioritization of "rational policy debate" and "moral values" in choosing candidates for elective office visibly clashed with the masses' priorities of finding support and state assistance toward "solv[ing] problems . . . in relation to land, residence, and other necessities of life." Thus, existing voter education programs, mostly based on the middle-class perspective, is seen by the rest of the masses as unappealing at best or patronizing at worst (154).

- Third, contradictions in priorities in urban governance have allowed for the persistence of informal social and economic relations among the urban poor, street vendors, and informal settlers. Subsequently, their inability to either participate or convert to formal economic struc-tures made them vulnerable to state restructuring of the city-space, which manifested in the demolition of stalls and squatter settlements. This state violence crystallized not only the precariousness of the masses' situation but also the prejudice of the middle classes against their

>   miseries as something not born out of structural inequal-
>   ity but due to their alleged predilection for criminality.[2]

Kusaka's work takes its rightful place along multiple constellations
of inquiry in contemporary Philippine political scholarship. First, he
takes part in the changing terrain of writing about the histories and
legacies of EDSA 1986. The field has already bucked traditional
nostalgia and valorization, giving way to more critical examinations
over the decades—laced either with disillusionment at worst or
dispassionate analysis at best. Significant publications touching on the
aftermath and legacy of EDSA 1986 now choose to either (a) revisit,
expose, or reanalyze facts hitherto unrecorded in the history books
(McCoy 1999; Magadia 2003); (b) analyze and criticize the movements,
interest groups, and social forces involved (Casper 1995; Hedman
2006; Moreno 2006; Encarnacion-Tadem 2009; Kasuya and Quimpo
2010; Fuller 2011, 2013); or (c) provide critical perspectives in reading
the symbolic value of EDSA to contemporary political agendas
(Manzanilla and Hau 2016; Espiritu 2017).

Second, *Moral Politics in the Philippines* also joins an emerging
subfield of inquiry documenting the political agency of the Filipino
underclasses—particularly those problematizing the masses' relationship
to the hegemonic sphere of middle-class reform politics. Building on
similar lines of inquiry pursued by recent works (cf. Schaffer 2009;
Pinches 2010; Kares 2014; Banta 2014; Magno and Parnell 2015),
Kusaka contributes to raising and criticizing the patronizing nature of
"the citizen's reform agenda" for the lower classes, which continues to
alienate them from political and economic life, driving them further to
the temptations and depredations of elite patronage.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, Kusaka's introduction of
the "dual public spheres" framework might actually be a worthy
continuation of the "genealogy of interpretations" used in the canon
of Philippine political science, at least the one documented by Nathan
Quimpo in his 2008 work *Contested Democracy in the Philippines.* In his
work, Quimpo chose to review and critique, in succession, the
elements and inadequacies of Carl Lande's patron-client framework,
Dante Simbulan's elite democracy / patrimonial framework, Renato
Constantino's neocolonial / dependency framework, Paul Hutchcroft's
patrimonial-oligarchic state (booty capitalism), John Sidel's bossism,

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2. This is covered under the entirety of Chapter 5 of the book.

and Jennifer Franco's clientelist-electoral regime.[3] Subsequently, Quimpo introduces his own interpretation in his eponymous contested democracy framework, wherein

- it is acknowledged that "the very meaning of democracy is contested";

- that the competing strands of *elite democracy* and *democracy from below* (i.e., the one espoused by social forces and popular interest groups) can deepen Philippine politics into "a participatory and egalitarian democracy" (Quimpo 2008, 23); and

- that liberal democracy, "despite its deficiencies, provides the opportunity for subordinate classes and communities to push for popular empowerment" (53).

Kusaka's work fills up the biggest gap in the assumptions of Quimpo's framework—that the organizations, movements, and agents pushing for *democracy from below* will always prioritize competing against elite forces, not among each other. Kusaka's "dual public spheres" framework, as it were, can help in explaining the contradictions that were not foreseen by Quimpo's work, such as the possibility of the mass sectors not automatically jumping in the political projects of progressive organizations, as well as the very real possibility of transformism, demobilization, and co-optation by these movements.

