Localities

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Expressions of Localities: Positionalities and "Powerful Particulars"

Localities have a unique place in the circuits of global cultural political economy. Other than geographical locations or sites of cartography, localities are analytical entry points into the subnational that are sometimes hidden from view or situated at the margins, hence not accorded prominence. Absent such emphasis, scholars run the risk of losing sight of local actors and the specificities that animate their life worlds.[1] As an optic, localities and their relatively "autonomous complexities" (Geaologo 1993, 108) offer different perspectives to oft-told stories.[2]

One of the features of localities—and key to their analysis in this special issue of *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies*—is their intrinsic embeddedness, that is, how their situatedness serves to filter power into myriad forms, creating distinct practices and relations conveyed as shared lived experiences. These are "powerful particulars" (Urry 1981, 455) that in turn co-constitute them. This issue of *Kasarinlan*, composed of works from the fields of archaeology, cultural studies, and history, dwells on particular localities as the local symbolic

1. Arjun Appadurai's *Production of Locality* describes locality as "the key characteristic of place, defining it as a phenomenological quality, constituted by a sense of social immediacy, technologies of interaction and the relativity of contexts....[it] emerges through a series of attachments and commitments that characterise local subjectivities" (quoted in McKay and Brady 2005, 91).
2. In the field of history, see for example Francis Gealogo's (1993, 108) discussion of local history's "autonomous character," which meant "local history is not only written for national history to have local color, but for local conditions to take center stage in reexamining the previously accepted generalizations on national history."

and material conditions in which power ebbs and flows. They recast localities from the purview of the illicit, the contested, and the peripheral or what Deidre McKay and Carol Brady (2005, 91) referred to as the "expression" of these localities: from the site of illicit trade of gold cultural materials founded on *hierarchical meaning-making practices* of diggers, financiers, collectors, and the cultural elite spanning laundering, misrepresentation, and fraud; five rival mosques in one Muslim compound as *contested spaces of representation* in their uneven construction and operation based on the competing narratives not just between outsiders and insiders but also within that Muslim community; to *a "peripheral" province's political history* shaped by the rise and fall of a local dynasty.

The Illicit

Victor P. Estrella's "Illicit Trade in Gold Cultural Materials in Butuan, Philippines" is an archaeologist's "attempt to get closer" to the covert interactions and meaning-making practices of local actors in *pag-aantik* or the illicit trade of gold cultural materials in the northeastern part of Southern Philippines. Where this illicit phenomenon lies at the intersections of local and global contexts, Estrella's microanalysis examines the flows of cultural materials as they pass through "markets" or "hubs" in Butuan, which can be "a source, transit point, or destination . . . [and] can be both illegal and legal, and the participants . . . both criminals and legitimate business people." Estrella's closer look into the "gray market" in Butuan serves to counter the stereotypical macroview of illicit trade in cultural materials and further examines the social nature of pag-aantik, tracing the complex relations of the different actors from the local diggers or mangkalot; financiers; collectors; to the cultural elite, to "see not just the plundering of cultural materials, but also the abuse of the workers and the perpetuation of dependency." Moreover, he weaves these relationships with the actors' meaning-making practices surrounding gold's transformation as cultural material: from (1) "laundering" or when gold transforms from an illegal to a legal object; (2) "misrepresentation" or the meaning-making practices of the diggers and "the deliberate attempts of the financiers to obscure the context of the materials to increase the price, and the legitimization of the collectors who try to fit these materials in the Butuan narrative." In short, the co-creation of the cultural material's

"new provenance" through the stories financiers and collectors tell; to (3) "fraud" or the negotiations of risk and trust among these actors.

Where Estralla writes that "[a]rchaeologists, in their study of the distant past, do not only excavate sites but also participate in the social dynamics of a locality;" he describes Butuan's "notoriety as both the historical and archaeological locus of gold items in the Philippines" as well as site of interactions "for profit and narrative making." Estrella strongly positions his manuscript as an alternative entry point in understanding this illicit phenomenon. As an archaeologist who witnessed firsthand and talked to the different local actors engaged in this illicit activity, he ends his piece by espousing this advocacy:

> As much as [local diggers] are the front liners of cultural destruction, they are also potential protectors of their own cultural properties, through education and local community engagement....by involving [them] in the active protection of their own cultural properties, we are actually reducing participation in the loss and opportunity to further destroy cultural heritage, and, at the same time, increasing awareness for its protection.

The Contested

ACT Ruiz's "Muslim Migrants and Hybrid Placemaking of Mosques in Culiat, Quezon City" examines religious placemaking or mosque making within the five-hectare Al-Salam Mosque Compound. Her work updates Akiko Watanabe's study on mosques and Moro migrant settlements in Culiat in Metro Manila, and also extends previous works on the Muslim compound by focusing not solely on the tensions between insiders and outsiders; but among insiders as well. As long-time resident of Culiat and through her outsider status in the compound, Ruiz attempts to examine these tensions and how they "intersect and result in the specific physical environment of the compound [constituting the] social experiences" of its Muslim inhabitants. She describes the compound as "an amalgamation of all the pull factors seen in other urban Muslim communities—state intervention, economic networks, diaspora, and tribal cooperation," but argues that it is foremost a "space of representation" where "[beneath] the veneer of the [community] label 'Moro' lies an explosive heterogeneity of people who simultaneously accommodate and refuse

the essentialism dealt from the Manila majority, and from one another."

In describing religious placemaking in Al-Salam, she surfaces the visual (prominent or hidden mosque structures and the suspect speed of their construction), aural (the language of the khutbah), and tactile (cleanliness and congestion in the mosques) elements to mosque making and how they are experienced, made sense of, and negotiated by the different local actors in the many mosques. While Ruiz has argued that, through religious placemaking, "[the] diversity of mosques [has allowed] multiethnic and multilingual Moros the choice to determine which religious space best reflects their unique identity," she also notes that four other mosques were built aside from the Al Salam Mosque not solely because of its incomplete and thus inadequate structure, but because to construct a mosque is "to control the compound." This intense rivalry, according to Ruiz, has in fact "triggered the dispersal of the jama'ah, violent confrontations, and even the resignation of former administrators." The construction of a mosque enables its maker to ask for donations from the community and even from groups in the Middle East, and where "there were efforts to deter corruption by accepting donations in kind only . . . . patrons [who were] turned off by the intrigues, withdrew their regular donations, [and the] Saudi Arabian embassy withdrew its annual Ramadan donations supposedly due to allegations of corruption." The above demonstrates the tensions within the Muslim community, where tensions between insiders and outsiders, that is, the Muslim minority versus the non-Muslim majority, have more often been the focus. Ruiz thus makes a clarion call for the non-Muslim majority to learn more about the Muslim minority in the area, where she describes these contestations as product of the Muslim migrants' ongoing struggle from within and from without.

The Peripheral

Kristoffer R. Esquejo's "Family and Politics in an Archipelagic Province: The Moreno Dynasty in Postwar Romblon, 1949-1969" fills a gap in Philippine political studies of peripheral provinces and their provincial elite. A Romblomanon himself, Esquejo made use of documentary sources and oral interviews with members of one of Romblon's political dynasties, the Morenos. Romblon, with its geographical isolation as an archipelago, small voting population, and divided

ethnolinguistic groups (Asi, Romblomanon, and Unhan), had two significant political dynasties: the Asi-speaking Festins and the Romblomanon-speaking Morenos. Esquejo describes how it was the latter that made its mark in Romblon's political history and elevated the province to the national scene: "At the time, it was quite rare for a small province to have produced a political family that has members occupying powerful positions in both the legislative and executive branches of the national government." However, where studies on political dynasties have focused on feuds between families, Esquejo hones in on the "internal rivalry" between two Moreno brothers, Florencio or "Pensoy" and Jose Daniel or "Joe." He elaborates how their careers in government were entangled with national party politics, as well as the practice of "politica de familia," at the helm of which was the Moreno patriarch Juan Quirino M. Moreno or "Tan Angki." Esquejo puts forward how "the elections of 1953, 1957, and 1961 were living testimonies of the guaranteed collective electoral victory of the Morenos in the position of congressman as long as the brothers were united in supporting each other"—with complementary efforts of the father. He further describes how this initially clashed with the Moreno brothers' American colonial education and "bureaucratic professionalism," but that the elderly Moreno would mobilize the family businesses to ensure the electoral victory of his sons, and in return, the young Morenos would oblige their father's requests.

Esquejo points to the 1969 elections as the intensification of the sibling rivalry, when Pensoy ran against Joe. It became a "display of disunity," which resulted in the victory of the next political dynasty that would reign over Romblon until the present, the Unhan-speaking Madronas. This rivalry devastated the Moreno dynasty; continuing throughout the 1971 elections and martial law, it ensured that no chance was given for the Morenos to return to power. When the Moreno patriarch passed away in 1975, the gap between the two brothers would continue to widen to the point of no return. Esquejo's piece can be seen as a way of giving recognition to the Moreno brothers, despite their family's faults. Where it is interspersed with mostly positive accounts of remembrance from oral interviews among locals, the article hinges on the "pride of place" that the Moreno brothers instilled among their constituents. Romblon is only one of many archipelagic provinces literally and figuratively "isolated from the center," and Esquejo's focus on feuds within the family of a

Romblomanon political dynasty is one contribution to understanding localities from the periphery.

While dwelling on particular localities—Estrella shows how the price of gold in the illicit trade in Butuan is fluid in the hands of local actors, which exposes the disadvantageous and precarious position of the diggers; Ruiz elaborates on how mosque makers compete for socio-political capital in Culiat, which illustrated the challenges of Muslim inhabitants in negotiating and reconstructing identities from within and without the Al Salam Compound; and Esquejo surfaces how peripheral provinces have their own share of stories that need not be isolated and left unheard and unexamined—the authors also reckoned with how their positionalities figured in how they analyzed the above localities. Where the "national" no longer takes precedence as "the primary site for the source of representation" (Pertierra 1995, 14), accounts of localities showing illicitness, contestation, and marginality provide rich sources of situatedness and understanding. Raul Pertierra, decades ago, called for the social sciences in the Philippines to "reflect and inform these varied sources" of knowledge (1995, 14). With globalization, localities are no longer circumscribed by physical boundaries and territories as they now "extend across long distances and different topographies" (McKay and Brady 2005, 89). This entails new modes of analysis and reorienting social science scholarship to include such localities as units of analysis.

Finally, we are pleased to note that all three articles are products of the Third World Studies Center (TWSC) Writeshop. Since 2014, the Writeshop has been the TWSC's training and advocacy centerpiece. It focuses on building the research and publication capacities of early career researchers, junior faculty members, and graduate students to help them produce a scholarly article for *Kasarinlan*. The authors featured in this issue are representative of the variety of TWSC Writeshop fellows over the years. Estrella is an archaeologist who recently obtained his master's degree and teaches at the Philippine Normal University and Ateneo de Manila University; Ruiz is a theater-for-development practitioner who is also a graduate student at the Asian Center in University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman; and Esquejo is a recent PhD teaching at the History Department of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, UP Diliman. Ruiz and Esquejo were 2017 TWSC Writeshop fellows while Estrella was a fellow of the 2018 TWSC Writeshop.

This issue of *Kasarinlan* also includes reviews of the second edition of Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso's *State and Society in the Philippines* and Reynaldo Ileto's *Knowledge and Pacification: On the US Conquest and the Writing of Philippine History*, written by Miguel Paolo P. Reyes and Joel F. Ariate Jr., respectively.

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Illicit Trade in Gold Cultural Materials in Butuan, Philippines

VICTOR P. ESTRELLA

ABSTRACT. Historical and archaeological records have always associated Butuan in northeast Mindanao with gold. This reputation has set off rampant looting activities in and out of the locality since the 1970s until today. Such illicit activities have never been given much attention, and thus, this form of destruction of cultural properties has never been accounted for. This study examines the conduct of *pag-aantik* in Butuan through the lens of an archaeologist working on the site. I intend to expose the processes and the people involved in the illicit trade in gold cultural materials in this archaeologically rich market. Through the ethnography of looting, the study draws its attention to the social nature of the illicit trade. I argue that a small-scale analysis of this activity in Butuan allows us to observe interactions and relationships between groups of people, and the transformations gold items go through in the process. This is all to inform the academe as well as the future policies that aim to combat the destruction of cultural resources in the country.

KEYWORDS. Butuan · illicit trade · gold artefacts · ethnography of looting

An Archaeologically Rich Hub

In the mid-1970s, a flotilla of ancient boats, locally referred to as *balangay*, was discovered in the northeastern Mindanao city of Butuan (figure 1). Subsequent archaeological excavations recovered an array of cultural materials. These material evidences have allowed researchers to argue Butuan's participation in interisland and even in Southeast Asian trade from about the seventh to the twelfth century CE (Capistrano-Baker 2011; Bolunia 2013, 2014, 2017; Hontiveros 2004; Lacsina 2016; Stead and Dizon 2011; Peralta 1980). Gold is among the notable products that have circulated Butuan during this time. Recent archaeological studies on recovered crucibles as well as preworked and worked gold pieces assert that goldworking, as a metalcraft, was once a conspicuous industry in Butuan (Cembrano



Figure 1. Present-day map of Butuan City in Northeast Mindanao, showing its sitios and barrios. Maps by the author, from Estrella 2017.

1998; Estrella 2016b, 2017; Ronquillo 1989). This is supported by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish ethnohistoric accounts describing the profusion of ornaments and implements made out of *bulawan*, or gold, to the population's disposal (Estrella 2016a; Gatbonton 2013; Hontiveros 2004; Scott 1994).

Up to this day, the balangay site complex has remained to be the single most important archaeological site in Butuan. A total of six wooden boats have been archaeologically excavated and more have been reported in barangays Doongan and Libertad (Lacsina 2014, 2015). Other cultural materials, recovered from previous pursuits, include earthenwares (Almendral 1983; ASEAN 1986; Barbosa 1978; Roales 1989), tradeware ceramics (Brown 1989), faunal remains (Bautista 1982, 1983, 1990; Bautista and Galpo 1983), and metal implements (Bautista and Orogo 1990; Cembrano 1998; Estrella 2016b, 2017; Ronquillo 1989). Two museum structures were built within the vicinity, the National Museum Region 13 Branch and the Balangay Shrine. Outside the complex, there were other archaeological excavations: in barangays Ambago, Ambangan, Bonbon, San Vicente, and Bit-os, yielding materials that are important but less sensational than the balangay (Alegre 1979a, 1979b; Bautista 1991; Bolunia 2005, 2017; Burton 1977; Jannaral 1977).

Butuan's archaeological potential was further brought to the attention of the whole country due to the rampant looting activities in the city since the discovery of the boats. Such activities, and the report thereof, have called for numerous archaeological missions to the locality. The National Museum of the Philippines refers to these missions as salvage archaeology projects, which intend to save what had not been affected by plundering incidents (Alegre 1977; Burton 1977; Salcedo 1976). Up until today, numerous artefacts are being recovered systematically. However, there remain copious undocumented materials, which find their way to markets, museums, and private collections in and out of the country. The foremost motivation in looting is the search for gold because of Butuan's history as a source of ancient gold as confirmed by the actual recovery of gold items from both documented and undocumented excavations. It is in Butuan and in neighboring provinces where many gold cultural materials are found and exchanged. People from the Caraga Region witness occasional appearances of gold objects (see Lastimoso 1981 as well as Ronquillo and Salcedo 1981 reports on Surigao treasure as an example). Items, such as ear ornaments, chains, and finger rings, to name a few, are brought to Butuan from

Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte, and Surigao del Norte. Butuan appears to be the exposed surface, since it is where most of the exchanges of cultural materials happen.

The exchange of cultural materials in Butuan has always been a part of a larger network of illicit trade in the country. Since the 1970s, or even earlier, many parts of the Philippines have witnessed heightened interest in selling, buying, and collecting archaeological and cultural items. During this time, the term "antique," which was used to refer to heirloom objects, had its meaning expanded to accommodate those items recovered from archaeological excavations (Almeda 1992). Paz (1992, 29) calls them in Filipino as "*antik hukay,*" to differentiate excavated items from heirloom objects. In Southern Luzon, particularly in the provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Palawan, archaeological excavations in the 1960s and 1970s made possible, not only the collection of archaeological materials, but also treasure hunting (Barretto-Tesoro 2013, 2017; Paz 1992; Peralta 1982; Valdes 2003). The local labor force who helped in the excavations, equipped with knowledge and skills acquired from archaeologists themselves, became the looters of cultural resources (Barretto-Tesoro 2013). Almeda (1992) identifies this modus operandi as far as the province of Sorsogon.

The history of illicit trade in the Philippines suggests that archaeology has something to do with its existence and frequency. It appears to be a continuous loop that has been made possible, if not created, by archaeological pursuits in the country. On one hand, the conduct of archaeology in localities could signal economic potential to illegal diggers and dealers. On the other hand, when an area is looted, archaeologists are summoned to investigate what is left of the activity. As much as archaeology generates knowledge of the past, it also heightens the interest in historically important objects or "antiques" in an area. Although it creates jobs by employing locals in the excavation, it tends to enable them to become pot hunters and looters themselves, posing a serious threat to cultural resources. It is, therefore, the archaeologist, in the forefront of these concerns to the archaeological and cultural properties, who has the responsibility to examine the situation and propose avenues for minimizing, if not ending, the loss of cultural properties. However, the task requires a clearer look at the situation, a gaze which does not consider the activity as an abstract whole, but rather, a concrete reality dictated by its socio-cultural context.

In this section, I introduced Butuan and its enduring romance with gold cultural materials. From this affair, I highlighted the conflicting interests between archaeology and the illicit trade and how one causes the other. Conflict arises when archaeologists succumb to the tendency of viewing illicit trade as an abstract whole. In the succeeding parts of the article, I will try to review this tendency and put forward a microlevel examination. I attempt to explain the different small-scale and oftentimes overlooked processes and people involved in *pag-aantik*, or the illicit trade in Butuan, based on my interviews with the participants and observations of actual diggings. In doing so, I intend to expose the interactions between groups of people as well as the transformations that gold items go through in the course of the process. I argue that on the lowest level of this illicit trade, we can observe important exchanges already happening, and at this onset of the market or hub, we can find avenues in combatting the destruction of cultural resources of the country.

Illicit Trade in Antiquities

Illicit trade is a broad, and oftentimes ambiguous, concept that refers to many forms of interactions defined by law as illegal. Radisch (2016,19) points out that it is "an exchange in the control or possession" of a prohibited commodity or service. Prohibited or illegal commodities and services, o both, vary from one country to another (Commolli 2018; Radisch 2016). Countries consider what to them are parts of an illicit trade differently, since their opinions differ on what constitutes as dangerous to the physical health and well-being of the people and their communities. Williams (2001, 107) enumerates four categories of commodities and services illegally exchanged: (1) prohibited goods or services; (2) regulated commodities irregularly sold; (3) excise goods outside their intended destination market without paying the local dues; and (4) stolen commodities. Each of these categories comprises long lists of commodities and services ranging from drugs, prostitution, and human trafficking to smuggled goods and even cultural materials.

Despite the apparent threat of illicit trade to the physical health and well-being of the population, and its sometimes covert social, economic, and political impacts, many people continue to engage in illicit trade in their pursuit of gaining high income (Radisch 2016; Felbab-Brown 2018). In one way or another, these people are involved

in organized crimes, and their convergence makes it even more problematic, since at this point, more categories of commodity or service can be involved (Radisch 2016). This therefore poses greater difficulty not only for the countries involved but also for the whole international community (Albanese 2015; Williams 2001). Interconnectedness brought about by globalization and conflicts even add complexity to these criminal activities (Kinget et al. 2018; OECD 2016).

Crime against Cultural Heritage

The trade in antiquities is considered to be a crime if cultural materials which are treated as regulated commodities are sold irregularly (Alder and Polk 2002; Polk 2009; Williams 2001). Proulx (2011) describes this trade as a "gray market," since it consists of both legal and illegal undertakings. The UNESCO (1970) Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property declares that all cultural properties must be protected against illegal sale and transfer from origin countries to destination countries.

The UNESCO Convention of 1970 takes its roots from a long attempt to safeguard cultural materials, initially from destruction brought about by armed conflict (1954 Hague Convention for Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; 1969 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage). It recognizes a new form of destruction and paved the way for more international treaties on protecting material and nonmaterial cultural properties (1985 Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe; UNIDROIT 1995 Convention on Stolen or Illicitly Exported Cultural Objects; 2003 UNESCO Convention for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage). In these agreements, owning artefacts or any other important cultural material is acceptable, but, stealing, smuggling, laundering, or trading them without proper permits is punishable by law (Bowman 2008; Tijhuis 2006). The movement, exchange, and transfer of cultural properties are, therefore, the focus of legal attention.

The distinction between cultural and personal property has been a subject of contention in international law (Frigo 2004; O'Keefe 1999). Prott and O'Keefe (1992) suggest that the legal language recognizes cultural property more than the broad concept of cultural heritage. It is then the property of the person or the country, as well

as the present and future access to it that is needed to be protected from illegal transfer and other forms of destruction (Tantuico 2018). Determination of what constitutes cultural property, however, depends on each country's legislation. In the Philippines, it ranges from objects "of cultural, historical, anthropological, or scientific value and significance to the nation" (Republic Act 3874, or the Act Prohibiting Exportation of Antiques in the Philippine Islands of 1931; Republic Act 4846, or the Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act of 1966 as amended by Presidential Decree 374 of 1974), to "products of human creativity by which a people and a nation reveal their identity" (Republic Act 10066, National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009). Tantuico (2018) observes that the law is only concerned over the control of the movement of cultural properties in and out of the country, realized in the tedious process of declaration and registration, and the granting of permission for their transfer or sale. I attempt to demonstrate that the destruction of cultural property goes beyond being broken or lost during unpermitted transfer or sale.

Changing Focus

Illicit trade in antiquities is inherently viewed from the framework of criminality. The questions of what kind of and to what extent is it a criminal activity, however, are still being asked. One thing is certain: there are some laws being violated in the trade. Mackenzie (2009, 41; 2011) proposes two perspectives in looking into the criminality of the illicit trade in antiquities: seeing the "market as criminal," and seeing the "criminals in the market." Nonetheless, I prefer to look at these views as macro- and microlevel perspectives.

Viewing the illicit trade in antiquities on a larger scale allows us to see an organized and complex networks of criminals operating in a transnational setting (Campbell 2013; Mackenzie 2009; Manacorda 2011). Campbell (2013,113), in particular, approaches the illicit trade through a "network paradigm" to be able to make sense of the complexity of this phenomenon. From examining the global characteristics of illicit trade, one can identify the organization of the trade, ascertain its scale, measure its worth, and highlight the complexity of the phenomenon (Radisch 2016). An advantage of a macrolevel perspective is that it emphasizes the global threat of this phenomenon. Consequently, it affects all corners of the society and combatting it is everybody's business (Comolli 2018). And, by saying that it is everybody's business, it means that not only governments should be

convinced to recognize this fact, but more importantly, everyone should come up with similarly convergent and comprehensive policies and plans of action.

However, Proulx (2011, 1) contends that this macrolevel view appears to be a stereotype in which illicit trades in antiquities are all seen as criminal activities on a global scale. In return, discussions tend to generalize it as transnational and global, making it even more abstract, lacking in local contexts and detached from reality (Hobbs 1998). In response, archaeologists and cultural workers alike see the need to provide the bigger picture in order to forward their causes of protecting valuable cultural properties. They, willingly or unwillingly, overlook what is within their own midst, where illicit activities are discreetly operating. The diversity of legality and regulation among countries and its interplay with equally diverse social organizations are even obscured (Edwards and Gill 2002; Hagan 1983). In addition, in large-scale views, measurements and valuations reduce the lives of the people to money and statistics. Everyone who is involved is treated as an offender, and therefore, a criminal.

Instead of two opposing views, however, I wish to see them as complementary parts of a comprehensive approach. The illicit trade in cultural materials can be found simultaneously within local and global contexts (Proulx 2010; Robertson 1995). After all, a global phenomenon should be "local at all points," and thus, should be reflecting local realities (Latour 1993, 117). It must be stressed that the global characteristics and organization of the illicit trade in antiquities have already been examined extensively, as we observed in the earlier sections of this article. On the contrary, small-scale analyses of its dynamics through an archaeological gaze have been given little attention. Thus, I wish to particularly draw the attention of my research on this level, not only to expose the nature of the illicit trade in antiquities, but also to draw realistic and grounded solutions to the problem. After all, the illicit trade market, as a whole, is not all the time criminal (Commolli 2018; Felbab-Brown 2018; Matsuda 1998).

Archaeologically Rich Market

What I am proposing is to start "from below" and give more emphasis on individual lives. I subscribe to Mackenzie (2005a,1) when he suggests that "we must be sure of the existence and form of the looting problem we wish to address" prior to the regulation of the trade and the formulation of policies to combat it. Whereas the macrolevel



Figure 2. Market flow of the trade in illegal antiquities (Kersel 2006, 189).

provides us with the possible end results of the problems, looking into the microlevel situation of the problem is the logical first step in understanding them.

Microlevel analysis of illicit trade in cultural materials happens in an examination of flows, chains, and portals (Kersel 2006, 2007; Radisch 2016). Cultural materials in an illicit trade move in traffic from one level to another, passing through a series of portals. Kersel (2006,189) refers to a level between portals as a market, whereas Radisch (2016:31) calls it a hub, and they are differentiated as a source, transit point, or destination (figure 2). These markets or hubs can be both illegal and legal, and the participants can be both criminals and legitimate business people (Borodkin 1995; Polk 2000). In the source, commodities are collected through looting of archaeological and

cultural sites and stealing from museums. They are then bought by dealers, who, in return, will sell them to the collectors. This could happen on a larger scale, where the source market or hub is different from where the transit points and destination markets are. However, as I shall demonstrate in this article, this movement can also be found in one place, in an archaeologically rich market.