All said, despite my personal agreement with much of the arguments, narratives, and perspectives within Kusaka's work, certain questions and possible gaps linger with me. First, I find it curious that the book has nary a reference to George Lakoff's earlier, similarly titled work *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think* (1st ed., 1996; 2nd ed., 2002). Of course, it must be granted that Lakoff's landmark study is primarily a work of political ethics, sociology, and cognitive science analyzing American politics—a context which may have specific and more advanced societal problems than the Philippines. Nonetheless, much of its lexicon, concepts, and patterns of analysis are arguably also applicable to the moral and societal divides being experienced in Philippine society—further assisted by the institutional heritages of its colonial relationship with the United States.

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3. The lengthy review of these aforementioned works is recounted in Quimpo 2008, 23-44.

Second, I felt that while Kusaka criticizes the very nature of "moral politics"—particularly that which "makes a non-issue of interest politics . . . by separating people into 'good' and 'evil,' thus escalating fragmentation and exclusion" (257)—there could have been ample space in discussing the theoretical questions regarding the role of morals and moralistic discourse in politics. While his arguments seem sensitive to the negative implications and exclusionary nature of moralistic posturing, he could have probably more forcefully contributed to addressing a relevant theoretical argument first posed by Wendy Brown, which notes how "moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formation of power" (2001, 35). Kusaka, to his credit, admits these limitations and hopes to pursue future research along these lines.

In closing, I must admit that reading through Kusaka's comprehensive narrative of the moral divide between the Filipino public did not just remain as an intellectual exercise for me. It became quite an emotional experience as well. As a student of democratization, as well as the politics of interest groups/social forces in the Philippines, the story he paints can be quite disheartening. Indeed, my own experiences as a scholar-activist have already disillusioned me with the old romantic notions that the Filipino masses are truly of the same mind and heart as the networks of activist and civil society organizations I normally engaged with. Yet Kusaka's choice quotations and anecdotes (both about the middle classes' disdain for the impoverished, and the palpable despair of his respondents from the masses) drove home to me just how wide the actual gaps of ideologies and aspirations are between our countrymen.

In reading this book, one may get the nagging feeling that if only Filipino scholars, public intellectuals, and indeed political actors have been sensitive to this moral divide, we may have probably foreseen the societal ferment and resentment which catapulted Duterte to Malacañang—something that many of them have yet to directly address.[4]

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4. For comparison, see the recent anthology by Curato (2017), which tries to comprehensively document the personality of Duterte, the emergence of his political machinery as well the adaptation of the Philippine state's problematic institutions to his hegemony—and yet gives very limited portrayal to the ground-level sentiments, perspectives and sociological realities of the voter population that supported Duterte's candidacy.

Indeed, Kusaka himself tangentially sees the rise of Duterte as Filipinos "tak[ing] a risky gamble in order to break the paradox of neoliberalism and democracy" (264).[5] At the same time, it is also a refreshing and necessary wake-up call—one especially needed after the clearly unwarranted hagiography of Noynoy Aquino's election and presidency,[6] the purveyor of political nostalgia that may have blinded us to our country's stark inequality and divide, the price of which we are currently paying for with the continuing degradation of our democratic institutions, and the literal shedding of blood of thousands of our countrymen.—HANSLEY A. JULIANO, LECTURER, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, LOYOLA SCHOOLS, ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

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5. Lest it be assumed that Duterte's tenure will remain unassailable, recent developments seem to have pushed Kusaka to develop his analysis further, ending with an appropriately-ominous assessment of Duterte's erratic first year in power: "[W]ithout legitimacy from due process, if his social bandit-like morality is felt to be untrue, his tenure will be critical. . . . Duterte's national politics can be fragile not because of the violation of liberal democratic principles, but because of the failed promise of a bandit" (Kusaka 2017, 73).

6. See, for example, Rocamora 2010; Villacorta 2011; Cruz 2015 and Claro, et. al. 2016.

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