It is on the level of the archaeologically rich market where the very first interactions with and exchanges of archaeological materials and other cultural resources take place. It is, therefore, the most important of all the markets. Local individuals, groups, and/or families compose the foundations of an archaeologically rich market (Kersel 2006). They are the diggers, dealers, and few collectors of cultural materials from their locality. The market or hub is often represented by a location, which can be both the geographical setting and the interactions of the people involved in the illicit trade. It is an important key, therefore, that the right mix of "developed infrastructure," "weak governance, unfavorable economic conditions, and weak law enforcement capacity" should be available (Radisch 2016, 31).

It should be emphasized that, more than a place, an archaeologically rich market is constituted by the complex relations between members of a society (Felbab-Brown 2018). Felbab-Brown (2018, 3) suggests that members of a society participate in illicit trade because it could be a means "to satisfy their human security and to provide any chance of their social advancement, even as they continue to exist in a trap of insecurity, criminality, and marginalization." On the other hand, Campbell (2013) views this participation of locals in different capacities in the illicit trade of cultural materials as role specialization and, therefore, a means of collaborating with one another. Collaboration can, however, be seen as an established hierarchy of dependence. Panella (2010) argues that a certain hierarchy among these participants is imposed to ensure the perpetuation of the status quo of key participants, especially of the collectors and dealers, by making the diggers dependent on them. Panella (2010) further identifies two important relationships among the participants of the illicit trade in cultural materials in an archaeologically rich market. The "first link" is the relationship between the diggers and the dealers, whereas the "local link" is the relationship between the "dominant actors," the dealers and the collectors (Panella 2010, 228). It is not only the interactions that could be examined in this way, but also the transformation of the cultural material being exchanged.

ETHNOGRAPHY OF LOOTING

This study employs alternative ethnographic approaches toward understanding illicit trade in cultural materials through looting, as exemplified by several studies in light of similar objectives (Antoniadou 2009; Hollowell 2006; Matsuda 1998; Staley 1993). In a traditional way, Renfrew (2000,15) defines looting as "the illicit, unrecorded, and unpublished excavation of ancient sites to provide antiquities for commercial profit." It usually involves theft from and destruction of sites that are known and unknown to archaeologists (Conklin 1994). However, it appears that the macrolevel view on illicit trade in antiquities has also stereotyped the concept of looting, focusing on its legalistic and economic dimensions. In reality, looting can take many shapes and sizes. It can "range from the accidental, amateurish, episodic, and unorganized, to the organized, professional, systematic, and well-financed dealings with cultural materials" (Kersel 2007, 85).

Looting, in archaeology, is not inherently wrong (Felbab-Brown 2018). Its concept tends to be influenced by the large-scale, black-and-white view of criminality. There is more to looting, since it happens within specific historical and socio-political contexts (Antoniadou 2009; Felbab-Brown 2018; Hollowell 2006; Kersel 2007). In other words, looting is constructed socially and culturally (Mackenzie 2005b), which is why Staley (1993) prefers to move away from the terms "looter" and "pot hunter" when referring to diggers, since they have outright negative connotations and cannot be used in diverse situations.

Examining the illicit trade on the microlevel therefore demands an ethnography of looting. However, due to some limitations, this study falls short in conducting a full-scale ethnography. Instead, I wish to refer to my method as a strategic engagement with the participants of the trade. Normally, archaeologists would refrain from interacting with diggers, dealers, and collectors, and would observe the activities from a distance in fear of involving themselves with the illicit trade, which is considered unethical (see the Katipunan Arkeologist ng Pilipinas Inc. (KAPI) Code of Ethics). My engagement, though as limited, attempted to go nearer. In order to gather empirical evidence and answer my research questions, I communicated with the diggers, dealers, and collectors as well as observed their activities while they were working on the ground. I built upon Antoniadou's (2009) view that such methodology has a two-fold objective. While it aims to expose the power relations in the production of our knowledge of the

past, it also "gives voice to unofficial, indigenous meanings of and engagements with material remains" (Antoniadou 2009, 246).

I was working on my master's thesis in Butuan when I first chanced upon the reports of diggings and discovery of gold cultural materials in the city. My first visits were in July and September 2015 to analyze gold artefacts from the National Museum Region 13 Branch (see Estrella 2016b and 2017). Not only did I read about the illegal diggings from the field reports of the 1970s but I also learned about these activities from stories told to me by members of the museum staff and some locals of the community. However, reports and stories were all I had. I did not have the chance to interview actual participants in the trade. I had the chance to come back in December 2015 and 2016, but for an excavation in Agusan del Sur, where I heard even more reports from the locals themselves about the recovery of bulawan or gold. With another project in October 2017, I embarked on understanding not only the diggings but also the succeeding stages of these illicit activities. During my fieldwork in October–November 2017 and July 2018, I interviewed local diggers, dealers, and collectors as well as observed and documented actual diggings and trade activities in Libertad (District 6) and Manila de Bugabus (District 4) in Butuan City, and Bayugan II in Agusan del Sur.

A total of only ten (10) diggers, three (3) dealers, and two (2) collectors were interviewed in this study. A friend from my previous research activities in Butuan introduced to me a dealer who happened to have once been a digger. When I asked him to introduce me to other participants in this trade, he agreed. I wasted no time and began my engagement and initially interviewed the diggers. I explained to them my study and they all signified their willingness to share what they know about the trade. However, they insisted on maintaining the confidentiality of their names and other information. Thus, no consent and other forms were accomplished. All of the respondents requested not to release their personal information, especially their names, in any means. Taking photographs and videos were also negotiated and they agreed that photographs of their activities could be taken but in the angles that their faces and/or defining characteristics are not seen. An interview guide was prepared beforehand but they refused a structured, one-on-one interview. Instead, all interviews were done during the trips and the actual conduct of digging activities, and responses were recorded in field notes.

The diggers are all locals of Butuan but not necessarily born in the city. Half of them trace their origins to different parts of the Visayas. They are all male, their ages ranging from twenty-five to seventy-six years. Diggers could speak both Visayan and Filipino, whereas dealers and collectors could conveniently switch from Filipino to Visayan and English. Therefore, language was never a major concern.

THE *PAG-AANTIK* IN BUTUAN

The World of Work

Diggers, or *mangkalot* (from the root word *kalot*, or to dig), are also locally referred to as workers. This is probably to evade the true nature of their labor to nonlocals like me. Interviewed mangkalot are all residents of Butuan. They are all male. The youngest mangkalot is about twenty-five years old and the oldest is around fifty-six years of age at the time of the interview. Most of them are *lubi*, or coconut, farmers, but a few work for a company in the town. They only have basic education on various levels. They are extremely acquainted with the city, the primary area they search in. They are also knowledgeable about nearby towns, since their job often requires them to get out of the city.

In the conduct of pag-aantik, workers usually form or are asked to form a band of five to six people. They usually come from one or two families. Their involvement in the activity is never regular. Only when financing is available do they commit a week or two to *palakad* or digging trips. Most of their work is done during night time. Pag-aantik is conducted during the rainy season (September to December) because it is the time of the year when the soil in Butuan is soft, brought about by constant rain and the occasional flood. Workers seldom dig during dry season, but when they do, they are faced with great difficulty, since the soil tends to become too compact, making it hard to dig through. The workers resort to using water, which they carry by pails, to penetrate the cracks in the land.

Pag-aantik usually starts with the palakad (from the root word *lakad*, or to walk), the search for good areas to dig by walking from one *sitio* to another. The workers locate areas primary from the reports of fellow lubi farmers. Their searches are based on their personal experiences. They have even come up with criteria for identifying areas to be dug, such as the steepness of the slopes, the nearby bodies of water, and the

Figure 3. Photographs of a *sonda* used to test lands for buried cultural materials (top); a *sonda's* rounded head in a close-up (middle), and a *guna*, a small knife used for slow and careful digging, next to a *sonda* still stuck on the ground (bottom). Photos by the author, 2017.

colors of the soil, to name a few. Areas with reports of supernatural phenomena are also indicators of "good" lands. Workers believe in the concept of *palhi*, or areas to be avoided because of unexplained forces watching over these. Also, they are able to identify *lata*, or lands that have already been satiated—areas that have already been tested or dug, or both, previously. Most of the areas where they search are privately owned and the owners have no idea that their lands are being surveyed.

When an area has been decided upon, it is "tested" for buried cultural materials. Workers use an instrument they have made called *sonda* (figure 3), a long rod, usually two-and-a-half to three meters in length, and around seven millimeters in diameter. It is used to repeatedly poke the area being tested. It has a round metal end that makes a sound when hitting tradeware ceramics, metal implements, and other objects buried in the ground. The burning of *kamanyan* or incense in a *pag-alay* ritual follows as sign of respect and/or at the event of difficulty in finding materials. When cultural materials are ascertained to be beneath the land they are testing, they proceed with the actual digging. They just dig the soil without any depth or size of pit in mind. They use *pala*, big shovels, in removing large chunks of soil, and *guna*, a hand knife (see figure 3), for *igot-igot*, the process of slowly taking out sediments. Workers believe that the appearance of ceramics and *sundang*, or daggers, where they are digging are an indication of burials. Subsequently, the position of the materials in the area guides their digging to a certain direction to locate gold artefacts.

Financing the Trade

Diggings stop when workers find bulawan or gold (figure 4). This means their work is almost done. According to the workers, gold items are always the primary intention of every pag-aantik in Butuan. Finding gold is the single most important motivation that gets the workers going in this trade. In fact, they would describe this motivation as *maka-wakwak*, or the inevitable tendency to become crazy for gold. Tradeware ceramics are collected and sold as well (figure 4). They collect them even though they believe that these are *plato ng patay* or possessions of the dead. The workers consider the dead as *walang binyag*, or unbaptized, and the first owner of these objects. Some of them regard the previous owners as their ancestors, which is why they ask for forgiveness whenever they dig burial sites and collect objects from there. They, however, believe in the local notion of *condenar*, that is, collecting these materials would mean the harmless transfer of ownership of the objects

Figure 4. Photographs of the gold beads and strip, and other materials recovered by the diggers (top); dig showing a large earthenware jar (middle); and tradeware ceramics accompanying the jar (bottom). Photos by the author, 2017.

from the deceased ancestor to the living digger. The objects are now deemed to be in "good hands" and no one can ever desecrate the grave of the ancestor for their properties again. Therefore, the deceased can now truly rest in peace (*plastar*). The human bones and sundang are reburied as a mark of respect and because these have little to no value in trade. Taboos include playing with the bones and telling offensive jokes about the dead. The workers also give thanks, since they, the ones living, now benefit from this bounty.

All of the digging activities where the interviewed workers were involved were commissioned by a dealer. Commissioned digging by groups happens more often than individuals or groups bringing and selling their finds. Thus, the dealers prefer to be called financiers, since they provide the means, food, and other necessities for the workers during the course of the palakad. Depending on the size of their workforce, a financier spends around PHP 1,200 to PHP 2,500 per day, which could continue for a week, at most.

Financiers are fewer than workers. They are also men. One financier (Financier A) is fifty-six years old and a seafarer. He does the commissioning when he has no ship to board. He maintains six or more loyal workers. Many of them are his old-time friends. He admitted that he and his workers were part of an older generation who were exposed to the rampant treasure hunting and looting activities in Butuan in the 1970s. This financier claims that he is related to a former National Museum Butuan Branch staff from whom he learned a thing or two about archaeology and the artefacts. He also claims to possess a dealer's permit, which he never let me see. Aside from the workers in Butuan who do the actual digging, he commissions a restorer from Cebu who fixes broken pieces of objects made out of various materials. Another financier (Financier B), forty-one years of age, was a former worker who served older generations of financiers. As early as nine years old, he was already joining palakad. His curiosity was sustained because his father was one of the early diggers in Butuan and among the few restorers. He would always ask his father about his job, especially about the items being brought to their house. He has three more brothers and they are also engaged in this kind of activity. Financier B claims that this has something to do with genes coupled with own strategies. His father would sometimes teach them what to do, but it was their own experiences that taught them to be successful in this trade. The last financier (Financier C) did not want to share his personal background. What he was able to share was that he is in the buy-and-sell business if

he is not financing diggings. This is where he probably got his skills in financing, and marketing and selling cultural materials.

The workers will only sell their finds to the one who financed their digging trip. The financier buys gold items from the workers based on their weight, which is measured in grams. A gram, during the time this study was being conducted, costs PHP 1,800. Upon payment, the workers will then divide the total amount earned from their finds among the members of their group. The financier, in return, immediately sells the items for PHP 4,000 to PHP 6,000 per gram. Time is very important to the financiers. Prices are high when the sale is done right after the objects are recovered from the ground. Financiers would not even dare to clean the dirt from the objects to prove that they were just taken out of the pit. Delaying the sale, more so repairing the items, could diminish the price. *Sinubong* is what financiers call a gold item with a grade of 10 carats or lower. However, they have no means of identifying the exact quality of the gold items and even look down on the idea of having these items looked at by pawnshop assayers. They even follow the principle that the lower the grade of a gold item, the softer it becomes, which is why the characterization is mostly dubious.

The financiers shared during the interviews that they follow several criteria for adding value to gold artefacts. The more outstanding one criterion is observed in an object, the higher the value added. They consider "age" (antiquity), "story" (history), workmanship, economic value, and "perfection" (completeness) as the most important characteristics of best-selling gold items. On the other hand, they believe that gold artefacts lose their value when they are further damaged, transformed, or melted. They call fake items as "modern antiques." I say it is a clever word play financiers use to describe the items traded by competitors. However, no financier would admit to selling fake items.

Collecting and the Butuan Narrative

The two Butuan collectors interviewed in this paper both possess magnificent gold items in their big collections. However, they cannot identify a single collector who specializes in gold artefacts alone. Collectors tend to be even fewer in number than financiers and workers. They are professional men who are in their seventies. One of them (Collector A) is a lawyer and another is a medical doctor (Collector B). Another collector, whom I failed to interview, owns a timber company. They have their own regular work. Collecting is done

Figure 5. Photographs of a 35-gram gold chain offered by Financier A to Collector B for PHP 500,000 and haggled down to PHP 350,000 (top); a 21-gram gold head piece owned by Collector A and offered to Collector B for an undisclosed amount (middle); and gold ear ornaments, weighing a total of 6 grams, offered for an undisclosed amount to Collector B (bottom). Photos by the author, 2017.

in the side-lines. They claim to have been collecting for two decades now. It is not clear, however, if their parents or other members of the family collected before. The primary repositories of their collections are their houses; one of them manages a small, private museum, which is open to the public.

Collectors seldom join palakad trips. Instead, the materials are delivered to their houses or offices. Transactions happen very discreetly and quickly, over a cup of coffee or dinner. It is here that the pag-aantik ends: when an artefact is finally in the possession of a collector. A financier offers his gold items for a price to his patron first. The collector haggles for a lower price (see figure 5, for examples). If they do not agree on the price, the financier will offer the items to other collectors. But when they do agree, it is not the collector who releases the money but their secretaries. When the collector happens to be out of the town, photographs of the items are sent to him and the negotiation happens over the phone or the internet. The frequency of financiers selling gold cultural materials depends on the season. If it is the digging season, the arrival of items could happen almost every day.

Gold items in the collectors' possession receive special treatments. Collector A keeps his gold items in a vault inside a room in his house. Collector B also keeps them in his house, but wears all of his favorite gold rings. A collector knows what other collectors have, which is why they do not fight often over collection pieces. To them, these gold artefacts from Butuan are not just another part of their collections. They are, instead, valuable pieces of history.

What compels both collectors interviewed in this study in collecting cultural objects from their locality is to contribute to the narrative of Butuan's significant place in the history of the Philippines. It seems it is a lifelong mission for them to forward this Butuan narrative. Collector B would always say, "Long before the existence of the Philippines, there was already Butuan." The collectors are very conversant with the history of the locality and even participate in discussions and conferences about topics ranging from Butuan's tribute missions to China in 1000s CE to Magellan's landing and eventual celebration of the first mass in 1521 in Masao. Collector B possesses manuscripts, objects, and other curios that, purportedly, can support their claims. Gold artefacts stand out, since these are proof of Butuan's participation in the Majapahit-period (twelfth century) gold manufacture and exchanges in Southeast Asia. They serve as striking evidences of the economic wealth of the area even before the coming of the European

colonizers. Collectors could provide their own interpretations on the forms and functions of the gold items, directly linking them with what they have read and seen about the ancient gold trade. One of them is even very active in events and acquainted with people from the historical and cultural agencies in country. On several occasions, I had been part of a team he had invited to see the museum and his personal collections. The collectors take most pride not only on being able to participate in academic conversations, but, more importantly, on having a tangible piece of the distant past in their collections.

INTERACTIONS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Exposing the structure and the participants of pag-aantik in Butuan City allows for the examination of the character of an archaeologically rich market. This section attempts to make sense of the different interactions between actors in this activity as well as the transformations that happen with the material being exchanged.

Social Nature of *Pag-aantik*

At the bottommost level of the illicit trade in gold artefacts in Butuan are the workers. They are neither looters nor pot hunters, since they are neither outsiders to the city nor engaged in full-time plundering activities. As we have observed, these workers are local residents who are raising their own families in the city. They are also employed as full-time coconut farmers and company workers. They speak the local language and share the local beliefs. They even see the connection between them and the burials they dig. Workers in the illicit trade in gold cultural materials in Butuan can be characterized as subsistence diggers (Hollowell-Zimmer 2003; Matsuda 1998; Staley 1993). According to Staley (1993, 348), subsistence diggers are prevalent in Third World countries, since the underdeveloped nature of their country's economy allows them to earn from the sale of artefacts and other cultural materials they have found in "support to their traditional subsistence lifestyle." Traditional subsistence includes farming, fishing, or involvement in local industries, a regular source of their everyday living. Subsistence diggers are engaged in what Hollowell-Zimmer (2003, 46) refers to as "low-end" diggings, doing "undocumented excavations in which the products are not headed straight for the international art or antiquities market but for less lucrative and often less visible markets or sometimes for no market at all." The labor is

nonintensive, requiring less effort and time from them (Felbab-Brown 2018). Therefore, it is a cash economy where the diggers do not earn much, a reason why they tend to involve themselves in these activities more often (Matsuda 1998).

The workers, subsequently, sell their finds to the financier who provided the means to conduct a palakad. Between the workers and the financier, the price is solely based on the standard of gold weight per gram. The financiers do not see the need to add more, since they commissioned the activity and provided the necessary resources, such as food and transportation fares, needed during the course of the digging. Financiers do not share what they know and abuse the worker's limited knowledge on the trade. Because of this, the workers receive only a small amount of money that they will have to divide among the members of the group. The workers are also afraid of losing the confidence of the financiers, which is why they do not complain that much. The diggers tend to become dependent on them, too. This tendency to "monopolize the information and control of the network" are just one of the many cunning strategies dealers employ to close a deal and to maximize their earnings from it (Panella 2010, 228). Borodkin (1995) further explains that dealers study the trade and the artefacts, manipulate prices as well as conceal the identity of their sources and patrons. Moreover, these dealers are the middlemen—the link between the diggers who found the artefacts and the buyers who collect them. They are the intermediaries who sell not only the cultural materials they got from the diggers, but also their "ability to take risks, to guard information, and to conduct transactions discreetly" (Borodkin 1995, 377–78; Mackenzie 2005a). Between the financiers and collectors in Butuan, the price is far higher. The price of an item becomes fluid, as it is now dictated not only by the gold standard but also of added value based on criteria of antiquity, completeness, and workmanship, to name a few. The price is also negotiated, and a deal is closed when both the financier and the collector agree on a price. In return, the dealers, almost all the time, earn way more than the diggers (Brodie 1998).

If the diggers are the source of the materials being traded, the collectors are at the other end of the market. The archaeologically rich market in Butuan grew itself local collectors to whom archaeological materials and other cultural resources find their way. Collectors' views on and motivations for collecting cultural materials can range from as simple as decorations to as complex as art pieces and investment

opportunities (Brodie 2002; Brodie and Luke 2006). In the case of Butuan, collectors are wealthy professionals who were brought up in the historical and cultural narratives of Butuan. Therefore, their enthusiasm comes from the need to contribute to the historical narrative of the locality. This motivation has resulted in the collectors establishing connections with the academe by donating and/or allowing access to objects (Brodie 2011; Brodie and Luke 2006). It is on this level that they get to interact with archaeologists and cultural workers. However, it is obvious that they still want to maintain a safe distance from the National Museum of the Philippines. Brodie and Luke (2006) see this as a compelling need to legitimize connections with the cultural elite. Ultimately, the possession and display of artefacts and other materials important to the history and culture of the locality validates the high and cultured status of the collectors (Brodie and Luke 2006; Paz 1992).

Campbell (2013) posits this participation of locals in different capacities in the illicit trade of cultural materials as role specialization, and, therefore, a means of collaborating with one another. Collaboration can, however, be seen as established hierarchy of dependence. Panella (2010) argues that a certain hierarchy between these participants is imposed to ensure the perpetuation of the status quo of the key participants—the dealers and collectors—by making the diggers dependent on them. Panella (2010) further identifies two important relationships among the participants of the illicit trade in cultural materials in an archaeologically rich market. Whereas the "first link" is the relationship between the diggers and the dealers, the "local link," on the other hand, is the relationship between the "dominant actors," the dealers and the collectors (Panella 2010, 228). The first link in the conduct of pag-aantik in Butuan is between the workers and the financiers. This initial interaction allows us to see not just the plundering of cultural materials, but also the abuse of the workers and the perpetuation of dependency. The workers are forced to become accomplices of the financiers to recover buried gold objects and participate in the illicit trade, concealing the nature of their work in the rhetoric of role specialization and collaboration. Aside from this, the financiers' deceitful ways also include the manipulation of prices, the creation of a narrative, and fraud, to name a few. Felbab-Brown (2018, 15) calls this the "technology of illegality," in which dealers continuously manipulate networks and knowledge to maximize their own profits from the sale of the artefacts and to somewhat evade punishment from

the law. Digging and financing now becomes an inescapable source of income for both workers and financiers in Butuan. In fact, according to the interviews, it is unthinkable for them not to dig and sell cultural materials on top of their regular jobs. The real collaborators in the pag-aantik in Butuan are the financiers and the collectors, as we have observed in its local link. Their collaboration allows for the continuation of this scheme in the locality. Paz (1992) reports that in an illicit trade in antiquities, the collectors are the ones who dictate the demand of cultural materials. The workers and the financiers, on the other hand, supply these materials to them, and the cycle goes on (Davis 2011). It is true in the case of Butuan, but the prices are easily negotiated between the collectors and the financiers. The conduct of commissioned palakad is also the product of the collectors' willingness and capacity to buy gold artefacts and the financiers' capability to provide the means for the workers during the digging.

The last relationship formed in the course of the pag-aantik in Butuan is between the collectors and the cultural elite. This relationship can be observed in how collectors fit their collection to the Butuan historic narrative, and in how they extend themselves to the members of cultural agencies and the academe. Brodie and Luke (2006) suggest that collectors who involve themselves with the accumulation of objects with great historical and cultural importance need to establish connections with the cultural elite, primarily with the museum curators, museum enthusiasts, and the academicians, themselves. As much as the collectors, by donating or allowing access to their collection, provide something for the museum curators and the academics, the academics, in return, validate the act of collecting (Brodie and Luke 2006).

The Changing Meaning of Gold Artefact

The interactions between the participants of pag-aantik in Butuan bring about transformations on the gold objects being traded. While the participants are very cautious in altering the physical appearance of the items, they are not that fully aware of the changes in meaning they have made on them. According to Polk (2000), the first layer of transformation happens when objects are transformed from illegal to legal or legitimate commodities. Kersel (2006) refers to this process as laundering and this is what separates illicit trade in antiquities from other organized crimes, since other commodities remain illegal when they are taken from one portal to another while cultural objects tend

to become legal. In the Philippines, under Republic Act 10066, archaeological materials, both found on land and underwater, are considered important cultural properties and should be protected. It also states that exploration and/or excavation without a permit is against the law. Palakad, therefore, is against the law, since both the workers and financiers have no permits and other legal documents to allow them to search and dig up the areas in Butuan. However, pag-aantik can be allowed by the law, provided that a person secures a treasure hunting permit. It is also quite perplexing that only the exportation of materials from the Philippines to other countries is regulated while the transfer from one locality or possession to another is not. Gold cultural materials in Butuan are even disguised as personal jewelery; thus, boarding them on airplanes has never been a problem to the collectors.

Another layer of transformation among gold cultural materials in Butuan is misrepresentation. From their recovery by the workers to their eventual sale to the financiers and to the collectors, interpretations about the form, composition, and function of the artefacts change. From possessions of the dead ancestors transferred to "good hands," the bulawan or gold items become antiques, and when they reach a collection, they become "evidences" of Butuan's golden past. Despite of the changes, gold artefacts remain a commodity, but their prices are affected by the changes in meaning. From a weight-based assessment of the object, gold items are given value according to their conceived temporal and spatial contexts, workmanship, and many more. Glover (2015, 239) sees it as the "chain of transfer from the original finder to the dealer, and to the collector," where, during the process, provenance is lost. When the archaeological materials or other cultural resources are given provenance other than their true source, misrepresentation occurs (Paz 1992). Gill and Chippindale (1993, 269) lament that the materials undergo "intellectual corruption of reliable knowledge," since the materials have been given a different story and interpretation. The items are now decontextualized (Brodie 2002). Misrepresentation of gold cultural items during the course of pag-aantik in Butuan entails meaning making by the workers, the deliberate attempts of the financiers to obscure the context of the materials to increase the price, and the legitimization of the collectors who try to fit these materials in the Butuan narrative. The financiers always have the construed intention to misrepresent the gold artefacts in Butuan. Mackenzie (2005a, 255) points out this ability to create provenance and to communicate it in

the market as a "verbal assurance" given to buyers of cultural materials. However, it can be viewed that the financiers and collectors also collaborate in making meanings for the objects they engage with. Since the stories are also negotiated, these make them cocreators of this new provenance. This layer of transformation, as supported by a long history of illicit trade in the locality, leads us to suggest that most, if not all, Butuan gold items circulating and being kept in many public and private collections in the Philippines have undergone misrepresentations brought about by their movement from one portal to another. We, therefore, should be critical when looking into the materials and collections they represent.

The last layer of transformation involves fraud. According to Brodie, Doole, and Watson (2000), forgery is common in and a risk of illicit trade. Collectors in Butuan face the risk of purchasing fake gold artefacts from financiers and other collectors. Fake gold items can appear either as both not genuine gold and not recovered from the locality or as genuine gold but the craftsmanship is recent. Both the financiers and the collectors have the capacity to have these items assayed but they seldom do. The collectors, with this limited means of ascertaining authenticity, are being totally swayed by the narratives created by the financiers. However, as much as there are risks, the market also thrives because of trust (MacKenzie 2005a). Participants, especially in the local link, collaborate and maintain good relations with each other. Because of this transformation, modern-day, if not fake, objects make their way to collections, making it more difficult to be certain of the narratives they are making.

Conclusion

This article is a product of my reflections on the impacts of archaeology and archaeologists to the sites and communities they work with. Archaeologists, in their study of the distant past, do not only excavate sites but also participate in the social dynamics of a locality. And, since archaeology is a discipline that puts artefacts in their socio-cultural context in the past, it should also be able to put its "enterprise on its proper socio-political and economic dimensions" today (Castañeda 2008). It is not the intention of my research to undermine the large-scale view of the illicit trade in antiquities but to provide an alternative entry point to the inquiry of such a phenomenon. This study allows us to look at the situation involving individual lives, lived in their own

concrete reality, and dictated by their society and culture. My strategic engagements with the participants of the illicit trade in Butuan have been a learning opportunity for me to listen to their stories and observe their actual activities. In gathering empirical evidence, I was able to expose the nature of the trade in an attempt to better explain to the academic community what is really happening and to inform appropriate policies that will address the concern.

Pag-aantik is the localized version of the illicit trade in cultural materials and it exists in the archaeologically rich hub of Butuan City. It is participated in by local workers, financiers, and collectors. The study was able to describe its character, in which identity and relationships are constructed and negotiated by society and culture. Its social nature exposes the hefty benefits gained by financiers and collectors at the expense of the workers. Butuan's notoriety as both the historical and archaeological locus of gold items in the Philippines also allows for gold to be a distinct category of cultural material exchanged in the illicit trade in the locality. Consequently, in the process, gold artefacts are constantly transformed by deliberately changing the perspectives on the meanings of objects for profit and for narrative making.

Toward the end, let me point out what this study wishes to communicate further. The destruction of our cultural properties lies not only on the actual plundering of archaeological materials from beneath the ground or their eventual loss in the illicit market but also on the exploitation and abuse of the local population for profit and the total loss of information about the past. This research informs us that the microlevel analysis is as valuable a source of information as the macrolevel view. Therefore, legislations on the protection of cultural heritage, both on the international and national levels, should be interpreted against local contexts. We do not need more laws, instead, what we need are specific and realistic provisions geared toward safeguarding both cultural properties and the local community. The study also suggests to move beyond regulations and to start building the groundwork in providing proactive social development for the local diggers who are the most exploited participant in this trade. As much as they are the front liners of cultural destruction, they are also potential protectors of their own cultural properties, through education and local community engagement. However, educating them might not be enough. We need to empower them. I subscribe to Matsuda's (1998) call to end stereotypes about diggers as the first logical step

toward their empowerment. Minimizing their exposure to such kinds of activity by providing alternative occupations or sources of livelihood can also be part of the solution. Empowering these local diggers also means giving them the responsibility of protecting their own cultural heritage. There is no guarantee that dealers will have no workers at their disposal after some of these diggers stop working for them. However, by involving the former diggers in the active protection of their own cultural properties, we are actually reducing participation in the loss and opportunity to further destroy cultural heritage, and, at the same time, increasing awareness for its protection. I believe this is an important first step.

I am exposing the illicit trade of gold cultural materials in Butuan not for the government to partake in the process but to inform agencies and other concerned groups about who and what we take into consideration. This is to challenge them to think of ways other than simply assuming, and thus permitting, the role of the financier and the collector, since it would only perpetuate abuse of both the local workers and of the cultural materials. Solving the problem of illicit trade means putting an end to the oppressive flow of the market. The primary involvement of the academe, particularly the archaeologist and other cultural workers, should always be in the exposition of even more covert systems and variations to these systems as well as in informing people in authority.❁

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Muslim Migrants and Hybrid Placemaking of Mosques in Culiat, Quezon City

ACT RUIZ

ABSTRACT. This article uses the framework of hybrid placemaking to analyze narratives behind the five mosques in the Al Salam Mosque Compound in Culiat, Quezon City. Salam as a space of representation, becomes a respite from inequalities experienced from without. But behind the veneer of homogeneity, Salam houses tensions between and among heterogeneous groups from within. Networks to the greater Muslim community, religious and cultural interpretations of faith, boundary maintenance, and homeward orientation differ from one group to another, manifesting in different spatial practices. Visual, aural, and tactile boundaries—the appearance and visibility of the mosques, the language used during holy sermons, and the selection of the congregation affect the relationships between mosque makers and patrons, as well as the image of the entire community to the non-Muslim community outside. Migrants are united in the Islamic values of cleanliness, peace, and unity, but differ in their implementation. As a representation of space, Salam is the melting pot where migrants use shared values as a take-off point to build around different expressions of these values. Actors interpret their mosque making as a way to overcome their uneven conditions, and reinforce their religious and political status inside and outside the community.

KEYWORDS. hybrid placemaking · mosque. Al Salam Mosque Compound · migration · Culiat

Introduction

> States make wars and wars—massively—make migrants. (Scott 2009, 146)

James Scott's assertion sets the tone for majority of studies regarding the formation of Muslim migrant communities in various predominantly Catholic cities in the Philippines. Literature abounds on how traditional Muslims from Southern Philippines, otherwise known as "Moros," face displacement, dislocation, discrimination, misrecognition, minoritization,

and various other disadvantages as migrants.[1] Generous emphasis is given on their status as survivors of war, exiles, refugees, and members of diaspora borne out of civil conflicts in Southern Philippines.[2]

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1. Spanish colonizers in the sixteenth century labeled Muslim resistance groups in Southern Philippines as "Moro," and systematically slaughtered them. This tradition continued throughout the American occupation in the eighteenth century (Frake 1998, Rodil 1994). The term "Moro" has been reclaimed post-Second World War by various Muslim independence groups to denote thirteen ethnolinguistic groups, inclusive of the Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, Iranun, and Yakan, to which many of the respondents of this study identify as. All groups have their own specific language, religious traditions, and customary laws. The first three of these specified groups identify with their own pre-colonial sultanate systems (Majul 1999, Rodil 1994). The Maranao, Maguindanao, and Iranun are based in mainland Mindanao, or Southern Philippines. The Maranao (also known as M'ranao, Maranaw, Meranao) claim ancestral domain over areas surrounding Lake Lanao in the province of Lanao del Sur, with majority of their population concentrated in Marawi City (NCCA 2015). The Maguindanao (aka Magindanaw, Magindanao), as with the Maranao, trace their ancestry to Shariff Kabungsuan, a fourteenth century Muslim forefather who established Islamic communities in areas now known as the Maguindanao province (Rodil 1994). The Maguindanao and Iranun (also known as Ilanun, Ilanon, Iranon) both claim areas of the Maguindanao province as ancestral domain, though the former are historically known to have accepted Islam earlier than the latter. Warren ([1985] 2002) explores at length the history of the Iranun's heritage on maritime raiding. The Yakan claim ancestral domain over areas in the province of Zamboanga del Sur and the island of Basilan, both tributaries to the Sultanate of Sulu during the fourteenth century. Anthropologists have theorized that the Yakan, renowned for their weaving and embroidery, descended from the Dayaks of North Borneo (Sherfan 1976). The Tausug (aka Taw Sug, Suluk, Sulu, Joloano) are based mainly in the island province of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and identify highly with the Sulu Sultanate. The sultanate began with Sultan Sharif ul-Hashim in 1450 (Majul 1999). By the eighteenth century, the sultanate power covered the entire Sulu Archipelago (now provinces of Jolo, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi), southern Palawan, and Sabah in North Borneo (Majul 1965). Sultan Jamal-ul-Kiram II, who died in 1936, was the last undisputed Sultan (Majul 1974). Various claims to the sultanate continue until present. Truly, Filipino Muslim identity is complex. I chose to use the term "Moro," however, consistent with other recent similar studies—namely Regadio (2015), Sapitula (2014), Taqueban (2012), and Watanabe (2008a; 2008b).
2. For instructive overviews: Majul (1999) uses thirteenth century genealogies, among other archival material, to situate the Muslim resistance to Philippine colonialization as part of the development of Islam in insular Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, Hernandez (2014) theorizes on the protracted peace process (or failures thereof) in Southern Philippines, and discusses misrecognition as a crucial aspect of this conflict.

But migration is not all suffering. Moro migrants, as with many other migrant populations around the world, not only "re-build what was once lost" but actually build anew.[3] Because of, or in spite of their changed material conditions, they construct: buildings, communities, and ultimately identities—changing the power structures of their environment with every new construction. Migrants engage in placemaking, which is a "bottom-up, asset-based, person-centered process that emphasizes collaboration and community participation in order to improve the livability of towns and cities" (Gadwa and Markusen 2010 in Toolis 2017).

As a framework, placemaking focuses on the "co-constitution of person and place" (Toolis 2017, 3). Stories, behaviors, constructions (physical), and constructs (non-physical) about a place are examined as ways actors assert their "right to the city" (Harvey 2008, 23).[4] Yes, states make wars and wars make migrants. But through agency and creative license, migrants make places—hence, migrants make states too.

This study presents narratives behind religious placemaking, specifically mosque making, within the Al Salam Mosque Compound in Barangay[5] Culiat, Quezon City (figure 1). The compound is almost a small Muslim state enveloped by larger non-Muslim institutions

3. There is ample literature on the impact of placemaking among migrant communities internationally, among which consulted for this study are Mazumdar and Mazumdar (2009), Lawrence-Zuñiga and Pellow (2008), Main and Sandoval (2015), and Nguyen (2010).
4. "The right to the city is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city" (Harvey 2008, 23).
5. Republic Act 7160 or the "Local Government Code of 1991" sees *barangay* "as the basic political unit, the . . . primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects, and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably settled." As a spatial and physical entity, a barangay must have "at least two thousand (2,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants."

along Tandang Sora Avenue.[6] Moro community leaders fought long and hard for this five-hectare territory and their way of life that combines the many worlds of their varied heritage into unique configurations. Traditional elders from various ethnolinguistic groups have consolidated their own governance structures, liaising with the local barangay government.[7] Economic opportunities in the city give rise to changing dynamics between men and women, the young and the old, and ultimately between outsiders and insiders.[8] Daily, the *adhan* (call to prayer) of the five mosques within—the Al Salam, Al Ahbrar, Al Ikhlas, Rahma, and Mohammadiy-ya—can be heard in and out of the compound.

I grew up to the sound of these adhan, my own home of twenty years a mere kilometer away from the compound. Outsiders to the compound interpret the many mosques as signs of disunity, correlating the diversity within to the assumed poverty of the residents, and ongoing "Moro wars" in Southern Philippines. But insiders interpret

6. The Al Salam Mosque Compound's formal name is unknown to many in Quezon City. Those in the neighborhood know the area as "Muslim compound," or simply "compound." Those from the farther areas of Quezon City know it as "Culiat," confusing that Culiat is in fact the entirety of the barangay that the compound is situated in, and not just the enclave itself. The entire Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) religious complex occupies most of Barangay Culiat, but people refer to INC properties as part of "Central"—derived from the religious denomination's imposing Central Temple, which overlooks Commonwealth Avenue. To many passersby, "Culiat" refers to the Muslim compound, and "Central" are the INC parts of town. Names alone delineate the two entities, as if they were separate worlds, when in fact the two communities' borders overlap.
7. Regadio's (2015) unpublished study gives in-depth detail about the systems of governance in place at the Culiat compound, though framed through the lens of "Morospora," or Moro diaspora. His framework intends to show how his respondents, drawing from their sense of diaspora, re-place identities once displaced. The density of his data shows, however, the negotiations and ultimately, innovations, that Moro leaders have designed and implemented to create—as opposed to simply "re-create"—their place within the power relations of the local barangay government. This paper draws heavily from the leads generated by his data, but takes a different view on a community's being bound to a sense of dislocation from their new home. As reviewers of this article have pointed out, there is yet any confirmation if his respondents have accepted the concept of "Morospora" themselves.
8. Taqueban (2012) discusses how living in Manila provided women of the compound more economic opportunities than they had back in their Mindanao homelands, shifting traditional gender dynamics. My personal correspondences with women leaders of the compound confirm this, the discussion of which deserves a separate paper.



Figure 1. Map of Barangay Culiat from the Quezon City Planning and Development Office.

glaring inconsistency: Why are many mosques seen as signs of hostility, when there are just as many different churches, temples, and chapels in the neighborhood?

Thu Suong Thi Nguyen's (2010, 164) argument, that "(re) territorialization [are] outcomes of ongoing political struggle" rings true in the case of Al Salam. Migrants are pressured by expectations applied to them, due to "circumstances of painful postcolonial hybridity" (Radhakrishnan 1993 in Nguyen 2010, 160). Inequality ensues when the majority are not held to the same.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

Nguyen's hybrid placemaking framework draws from Henri Lefebvre's (1991) theory of spatial production comprised of (1) space of representation, (2) spatial practices, and (3) representation of space. The first looks at what constraints actors try to overcome through placemaking. The second describes how a place is built, and looks at how actors behave in it to reflect their values and world views. Finally, the third discusses the ideals that actors aim for in their placemaking. Hybrid placemaking takes these three into consideration to infer how migrant actors interpret their uneven conditions, and transform these difficulties into political action.

This study was inspired by Taqueban (2012), Regadio (2015), and Watanabe (2008a; 2008b), who have all taken ethnographic approaches, as I have, in studying various aspects of the Al Salam Mosque Compound. The story of mosque making in this study continues and updates Watanabe's (2008a; 2008b) investigation on the relationship between mosques and Moro migrant settlements in Metro Manila, specifically in Culiat. My chosen framework not only considers the tensions between insiders and outsiders to the compound, as shown in Taqueban (2012) and Regadio (2015), but also further examines the tensions insiders have with one another. I wish to contribute an analysis that highlights how these tensions intersect and result in the specific physical environment of the compound. Likewise, the physical experiences of the compound co-constitute its social experiences.

Data was gathered primarily via on-site, one-on-one unstructured interviews with main respondents: *imam* (Muslim leader), mosque owners, and administrators. Incidental interviews were also conducted among residents living near the mosque, and mosque caretakers.

it differently. Interviews with residents of the compound point out a Formal correspondence with the Culiat Barangay Hall, through the staff of *sangguniang barangay* member[9] Ameerah Ibrahim, facilitated my entry into the community. Residents curious about my recurring visits eventually became respondents. To those who were neither administrators nor owners of the mosques in question, I gathered data on their personal experiences in the compound. Interactions with them led to interviews with the main respondents.

Questions to main respondents focused on their life stories, tracing their journey from Mindanao to the compound, the narratives behind how and why their respective mosques were built, and their interpretations of the narratives of the other mosques around them. This approach was inspired largely by Patricia Horvatich's (1992) dissertation on Muslim discourses in Tawi-Tawi, Philippines. Horvatich's interviews were structured around how respondents reconciled their relationships with relatives and neighbors who had differing views on Islam. Guided also by Watanabe's (2008b) inquiry on the function of mosques, I asked them what mosques are for, and what mosques meant to the community. The final questions revolved around whether they felt having many mosques in one compound was desirable or not. Interviews were conducted mostly in Tagalog, the lingua franca of Metro Manila, though there were instances when witnesses to the interviews offered inputs in their mother tongue, which the main respondent would translate into Tagalog. Majority of the interviews were audio recorded, though I relied heavily on handwritten field notes.

I conducted eight main interviews within three weeks, with sessions averaging two hours per respondent. Interviews were conducted mostly in the respondents' residences, in view of family members, visitors, and sometimes, other respondents. At the end of each interview, respondents allowed me to see portions of the mosque, but only the first chambers, and only when activity was dismal. I was able to interview the representatives of all the mosques, save for one. Representatives of the Al Ahbrar Mosque declined formal interviews

9. Barangay council member is an elective post; as prescribed by Republic Act 7160, "the sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large and sangguniang kabataan chairman, as members."

for undisclosed reasons, though several of them generously guided me to other respondents.

Security concerns halted my fieldwork. The conclusion of the national elections in June 2016 and subsequent implementation of the current administration's "war on drugs" have worsened the raids and shoot-outs within the compound, compromising further entry. My respondents have advised me not to return to the compound, and I have not ever since. Given the sensitivity of some of the information disclosed in their interviews, I also deemed it necessary to protect the identities of the respondents. Thus, names of respondents are anonymized, many details that may make them readily identifiable are excluded from discussion, and some information is not attributed to specific individuals.

I take caution, as Efenita Taqueban (2012) does, in the implication of my own politics in ethnographic writing. I heard and wrote the stories as a resident of Barangay Culiat since 1996 to present, a woman born to a middle-class Catholic background. My data is limited to the information presented to me in Tagalog, and mediated by my outsider status. I consider this study an attempt at documenting the agency of my often negatively-stereotyped neighbors. For whatever lapses this study presents, I take full responsibility for my "systematic construction of others and [myself] through others" (Clifford 1986, 121 quoted in Taqueban 2012, 3). That the way one describes the other, the meanings of their ideas, are through stories, and that these stories are "morally charged" (Clifford 1986, 100 quoted in Taqueban 2012, 2).

Making Space: From Mindanao to Manila

Pressures from Without

"Original objective *ng* Libya *ay maging* Islamic center, *dasalan lang dapat. Kaya nagkaroon ng mga ganitong gulo kasi hinaluan na ng residente, ng* business, *ng mga* transient," (Libya's original objective was to make this an Islamic center, for religious purposes only. But it's become more complicated because residents, businesses, and transients came into the mix) Hadji A, the compound's de facto chairperson, tells me.[10] But even he cannot deny that historical events in Mindanao and Manila

10. Hadji A, interview by the author, May 21, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

pushed many Muslims out of their original homes, and into the crucial safe haven that was the compound.

The compound started out as a religious endowment from the Libyan government to the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) in 1971. What was ideally a quiet place for worship, far from the bustling metropolis, became a bustling cosmopolitan space for migrants in two decades. Several major events spurred waves of mass migrations to Culiat. First, the declaration of martial law in 1972 led to intensified civil war against Moro secessionist groups, resulting in civilian massacres and massive displacement in Mindanao.[11] Another was in 1986, when homes in the Islamic Center in Quiapo, Manila were demolished (Watanabe 2008a).

Third was the "Battle for Al Salam" in the 1990s. A land dispute ensued in 1989 when, unbeknownst to the residents of the compound, new officers of the IDP sold the Culiat estate to members of the dominant Christian denomination, the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC, Church of Christ).[12] In 1990, a demolition attempt led to an armed encounter between INC agents and Muslim residents. This garnered mainstream media attention, as casualties included several Saudi Arabian and Pakistani students, sympathizers of the residents. Atty. Blo Umpar Adiong, an elder member of the IDP, filed a lawsuit against the INC for ownership of the compound that same year. Protests in support of the Muslims' legal battle included shows of arms, youth-led mass mobilizations, and media campaigns. To deter resettlements and demolitions, Moro leaders encouraged more Muslims to reside in the compound. The legal battle was won when the Supreme Court finally conferred ownership to the residents in 1997 (Watanabe 2008b). Shortly after, the Estrada administration would declare an "all-out war" against separatist movements in Mindanao, causing yet another wave of migrants in 2000 (Taqueban 2012).

11. Hernandez (2014, 52) notes: "The event that triggered the group-building process was the so-called Jabidah massacre on the night of March 18, 1968. The Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos ordered soldiers to infiltrate Sabah in his quest to occupy the Malaysian territory claimed by the Philippines. When 28 Muslim soldiers refused, they were massacred. This event is regarded as the causal event behind the modern Moro insurgencies in the Southern Philippines."

12. Reed (2001) provides an overview on the rise to prominence of the INC in the Philippines, with chapters specifically focused on the establishment of the group's "New City of Faith" in the Tandang Sora area. The contrasts between the developments of the INC and Muslim communities in Culiat make for interesting further study.

Figure 2. Satellite view of Al Salam Mosque Compound from Google Map.

The "Battle for Al Salam" was framed as a victory not only for the Culiat settlers, but for Islam as well. Just as Moros had defended their homeland against the Spanish and American colonizers, so have the residents of the compound "reclaimed" their land from nonbelievers (Watanabe 2008a). Residents of the compound continue to invoke participation in the demolitions, armed clashes, and mobilizations during the land dispute to legitimize their leadership in the community. Riding on the energy of the victory over the land dispute, Moro leaders established the Quezon City Muslim Consultative Council (QCMCC), officially adopted by the city government in 2004. But nowadays, only few of the residents remember this landmark struggle. Majority of the current residents are transients, applicant overseas workers to the Middle East, waiting to be deployed (Taqueban 2012).

Still, the compound remains a bastion for the 531 permanent households within (Regadio 2015).[13] Muslim residents seek sanctuary from the growing encroachment of the non-Muslim majority from the outside. An aerial view of Salam further emphasizes its enclosure (figure 2). To the north, the Quezon City Police District Precinct No. 3 and the Culiat Barangay Hall flank its entrance. To the west, it is bounded by the New Era Elementary School, to the south New Era University campus, and to the east by the Liberato-Kanekoa Memorial Temple-Pentecostal Church, and the religious Institute for Consecrated Life in Asia.

Taqueban (2012, 13) says it best when she describes the "two-fold stigma for Salam residents—that of being poor, and the implications of being Muslim." Stereotyping makes it hard for the migrants to study in public schools and get decent jobs. There is an overwhelming sense of imbalance as Muslims are increasingly pressured to assimilate. Moro professionals bear the burden of being "double-bladed"—versed in Islamic and Philippine constitutional law (which has also been dubbed "Christian law" by some residents), and familiar with Muslim, Christian, and Catholic customs. They feel frustrated, however, that many Filipinos, especially local government officials, are ignorant of Islam and its traditions.

13. As per Regadio's (2015) data the ethnolinguistic breakdown of the households is such: Of the 531 households, the Tausug (186 households), Maranao (147 households), and Maguindanao (107 households) comprise the majority. The rest are divided among Iranun (68 households), Yakan (18 households), and Sama (5 households).

The compound is also notorious for its reputed connections to illegal drug trade, terrorism, and violence. Every time "Islamist terrorists" made the news, the local law enforcement would conduct raids, engage in shoot-outs, and unlawful arrests in Salam—shows of power now worsened by the Duterte administration's "war on drugs."[14]

Nevertheless, the hybrid governance system,[15] religious freedom, and the mix of Manila and Mindanao traditions that the compound offers are unique features that keep others attached to the place. The compound is an amalgamation of all the pull factors seen in other urban Muslim communities—state intervention, economic networks, diaspora, and tribal cooperation.

Despite the "people power" style demonstrations evoked during the land dispute (Watanabe 2008b), leaders express the need for strongman leadership. Hierarchy is correlated with discipline, whereas democracy is not. As Hadji A puts it: "*Hindi p'wedeng pantay-pantay na tuloy parang* democracy, *walang disiplina*" (We can't be equal as if we're in a democracy, without discipline).[16] And yet, the several respondents have likened the sultanate, the datuship system, to federalism and have used the same to justify the growing number of mosques.[17] Federalism, meanwhile, comes from the Latin word *foedus*, meaning covenant. This implies the commitment of equals, quite a democratic concept.

The united Muslim front is a fragile veneer that residents of the compound find hard to maintain because it is expressed in practices that are interpreted differently by the non-Muslim majority. For

14. Acts of violent othering persist in the compound. National news related to secessionists, terrorist groups, kidnap for ransom, and other hostilities in Southern Philippines is bound to trigger arrests and raids in Salam. While illegal drugs have long been a problem in the compound, the "war on drugs" have legitimized more regular shows of power. Over 145 suspects were arrested in the compound in the first quarter alone of Duterte's administration. See Yee (2016).
15. Regadio's study (2015) is an in-depth ethnographic documentation of the compound's governance systems, which incorporates clan and ethnolinguistic ties to simulate datu and sultan hierarchies. Most interesting of all are the layers with which justice is interpreted through local customs, the Sharia court and the local barangay.
16. Hadji A, interview by the author, May 21, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
17. Datu is the leader of an indigenous group occupying a distinct locality. An apt comparison can be drawn between the many mosques of Culiat, and the divergent educational systems among indigenous groups in Cambodia in Lall and South (2014). In their study, respondents interpret resistance to the national school system as "federalism from below."

example, residents take pride in their unique tribal council governance system. Outsiders perceive the division of leadership as lack of peace. As a result, Muslim leaders pressure their constituents to seek redress from the barangay as a last resort, lest they be seen as incapable of handling their own concerns (Regadio 2015). Meanwhile, local law enforcement has handled publicized conflicts between members of other religious denominations rather differently.[18]

Fractures from Within

As with any diverse community, there are fractures within. Differences drawn along ethnolinguistic lines often prevail over class differences. After the land dispute, intertribal organizations, once main players during the protests, receded from the frontline (Watanabe 2008b). Residents stereotype one another as well, though it is common for residents to intermarry across ethnic groups. The Maranao, Tausug, and Maguindanao compete demonstratively for leadership, as these three are affiliated historically with their own respective sultanates in Mindanao. Leadership is a royal privilege, not an open position says Sheikh B, a co-founder of the Rahma Mosque. "*Pag 'di ka* royal blood, *'di ka p'wede . . . kahit sa aming mga* Maranao, *kahit* millionare *ka, kung 'di ka* belong *sa* royal, *hindi ka magiging presidente, kasi hindi mo nabibili 'yan eh.*" (If you do not have a royal blood, you can't . . . even with us Maranao, even if you're a millionaire, if you're not royal, you can't be president, because you can't buy it.)[19]

Other differences are drawn based on the participation in the land dispute. Elderly Tausug, seen as those "who held the fort" during the demolitions, became the majority within the Salam Mosque Madrassah Advisory Council (SMMAC). Tausug are also accused of monopolizing representation to the barangay, as it is the SMMAC chairperson who is appointed to the barangay council.

18. During the height of a corruption scandal against leaders of the INC, the local police force ruled out cases of abduction (Francisco 2015) despite the complainant's seeming calls for help through a sign indicating "Help. We are held hostage" seen from an INC building in Tandang Sora, and through online social media (Saludes 2015). Investigations were dropped shortly as the INC mobilized thousands of followers to protest the alleged "government intrusion to religious freedom" in August 2015. The protest lasted two days, blocking major highways of Metro Manila (Francisco and Mogato 2015).
19. Sheikh B, interview by the author, May 15, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

Residents also differ in their homeward orientation. Many migrants are inclined to return home. They actively keep ties with relatives at home, manage businesses over long distances, if not travel occasionally to Mindanao. Particularly migrants from Jolo or Basilan tend to have less reason to return. Like Hassan, other elder members of the SMMAC share similar reasons for fleeing their hometown: martial law-era massacres,[20] terrorist attacks from kidnap for ransom group Abu Sayyaf,[21] and violent clan wars between ethnic groups.[22] Those with positive associations with Mindanao want to "bring Mindanao to Manila" and tend to insist on maintaining ethnolinguistic divides. To those who have been burned by memories of the past, it is more to the ideal *dar al Islam* (world of Islam), than to Mindanao, that they want Manila to return to.

The Al Salam Mosque Compound, as a space of representation, features a community challenged from within and without. Beneath the veneer of the label "Moro" lies an explosive heterogeneity of people who simultaneously accommodate and refuse the essentialism dealt from the Manila majority, and from one another.[23] The responses to

20. Davao-based indigenous people's advocate Rodil (1994) notes, "Within two months after the declaration of martial rule, in November 1972, the Moro National Liberation Front-Bangsa Moro Army (MNLF-BMA) launched a series of coordinated attacks . . . From the last months of 1972 to December 1976, large scale fighting raged in Moroland. No one knew the score of the dead, the wounded and the displaced. No one, not even the military kept any record, or if they did, this was never made known. A publication made an estimate of deaths, injured, and displaced in the Cotabato provinces from 1969 to the first quarter of 1976 and it came out with the following combined total: Deaths—35,000 to 60,000; Injured—31,000 to 54,000; and Displaced—260,000 to 350,000" (56).
21. Abu Sayyaf, literally meaning "sword of the father" in Arabic, is the name of a terrorist group based in Basilan, famed for beheading foreign captives and kidnap-for-ransom. The group first made international headlines in 1995 for their attack on the Christian western Mindanao town of Ipil. Frake (1998) situates the Abu Sayyaf as part of over 400 years of Muslim insurgency in the Philippines, and discusses how "deadly indifference" and "prevailing violence" against Muslims in Mindanao result in the proliferation of violent groups.
22. Torres's (2014) anthology on the different states and traditions of clan war is instructive here.
23. This echoes Frake's (1998, 45) discussion on the formation of the "Moro" identity when he says, "The people who became Muslims did not share anything in common, other than their new religion, that distinguished them as a group from other inhabitants of the Philippines. Moros did not become Muslims. Muslims became Moros, Philippine Muslims."

these tensions involve delicate processes of identity construction, which involves as much forgetting as it does remembering.[24]

Migrants curate which memories, images, values, and behaviors belong to their new self-image and new homes. The physical space symbolizes victory and enclosure, accommodation and isolation. Political action within is a hybrid of the traditions from Mindanao, and the opportunities granted by Metro Manila. And the community, though united in Islam, is split between fulfilling the expectations of ethnic groups, fellow Muslims, and the non-Muslim majority. It is the complexity of these conditions that shape the residents' spatial practices. Mosque making in particular demonstrates the many ways Moros interpret and engage these conditions.

MAKING MOSQUES: THE MANY WAYS

Mosques, Officially

In Manila, mosques mark where the Muslims are. The compound, in its complexity, began as a primary community, but later evolved as a site for secondary and job-centered communities as well.[25] Determining what makes a mosque officially a mosque becomes complex as well. This section discusses the spatial practices of mosque making in the compound.

Mosques, also known by its Arabic name *masjid*, is the only space for the *jama'ah* (congregation) to conduct the *Jumu'ah* (Friday prayer), wherein the imam delivers the weekly *khutbah* (holy sermon). Daily prayers called *sambahayang* (or in Arabic, *salat*) are also performed here. The domed roof and *munara* (minarets) with a crescent symbol distinguish many mosques, but respondents say this is optional. The number of regular jama'ah, facilities within the place, and formal recognition from legal and religious institutions are factors as well. In

24. Grosz-Ngate's (2002) study on the Bamanaw of Mali hints at the importance of selective forgetting in the construction of Muslim identity.

25. In Watanabe (2008a), "primary communities" are those where national or international institutions initiated the establishment of a mosque, hence drawing Muslims towards its proximity—mosques first, Muslims later. "Secondary communities," on the other hand are the converse. A significant number of Muslims settled in an area, drawn together by ethnolinguistic ties or commercial interests, and legitimate their settlement through the establishment of mosques. "Job-centered communities" involve the creation of mosques by a concentration of Muslims in certain industries. This prompts the establishment of a mosque in the work site, but not necessarily residences.

addition to the recognition from the barangay and registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Watanabe 2008a), respondents add that mosques must be registered with the following to claim official status: the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF), the QCMCC, and the Imam Council of the Philippines. These distinguish a mosque from a simple *ranggal* (prayer room).

Watanabe (2008a) also lists the availability of space to perform the salat (which involves multiple prostrations) and a *mihrab* (arched niche) facing the *qibla* (direction of the Kaaba) are enough. Respondents from the compound contend other crucial facilities that mosques must have: areas for ablution (for the living and the dead), spatial divisions for male and female jama'ah, a *minbar* (raised platform for the imam), and a sound amplifier for the adhan.

In the compound, Muslims are encouraged to upgrade traditional ranggal to mosque status based on the number of jama'ah present regularly during the Jumu'ah. Respondents are split as to how many jama'ah it takes. Those who pray at the Al Salam Mosque contend that five are enough. Those from Rahma Masjed say eleven. Watanabe (2008a) offers that forty must be present. These differences may be traced to different strands in Islam. Whatever the doctrinal differences, it is the number and quality of regular jama'ah that either encourages Muslims to modify their ranggal physically or seek the appropriate institutional recognition as a mosque. Conversely, a dismal number of jama'ah discourages them from praying at an already established mosque.

Crucial to all mosques are the imam, administrators, and maintenance personnel. While founders and owners of the mosque can be the administrators themselves, it is not often the case. Administrators appoint which imam conduct the daily prayer and which ones deliver the khutbah during Jumu'ah. Administrators manage the prayer schedules, guide the jama'ah's conduct inside the mosque and oversee the physical maintenance of the mosque. Collection and management of donations are the administrator's prickliest duties. He updates the jama'ah about the donations collected and where it will be spent. For most mosques in the compound, services to the mosque are voluntary and pro-bono.[26] The imam conducts the daily prayers,

26. It would be interesting to study the relationships between national institutions and mosques across the Metro. A former administrator of the Al Salam Mosque complains that the administrators Golden Mosque in Quiapo are compensated through the NCMF, but those in Al Salam Mosque are not. The NCMF, however, provides *iftar*, the evening meal during Ramadan, to the jama'ah in Culiat.

delivers the khutbah during the Jumu'ah and administers the ceremony for the departed. While there is no official ceremony for one to be an imam, it is often the mosque administration or a council of elders who choose which among the religious become one.

Five Mosques in One Compound

Al Salam Mosque

The Al Salam Mosque stands in the center of the compound, the oldest among the five mosques in Culiat (figure 3). After the purchase of the estate in 1971, it was only in 1979 that the actual mosque was built through what was then the Commission of Muslim Affairs. Prior to the mosques, residents at the compound would pray at home.

The mosque sits on Libyan Street, almost a hundred meters from the compound gates on Tandang Sora Avenue. In front of it is the compound's headquarters and a series of stalls and stores. There is a basketball court to the right, behind which is the *madrasah*, where children are sent to learn about Islam. The mosque's brown gates are not more than six feet tall. And at the entrance of mosque, right behind the gates, one can often see C, the caretaker, and some goats peacefully resting. Behind the gate, the floor is lined with red tiles and mixed gravel. A cemented overhang with a squat three-arched dome frames the main entrance. Three wide semi-circular windows with green glass line every wall. Within, the floorspace is tiled in white and yellow pillars, both columnar and rectangular are distributed throughout. A painted wooden *minbar* at the farthest end of the room lies next to a simple unadorned *mihrab* at the center.

Having gone through major renovations in the 1980s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Al Salam remains unfinished. Currently, only the first floor is fully painted, cemented, and tiled. From the ground floor, the second floor is obscured by wide horizontal slats. Looking from the outside, concrete hollow blocks are exposed and walls remain undone on the second level, the prayer area for women. Above the second floor, exposed metal rods extend skyward, awaiting the construction of a third floor. Ustadz D, who was formerly involved in Al Salam's administration, estimates a seating capacity of 1,000, if the construction were completed; for now, it seats 300.[27]

27. Ustadz D, interview by the author, May 12, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

Figure 3. Al Salam Mosque. *Above,* a view of Libyan Street across Al Salam Mosque; *below left,* the second floor; *below right,* the first floor. Photos by author, 2016.

Al Ahbrar Mosque

More prominent from the outside is the green and white Al Ahbrar Mosque on Sulu Street (figure 4). Visible from one of the compound's smaller entrances, the Al Ahbrar boasts of a green metal dome and crescent. The two-panel metal door is white, with a green metal relief in the shape of a green dome and crescent, reflecting the actual dome above it. An acrylic sign with the mosque's name hangs from the tower, obscured by skinny palm trees and telephone wires. The otherwise square building displays a thick cemented bulge extending to the street with an air conditioning unit protruding from the side.

Respondents' memories on when the mosque was established vary. The mosque was constructed one night in 1992, says Hadji E, a former member of the SMMAC.[28] According to Hadji F, a long-time member of SMMAC, the construction was in 1983.[29] Nevertheless, all respondents agree, the Al Ahbrar was second to be built after the Al Salam. According to Hadji E, former SMMAC member Hadji Talib Usman initially asked the council for permission to build *madaris* (plural of *madrasah*, a Muslim school). But one morning, residents of Sulu Street awoke to a cemented stack of hollow blocks, the foundations of the mosque. Usman insisted he had informed SMMAC of his intention to build a mosque. The SMMAC remembered otherwise. The council was taken by surprise when they found out that Usman had registered it with SEC, the QCMCC, and in the barangay, says one of my interviewees.

Usman might have wanted to control the compound using the mosque, says another interviewee. Using the mosque, they could ask money from groups from the Middle East, ask donations from the community. Hadji F adds, "*Ang iba magpatayo ng* mosque *para lang meron silang masandigan . . . Para meron silang* title, *para* in case *humingi sila ng tulong, meron silang ipakita.*" (Others build mosques so that they have something to rely on . . . So that they have a title, in case they ask for assistance, they have something to show for it.)[30]

Unfortunately, intrigues connecting the Al Ahbrar to gunrunning operations have sent Usman into exile. Former and current administrators of the Al Ahbrar have refused interviews for this study.

28. Hadji E, interview by the author, May 7, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
29. Hadji F, interview by the author, May 8, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
30. Hadji F, interview.

Figure 4. Front view and side view of the Al Ahbrar Mosque. Photos by author, 2016.

Al Ikhlas Mosque

The Al Ikhlas Mosque, established in 2001, is invisible from the street (figure 5). During my fieldwork, my guide, a resident of the compound for ten years, had difficulty finding it. Even residents on Cotabato Street, the mosque's official address, were not aware of its location. After much asking around, we were pointed to an alley between two houses. The walls were spray painted in blue with the word MOSQUE, drawings of an arrow, and a dome with a crescent. The alleyway was so hidden, the temperature inside the almost two-foot narrow corridor was almost cold, even in mid-afternoon. Upon finding the hand written sign of Al Ikhlas on a metal sliding door, my guide and I shared our first time seeing what others call "Iranun Masjid."

The Al Masjidol Ikhlas Wadaarol Ihsaan, Inc. at 119B Cotabato Street is literally footsteps in front of founder G's house and his *sari-sari* store (a family run, neighborhood variety store). It is a structure

Figure 5. Al Ihklas Mosque. *Above left,* sign on the steel door; *above center,* the *minrab* and mats, interior; *above right,* shoe rack and blackboard at the entrance. *Below*, the corridor leading to the mosque. Photos by author, 2016.

with a steel sliding door built in the gaps of the houses beside it, occupying the space of what ought to be a firewall. Sliding it open, G exposes a studio-type room with a fifty-person capacity. There is a shoe rack built on the wall to the right, beside the entrance. Across are prayer rugs, and on the wall are varied displays of the Kaaba and a blackboard. On the leftmost wall is the *minbar*. There are others spaces on the wall to the left, leading into the chamber from which the *muezzin* calls out the *baang* (similar to adhan, call for prayer). The mosque has two floors, but its founder plans to build a third one in the future. The first would be for the *madrasah*, the second would be the prayer space for the men, the third for the women. Eventually, G also wants to build a *munara*.

G is an Iranun who has been living in Culiat with his family since 1998. With some of his savings, he bought the Al Ikhlas's lot, which was a dumpsite, from a certain Colonel Makabarud. He cleared one side, made a *silong* (shed), and used this as a ranggal. When G found out about the Rahma Masjed—still under construction in 2003—he started hosting Friday prayers at his ranggal too. The jama'ah encouraged him to officially register the mosque. In fact, a Tausug from the SMMAC donated three bags of cement to G and encouraged him to turn the ranggal into a proper prayer room. G makes an excuse of this supposed donation: "*Bakit pa ako magpapaalam sa* SMMAC, *eh mismong* religious leader *nila ang tumulong sa akin at nag-*encourage *na palakihin ko ito?*" (Why should I ask persmission from the SMMAC, it was their own religious leader who helped and encouraged me to enlarge this [mosque]?)[31]

G says the mosque was built for the jama'ah nearby who made excuses that they could not pray in a mosque that was too far from their homes. Also, the Al Salam is too crowded, and it has taken too long to complete. "*Maluwag ang* Islam" (Islam is not strict), he explains. Those who are weak, sick, or pregnant are exempted from Ramadan, "*pero utang nila 'yun*" (but that becomes their debt).[32] Because Islam is "maluwag" (not strict), it can therefore accommodate adjustments. It permits that the Ikhlas and the other mosques provide what the Al Salam Mosque cannot. G agrees, the Qur'an states it is ideal that only one mosque should deliver the khutbah per *kawman* (community). If the Al Salam Mosque is completed so that all the jama'ah fit during the Jumu'ah, then the khutbah in Ikhlas should stop.

31. G, interview by the author, May 17, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
32. G, interview.

While G agrees that the Al Salam ought to be the central mosque, he disagrees that there is anything wrong with an individual building his own mosque. Mosque-building is part of Muslim's religious obligation. Others may have the money, but only the chosen few respond to the call to build mosques.

Rahma Masjed

Three storeys high, with a prominent metal sign almost ten feet long and a golden dome that stands out in the compound's skyline, the Rahma Masjed is the more prominent mosque in Cotabato Street (figure 6). Sheikh B, one of the mosque's co-founders, tells of a certain Ali Tahib who owned the lot on which the Rahma Masjed now stands. As part of Tahib's dying wishes, he sold the lot to the Residence and Homeowners Maranao Association (RAHMA) in 1999, and a madrasah was built on the site in his honor. The following year, the Rahma Masjed was completed and SEC registered. Sheikh B says construction continues to the present, as the jama'ah plans to add other features such as dorms for the Qur'anic learning center, to house selected trainees for the Hifz-o-Qirat, the competition for Qur'an recitation. The ground floor serves as a reception area for various social gatherings or meetings. The men's section occupies the second floor, and women are on the third. Though the estimated capacity is 200, this seems largely conservative, seeing how the ground floor is also used to accommodate jama'ah during congregations.

Rahma in Arabic means mercy. To the jama'ah of the Rahma Masjed, the mosque is also a symbol of teamwork and cooperation. During its early years, each jama'ah was assigned to raise PHP 8,000.00 for construction supplies. Once the foundations were erected, members of the RAHMA personally solicited from rich colleagues who were sure to give big, for word to spread that they gave little would be embarrassing. What sets Rahma apart from the other mosques is that it only takes donations in kind, says Sheikh B. In fact, they have received donations from Saudi Arabians who claim to have learned of the mosque from paratroopers who saw the golden dome from a helicopter. Sheikh B claims the RAHMA has not solicited from Islamic organizations, consulates, or embassies.

The jama'ah not only raised funds for the mosque, but labored on it too. Titles were irrelevant, everyone shoveled cement, carried supplies, and sweated under the sun for free. "*Walang atto*-attorney, *lahat kami* volunteer" (being an attorney didn't matter, we all volunteered)

Figure 6. The Rahma Masjed. *Above left*, the mosque's facade, viewed from street; *above right,* interior, the first floor of Rahma Masjed; *below left,* Cotabato Street viewed from the mosque's gate; and *below right,* the gate to the Rahma Qur'anic Learning Center. Photos by author, 2016.

recalls Sheikh B.[33] The men would do manual labor, while the wives contributed food for them. They all ought to have lost weight, if only the wives would stop feeding them so well, he jokes.

While the Rahma has a reputation for being a Maranao Mosque, the jama'ah are mixed. Ustadz D, after resigning from Al Salam, became one of the imam for the Rahma. As there are many mosques in Mindanao, Sheikh B sees no problem with having many mosques in Manila. The more mosques, the more people are called to goodness, the better. Besides, the Al Salam Mosque could no longer accommodate the growing jama'ah.

Leadership comes naturally to Maranaos, especially to those like him who come from a royal bloodline. "*Sa* Muslim, *mahalaga talaga ang* leadership . . . *dadalhin mo sa* Manila *kung ano ka sa* Mindanao," (to Muslims, leadership is very important . . . you bring to Manila what you were in Mindanao) says Sheikh B.[34] As a Muslim leader, it is his responsibility to be a good example. He actively seeks to work with non-Muslims, hoping to improve their perception of Islam and Muslims. He is proud to say that during meetings of the Culiat High School Parent-Teacher Association, when he mediated heated arguments, some parents have told him "*parang hindi ka* Muslim" (you seem not a Muslim).[35] As a community leader, he proudly recalls how this family home became the headquarters for protesters during the land dispute. As a Maranao leader, he finds no fault in providing his constituents a proper place for worship.

Mohammadiy-yah Mosque

The name Mohammadiy-yah is not that known in the neighborhood, but people know where to point you to if you ask for "Bakery Mosque" (figure 7). The Mohammadiy-yah is on the third level of a building on Muhjaheedin corner Libyan Street. It has no signs, no domes. The building is prominent, but the mosque is not. Hadja H, a Maguindanao from General Santos City in South Cotabato, built the third level of her house in 1996 as a ranggal. In 2003, it was registered at the SEC as the Mohammadiy-yah. Respondents recall that Hadja H had a recruitment agency on the second floor. The bakery was once in the first floor, a wide studio-like space with only three walls; where the fourth

33. Sheikh B, interview by the author, May 15, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
34. Sheikh B, interview.
35. Sheikh B, interview.

Figure 7. The Mohammadiy-yah Mosque on Libyan corner Mujahideen Street. *Above,* the mosque is on the third floor of the building on the left, the entrance is behind the colored umbrella. *Below,* interior of the mosque. Photos by author, 2016.

ought to be is a wide gap that opens up to the street. Hadja H now lives on the first floor and has rooms for rent on the second. From the street, one sees the spacious first floor adorned in cloth scrolls with Arabic calligraphy and depictions of the Kaaba. Two wooden benches line up against the corner of the room. To the opposite corner is a closed off area, concealing what seems to be a kitchen and a bedroom. Whether sitting in the bedroom, or on any of the two benches, one can view the street outside, and keep an eye on the entrance to the mosque, an unadorned doorway on the farthest wall of the ground floor.

A narrow staircase behind the doorway winds along the side of the building where one can either turn a corner to an ablution area on the side, or walk up to the entrance of the mosque on the third floor. The mosque is an airy studio with yellow square cement pillars; the metal roof and its beams exposed. Multiple clocks displaying time from various Islamic countries frame the *mihrab* set at the deepest end of the room with red carpet. Meanwhile, a metal wire hung with blankets divides the space for male and female jama'ah on the opposite side of the room. The capacity is approximately 400 persons.

Hadja H is a widow and a mother. As a wealthy member of royalty, she acknowledges, "*hindi ako naghirap tulad ng iba*" (I didn't have it hard like others).[36] Tiban says she need not stay in Culiat, if not for the mosque. Their family has built mosques in the province, but only in Culiat can she keep a mosque in Manila. "*'Yan ang isulat mo diyan. Kaya pinatayo 'yan ni [Hadja H] 'yung* mosque, *dahil namatay ang tatay niya, nanay niya, asawa niya, at anak niya. Para sa kabilang buhay, meron makakarating sa kanila na pamilya niyang namatay.*" (This is what you should write down there. [Hadja H] built the mosque because her father, mother, husband, and child died. So that in the next life, her deceased family will receive something.)[37]

She came to Manila in 1983, but a fire urged her to relocate to her father's property in Culiat. Former president Fidel Ramos, a distant cousin, she says, urged her to lead the community in Culiat. But she refused, uninterested in political entanglements. "*Panahon ni* President Ramos, *sabi niya, '[Hadja H], itaas mo 'yung mga* mosque *diyan sa* Culiat.' *Sabi ko, 'May namatay nang mga* Pakistani *at Arabo, ayoko.' May bahay naman ako sa* Islamic Center. *Pinilit niya ako. Sabi niya, 'Sige na, alang-*

36. Hadja H, interview by the author, May 15, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
37. Hadja H, interview.

alang naman sa akin.' Kaya nu'ng 1993 *nagpatayo na kami dito. Bahay muna. Nu'ng namatay na* [*ang tatay ko*] *unti-unti ko nang naisip;* 1999, 2001 *pinatayo ko na 'yung* mosque." (It was during President Ramos's term. He told me, '[Hadja H], build mosques in Culiat,' I told him, 'I don't want to; Pakistani and Arabs were killed there.' I already had a home in the Islamic Center. He urged me, 'Go on, do it for me.' In 1993, we started first with the house. When [my father] died, I thought about building it. In 1999, 2001 I had the mosque built.)[38]

Entrance is exclusive. Hadja H interviews the jama'ah before they are allowed to pray. She built her own mosque "*para tahimik, para hindi makidasal sa mga madudumi*" (to have peace, to avoid praying with the unclean).[39] By *madumi* (unclean), she means the sinful, particularly those involved in drugs. Asked if she would consider praying at the Al Salam, when it's finally completed, she tells me "*Meron na ako ng sarili ko, bakit pa?*" (I already have my own, so what for?)[40]

Seen, Heard, and Felt

Making many mosques within earshot of each other's adhan is discouraged in the Qur'an. The Al Salam Mosque alone was meant to project a uniform and united *ummah* (religious community) to outsiders. But it could not accommodate the varied needs of the diverse jama'ah within. Separate mosques were built based on perceived inadequacies of other mosques' physical structure, their administration's management of funds, and the language of the khutbah.

Mosque makers in Salam make the best out of their congested compound. Residential areas and public gathering sites, ideally, should be far from a mosque. In Islam, mosques are dedicated to prayer, so much so that unlike Catholic or Christian churches, marriages, baptisms, and religious feasts or celebrations are held outside of the mosque. But space is scarce, and public facilities such as basketball courts and compound headquarters overlap with the borders of Al Salam Mosque on Libyan Street. Though rare, the congestion can escalate to violence. Some respondents recall screaming matches between ball players and jama'ah parking in the basketball court.[41]

38. Hadja H, interview.
39. Hadja H, interview.
40. Hadja H, interview.
41. Ustadz D, interview by the author, May 12, 2016, Sulu St., Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

Less desirable than living near mosques is living in mosques. During the land dispute, residents camped out in the Al Salam. Once the demonstrations subsided, administrators allowed caretakers' families to continue occupying the mosque and the madaris building. Ustadz D recalls this *haram* (forbidden) act: "*Pinagbigyan na lang* family *nila mag-*squat *doon. Kasalanan pa naman na magsama ang mag-asawa sa isang* mosque." (They allowed the family to squat there. It is a sin for husband and wife to live together in a mosque).[42]

He considers "cleaning out the mosque" (the relocation of mosque and madaris settlers) an unprecedented achievement. Though settlers were armed and unfazed by incoming construction supplies for the renovation of the mosque, Ustadz D says he secured a house for them on Basilan Street and convinced them to move there instead.

Other mosque founders are quick to defend the separation of their mosques from their actual residences, no matter how small the distance. Hadja H says of the Mohammadiy-ya, for example: "*Solong-solo 'yung sa taas na* mosque *lang . . . 'Di naman nakahiwalay, pero nasa itaas. Bawal na 'yung bahay ni* Allah *dito sa baba, kailangan na sa itaas.* Qur'an *'yan eh. Pag may gagawa ng* mosque *na lalabag sa batas ng* Qur'an, *'di p'wede. Eh kaso nasa taas 'yun. Kahit naman 'yung* Masjid Al-haram *sa* Saudi, *sa* Mecca, *'yung mga* mall *na 'yun may mga* mosque *din, may upuan na sambahayang. Basta nasa taas, bawal ang nasa baba. Nasa taas lahat.*" (Above, the mosque stands solo . . . It's not separate, but it's on a higher level. It would be wrong to have the house of Allah here downstairs, it should be up there. That's in the Qur'an. It's wrong to not follow the laws of the Qur'an when you make a mosque. But it [the mosque] is upstairs. Even the Masjid Al-haram in Saudi, in Mecca, malls there have mosques too, there are places to sit for the daily prayers. For as long as it's upstairs, downstairs it's forbidden. It's all up there.)[43]

Other than the mosques' proximity to public spaces, design is also crucial for mosque makers. The split of the RAHMA from SMMAC, for example, was supposedly triggered when one party wanted the Al Salam Mosque's post to be shaped into a rectangle, as opposed to the engineer's blueprints, which indicated a columnar post. Parties argued over cost and durability.

42. Ustadz D, interview.

43. Hadja H, interview by the author, May 15, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

The mosque's physical inadequacies are also no longer conducive to prayer. Imam J of Al Salam Mosque himself admits, "*Hindi na magkasya mga tao. Maputik kung umuulan, hindi kumpleto 'yung silong.*" (People don't fit inside anymore. Mud gets in when it rains, the ceiling isn't completed yet).[44] G mentions that residents on Cotabato Street are unable to hear the baang from Al Salam.[45] Sheikh B says institutions such as the NCMF, the QCMCC, and the Imam Council of the Philippines are adequate signs of Moro unity, the *ummah* need not suffer a cramped mosque if only to look "united" to outsiders.[46]

As Al Salam remains unfinished, it becomes the visual element which supplements aural elements of gossip and intrigue, reminding jama'ah of the SMMAC's shortcomings. The exposed concrete hollow blocks and skeletal structure of the Al Salam offer no reassurance against the talk of malversation of donations, and the competing adhan emitted from other nearby mosques. This visual and aural environment have triggered the dispersal of the jama'ah, violent confrontations, and even the resignation of former administrators. One interviewee, having witnessed the changes within the administrative roster since the 1990s regrets: "*Bihira tayong makahanap ng tao na* devoted to Allah . . . *'yung iba humanap ng paraan kumita . . . Maraming* foreigner *ang dating dito sumasamba, bago pa sila nag-away-away lahat . . .* More or less twenty years *na ako dito, hindi pa rin daw nakokompleto ang* mosque . . . *'Yung iba, sa* Maranao, *sa* Maguindanao *natapos agad.*" (We rarely find a person devoted to Allah . . . others find ways to earn a profit . . . Many foreigners worshipped here once, before they started fighting amongst themselves . . . More or less I've been here twenty years, and the mosque remains unfinished. Others, the Maranao and Maguindanao [mosques] were completed quickly.)[47]

One interviewee noted that donations during the time of a previous mosque administrator would have sufficed for the complete renovation of the Al Salam. The victory over the land dispute energized Muslims from all over to contribute. To assure transparency, donations in cash collected during congregations were written on a public

44. Imam J, interview by the author, May 19, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
45. G, interview by the author, May 17, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
46. Sheikh B, interview by the author, May 15, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
47. C, interview by the author, May 19, 2016, Al Salam Mosque, Quezon City.

blackboard. Large amounts of cash were refused, and donors were requested to deliver in kind instead. Supplies and equipment were delivered to the compound, for all the jama'ah to see. The same is practiced in the Al Ikhlas and the Rahma Masjed. The mosques' respective founders and administrators accept donations in kind only, and labor on the mosque was done for free. While respondents believe that this distinguishes them from one another, national institutions seem unaware. During the 2005 national elections, a candidate gave donations to all the mosques in Culiat. One mosque founder complained that someone misrepresented his mosque in his absence and absconded with the funds.

On various occasions, jama'ah would issue public physical threats, angered by the presence of suspect administrators. Though confrontations were handled via each ethnic group's traditional grievance councils, the Al Salam Mosque's negative reputation led others to break away. Patrons, turned off by the intrigues, withdrew their regular donations. The Saudi Arabian embassy withdrew its annual Ramadan donations supposedly due to allegations of corruption. A contribution of supposedly a million pesos had been left unaccounted for. Recalling the incident, one mosque founder remarked, "*Kung ako bigyan ng* one million, *tignan natin kung 'di kumintab ito* [mosque]." (If I were given a million, you'll see how I make this mosque shine.)

Visual prominence is a source of status as well. The Al Salam, while in disrepair, has definitely more recall with insiders and outsiders than the concealed Al Ikhlas and Mohammadiy-ya mosques. A lack of visible nameplates, *munara,* and domes prevent unfamiliar jama'ah from wandering into these smaller mosques. The founders of the mosque are rendered anonymous as well, easily bypassed by influential outsiders. Domes on the Al Ahbrar, Al Salam, and Rahma Masjed have served as beacons of Islam to Muslims outside of Culiat. As with other studies (Regadio 2015; Taqueban 2012; Watanabe 2008b), Muslim respondents agree that the presence of domes encouraged them to enter the compound, despite not having affiliations within.

Other than the physical structure, the visual prominence of labor done on the mosque is indicative of the founders' integrity as well. Constructions done overnight, discreetly, or gradually are seen as a reflection of the founder's lack of integrity. Stealth and deception are implicated when the jama'ah are "surprised" that a mosque has suddenly been built or registered officially. The speed with which a mosque was built is also suspect. Taking too long to complete a

mosque indicates suspicious financial management. A quick construction of a mosque indicates the wealth of the founder—which is suspect to positive and negative connotations as well. Meanwhile, the visual confirmation of construction supplies, neighbors doing manual labor, or public billboards written on to reflect collections are interpreted as signs of transparency, honesty, and integrity.

A crucial aural element to religious placemaking is the language of the khutbah during the Jumu'ah. The imam in the Al Salam Mosque are expected to be multilingual, able to deliver the khutbah in English, Tagalog, and Arabic. But unlike in other multilingual places of worship, mosques in the compound do not have set schedules for sermons to be delivered entirely in one language. The imam, based on his perception of the crowd's composition, switches spontaneously from one language to another as he delivers his khutbah. The SMMAC consider it enough that English and Tagalog to be the lingua franca, understood by the majority. Arabic is the necessary holy language. Some respondents from SMMAC insist that the khutbah need not be spoken in one's mother tongue, it is the responsibility of Muslims anyways to learn Arabic.

I, a Pakistani resident of the compound since 1994, has worshipped in the various mosques within Culiat. He points out that not all imams translate their khutbah. Since the jama'ah cannot interrupt the imam during the khutbah to ask for a translation, they sit through it without understanding anything. Instead of asking the imam to change languages next time, they would rather look for another mosque where their language is spoken.[48] Ustadz D, a multilingual imam himself, understands the affinity jama'ah have for their own language. "*Ang mga tribo-tribo*" (The people of the different ethnic groups), do not "feel" the khutbah as much if it is in Tagalog, English, or Arabic, he tells me, placing a palm on his chest.[49] The responsibility of learning more languages lies with the imam, not the jama'ah.

The imam in Mohammadiy-ya, Al Ikhlas, and Rahma mosques deliver their khutbah in English, Tagalog, and Arabic as well, but supplemented with Maranao, Maguindanao, and Iranun, often reflecting the mother tongue of the founders. Sheikh B insists this diversity is

48. I, interview by the author, May 19, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
49. Ustadz D, interview by the author, May 12, 2016, Sulu St., Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

necessary, since not all jama'ah face the same concerns. Imams need not be uniform, the content of their khutbah ought to reflect the sentiments and nuanced needs of their respective congregations. The lack of mother tongue khutbah indicate contested strategies in representing unity within the community. The mostly Tausug SMMAC aim for a flattening of tribal differences.

The largely Tausug SMMAC have not insisted on the Tausug language in Al Salam, due probably to the shared negative memories of Jolo and Basilan. What they have done however is to hold on to the identity formed during the strategically essentialist campaign for the land dispute, hence the active campaign to concentrate jama'ah to Al Salam.

One mosque founder denies tribal affiliation as his main impetus for building the mosque. "*Dahil ba Iranun ako? May dugo akong* Maranao, Maguindanao." (Is it because I am Iranun? I have Maranao and Maguindanao blood too.)[50] Like him, many of the jama'ah are multiethnic and multilingual. He feels all this talk of tribalism is merely diverting attention away from the corruption allegations.

While nonphysical, the boundaries drawn around the mosques based on the inclusivity and exclusivity of the jama'ah are also tactile experiences meant to reflect the religiosity and cleanliness of the mosque leaders. Some SMMAC members have accused other mosques of denying entry to certain jama'ah, but it is only Hadja H who confirms that she does. The Rahma, Al Ahbrar, and Al Ikhlas, like the Al Salam, accommodate jama'ah from all backgrounds. Despite Al Ikhlas being near his doorstep, G does not actively filter the jama'ah. One might argue however that the Ikhlas' seeming invisibility from the street is filter enough.

Hadja H is unique when she says that praying alongside the sinful diminishes her *pahala* (reward for the faithful). The sins of one person in the jama'ah infect the others, the "clean" ones are "sullied" by the sinful. The respondents time and again recall the Islamic concept of cleanliness. To be clean one must wash the body before prayer, and clear the mind of negative thoughts. For those who filter the jama'ah, cleanliness also involves avoiding bad company.

"*Oo, nakakahawa ang kasalanan ng isang* jama'ah *sa kapwa* jama'ah." (Yes, the sin of one jama'ah may infect the other jama'ah.) An imam

50. Interview by the author, May 17, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

of Al Salam Mosque agrees, but it is not the Islam's way to stop a person from entering a mosque.[51] "A true mosque is open," says I.[52] The collective sins of the jama'ah do not overpower the spiritually cleansing capacities of a mosque. For some respondents, a mosque heals an ailing soul. Hadji A puts it eloquently: "*Parang* hospital *para sa kaluluwa, lahat ng sakit ng utak at puso pinapagaling ng* khutbah *kasi walang ibang ginagawa sa* mosque *kundi anyayahan ka sa kabutihan.*" (Like a hospital for the soul, all the illnesses of the mind and heart are healed by the khutbah because the mosque does nothing but invite us all to goodness.)[53]

Respondents interpret hearing the adhan as a reminder to be a good person. It invites one to think of Allah instead of being distracted by the *saitan* (evil spirit). That is why it is important for the *bilal* (muezzin) to sing the adhan well, it should awaken you and move you. Prayers are physical exercise and spiritual exercise as well, the moving around helps send bad thoughts away. The saitan are also turned off by the baang because they know there are religious persons around. So while many overlapping baang seem noisy to non-Muslims, Muslims interpret these as constant reminders of Allah's presence.

Mosques do create and verify leaders of a Muslim community (Watanabe 2008a). The physical integrity, financial transparency, and openness of a mosque reflect its founders' religiosity and generosity. Though mosque-building and management seem a competitive strategy to vie for positions of influence in the community, "keeping the peace" cements a person's leadership status.

Peace is reflected in the discipline of the jama'ah. Hadja H, by selecting her jama'ah ensures that the Mohammadiy-yah is dissociated from criminals. Sheikh B contends that Maranao pride and the elders' strictness keep the Rahma Masjed's jama'ah away from trouble. Ustadz D, during his involvement with Al Salam's administration, formed the Bantay Bayan, volunteer gatekeepers to the compound. Drug busting became part of his religious calling, as he faced the ire of conspiring neighbors, impostors, and even corrupt law enforcers, the voice of Allah guiding him in determining suspects. And while all these

51. Interview by the author, May 19, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound Headquarters, Quezon City.
52. I, interview by the author, May 19, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
53. Hadji A, interview by the author, May 24, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

examples of discipline seem highly punitive, Hadji A, in his nonviolence, retains the respect of many mosque founders.

While other members of the SMMAC berated G for building the Al Ikhlas, Hadji A was noted for quelling the fight and declaring that any offering to Allah should not be torn down. "*Pinagbigyan na lang*" (Let them have what they want) or "*Pinabayaan na lang*" (Let it be) is the chairman's response to every new mosque. "*Pinahintulutan na lang kasi para naman sa Panginoon.*" (We let it be since it is for our Lord.)[54]

While mosque founders argue that they multiply the pahala of the community by building more mosques, the SMMAC argues for concentrating pahala towards the central mosque. Individuals gain pahala for merely having the intention to pray. They get additional pahala for walking to the mosque, calling others to pray, and for the actual prayer ritual itself. The pahala that an individual gets is multiplied by the number of steps they take going to the mosque, and by the number of jama'ah praying alongside him. Even the mosque accumulates its own pahala, based on the number and quality of its jama'ah. Thus, according to one interviewee, the jama'ah ought to bear the distance of the mosque from their homes and not expect prayers to be convenient. Every step towards the mosque has a pahala point—hence those living farther from the mosque have more pahala advantages than those living near it. The same interviewee insists that having many mosques dilutes the pahala that the community gains.

The aforementioned interviewee concedes that, "*Obligasyon talaga ng isang* Muslim *na magpatayo ng* mosque, *kasama na dito 'yung dahil may* pahala *siyang matatanggap, at dahil* service *niya ito kay* Allah." (It really is the obligation of a Muslim to build mosques because of the pahala he receives, and also because it is his service to Allah.)[55] But the special circumstance of being a minority in Manila complicates the freedom to make many mosques. "*Dahilan sa sinasabi nila na sila ang tunay na* Muslim, *sila ang may karapatan . . . Hindi nila iniisip na nagkakawatak-watak. Pag nagkawatak-watak, wala tayong puwersa.*" (It's because they insist that they are the true Muslims, they have the right . . . They're not thinking that it divides us. When we are divided, we have no power.)[56]

54. Hadji A, interview by the author, May 21, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
55. Interview by the author, May 8, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
56. Interview, May 8, 2016.

Congested, Contested Reflections

Others see many mosques as relatively harmless, but Hadji E, like most members of the SMMAC, are the most negatively affected by it. "*Ugali sa Mindanao, nadadala dito,*" (they have brought here how they do things in Mindanao) he laments.[57] From Talipao, Jolo, Hadji E went to Manila to study. But family conflicts in his hometown made him stop his schooling. Although he intended to look after his family there, lack of jobs forced him to return to Manila. Culiat has been his home since the 1970s.

For many Tausug elders of the SMMAC, Mindanao is associated with armed conflicts, missed opportunities, all-out reversals of fortunes; a place they are glad to have escaped. Most of their family are in Culiat. They have little to no opportunity, nor do they have the desire to return to their places of birth. Culiat is the new Mindanao, and the compound is the new hometown. The SMMAC becomes their new "ethnic" group in contrast to the other bigger "ethnic" groups like the INC, the local government, other Muslim communities in the city, and the Manila Christian majority. It makes sense that fealty to Mindanao-based ethnic group is seen as a dilution of the community's solidarity. One interviewee recognizes that the performance of a united *ummah* may be contrived, but it is crucial.

"*Hindi mabuting bagay 'yan. Itong lima na* masjid *dito sa amin, gusto namin mangyari sa* Friday prayer, *sa iisang* mosque *lang sila magsisimba. Sa* [daily prayer] *p'wede sa kanya-kanyang* masjid, *pero sa Biyernes kailangan ang sermon iisa lang.* Jumu'ah *nagkanya-kanya na rin.*" (This isn't good. Though there are five mosques here, for the Friday prayers, we want everyone to pray in just one mosque. For the daily prayers, you can go to your own mosque, but on Fridays, there ought to be just one sermon. It's the Jumu'ah and yet people want to pursue their own ways.)[58]

"*Ugali sa* Mindanao" (that's how it is in Mindanao) is an acceptable excuse for other mosque founders. In the case of Sheikh B and Ustadz D, their status as a minority in Manila does not hold them back from pursuing leadership roles. Their careers say to Muslims and non-Muslims alike: leaders in Mindanao lead in Manila too. As there are many mosques in Mindanao, so should there be in Manila. Bringing

57. Hadji E, interview by the author, May 7, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
58. Hadji E, interview.

Mindanao to Manila is exactly the point, and the city will be better for it.

The discussion on whether many mosques is good or bad does not change a single most important problem, says one interviewee, as the Al Salam main mosque remains unfinished: "*Kung sana binigay na lang nila sa* Al Salam *'yung pera na pinanggawa nila ng* mosque*, eh di sana tapos na 'yun ngayon.*" (If they only gave to the Al Salam the money they used to build their own mosque, then it would have been completed by now.)[59]

One interviewee, a Tausug who fled the martial law-era massacres in Jolo, has been a resident of the compound since the 1980s. Now, threats from the Abu Sayyaf prevent him from visiting his hometown. Those terrorists cannot even read and write, how could they understand the Qur'an, he asks me. They should not even call themselves Muslims. To him, a solid Al Salam is critical to keeping the peace. But he recognizes that the SMMAC has its faults too, "[*May*] *mga kasamahan din naming mayabang, kaya nawawalan sila ng interes, kaya mas mabuti na humiwalay na sila.*" (There are those among us who are arrogant, that's why others have lost interest, it is better that they separated from us.)[60]

Unfinished or not, the SMMAC still insists Al Salam has the most legitimacy among all the mosques in the compound. It is the oldest, built with the purest intentions, and was initiated by a religious group from the Middle East.

Mirror Mosques

Hadji A argues, "*Hindi mahalaga 'yung hitsura ng* mosque*, basta nagkakaisa ang* jama'ah *nila.*" (What the mosque looks like doesn't matter, as long as the jama'ah are united.)[61] But data collected say otherwise. What the jama'ah see and hear do affect how they feel and think about their faith and their community. More importantly the visual, aural, and the tactile (boundaries, congestion, spaciousness, exposure to elements, cleanliness, and others), all sensory experiences of the place spur mosque makers into action.

59. Interview by the author, May 8, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
60. Interview by the author, May 8, 2016, informant's residence, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.
61. Hadji A, interview by the author, May 24, 2016, Al Salam Mosque Compound, Quezon City.

Religious motivations, such as responding to a special devotion, fulfilling a brethren's dying wishes, or providing for loved ones in the afterlife, drive mosque making. Nonreligious motivations such as dissociating from stigma or vying for social mobility, are interpreted within the religious motifs of cleanliness and Islamic reclamation.

Muslims do move, not only from one home to another, but from one mosque to another, to live in accordance with their perceived status. The status pertains not only to class, but to perceived religiosity, integrity to the community, hierarchy among ethnic groups, continuity of roles in Mindanao, and the maximization of flexibility afforded in Manila. Al Salam's hybridity and the contested place of Moros in the national capital region drive mosque making. These various drives converge and conflict as respondents balance their self-representation to the non-Muslim majority and to one another.

Mosques are seen as a reflection of the jama'ah. Mosque making becomes a deliberate effort for the founders' and the jama'ah's self-representation. Respondents contest which audience to prioritize in their self-representation, however. They acknowledge that, as in the battle for Al Salam, the performance of unity through uniformity, through strategic essentialism, is effective in dealing with the non-Muslim majority.[62] But in balancing their identity as Moro migrant with other ethnolinguistic and religious identities, others refuse homogenization from within. Gains from embodying cultural differences and nuanced loyalties are seen to outweigh the losses incurred.

Mixed Actions and Muslim Ideals

Of the five roles that mosques play in a Muslim community, Watanabe (2008b) elides that which many non-Moros take for granted: Mosques are a peaceful place to pray.[63] This seemingly simple objective is the

62. Watanabe (2008b, 288) explains that "strategic essentialism, a term initially coined by Spivak (1990) to refer to a means by which minority or indigenous groups fought for their survival by defining their identity and culture in essentialist terms." Though Watanabe has hinted at the limits of strategic essentialism, Emily Lee (2011) provides the theoretical questioning of the epistemology of authenticity. Abraham Sakili's (2003) exploration of *tawhid*, the Islamic value for unity in diversity, may serve as a counterpoint for Islamic scholars.

63. The five functions as listed are: 1) represent affinity with Middle Eastern nations, 2) provide political leverage, 3) verifies leaders, 4) exchange of information and building relationships, and 5) act of "reclaiming" what was once Muslim territory (Watanabe 2008b, 31–33).

most crucial and immediate response among the mosque founders of the compound, when asked what mosques mean to them. With the convoluted history of oppression, marginalization, dissent, diaspora, and conditioning attached to a Moro identity in the Philippines, peace seems a privilege more than a right.

Peace is the representation of space that mosque makers aspire for. But the actions towards the goal are contested. In religious placemaking, the community takes into consideration what actions mean to fellow Moros and to the non-Moro majority. Strategic essentialism in previous political mobilization has ingrained a simplistic logic among the non-Moro majority: diversity is divisive, and uniformity is unity; unity is peace. This explains why Moros, though aware of those who are willing to compromise among them, choose to frame the land dispute as a religious conflict (Watanabe 2008b), and consider local government the last resort for settling grievances (Regadio 2015).

Meanwhile, Moros find that while repressing their heterogeneity is effective to certain ends, it can be oppressive, especially when it comes to religion. Expressing one's truth is peace—if not total peace, then peace of mind at least. Khutbah in the mother tongue is more felt. Traditional visual motifs and designs seen in mosques are more visceral. Misunderstanding from the outside seems a small price to pay for the peace that the freedom to be different brings. The lack of religious regulatory bodies in Manila also aids this diversity. The NCMF, QCMCC, and Imam Council of the Philippines tend more to be advisory and representative bodies, but do not sanction the disruption of religious orthodoxies. It is exactly this lack of religious sanctions in the compound that its residents celebrate (Taqueban 2012).

The price of misunderstanding comes from without and from within. Mosque makers differ on how to maintain "cleanliness," a prime Islamic virtue. Some turn to exclusion of jama'ah, while others turn to inclusion. Cleanliness tainted by drugs, crime, and terrorism are dealt with in various ways. Other religious leaders engage in disciplining their constituents, while others screen them. Whereas one mosque founder deliberately avoided "dirty" politics to keep the religious purity intact, others dived into civic engagements—either as community organizers, drug busters, sangguniang barangay members, and so on.

Peace also manifests in deliberate nonviolence. While the Moros of the Al Salam Mosque Compound have been documented to invoke the "warfreak Moro" stereotype for political mobilization, data collected

on the ground shows that they would rather not fight over disagreements, and are keen to quell violent outbursts of any kind. Neighbors know better than to fan the flames of further conflict. The balance within is already so fragile; conflict management strategies from every cultural source possible is utilized to "keep the peace." Conflicts and violence abound when the hegemony of one group is enforced—those who cannot return to their hometowns because of terrorist or armed struggles know this. Sanctions are restrictive and lead to further repression. Repression is not peace. "*Pinabayaan na lang*" (Let it be) keeps an uneasy peace between a "riotously heterogenous" minority (Scott 2009, 26). The groups within the compound are not only heterogenous, but there is also a "bandwidth of identities" that each individual shifts to depending on the need (Scott 2009, 281).

While onlookers from outside the compound might say, "*Ang gulo-gulo sa loob*" (it's so troublesome inside), those who moved to the compound from war-torn Mindanao know where the real *magulo* (trouble) is. Al Salam Mosque Compound, with its noise and congestion, is their newfound peace. Hence, data herein offers no support for consistent use of regulative sanctions against decentralization of the jama'ah, or organizations that successfully implement these. The sanctions, however, to noncompliance of building new mosques are religious: one forgoes the chance to multiply one's pahala, fulfill all the duties of a Muslim, and leave a legacy. To some mosque makers, praying beside sinful jama'ah can be considered sanction enough.

Peace also manifests in dissociation. Patrons and jama'ah leave mosques "tainted" by intrigue. Deviant Muslims (terrorists, criminals, and others) are labeled "ignorant" of the true meaning of Islam. There is also peace to be had in silence. By refusing to be part of this study, administrators from the Al Ahbrar maintain the mosque's mystery, and are peacefully spared from an inquisitive outsider such as myself. Interestingly, the SMMAC's attempt to flatten ethnolinguistic difference is motivated by a pursuit of peace—the elision of ethnic delineations are an attempt to forget, to silence personal memories of war. Memories of war are refreshed enough anyway during every drug bust, raid, terrorist attack, and news of conflict from Mindanao. What SMMAC contends with is that its flattening of tribal differences alienates those who positively associate with Mindanao.

Just as Salam residents linked the land dispute to a narrative of "reclaiming what was once ours," the community's mosque makers do too. Respondents express a desire to "return" the Philippines to Islam,

to bring Mindanao to Manila via many mosques. But this involves the delicate balancing act of wooing the non-Moro majority to sympathize with their cause, while simultaneously protecting the diversity of their truths. The Al Salam Mosque is a beacon for displaced Moros nationwide, a symbol of victory over the land dispute. But life after victory is an ongoing struggle as well. Human folly, competition for resources, and the inevitable tensions of being migrant and its inherent minority status led to friction and tainted reputations. Other mosque makers choose to build new mosques as a way to create a new image.

CONCLUSION

Salam, as a space of representation, provides hybrid circumstances for mosque makers to maximize. Unique opportunities arise such that mosque making is not tied to wealth, civic engagement, or lineage alone.

Spatial practices of mosque makers in Culiat involve shaping the sensory experiences of the jama'ah, through either visual, aural, or tactile elements. With such, mosque makers resist homogenization from within. Visual elements such as the prominence of the mosques, their design, location, and state of completion reflect on the character of mosque founders. Aural elements include gossip and intrigue surrounding the mosque, the language of the khutbah, and the extent to which the adhan of a mosque is heard. Tactile elements include physical and nonphysical boundaries to mosque entrances, the congestion of the jama'ah, and the exposure of the jama'ah to natural elements and the proximity of the mosque to other public gathering spaces. Using these elements, mosque makers amplify or silence ethnic delineations, connections to Mindanao, and links to the Middle East. Mosques can either protect mosque makers from undesirable cohorts, or invite "sinners" to be cleansed. They are a means to isolate from the receiving community, but are more commonly used for political leveraging. Most importantly, mosques are a means to assert individuality. The diversity of mosques allow multiethnic and multilingual Moros the choice to determine which religious space best reflects their unique identity.

Not all mosques are the same, just as not all Muslims are the same. Diversity and competition stimulate Muslims and mosques to up their ante in reflecting their representation of space, or the core values of Islam as best as they can. Mosques symbolize peace, cleanliness, and

healing. More mosques, more adhan, more pahala—a multiplication of goodness all throughout.

This would not be seen as negative, if only the non-Muslim majority were disabused of the aphorism that uniformity is unity. Because of a systematic perpetuation of misrecognition, in which differences are seen as a deviation from a hegemonic ideal (Hernandez 2014), many mosques are seen as the dilution of strength of Islam as a religion, of Moros as a people, rather than the exponential expansion of it. Ironically, strategic essentialism during the land dispute contributed to this malaise. So much so that Muslims tend to interpret "*parang hindi ka* Muslim" (you seem not a Muslim) as a compliment, rather as an affront.

What escapes many non-Muslim inhabitants of Culiat though is a simple truth: More mosques mean more Muslims. And as any Manileño knows, where there is people, there is power. Instead of dismissing the profusion of mosques as a sign of dwindling power, the surrounding receiving community ought to pay more attention to this expanding minority, and learn more about them. The burden of being "double bladed" ought to be shared.

While the receiving community of Culiat and the rest of the non-Moro majority of the Philippines continue to perpetuate misrecognition, friction over which side of the balance to favor continues among members of the Moro community. Provoking this friction is more likely to stimulate the establishment of more mosques and more Muslim communities in the city, rather than their capitulation.❁

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Family and Politics in an Archipelagic Province: The Moreno Dynasty in Postwar Romblon, 1949–1969

KRISTOFFER R. ESQUEJO

ABSTRACT. Through documentary sources and oral interviews, this article examines the vital role played by Romblon's distinct features as an archipelagic province on its local politics, particularly the rise and fall of the Moreno dynasty. The elder brother was Florencio Moreno, a government civil engineer who served as Romblon's congressman and was later appointed secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications (DPWC) in the Magsaysay and Garcia administrations. The younger brother was Jose D. Moreno, a wartime military doctor who succeeded his elder brother as Romblon's congressman for three terms. From 1949 to 1969, the Moreno dynasty monopolized the said position, effectively bringing progress and pride of place to their constituents and figuratively putting Romblon on the Philippine map. While the brothers represent the emergence of professional politicians in Philippine postwar politics, their respective political careers were still largely restricted by the combined factors of geography, demography, and kinship dynamics of their home province. As a result, a sibling rivalry erupted which ultimately ended not only their political heyday but also shattered their economic interests.

KEYWORDS. Moreno dynasty · Romblon · kinship politics · public works · public health

Introduction

Romblon is an archipelagic province geographically located in the center of the Philippines. It has a considerable distance from the capital, Manila, and, being composed of 158 islands and islets, remains relatively isolated in all directions—it lies west of Mindoro, south of Marinduque, east of Masbate, and north of Panay (figure 1). As a result, its people face perennial problems that might not be common in other land-locked provinces in Luzon and Mindanao. First, there is the problem of geography, which translates to interisland transportation and communication difficulties. Second, there is the problem of

Figure 1. Map of the Philippines and of Romblon. *Source:* Wikipedia maps by Eugene Alvin Villar (Philippines) and Mike Gonzalez (Romblon).

demography, which means a small voting population that would barely matter in national elections. Third, there is the problem of language, which further divides the people who strongly uphold kinship ties and conservative family values.

Presently made up of seventeen municipalities, Romblon has three main ethnolinguistic groups. First is Asi, largely spoken in five municipalities—in Banton, Corcuera, Concepcion, Odiongan, and Calatrava—where native surnames start with the letter *F*. Second is Romblomanon, commonly used in another five municipalities—Cajidiocan, Magdiwang, Romblon (the capital town), San Agustin (the Morenos' hometown), and San Fernando—where indigenous surnames commence with the letters *M* and *R*. Third is Unhan, dominantly spoken in the municipalities of Alcantara, Ferrol, Looc, San Andres, San Jose, Santa Fe, and Santa Maria—where local surnames start with the letter G (Esquejo 2010, 102).

In terms of local politics, it was the Asi group who was the first to become politically active during the Spanish colonial era. This could be explained by the fact that Banton, the known home island of Asi speakers, located in the northernmost part of the Romblon archipelago, was established as a Spanish pueblo in 1622. In fact, it was established as a pueblo nine years earlier than the capital town of Romblon (Madeja 1993, 124). As centuries went by, the Bantoanons migrated to neighboring islands and established communities despite the challenges of living and external threats. Highly conscious of their cultural identity and proud of their collective heritage, they are consistently recognized within the province as highly literate people and leading professionals in various fields (Fabella 1976, 4; Meñez 1998, 25–30).

Therefore, it was no wonder why Leonardo F. Festin, an Asi-speaking lawyer from a land-holding family of Odiongan, became the biggest political name in prewar Romblon politics. In 1916, he was first elected as an assemblyman or *diputado* of the Third District of Capiz and later became a member of the Fourth Legislature (1916–1919). In 1919, a year after Romblon became an independent province, he again won the electoral mandate for the Fifth Legislature (1919–1922), and later managed to win seven subsequent reelections: Sixth Legislature (1922–1925), Seventh Legislature (1925–1928), Eighth Legislature (1928–1931), Ninth Legislature (1931–1934), Tenth Legislature (1934–1935), Second National Assembly (1938–1941), and Third National Assembly (1941–1946) (*Festin Story* 2001, 34–38).

Ironically, at the same time that the American colonial government was actively teaching the ideals of democracy and self-government to Filipinos, feudal-like politics emerged in Romblon, as Festin became the longest to hold office as an assemblyman in prewar Romblon. At the time, there were no term limits for elective posts and he was able to successfully monopolize the position while many other equally qualified leaders from other ethnolinguistic groups consecutively occupied the gubernatorial post. A critical study reveals that this became possible due to the patronage of Manuel L. Quezon, long-term senate president and the Philippine Commonwealth's first president (Esquejo 2014, 89–93).

Remarkably, Festin only experienced two electoral defeats in his entire political career as a high-ranking member of the ruling Nacionalista Party (NP). First was in 1935, when he was beaten by Gabriel F. Fabella, a neophyte lawyer and University of the Philippines (UP) history instructor from Banton. The outcome was so unacceptable for Festin that he filed an electoral protest against Fabella's victory but failed to overturn the result to his favor. Second was in 1946, when he lost to Modesto F. Formilleza, a deputy collector of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The second defeat was so devastating that it ultimately ended his three-decade-long political career (Fabella 1998, 50–62; *Festin Story* 2001, 45–46, 51, 65).[1]

Unlike his own townmate and predecessor, Formilleza was born to a poor family in Odiongan. From a working student, he rose through the ranks to become a lawyer and taxation expert. Since he studied in Capiz during his early days, he had developed a strong connection with Capiz native Manuel A. Roxas, a long-standing presence in the political scene who eventually became the first postwar Philippine president (Fabella 1998, 22). In fact, it was the latter who convinced him to run as representative under the Liberal wing of the NP (later renamed as the Liberal Party) in 1946. Due to the popular

1. In 1940, Assemblyman Festin sponsored Commonwealth Act 581, which converted Romblon into an irregular province composed of only of four special municipalities: Romblon, Maghali, Sibuyan, and Tablas (ROMASITA). The so-called Festin Bill was viewed by many historians as an experiment in local government during the Commonwealth period, as Romblon would still receive financial subsidy and privileges from the national government. An additional feature was that the interior secretary would serve as the governor ex-officio of the province. Since this was also perceived as Festin's political tactic to simply perpetuate himself in power, it became a big electoral issue in 1946, which finally resulted in his downfall.

demand for change of leadership, he garnered 7,816 votes against Festin's 4,374 votes. As Romblon's representative, he became the chair of the Committee on Ways and Means, and was responsible for the enactment of two laws: the National Revenue Code of the Philippines and Republic Act 38, which restored the regular status of Romblon as a province.[2]

However, Festin did not easily give up, as he desperately wanted political vengeance against Formilleza. A few months before the 1949 elections, he finally convinced Juan Quirino M. Moreno to let his firstborn son, Florencio, try his luck in local politics under the opposition banner of NP. At the time, the late President Roxas had already been succeeded by the embattled President Elpidio Quirino of the Liberal Party (LP) while Formilleza sided with the Avelino wing of the same ruling party. It must be noted that the Quirino administration then was already heavily tainted with alleged rampant graft and corruption charges (Agoncillo 1990, 440).

The 1949 elections is a more significant turning point in Romblon political history. At the national level, the LP stayed in power, as Quirino won his own term as president. At the local level, Florencio Moreno did not simply oust Formilleza but his victory ended the more than three decades of supremacy of the Asi leaders, from Festin to Formilleza (1916–1949). It marked the rise of Romblomanon-speaking leaders largely dominated by the Moreno brothers (Fabella 1962, 72).

The Morenos' hometown has a complicated historical background. The many changes in its municipal place-name are somewhat a representation of the rise and fall of its political clans. Badajoz is located in the northeastern part of Tablas, the biggest island of the Romblon archipelago. The site was formerly known as Guintigui-an, the name of the town's northern river where a minute variety of fish without tongues, locally known as *tigue*, thrived and could easily be caught by means of crude nets. By 1855, Pueblo de Guintigui-an was formally organized by three migrants from Romblon, Romblon—namely: brothers Don Laureano Montesa and Don Luis Montesa, and a cousin, Don Esteban Montesa. At the time, it comprised three *visitas*: Guinpuc-an (now Barangay Carmen) in the north, Cagbagacay (now the municipality of Santa Maria) in the south, and Cabolutan (still a *barangay*) in the middle. In reality, it was only a successor pueblo to the

2. Edna F. Formilleza, seventy-nine years old, interview by author, Cubao, Quezon City, June 27, 2009.

third visita, a formerly larger pueblo which was stricken by a serious small pox epidemic in the 1790s that almost wiped out its entire population. In 1868, Guintigui-an was renamed Badajoz on its feast day by a certain Spanish soldier named Andres Lebarde after his own hometown Badajoz in Spain (Prado 2005, 2–4, 21–25).[3]

For the next decades, the name Badajoz continued to be used to refer to the town and seemed to have been fully accepted by its residents, while its municipal jurisdiction underwent continual changes during the Spanish and American regimes. However, people from the neighboring towns jokingly rephrased its name to "bad host" after personally experiencing the seeming lack of hospitality of the town and the individualistic attitude of its inhabitants, particularly the elite, toward strangers and visitors during its annual feasts. On June 20, 1957, the town's name was finally changed from Badajoz to San Agustin, in honor of its patron saint, through Republic Act 1660 by Rep. Jose D. Moreno. In recognition of this act, his younger sister Monica was unanimously crowned queen of San Agustin's first town fiesta (Prado 2005, 5a).[4]

Eventually, San Agustin was further reduced in size, as two more municipalities were created from its territory: Calatrava (1968) and Santa Maria (1984). As of the 2010 census, it has a total population of 22,118, the fourth biggest out of Romblon's seventeen municipalities. Currently, it is composed of fifteen barangays: Bachawan, Binongaan, Buli, Cabolutan, Cagbo-aya, Camantaya, Carmen, Cawayan, Doña Juana, Dubduban, Lusong, Hinugusan, Mahabang Baybay, Poblacion, and Sugod (Esquejo 2014, 99; Esquejo 2010a, 38, 471).

Presently, San Agustin is predominantly a Romblomanon-speaking town. Though the location was believed to have been first populated by Aetas, followed by the Mangyanes and Unhan Visayans from Panay during the earlier colonial periods, it was the migrants from Romblon Island who eventually succeeded in establishing it as a pueblo and later peopled it through a series of migration. As a consequence, they carried

3. According to Prado (2005, 24), the renaming of Guintigui-an to Badajoz is misattributed to Don Jose Fernandez de Terran, the Spanish governor of the Romblon politico-military district from 1880 to 1883. Popularly known as cruel and abusive, he was believed to have ordered the forced conversion of the Mangyanes of Tablas to the Catholic faith. In response, most of these people disobeyed him by opting for mass migration to Mindoro.

4. Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016.

with them their culture and language to their newfound home. The pull factor for them was that northern Tablas at the time was viewed as an ideal site for establishing new settlements, as it was abundant with fishing banks, fertile soil, thick forests, and lush mountains. This is the explanation as to why most of its current inhabitants carry surnames that start with the letter M, just like in the capital town of Romblon, a pattern that was originally implemented through the 1848 decree of Spanish Governor-General Narciso Claveria y Zaldua (Prado 2005, 23; Esquejo 2010, 102; Agoncillo 1990, 94).

KINSHIP AND POLITICS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Political dynasties have been the central theme of various publications. One classic example is McCoy (1994), which focused on the provincial elites and was published almost a quarter of a century ago. As a compilation of scholarly articles, it widely discussed several leading political families that arose from several provinces, including Bulacan, Cavite, Iloilo, Cebu, Lanao, and Maguindanao. The authors collectively concluded that most of these families chose violence and rent seeking in order to entrench themselves in politics and remain in national prominence even during the Philippine postwar and martial law eras (McCoy 1994). Though this book was ground-breaking in the study of Philippine political dynasties, it was somehow limited only to the historically well-known and economically affluent provinces. In fact, it only gave emphases to big political clans such as the Pardo de Taveras, Lopezes, and Osmeñas who were frequently tackled in mainstream Philippine history. Still, there is a pressing need to fill the considerable gap by doing similar scholarly research in other peripheral provinces whose provincial elite have also left an impact both on their respective areas and on the national scene.

One of the least discussed areas of political studies is Romblon. According to one political scientist, there are only two significant and noteworthy political dynasties from Romblon: the Festins and the Morenos. The Festins were fully dominated by one member (Leonardo) for a very long time, the Morenos were largely represented by two siblings side by side (Florencio and Jose Daniel). Moreover, the Moreno family is viewed as more powerful because it was not only a family of professionals but also a clan of landlords and businessmen (Simbulan 2005, 317). At the time, it was quite rare for a small province to have produced a political family that has members

occupying powerful positions in both the legislative and executive branches of the national government.

In looking for a parallel case of provincial elite, the Morenos of Romblon were to some extent quite similar to the Duranos of Cebu. First, both belonged to archipelagic provinces with considerable distance from the so-called "Imperial Manila." Second, both the Moreno siblings (civil engineering and medicine graduates) and Ramon Durano Sr. (education graduate) were contemporaries and products of the premier state university in prewar Manila, UP. Third, the elder Moreno brother and the said Danao-based political patriarch both started as neophyte congressmen in 1949 (Cullinane 1994, 166–71).

However, this article argues that, unlike the Duranos and other members of the provincial elite, the Morenos were distinct as a postwar political family because they had very little to offer to any national figure as patron. It must be noted that the latter's home province was neither a commercial nor an ecclesiastical center of its region. Though strategically situated in the central part of the Philippine archipelago, Romblon is not contiguous to any province and is isolated in all directions.[5] Moreover, it did not possess vast natural resources nor a big voting population of which the Morenos could take advantage for the accumulation of personal wealth or in exchange of state patronage from any sitting president (Esquejo 2010a, 1–3, 32–39).

In addition to this, Florencio or "Pensoy" (elected from 1949 to 1957) and Jose Daniel or "Joe" (elected from 1957 to 1969) came to power in an era defined by Western discourses that include "Christianity's ethics and morals, the concept of loyalty to the nation-state, and the professionalism associated with the merit system in the modern bureaucracy"(Roces 2001, 45). First, they came from a devout Catholic family who hailed from a predominantly Catholic province. They even had a paternal uncle who served for a long time as parish priest of the Romblon capital. Historically, the Augustinian Recollects are solely credited for evangelizing the early Romblomanons in the first half of the seventeenth century as well as building fortresses for their defense during the so-called "Moro Wars."[6] Second, the Moreno brothers were

5. In a 1975 report of the US Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey, there are 158 islands and islets that make up the Romblon archipelago. However, only twenty-six of these have official names recognized by the government. See Prado (2005, 1–2).

6. For a detailed discussion of the Augustinian Recollect mission in Romblon during the Spanish colonial period, see Esquejo (2016).

recipients of American colonial education that taught them bureaucratic professionalism and responsibility in office. Under a meritocratic system, they were able to study and finish tertiary education in UP despite hailing from a marginal province. By complying with the professional civil service regulations, they were able to join government service and were elected to the legislature. Moreover, they sponsored public works and health-related bills, aiming for the efficient delivery of social services to the public. Third, they practiced the concept of loyalty to the nation-state, as manifested by their individual heroic wartime records. Pensoy worked in the construction of roads that became essential to the defense of Bataan against the Japanese forces while Joe served as a member of the guerilla medical corps in Panay despite the pressures and death threats suffered by their family.

Yet, how the Moreno siblings managed to keep themselves in power is a different story. Like other provincial elite, they were bound by *politica de familia*, a system that clashed with the Westernized views on politics and citizenship which were fostered on them. The concept is defined as one which "compels individuals to think in terms of family solidarity to the detriment of any other socio-political unit outside the family" (Roces 2001, 2–14). Serving as bond of the siblings, their father was instrumental in maneuvering the political careers of his sons while ensuring the success and survival of their provincial-based family businesses. Due to this paternal intervention, Pensoy and Joe were forced several times to compromise their Western values in the name of family. By prioritizing laws that benefitted many sectors of social services, fortified by the popular patronage of their businesses, the Morenos successfully managed to stay in power for twenty years.

By 1969, an unexpected turn of events took place. Joe, the younger brother, was running for his fourth term as the incumbent congressman under the Nacionalista Party (NP). At first, he was challenged by Esteban S. Madrona, a first cousin of his wife, who ran under the LP banner. Pensoy, the older brother, filed his own candidacy for the same position, posing a serious threat to his own kin. Though the family patriarch succeeded in convincing Pensoy to eventually withdraw, he did so only a day before the elections. This decision was not promptly made known to the voters in the neighboring islands. Expectedly, numerous ballots containing only the Moreno surname were considered void and were nullified by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) at the expense of the incumbent, thus catapulting Madrona to victory.

Rumor had it that Pensoy secretly endorsed and supported his own brother's opponent.

The 1969 elections happened almost half a century ago. However, many questions and speculations remain unanswered and undiscussed, especially to the members of the younger generation in Romblon. Despite this, the Moreno descendants remain divided up to the present in terms of political affiliation while the Madrona children continue to rule this archipelagic province. Based on unpublished materials and several accounts published in newspapers, and strengthened by oral sources, it appears that sibling rivalry indeed caused the downfall of the Moreno dynasty.

This article attempts to present a new case study and contribute to the increasing discourse on Filipino political dynasties, since the idea of self-destruction caused by internal rivalry has not been deeply tackled in Philippine political history. In other words, it focuses not on a mere feud between families but on a feud within a family. Furthermore, it also puts forward the following points: first, the 1949 and 1969 congressional elections were both significant turning points in the political history of Romblon province, as these marked the rise and decline of Romblomanon-speaking leaders largely dominated by Pensoy and Joe.

Second, the demographic and geographic weaknesses of Romblon province have both made and unmade the political careers of the Moreno brothers. Somehow, having an archipelagic province with a small population as bailiwick has been, and still is, political baggage for professional bureaucrats-turned-local politicians who aspire for national political positions.

Third, the rivalry among the Moreno extended clan ultimately ended the political dominance and economic prosperity of the family. On one hand, the Moreno brothers' infrastructure projects were admired and imitated by later generations of Romblon political leaders and constituents. On the other hand, the competition between the two brothers paved the way for the rise of another provincial dynasty that endures up to the present.

Throughout the article, the term "Romblon" could refer to the entire province or to the town capital which bears the same place-name. In the same way, "Romblomanon" could mean the people of the whole province or one of the three main languages in this province.

Figure 2. Juan Quirino Montes Moreno, who was endearingly called "Tan Angki." Author's photo of the original portrait.

ROOTS OF THE MORENO CLAN

The Moreno family attributes their economic and political ascent to the labors of their patriarch, Juan Quirino Montes Moreno, endearingly called "Tan Angki" (figure 2). Second child in a brood of five, his parents were Nicolas Moreno and Teodora Montes, pure-blooded Filipinos residing in a peripheral barrio of Badajoz, Romblon. Tan

Angki was described as short in stature with distinctively South Asian-like features (commonly called Bombay). From being a fisherman, he successfully rose from poverty through a rare combination of luck and frugality. Most of his winnings in cockpit fights were patiently saved by his housewife, Fidela Manalon, a Chinese mestiza, and were invested in a small *sari-sari* (convenience) store and copra business. In due course, the growing profits were used by the couple to buy tracts of land and other properties in their vicinity. Having a prospering economic base and being a sociable person, Tan Angki later joined local politics by serving as *teniente del barrio* and *presidente municipal* of Badajoz (1926–1928).[7]

During his early years, Tan Angki worked as a houseboy of a certain Spaniard who provided him with meager education in Manila. While acquiring a little knowledge of the Spanish language, he was also exposed to the political events at the time. In fact, he always bragged that he personally witnessed the execution of Dr. Jose Rizal in Bagumbayan. Because of their limited education, Tan Angki and his wife tried to give their children the best education they can afford, even to the extent of establishing schools. Tan Angki founded the Badajoz Elementary School in the town center. In 1948, he also joined his older brother Eduardo, also a former presidente municipal, and other prominent men of Badajoz to become the original incorporators and stakeholders of Tablas Academy, one of the earliest private high schools in Romblon (Fabella 1998, 118–19).[8]

Tan Angki and Fidela had eight children. When Fidela passed away, Tan Angki married Victoriana Magracia, a woman of modest background and was forty years younger than him. She continued the retail trade business of the first wife. Their union produced three more children. Having a growing family was never a problem to Tan Angki, as he was able to effectively manage both his entrepreneurial and political endeavors. Later, the family's business interests vastly expanded, as they also penetrated other industries at the local level, particularly

7. Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016; and Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016.

8. Three private schools were founded in 1948, largely through the initiative of Prof. Gabriel F. Fabella. These were Romblon College in Odiongan, Banton High School in Banton, and Tablas Academy in Badajoz and one public school, Looc High School in Looc.

public transport. At the outset, he purchased several barges for interisland transport from Badajoz to the Romblon capital. Then, he bought trucks and used them as public utility buses (forty units in its heyday), which became the nucleus of the Tablas Transportation Company (TABTRANCO) and served all Tablas towns. To beat the competition, he even bought the bus units of his neophyte business rivals. Eventually, he set up a gasoline station in Badajoz to monopolize the supply and distribution of petroleum products throughout the island. He later became popularly known as a self-made man and was dubbed "Don Juan" by his fellow Badajoznons. All of his children were sent to reputable Manila-based schools such as the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and UP. As expected, the children's education and choice of profession were largely shaped by the father's decision, aligned with the family's political and economic interests. Later on, most of them became professionals in their own right and became sources of pride of their family and municipality: three businessmen, one engineer, one doctor, two pharmacists, and one who became vice president of the Philippine National Bank (PNB).[9]

CAREERS OF PENSOY AND JOE

Pensoy was born on November 7, 1907, in Badajoz, Romblon. As the oldest son, he was the second among the eight children from his father's first marriage. His siblings were Tasiana, Dioscora (Morales), Juliana (Nepomuceno), Lilia (Madali), Jose Daniel, Felonila, and Felices. His half-siblings were Rosita, Monica (Hilario), and Juana. He first studied at Badajoz Elementary School, then secured his secondary education from Asilo de San Vicente de Paul in Manila. Later, he took up civil engineering in UP and graduated fourth in his class in 1929.[10] In the same year, he passed the civil service board examination, and a year later, ranked second in the civil service examination for government assistant civil engineers. Five years later, he ranked eleventh in the civil

9. Jaime M. Nepomuceno, sixty-four years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 27, 2009; and Felices M. Moreno, eighty-three years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 27, 2009.

10. Florencio Moreno (CE '29) was the first civil engineering alumnus of the UP College of Engineering elected to the Lower House. He was followed by Felix Fuentebella of Camarines Norte (CE '36) and Jose L. Lachica of Sorsogon (CE '38).

service examination for senior civil engineers (Moreno 1969a,1; Moreno 1969b, 7).

Before entering politics, Pensoy had already been serving in government as a career civil engineer for quite some time. While still a student in UP, he started working as an engineering assistant in Pangasinan. Gradually, he held various positions in several engineering districts. In Quezon City, he was assistant civil engineer (1929–1935), senior civil engineer (1935–1938), project engineer (1938–1939), and assistant city engineer (1939–1940). Then he became a district engineer of Bataan (1940–1941). During World War II, he occupied both vital positions of city engineer of Baguio City and provincial engineer of Benguet (1943–1945). This was followed by his designation as provincial engineer of Romblon (1945–1946), his home province, and Ilocos Sur (1946), and was finally promoted as superintendent of irrigation (1946) and district engineer (1947–1949) of La Union (Moreno 1969a,1; Moreno 1969b, 8).

According to James J. Halsema, Pensoy was one of the young, brilliant Filipino engineers who were under the direct tutelage of his late father, Eusebius Julius Halsema, a colonial engineer and former mayor of Baguio City. In fact, Pensoy was part of a survey team which conducted a thorough inspection of roads from Kilometer 21 to Bokod and other road projects that required voluntary work. Due to Pensoy's ability, he endeared himself to Halsema and was personally chosen to supervise the improvement of main roads.[11] In 1938, he and his team successfully extended the road another 50 kilometers, which was previously a two-way path covered with gravel and sand. In addition to this, he was positively described by Halsema's son:

> Moreno was a member of a generation of Filipinos who had grown up in the American era and felt thoroughly at home in it. They had not experienced the snubs and racial slurs that many *pensionados* earlier encountered in the United States. Moreno had American teachers in elementary and high school and had no difficulty in dealing with his American professors, headed by Dean Hyde, at the UP. He knew their

11. Engineer Moreno regarded Mayor Halsema, his former boss, as his second father. He lived in the upper floor of Halsema's office until he married Rosario Llorca, a Romblon-born mestiza whom he met at a dance in Baguio Auditorium. As a fitting tribute to the American official, he co-authored with Rep. Dennis Molintas of Benguet a bill renaming the mountain trail from Baguio City to Bontoc, Mountain Province, as the Halsema Mountain Road. This was RA 933, which was passed on June 10, 1953.

Figure 3. Florencio "Pensoy" Moreno's campaign rally in Alcantara, Romblon when he ran for Congress. Photo courtesy of Firmalo family.

> language and culture well. Moreno quickly learned those of the Mountain Province as well . . . Halsema liked this personable, efficient young man who did not hesitate to express his opinions. They usually were right. (Halsema 1991, 223)

Equipped with a strong academic foundation and extensive hands-on field experience, Pensoy became an able government administrator wherever he was assigned. As the project engineer of the so-called Diliman Estate, he was largely responsible for the construction of major buildings in the newly built Quezon City, which was envisioned then to be the future national capital. In 1939, he also had a pivotal role in the layout and construction of a circumferential highway in Metro Manila, now popularly known as Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) (Carunungan 1982, 32).[12]

Joe was born on July 21, 1915, in Badajoz, Romblon. As stated earlier, he was the sixth among all the eleven children of Tan Angki. All his life, he was a product of the public school system. Like his elder brother, he first studied at Badajoz Elementary School in their family's hometown. He then transferred to the Romblon capital where he took his secondary education from then Romblon High School (now Romblon National High School). Later, he moved to Manila where he took up and finished the degree of Medicine in UP in 1939.[13]

During World War II, Joe voluntarily joined the medical corps of Free Panay Guerilla Forces as a medical doctor. With a rank of captain (later major), he served as the regimental surgeon of the 66th Infantry (BERLIN). Later, he was also designated as the chief of the 66th Medical Company. On June 8, 1944, he was chosen as one of the faculty members of the newly opened BERLIN Officers' Troop School (BOTS) based in Oquendo, Balete, Aklan. He taught the subjects of First Aid, Field Hygiene, and Sanitation to the noncommissioned officers of the 66th Infantry. Before the war ended, he joined Captain Teofilo Zosa in the construction and management of a base hospital for the Filipino forces. Most of his subordinates in the said hospital were

12. Before this circumferential highway was named after an illustrious historian from Rizal province, it was previously called the North-South Circumferential Road. In 1946, it was renamed Avenida de 19 de Junio in honor of the national hero. In the 1950s, it was again renamed Highway 54, but due to the clamor from Rizal province residents, it was renamed after Epifanio de los Santos in 1959 through RA 2140. Presently, it is the longest and most congested highway in the metropolis.
13. Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016.

also his fellow Romblomanons (Manikan 1977, 412, 525–26, 599, 647).[14]

Like Joe, Pensoy also had relatively unknown but crucial acts of patriotism during the war. While in Bataan, he and his personnel were able to hasten the completion of roads from Pilar to Bagac as well as other main provincial routes which traverse the peninsula from east to west. In other words, these proofs of his efficient service somehow helped the speedy movement of the USAFFE troops while resisting the advance of the enemy troops (Halsema 1991, 224, 279).

A few years later, Pensoy had already secured two factors that would make him a viable candidate for an elective position. First, he had gained wide experience in dealing with ordinary people during his pioneering work in the Cordillera region. Second, there was a strong clamor for public works at the time, which became his vow for the electorate of Romblon.

In the 1949 elections, Pensoy ran under the NP banner and garnered a total of 8,021 votes against the incumbent congressman, Modesto F. Formilleza, who only mustered 7,230 votes. In the 1953 elections, Pensoy won again by a slim margin—securing 10,642 votes over LP bet Governor Jovencio Q. Mayor, a relative by affinity, who got 10,019 votes.[15]

The mayor of San Agustin from 1968 to 1971, Abundio M. Montesa Jr., vividly remembered how he and his younger town mates passionately campaigned for Pensoy's first electoral campaign (figure 3). In his view, those days were quite different from today, as local elections then were fairly conducted:

> As early as 1948–1949, I was already involved in politics. I was in high school then, when the late Engr. Florencio Moreno ran for Congress against the incumbent Cong. Modesto Formilleza. The youths of San Agustin (formerly Badajoz) organized themselves into a united group called the United Sons of Badajoz. Some of the members were already of voting age while others like myself were not yet of voting age. We campaigned in the different barangays (called barrios before) and in the

14. Doctor Moreno himself conducted a postmortem autopsy on the body of Maj. Jesus Jizmundo, commander of the 66th RCT 2nd Batallion who was mortally hit by a shrapnel while attacking the Iloilo Trade School on February 8, 1945. Though the latter was brought to the hospital, he died afterward. See Manikan (1977, 674).

15. Edna F. Formilleza, seventy-nine years old, interview by author, Cubao, Quezon City, June 27, 2009; and Jovencio Ll. Mayor Jr., sixty-two years old, Banaue, Quezon City, January 12, 2010.

> different municipalities in the whole province. In our campaigns, the group contributed money, foodstuffs, etc. necessary in the campaign. We did not ask [for] anything from the candidates because we know they were poor and really hard up in their campaign. The voters did not ask [for] anything from the candidates, instead they gave what they can give to the candidates. There were no flying voters. The teachers who composed the election committees were honest and did their work well. There were no vote buying. No "*dagdag bawas*" [vote padding and shaving]. There were no corrupt practices in those days.[16]

However, Pensoy's long-term political goal was not to remain merely as Romblon's representative. Most of his priority projects and legislations were focused on the twin sectors of transportation and communication, revealing his ambition to run for higher office. As a neophyte member of the 2nd Congress (December 30, 1949–December 8, 1953), he only served as a member of several house committees such as Appointments, Public Works, and Commerce and Industry, and was the main proponent of just one bill, RA 917 (also known as the Philippine Highway Act of 1952) (Moreno 1969b, 4–5).[17] However, he significantly improved his legislative performance during his second term. By 1953, he was unanimously elected by his colleagues as committee chair on public works and served as a committee member of Government Enterprises, and Presidential Committee for Programming and Planning of Roads.[18] Due to his notable record in

16. Abundio M. Montesa Jr. seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, October 22, 2008.

17. Pensoy gave a lackluster performance in the Second Congress when he first met the big names in Philippine politics at the time: Floro Crisologo (first district, Ilocos Sur), Arsenio H. Lacson (second district, Manila), Jose B. Laurel Jr. (third district, Batangas), Diosdado Macapagal (first district, Pampanga), Ramon Magsaysay (Zambales), Ferdinand E. Marcos (second district, Ilocos Norte), Emmanuel N. Pelaez (Misamis Oriental), Eugenio Perez (second district, Pangasinan and House Speaker), Arturo M. Tolentino (third district, Manila), and Cornelio T. Villareal (second district, Capiz).

18. Through Pensoy's membership in, and later chairmanship, of various committees in the Third Congress, the following laws were passed: RA 544 (Civil Engineering Law), RA 545 (Architects' Law), RA 780 (School Construction Fund Apportionment Act), RA 1216 (Amendments to the Portworks Act), RA 1294 (Artesian Wells Act), RA 1383 (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority Law), and RA 2000 (Limited Access Act). He also initiated the enactment of the Continuous Five-Year Infrastructure Program of Expenditures and the documentation of projects funded by the so-called pork barrel. He coauthored RA 1000, allocating PHP 1 billion as government guarantee to productive projects such as concrete roads, irrigation systems, waterworks, long-term permanent bridges, airports, port works, and prefabricated school buildings (Moreno 1969b, 5–6).

Figure 4. President Ramon Magsaysay and DPWC Sec. Florencio "Pensoy" Moreno (fifth from left) with Romblomanon leaders. Photo courtesy of Firmalo family.

the Third Congress, he was shortlisted by the *Philippines Free Press* and the Congressional Press Club as one of the Ten Most Useful Congressmen (1954–1955). He also received certificates of recognition from the *Congressional Bulletin* as one of the Ten Most Excellent Parliamentarians of the Lower House and from the League of Women Voters of the Philippines for his firm stand against the systemic corruption in government spending for public works. In a May 22, 1954 article in the *Philippines Free Press*, Leon O. Ty praised his integrity and efficiency as a legislator, especially his tireless efforts against the evils of pork barrel:

> He has continually advocated [for] the abolition of the pork barrel because of the known evils that [are] bred in the hands of politicians. As a result of the public works measures that he has sponsored during his five-year incumbency in Congress, many of the abuses in connection with the expenditures of public funds for roads, bridges, etc. have been eliminated. As a public works man, Moreno certainly knows his business. The Romblon congressman has authored many vital measures. He filed a bill providing for the advance planning of public works; another Moreno bill seeks to amend an existing law. This measure provides for the allocation of funds for the construction of elementary school buildings. There are only a few members of the House who can hold a candle to Moreno in the number of bills of vital importance sponsored during the last session. (Moreno 1969b, 9)

Pensoy's extraordinary legislative career led to his appointment as secretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications (DPWC), a highly coveted cabinet position, in 1955 by President Ramon Magsaysay (figure 4).[19] Despite having a weak political bailiwick, he was treated as an asset of Magsaysay's administration that even after the popular president's sudden demise, he was reappointed by President Carlos P. Garcia to the same position (figure 5).[20]

19. According to Gil Moreno, his father cheated death twice while in office. In 1949, he almost joined the convoy of former First Lady Aurora Aragon Quezon, which was ambushed in Bongabon, Nueva Ecija. In 1957, he almost ended up with Magsaysay's party to Cebu that ended in a plane crash. He was able to evade these accidents through last-minute changes in his decisions.

20. Other than DPWC, from 1955 to 1967, Pensoy was also interim chair of the Reparations Commission for government projects (1955–1957), two-time chair of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) (1955–1963 and 1965–1967), vice chair of the board of directors of Philippine Airlines (PAL) (1955–1961), chair of the Screening Committee on Bond Issue Projects under the Council of State (1958–1961), chair of the Coordinating Committee that implemented the Marikina Multi-Purpose Project (1955–1961), and chair of both the Roxas Memorial Commission and the National Pantheon Board (1955–1961) (Moreno 1969, 6–7).

Figure 5. President Carlos P. Garcia and DPWC Sec. Florencio "Pensoy" Moreno (center) with Romblomanon leaders. Photo courtesy of Firmalo family.

At the local level, the people of Romblon definitely benefitted from Pensoy's legislative and executive positions. While serving as district engineer of Romblon, he initiated the circumferential road in Tablas Island. As both congressman and DPWC secretary, he was credited in building the first and only provincial airport in Tugdan, Alcantara, in 1956. Through his lobbying efforts, other circumferential roads on other islands were completed, while the ports in Poctoy (Odiongan), San Agustin, Romblon, Malbog (Looc), Ambulong (Magdiwang), and Carmen (San Agustin) were improved. Under his watch, municipal buildings in various towns were constructed, while telephone lines which connected all the towns of Tablas Island were installed. He prioritized the initial construction of two hospitals in the province—the Cajidiocan Emergency Hospital in Sibuyan and the Tablas Island Emergency Hospital in Tablas (Arac 1961, 24–27; Lota 1961, 14–15; Madrona 1961, 16–17; Montaña 1961, 18–21; Villanueva 1961, 22–23).[21]

Amidst these numerous acts of public service to promote the well-being of his own constituents, there was a popular negative perception of Pensoy and his public legacy. Many of his living contemporaries in Romblon believe that he did not fully maximize his political power and influence to wholly serve his fellow Romblomanons. They were not aware of Pensoy's greater plans which were disclosed only to close family members. In fact, it was part of his secret goal to introduce his name to more Filipinos as DPWC secretary by evenly distributing infrastructure projects nationwide. With his wide experience and intellectual prowess, he was confident in his ability to fulfill his dream. However, to his great dismay, he was not selected for the 1961 and 1965 NP senatorial slates due mainly to the fact that Romblon, his bailiwick, is a small and peripheral province with a very limited voting population.[22]

Other locales believe otherwise. Faustino Fabella Jr. recalls how the radio journalist Rafael Yabut used to attack Pensoy for sending valuable amounts of construction materials to the various islands of

21. For a detailed discussion of infrastructure projects for Romblon's three major islands during Pensoy's term, see the entire issue of the *Technical Statistical Review* 5, no. 6 (November–December 1961).

22. Gil Ll. Moreno, sixty-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, October 23, 2008; Felices M. Moreno, interview by author, eighty-three years old, San Agustin, Romblon, May 27, 2009; and Jaime M. Nepomuceno, sixty-four years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 27, 2009.

Romblon. Essentially, this became the basis of a political joke that Romblon might sink into the sea due to more than sufficient quantities of cement. Local folklore even has it that Romblomanons blamed Pensoy whenever there were earthquakes, thinking they were caused by the concrete bridges and heavy equipment brought to Romblon.[23]

As the worthy successor of his older brother, Joe was the longest-serving lawmaker of Romblon after Festin. In the 1957 elections, he ran under the same party as Pensoy and garnered 13,571 votes, besting three other rivals, LP candidate Governor Jovencio Q. Mayor who got 12,713 votes, Progressive Party of the Philippines standard bearer Governor Patriotismo Fondevilla who received 65 votes, and Nationalist Citizens Party bet Francisco Fabon who garnered 16 votes. Joe was reelected in 1961 with 19,745 votes over Mayor's 15,672 votes. He again became victorious in the 1965 polls with 19,989 votes over another doctor and incumbent governor Antonio Y. Mayuga, who only mustered 18,133 votes.[24]

In his entire twelve years in the Lower House, Joe was most productive during his last term (Sixth Congress, 1965–1969). Due to Speaker Jose B. Laurel Jr.'s trust in him, Joe was designated committee chair of health and vice chair of appropriations.[25] Because of these positions, Joe was dubbed the "guardian of national public health" during a publicized fish scare that was rooted in the dubious allegation that fish bought from public markets came from polluted sources. As a response, he initiated a congressional inquiry. After thorough laboratory tests, it was found that the rumors were false, thus ending the public scare and restoring public confidence in the national fishing industry (Rodriguez 1969, 18).

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23. Faustino F. Fabella, Jr., seventy years old, email interview by author from Canada, August 26, 2009.

24. Jovencio Ll. Mayor Jr., sixty-two years old, interview by author, Banaue, Quezon City, January 12, 2010.

25. Joe was responsible for the passage of the Philippine Midwifery Law, Philippine Nursing Law (amendments), Hospital Licensure Act, Geriatrics Center of the Philippines Act, National District Hospitals Act, and Medical Technology Act. Yet, his most valuable medical-related law was RA 6111 (Medicare Law). The said legislation provided for a comprehensive and coordinated (government and private) medical care program to be introduced gradually, preserving the insured freedom of choice of physician and hospital. In fact, this was considered one of the most successful bills passed by the Sixth Congress and he was acclaimed the "Father of Medicare." See Luceño (1969, 8–12) and Rodriguez (1969, 17–18).

Unlike Pensoy, Joe seemed to enjoy his legislative position and did not appear to harbor any plans for higher office. For his constituents, the latter enacted numerous laws that were more diverse than the former's. Joe prioritized the health of his own constituents by appropriating funds for the building and strengthening of local hospitals. These include the elevation of Tablas Emergency Hospital into Tablas General Hospital, the completion of Sibuyan Emergency District Hospital (construction started by Pensoy), and the building of two other hospitals. He also gave emphasis to the education sector: the creation of Alcantara National Trade School (ANTS) and Romblon School of Fisheries, the elevation of Looc High School to Looc National High School (LNHS), the elevation of Romblon National Agricultural School in Odiongan to a college, and the elevation of San Fernando High School to Romblon National Vocational School (RNVS). Likewise, he focused on creating new political units as an effective form of local empowerment. These include Barrio Lumbang Weste in Cajidiocan and Barangay Claro M. Recto in Odiongan (which later became part of Ferrol), and the municipalities of Isla de Carabao (created through RA 3423 enacted on June 18, 1961) and Calatrava (through RA 5317 on June 15, 1968) (Luceño 1969, 11).[26]

To continually attract and secure Romblomanons' affection and mandate, Joe expanded his brother's pet projects. He allocated funds for the improvement of Tugdan Airport's asphalt runway as well as the various circumferential roads on the three main islands of Romblon. Two more ports in Banton and Sta. Fe were added; the latter he called Fisherman's Small Craft Landing. He also approved the building of International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT) in Romblon capital town in order to improve the telephone connections to Manila and to let Romblomanons enjoy the luxury of owning television sets. He also fought for more funds for the communal irrigation systems in order to solve the problem of rice scarcity and the development of big waterworks projects through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Community Development (PACD) and National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) (Olingay 1969, 23; Jimenez 1969, 24).

26. On June 16, 1965, the municipal district of Isla de Carabao was renamed San Jose through RA 4829. On June 23, 1969, San Jose and Calatrava were officially elevated as regular municipalities through Executive Order 184. Fulgencio S. Moreno, sixty-four years old, interview by author, Looc, Romblon, January 2, 2010.

Before his third term ended, Joe was shortlisted as one of the seventeen Top Performers-Achievers of the Sixth Congress, according to the *Congressional Researcher*, a bimonthly newspaper of the Lower House. In a citation, he was described as a very prolific lawmaker:

> Very satisfactory legislator—Principal author of 17 national and 14 local bills passed into law, 3 local bills passed by both Houses but vetoed by the President, 27 national and 5 local bills passed by the House but pending approval by the Senate, 12 national and 25 local bills reported out by the Committee but pending for Second and Third Readings in the House; Sponsor of one adopted resolution, as of the end of the Eighth Special Session of the Sixth Congress. (Rodriguez 1969, 18)

It is interesting to note that the elections of 1953, 1957, and 1961 were testimonies of the guaranteed collective electoral victory of the Morenos in the position of congressman as long as the brothers supported each other. For three consecutive times, only one rival candidate posed a serious challenge to both of them; this was Jovencio Q. Mayor (1912–1993), a two-time governor of the province from Ferrol (then a barrio of Odiongan) endearingly called "Tata Joven." He was a formidable contender because of two factors: first, he was always characterized as a charming and genial politician beloved by common voters; second, his wife Vicentica Cajilig Llorca (an older half-sister of Pensoy's wife) belonged to an enormous and powerful clan whose members were common descendants of Don Miguel Llorca, a Spaniard family patriarch, and were scattered in various towns of Tablas such as Ferrol, Odiongan, Alcantara, and Santa Fe. Still, Pensoy won in a close fight against Joven in 1953 while Joe easily defeated Joven in 1957 and 1961.[27]

Moreno businesses such as TABTRANCO (founded by Tan Angki before 1949) and Tablas-Romblon Marble Corporation (also known as TROMCOR and independently owned by Pensoy) thrived side by side while the siblings remained in power. To strengthen the chances of his sons in winning elections, Tan Angki utilized TABTRANCO (including two sea barges) to provide free boarding passes to numerous voters from neighboring islands. Also, TABTRANCO provided free

27. Jovencio Ll. Mayor Jr., sixty-two years old, interview by author, Banaue, Quezon City, January 12, 2010; Celina Ll. Ramo, seventy-two years old, interview by author, Looc, Romblon, October 29, 2016; and Lydia S. Llorca, eighty-three years old, interview by author, Odiongan, Romblon, November 3, 2017.

Figure 6. Dr. Jose Daniel "Joe" Moreno (seated, center), chief of Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, and the entire hospital staff and personnel. Photo courtesy of Chua family.

supply of crude oil to Pensoy's business whenever the latter was on the brink of bankruptcy.[28]

Out of his deep respect for and enormous debt of gratitude to his father, Pensoy initially gave in to the dynamics of politica de familia. In various cases, he consented to the favors asked by his father. For instance, DPWC gave TABTRANCO the exclusive contract of postal services (collecting and distributing ordinary mail and pier airmail) to the people of Tablas. At the time, the Bureau of Posts was under the direct management of DPWC and Pensoy had an office in its central building in Manila. Under this set-up, the TABTRANCO's manager, who is a brother-in-law, received his monthly salary from the government while another brother-in-law was appointed district engineer. Pensoy was also obliged to withdraw an action whenever it ran contrary to his father's wishes. Romblon's only provincial airport in Tugdan, Alcantara, is a case in point. He initially attempted to construct the airport in Bonbon (part of Doña Juana, San Agustin,) due to its suitable location. However, it did not push through, as his father, who owned vast lands in the area did not want to sell any of them to the government.[29]

Joe also supported the political decisions of his father. At first, he had no other political plans after his stint as an interim municipal mayor of Badajoz (1947–1948), but Tan Angki urged him to run and take Pensoy's place in 1957. Because of his father's persuasion, Joe had to quit his lucrative job as chief of the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital (1955–1957), subsequently ending his medical practice (figure 6). After getting elected, he immediately worked for the changing of the name of their municipality from Badajoz to San Agustin, much to the pride of his father. Aside from being younger than Pensoy, this more subservient attitude of Joe toward their father could have been the reason why the latter consistently sided with him, even during the 1969 elections. This partiality could be attested by the old man's preference to regularly stay in Joe's Guadalupe, Makati, residence while seeking medical attention.[30]

28. Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016.
29. Jaime M. Nepomuceno, sixty-four years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 27, 2009; and Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016.
30. Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016; and Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016.

The 1969 Elections

In the 1969 elections, Joe decided to run for his fourth term, a record rivaling Festin's. It was crucial because: (1) it would have been his last term, and (2) being in public office was his only means of livelihood since he gave up his medical practice.[31] He was harshly criticized by his political enemies as inutile and had overstayed in power. In his defense, journalist Fernando Mar Rodriguez wrote:

> To go back to Rep. Moreno, his political opponents who claim that he has not done anything for the Province of Romblon do not need to go far. All they have to do is to look at the lives of the people themselves. Has Rep. Moreno done things to alleviate their plight from which they used to languish before? Has Rep. Moreno been instrumental in raising the per capita income of the average Romblomanons? Was Rep. Moreno directly instrumental in the establishment of basic projects now being utilized by our people? And finally, was Rep. Moreno an outstanding solon in point of legislative work? If the answer to these questions is yes, then he deserves your continued support and mandate. (Rodriguez 1969, 31)

This time, Joe's reelection campaign was hanging by a thread, since the rival candidate from LP was considered a more formidable opponent than Mayor. In close reading, Esteban S. Madrona (1927–2004) had several factors to outmaneuver the incumbent. First, he was a former war hero like Joe who gallantly participated in the liberation of Romblon. Second, he was a career civil engineer who previously worked closely with Pensoy under the DPWC. Third, he was a townmate of Joe who also belonged to a prominent family in San Agustin. Fourth, he was a nephew of Manuel L. Solidum, a former mayor of Alcantara and a two-time governor of Romblon (elected for the third time in 1971). In fact, he and Joe's wife were first cousins. Fifth, he was able to utilize his kinship ties (through his wife) in Asi-speaking towns such as Banton and Odiongan. At the time, younger people from those towns were becoming increasingly outspoken against the continuing dominance of the Moreno dynasty in Romblon (Famatigan 2003, 100–01).[32]

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31. Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016.
32. Esteban Madrona's term with the declaration of martial law in 1972. He tried to revive his political career in 1984 but failed. His son, Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, was elected in 1992 and has won seven elections since then (congressman from 1992 to 2001, 2007 to 2016, and governor from 2001 to 2004). Last May 2019, he again succeeded his younger brother, Emmanuel F. Madrona, as congressman. Mario G. Fradejas, Jr., seventy-nine years old, interview by author, Odiongan, Romblon, January 30, 2010.

The situation became more intense when the rivalry between the two Moreno siblings became public. Earlier that year, Pensoy had already been vocal about returning to his previous position as congressman while his own son, Miguel Ll. Moreno, was the incumbent vice governor of Romblon. To Pensoy's great disappointment, Tan Angki sided with Joe in his reelection bid and pleaded with Pensoy to wait another term. Allegedly urged by his wife and children, Pensoy insisted on running again by invoking seniority in the family (as *manong* or oldest among the brothers). Feeling disobeyed, the father used emotional intervention until Pensoy was forced to withdraw his candidacy a day before the elections. Due to confusion and the public display of disunity, many ballots were declared invalid while a substantial number of voters opted to elect Madrona as the new leader. Furthermore, gossip quickly spread among the constituents that Pensoy himself secretly campaigned against his own brother by siding with Madrona.[33]

Why did Pensoy attempt to run against his own brother? It must be noted that Pensoy had greater dreams to be a senator but twice failed to be shortlisted by the NP. In 1961, he was unable to get a spot when the party leaders pointed out that he came from a peripheral province with a small voting population. In 1965, a former house colleague tried to help him secure a slot from President Marcos in exchange for bribe money, a move that he blatantly turned down out of pride.[34] Having no other way to recapture power, Pensoy sought for his former political position, held at the time by his successor, his younger brother Joe.

Pensoy's action to defy their father and go against his own brother could be explained by how politicians behaved at the time. Based from K. G. Machado's (1974) study, a new political class emerged after the grant of Philippine Independence in 1946 and was characterized to have entered politics through more specialized channels later in their lives. Also, its members were more likely to make political choices that

33. According to Peter Montojo, he was about to deliver a nomination speech for Joe's reelection in the 1969 NP Romblon convention when Pensoy unexpectedly stood up in the midst of local leaders and uttered these words: "A merchandise of inferior quality has to be overadvertised to make it saleable." Jaime M. Nepomuceno, sixty-four years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 27, 2009; Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016; and Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016.

34. Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016.

would eventually lead to the breakdown of traditional local factions and their replacement by more specialized political and electoral organizations. If necessary, they could violate the rules of traditional factional politics and could make independent political decisions, a postwar leadership trend that could have led to a more viable party system in the Philippines if martial law was not declared in 1972 (119–23). By following Machado's observations, it seemed that Pensoy was able to transform into a professional politician, to the disappointment of his clan, while Joe remained within the entanglements of politica de familia.

Indeed, the sibling rivalry was so devastating to the Moreno dynasty that it shattered not only their formerly united political base but also jeopardized their family businesses. On the political side, the family never regained the same positions it held for two decades. Joe was so ashamed of his defeat that he did not run again.[35] He also lost the electoral protest about the invalid votes, which he filed and was largely funded by a US-based daughter. On the economic side, TABTRANCO was not able to regain its former popularity and dynamism. In fact, it was already showing signs of bankruptcy before 1969, as the jeepney (popularized by Leonardo Sarao in 1953) had already been introduced as a cheaper mode of transportation. Apparent mismanagement among family members further led to the external flow of funds. As a result, the political downfall of the Morenos in 1969 eventually led to the closure of TABTRANCO in 1976.[36]

The 1969 elections did not only end the Moreno era in local politics but also marked the decline of the political rule of the Romblomanon-speaking leaders and the rise of Unhan-speaking leaders such as Governor Solidum and Assemblyman Nemesio V. Ganan Jr. Furthermore, the succeeding local elections showed the change of dominance from NP to LP. In 1967, most occupants of provincial positions, including eleven out of fourteen municipal mayors, were affiliated with the Morenos' party (Commission on Elections 1969,

35. In 1984, Felices Moreno, the youngest brother among the siblings, ran but narrowly lost the gubernatorial post to Governor Solidum. His camp was prematurely celebrating his perceived victory on the night of the elections but, the next day, the ballots were stolen and the provincial capitol building was burned, allegedly by his opponent's camp.

36. Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016; and Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016.

249, 456–58), but in 1971, only five out of fifteen municipal mayors were part of NP while the rest of the posts all belonged to LP, then the opposition party to President Marcos (Commission on Elections 1973, 391, 628–30).

The 1971 elections for Constitutional Convention delegates could effectively testify to the weakening state of the Moreno dynasty when Pensoy launched his political comeback but only ranked third in a field of many candidates. It was concrete proof of his declining popularity among the electorate more than two decades after he was first elected. The two winners were Manuel F. Martinez and Ernesto G. Ang, both members of the younger generation who represented exact opposites of the ruling political family and offered fresh hopes and idealism for the people of Romblon. Pensoy filed an electoral protest against Ang for his citizenship, but the court ultimately favored the neophyte.[37]

The declaration of martial law in 1972 further frustrated the recovery plans of the Morenos. The era of the Marcos dictatorship was a dark period for the siblings. On the one hand, most of Pensoy's ideas in public works, such as hydroelectric power plants, were largely exploited by the Marcos regime without appointing him to any government position. This could have been a result of Pensoy's strained relationship with Marcos when they were still colleagues in Congress in 1949.[38] On the other hand, Dr. Pacifico E. Marcos, the dictator's younger brother, falsely took sole credit for sponsoring the Medicare Act. This move deeply hurt Joe, who, as a former congressman, did much from its initial development to full enactment. It must be noted that Joe spent some time in Mexico in order to study the whole idea of the said legislation.[39]

37. Ernesto G. Ang, sixty-nine years old, interview by author, Odiongan, Romblon, May 29, 2009.

38. Family members repeatedly narrate that Pensoy used to bully the young Marcos while they were colleagues in the Lower House. Though they were both prewar UP graduates, the former was almost ten years older than the latter. Since Pensoy was an engineer-turned-congressman and not a lawyer like Marcos, it became his lifetime goal to finish his law studies. In fact, he was still taking up law subjects when he served as dean of the University of the East's College of Engineering in the 1970s.

39. Monica M. Hilario, seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, May 11, 2016; and Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016.

Figure 7. Rep. Jose Daniel "Joe" Moreno with wife Luz and their seven children. Photo courtesy of Chua family.

Pensoy Moreno married Rosario Soliven Llorca in 1936. Their union produced eleven children: Miguel, Juanito, Florencio Jr., Gil, Arturo, Rosalor (West), Eduardo, Fidela, Rosario (Battung), Victor, and Roberto Glen. After Pensoy's death, some of his children successfully engaged in municipal and provincial politics. However, none among them surpassed the political record of their late father.[40]

Joe Moreno married Luz Madrona Dalida of Alcantara in 1940. Their marriage produced seven children: Ellen, Roland, Jose Daniel Jr., Louella, Edmond, Erlinda (Chua), and Maria Christine (Madamba) (figure 7). One son attempted to enter politics like his father but lost (Chua 2016).[41]

After the death of Tan Angki in 1975, the relationship between the Moreno brothers worsened. Though they were socially civil to each other, they did not fully reconcile; instead, they traversed separate paths until their retirement. Pensoy spent his remaining years teaching engineering courses in various universities in Manila and Baguio. He died on June 19, 1982, at the age of seventy-four and was buried in the family mausoleum in Manila North Cemetery. Joe, meanwhile, went back to America, where he spent his retirement years together with his wife and children. He died on February 16, 2000, at the age of eighty-four and was buried in a privately owned cemetery in San Agustin, Romblon.[42]

In Montesa's view, the Moreno brothers deserve recognition and remembrance from their constituents as men of hard work and integrity:

> From these points of view and my personal perception, I consider then Congressmen Florencio Moreno and Jose D. Moreno (brothers) as great politicians and good public servants. With meager resources (government funds) during their incumbencies, they accomplished much in this province. The accomplishments of both are too many to mention. Both were honest and dedicated in the performance of their positions. They did not enrich themselves while in office. Both were not involved in any anomaly, or graft and corruption. They died poor, unhonored, and unsung.[43]

40. Gil Ll. Moreno, sixty-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, October 23, 2008.

41. Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, May 27, 2016.

42. Gil Ll. Moreno, sixty-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, October 23, 2008; and Erlinda M. Chua, sixty-one years old, interview by author, in Don Antonio Heights, Quezon City, on May 27, 2016.

43. Abundio M. Montesa Jr. seventy-seven years old, interview by author, San Agustin, Romblon, October 22, 2008.

Conclusion

The rise of the Moreno siblings to power was largely shaped by their adherence to three Western values: Catholicism, professionalism, and nationalism. Equipped with vast experience from their individual careers, they were highly regarded by Romblomanons as two capable leaders who could properly represent their lone district at the national level. However, the key to the family's survival in local politics required politica de familia. Thus, the siblings reluctantly gave in to the demands and pressures from the family patriarch. Due to internal (clash between the father and Pensoy for family leadership) and external factors (change in national leadership), the Morenos succumbed to an inevitable rivalry between Pensoy and Joe. As a result, the family suffered political defeat in the 1969 elections, which eventually led to the decline of their economic interests.

As already stated, the Moreno brothers both belonged to the promising breed of Philippine postwar professional politicians who supported each other while holding individual political offices and sustaining their family's businesses. Though they had the potential to further contribute to national leadership, limited features of their home province not only thwarted their plans for political expansion but turned them into political enemies. Ultimately, the downfall of Pensoy and Joe from politics led to the family's economic decline, as the imposition of authoritarian rule prevented them to recover.

As siblings, Pensoy and Joe had many things in common. Aside from being relatives by blood, they were both UP-educated and members of a Filipino generation trained under an American system of education. Also, they both performed patriotic service during wartime according to their respective professions. Moreover, they were in their prime years when they ran for public office. Both were forty-two years old when they served their first terms as congressmen. Furthermore, both of them brought pride of place and social services, beneficial for the well-being of the Romblomanons in general.

This study of a Romblon-based political dynasty attempts to contribute to the growing discourse on the Philippine provincial elite, with special focus on the postwar period from 1946 to 1972. Aside from Machado's 1972 study, there are other classic studies that discussed this era. Enriched with political theories, Hollnsteiner (1963) and Free (1960) both offer further insight on the electoral processes at the time. Still, the case of the Moreno brothers gives additional perspectives, as both were professional politicians who

engaged in a feud within the family, a new and interesting angle for political scientists to explore.

However, there is much to be done to cover other archipelagic provinces with limited populations and are geographically isolated from the center, such as Batanes, Biliran, Camiguin, Catanduanes, Dinagat Island, Guimaras, Marinduque, Masbate, Palawan, Siquijor, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi.❁

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REVIEWS

Abinales, Patricio N., and Donna J. Amoroso. 2017. *State and Society in the Philippines,* 2nd ed. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. xlix, 413 pp.

As I was doing research for an article on President Rodrigo Duterte's ties to the Marcoses, I came across a 2017 online article by Patricio Abinales, "Digong is Boss, Not the Bayan's Champion," published by *Rappler* (Abinales 2017). By then I had gathered numerous details about Duterte's political heritage from various other sources, many of which were freely available online even before Duterte was elected president. Thus, I was struck by the number of errors in this brief commentary by a well-known Mindanawon scholar. The article states that Duterte became Davao City's officer-in-charge, and served in that position from May 2, 1986 to November 27, 1987. Duterte was actually officer-in-charge *vice-mayor* from 1986 up to 1988 when he won his first term as mayor of Davao City. The error is stated twice; it also appears in a table embedded in the article titled "The Dutertes Rule Davao." The article also contains statements such as:

- "The Dutertes were migrants from Danao, Cebu, where Digong's father had his first taste of politics when President Manuel Roxas appointed him mayor of the city" (Vicente was appointed mayor of Danao by Sergio Osmeña, still immediate postwar president by virtue of succeeding Manuel Quezon);
- "[Ramon] Durano—a former WWII guerilla-like Marcos—had claimed the town as the clan's base of power, and Vicente had no choice but to look elsewhere to further his

political ambitions" (After winning the presidency in the 1947 election, Roxas, a member of the Liberal Party, replaced Vicente, a Nacionalista stalwart, with Pedro Sepulveda as Danao's mayor);

- "[Alejandro] Almendras's close patronage ties with [President Elpidio] Quirino led to the appointment of Vicente as provincial secretary, and then, in 1958, when Almendras was elected to the Senate, Vicente took over as governor" (Vicente did not replace Almendras because Almendras was elected senator; Almendras needed a replacement because he was appointed as President Carlos P. Garcia's Secretary of General Services);
- "Vicente would hold that position until President Ferdinand Marcos appointed him Secretary of General Services in 1964 (again replacing Almendras who was elected to the Senate)" (Vicente did not replace Almendras as Secretary of General Services, since Almendras only held that position until 1959);
- "Vicente remained loyal to Marcos, but his wife, Soledad, turned oppositionist (and one of the first Davao Dilawan!) after Ninoy Aquino's assassination in 1983" (this statement suggests that Vicente lived to see Marcos become a dictator when, as was quite well-known even in 2017, Vicente died in 1968).

I was certain that the Abinales who authored the pioneering dissertation-turned-book, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation State*, would not be as sloppy. Indeed, in the sections of that book focusing on "Landring" Almendras, Abinales, drawing from archival sources such as letters and articles from Mindanawon newspapers from the 1950s up to the 1970s, knew precise details about the political careers of Almendras and his political subordinate, Vicente Duterte (see Abinales 2000, 145–52, 171–76).

Seeing this odd discrepancy, I decided to examine the second edition of Abinales and Donna Amoroso's *State and Society in the Philippines*—which updates the book from the conclusion of the Arroyo administration all the way to the first few months of the Duterte regime—to check if any of the abovementioned errors also found their way into that book. At least one did; on page 338, the *Rappler* table

stating that Duterte became Davao City's officer-in-charge after the EDSA Revolution also makes an appearance.

I do not mean to imply that the first edition of *State and Society*, published in 2005, was immaculate; even that edition was hardly error-free. A review of the book's first Philippine edition in this journal is at times laudatory in tone, but the bulk of it highlights a number of the book's typographical and factual errors (Ariate 2006). The reviewer concludes that "[e]ven if in no certain way will the length of this list [of errors] affect the conclusions drawn by Amoroso and Abinales, it will be helpful for the readers of the book's future edition—which undoubtedly there will be—if these seeming weaknesses in details sustained by the book will be addressed" (Ariate 2006, 218).

Later printings of *State and Society*'s first edition did correct one egregious error pointed out by Ariate (2006, 214), likely not the authors'—"Philippines" was previously spelled "Phillippines" on the book's spine—but all other errors were apparently noted, perhaps with thanks, but little else. Raul Roco is still "Paul Roco," and readers are still told to pronounce Luzon as "loo-ZONE." In the second edition, other errors not highlighted by Ariate also still stand, e.g.,

- On page 244, Fidel Ramos is described as winning "by only a slim majority," when it was actually by a small (and highly contested) plurality. This error stands out particularly when one reaches page 304, when Abinales (in one of the new chapters, written after his wife and co-author passed away) shows that he of course knows the difference between a majority and a plurality;
- On page 260, readers are instructed to say "pare" aloud as "PA-ray"; it seems that fidelity to local pronunciation (by any ethnolinguistic group) was not a particular concern of the authors (or were they trying to normalize a particular, perhaps, translocal way of pronouncing Filipino words?);
- On page 265, the authors mix up Jose Singson and Luis "Chavit" Singson; the latter was the Ilocos Sur governor and "longtime Estrada crony" who turned against his presidential friend in 2000, not, as stated in the book, the former, who may either be Chavit's father or his brother, Jose Jr.;

- Saying that Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, while campaigning in 2004, spoke "the local language in her native Visayas" (page 273) is a bit of a stretch, since, although she does speak Visayan/Cebuano, and she reportedly spent some of her formative years in the house of her maternal grandmother in Iligan—which is in Mindanao, not the Visayas—both her mother and father were born in Luzon.

Besides errors, the book has, across editions, notable instances of excluded information that would have helped in better understanding the relationship of political factions and the electorate in the Philippines. For instance, there is absolutely no mention of the 1987 Mendiola Massacre and its ramifications, especially as regards Corazon "Cory" Aquino's relationship with the Philippine Left and the possible solidification of groupings that made known their opposition to Aquino by voting against the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Joseph Estrada is profiled as being an action star prior to his election to the Senate in 1987, leaving out the fact that that was not his political entrypoint, as he had previously served as mayor of what was then the Municipality of San Juan a few years shy of twenty. On page 262 of *State and Society*'s second edition, a table of celebrity candidates during the 1998 and 2000 elections, derived from articles by journalists Luz Rimban and David Celdran, lists Estrada as a candidate for president whose previous occupation was "action star"—as if he had not risen through the political ranks since 1969. In the same table, Alfredo Lim is reduced to "TV host," when, by 1998, he was best known for being the "Dirty Harry" two-termer mayor of Manila and, before that, the no-nonsense chief of the National Bureau of Investigation under Cory Aquino. These reductions become particularly eye-catching when one reaches page 268, where Arroyo is described as having attained "veteran politician" status before her ascent to the presidency, even though her career as an elected official started much later than Estrada's and in the same year as Lim's. (Also, if a point was being made about the confluence of politics and showbusiness, then why is there no mention of the well-documented use of Arroyo's passing resemblance to immensely popular actress Nora Aunor in her campaigns?)

All these aside, I have repeatedly consulted the first edition of *State and Society* whenever I had to write about the Philippines; the book was prescribed to me and my fellow students in a college sociology course at the University of the Philippines Diliman twelve or so years ago. It

serves as an excellent introduction to the politico-socioeconomic history of the Philippines up to about 2004, or of the interplay between what the state orders and what social forces demand (and, at times, the reverse) in our archipelagic country. Most readily accessible reviews of the first edition, including that of Ariate, agree. Morada (2005, 535) noted that the book presented "outstanding scholarship and admirable depth and breadth of discussion and analyses about state formation and the dynamics of state-society relations in the Philippines." Ševiæ (2007, 512–13) noted that the book "is a very good read for both novice researchers in the area and those who need a well-written reference-type book that provides information in an authoritative manner," and decreed that the book is "suitable for classroom use." Reyes, though somewhat disparagingly stating that the "readily apparent" target audience of the book is solely "the undergraduate American readership" (2007, 198), hailed the book as a "refreshingly useful volume" for the aforementioned target audience and the "generalist/comparativist" (2007, 199).

Quality-wise, does the second edition of *State and Society* skew more toward the praiseworthy first and the excellent *Making Mindanao*, or his sloppily produced *Rappler* article? Lisandro Claudio, in his superlative-laced foreword to the second edition, states that "*State and Society in the Philippines* (now revised [how?] and updated) should be *the* history textbook of the current generation of Filipino students" (xviii; Claudio's italics). It should be noted, however, that the new chapters of the book ("The Rise and Fall of the 'Strong Republic,'" "Cacique Democracy Personalized," and "Neo-Authoritarianism?") written solely by Abinales, seem to be at least as error-and-exclusion-riddled as the preexisting ones.

- On page 291, Republic Act 7941, or the Party-List System Act, is described as exclusively alloting seats in Congress to "parties representing the poor and the marginalized," when a plain reading of the law shows that it does not; this fact was reinforced by *Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. the Commission on Elections*, decided by the Supreme Court on April 2, 2013.
- On page 292, Abinales implies that the Family Code is a product of debates in Congress, when, as the numerical designation of the law—Executive Order 209—suggests, it

was the result of the dictatorial power wielded by Cory Aquino before the convening of elected members of Congress following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution (also, the reference he cites, an article he wrote [Abinales 2009], does not say anything about the Family Code on the stated page, nor in the preceding or subsequent pages, nor anywhere else in that article).

- Indeed, Abinales seems reluctant to discuss the extent of Cory Aquino's immediate post-revolution powers. On pages 311–12, he notes that the first President Aquino was able to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) "to recover billions plundered by the Marcos family," but the second President Aquino's similar Truth Commission was struck down as unconstitutional. Abinales chose not to elaborate; Cory Aquino, as a one-person legislature of a revolutionary government, could create a prosecutorial body such as the PCGG, while her son, whose powers were limited by the 1987 Constitution, could not.

- To say that the "[Communist Party of the Philippines'] legal organizations . . . . did badly in the [2010] elections" just because their senatorial candidates lost, as Abinales does on page 294, is to downplay the fact that the so-called Makabayan Bloc in the House of Representatives still won seven seats through five parties, and as a whole received over three million votes. It would have been fairer to say that they did as well, perhaps even slightly better, than in previous elections.

- On page 301, Abinales seemingly accepts the pro-Duterte propaganda of Davao City being "one of the safest cities in the country."

- Page 314 contains the following curious dyad: "Despite Aquino's reformist campaigns, the darker features of the political process prevailed. The Senate remained under the control of the opposition after Ferdinand Marcos Jr.; the dictator's former defense secretary, Juan Ponce Enrile; and coup plotter Gregorio Honasan were reelected in the

2009 midterm elections." Working backward: 2009 was not an election year, 2007 and 2010 were; Honasan won his third non-consecutive term as senator in 2007, while Enrile was reelected in 2010, which was also the year that Marcos was elected to his first, and thus far only senate term; and by 2013, after the midterm election, the Senate was dominated by Aquino's allies (though by 2016, many of them eventually did oppose Aquino and his anointed candidate, Mar Roxas).

- Any discussion of Benigno Aquino III's rise to power that does not reference the August 2009 death of Corazon Aquino and the nationwide lamentation that followed (even the Marcoses went to her wake) will either tend to oversell Aquino's (at the time, virtually non-existent) political clout independent of his parentage or make it seem that he won his big plurality in 2010 largely because he had a (back then, virtually non-existent) reformist reputation; Abinales leans more toward the latter.

- A statement on page 342, "Criticism of Duterte's harsh methods is now universal, with even international pop singers becoming visibly upset by the rise in the numbers of dead people," did not age well, nor was it accurate when the book came out; the inconclusive conclusion, "Ominous Future," ends with the results of a December 2016 Social Weather Stations survey, showing but without commenting on the seeming contradiction that the overwhelming majority of Filipinos (or at least those surveyed) claim that they are satisfied with the Duterte administration's anti-drug campaign and believe that it is effective, but worry that "'they, or anyone they know, will be a victim of extra-judicial killing'" (344).

Perhaps some of these errors and omissions can be chalked up to the difficulty of writing contemporary history, or of writing about groups and individuals who at times have a wanton disregard for objective (as opposed to "alternative") facts. But the uneven and error-filled additions to the second edition highlight the fact that in writing the book, it was not only depth of discussion of certain issues that the authors "[traded off] in [their] decision to attempt a sustained analysis

of state formation over the course of a millennium" (xxiii). In trying to craft an accessible history book that nevertheless revels in Philippine complexity, the authors at times seem to blur the (admittedly tenuous) line between political punditry/polemics and well-researched scholarship.

Thus, on page 221, we find the following: "It was Marcos himself who radically changed the political landscape on August 21, 1983. On that day, ex-senator Benigno Aquino Jr., who had been in the United States since 1980, returned to the Philippines. As he deplaned, he was surrounded by a military escort and shot dead." The obvious insinuation here is that it was "Marcos himself" who ordered the assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr., lack of irrefutable evidence notwithstanding. Moving to the new chapters, Abinales states that Duterte's family "was one of three that ruled Davao for most of the second half of the twentieth century, adjusting seamlessly to the change in politics during the Marcos dictatorship and when constitutional democracy was restored in 1986, shifting political fidelities with very little effort and ingratiating itself to the new regime" (338). Besides the inaccuracy—*constitutional* democracy was not restored in 1986, again because Cory Aquino had sole lawmaking and appointive powers for more than a year after the EDSA Revolution—this sentence suggests that the Dutertes only turned their backs on the Marcoses after the dictator was deposed, when, as Abinales notes in his 2017 *Rappler* article, Soledad Duterte ended up a leader of the anti-Marcos forces in Davao City years before the EDSA Revolution.

Going back to that *Rappler* piece: despite the deeply flawed historical pathway that he took in that article, there remains therein some factual statements and conclusions regarding Duterte that make sense, given other data; the same can be said for even the most contentious sections of *State and Society*. I am reminded of a defense for Michel Foucault's "archealogies/genealogies," i.e., that they "do not aim at a full and balanced reconstruction of past phenomena in their own [terms, instead] focus selectively on just those aspects of the past that are important for understanding our present intolerable circumstances" (Gutting 2005, 15). Such a defense, however, can be vulgarized then weaponized as a justification for historical denialism in favor precisely of those who are the cause of the majority's "present intolerable circumstances." Moreover, if some pro-Duterte/Marcos pseudo-intellectuals highlight Abinales and Amoroso's errors and slippages, or note that while the book certainly does not portray either

President Aquino as a saint, it does downplay a lot of the facts that have been deployed by their opponents to politically delegitimize them, then it becomes easy to (dishonestly) reduce the latest edition of *State and Society* as biased toward the pro-Aquino "yellows." Worse, a more objective reviewer might say, "how can we trust the theses about Philippine state-society relations in this book when the authors seem to misunderstand or misinterpret a lot about the leaders of the state?"

To sum up this review, I will continue to recommend and consult from time to time the first edition of *State and Society*; I pray that someday we will consider the second edition as a somewhat misguided interlude between the first and the third. Not addressing the combined issues of the first and second editions is a disservice to the book's wide and still-increasing influence (well over 460 citations, according to Google Scholar, as of this writing). If the devil is in the details, then there is a little bit of the infernal in this book, which otherwise adequately sums up the Philippines' purgatorial "weak state."—**Miguel Paolo P. Reyes**, *University Research Associate, Third World Studie Center, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman.*

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Ileto, Reynaldo Clemeña. 2017. *Knowledge and Pacification: On the U.S. Conquest and the Writing of Philippine History.* Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. xii, 362 pp.

Immediate reviews in the press of Ileto's book were mixed. One reviewer hailed the book as "one of the best books ever written about the Philippines" (Cruz 2017). Another cursory review highlighted one thing: how President Rodrigo Duterte inspired historian Rey Ileto to bring the book to fruition. "In fact, Ileto says this book, in the works for more than 10 years, is finally out in large part after Rodrigo Duterte brought up the Philippine-American War—even displayed pictures of American atrocities—to brush aside questions about his war on drugs" (Alcuaz 2017). For the historian Ambeth Ocampo, "a glaring omission emerges from the collection: There is no essay on how he developed from criticism, how he was actually honored by his detractors. Friendly praise is never the same or as formative as unfair criticism from an enemy" (Ocampo 2017).

These mentions in the press are quite instructive if one were to read Ileto's book. The one extolling the book's excellence easily induces skepticism. The one that mentions Ileto's affinity for Duterte alerts us to the possible controversial, if not disagreeable, politics that the author subscribes to. And that last one on how Ileto handles criticisms is an insinuation that Ileto would rather not have them, though one would hope that intramurals in the academe are more than issues of ego and turf.

The book's twelve chapters are grouped into three sections: the Filipino-American war; memory, history, and politics; and knowledge and pacification. Ileto presents how the Americans, and the Filipinos complicit in their conquest and rule, controlled the writing of the history of the Philippine-American War, even as that war of colonial conquest was still being fought over. The independent Philippine republic must be denied out of existence. The resistance forces must be denigrated as cutthroats and bandits, local despots that swindled and herded and flogged to the point of death the poor, ignorant masses into waging a losing war. The colonial rule must be rewritten as the onward march of the modernizing, civilizing, great American empire. Ileto even summoned personal details of his biography and that of his father, former defense secretary, Gen. Rafael Ileto, hoping that "[t]hrough this account of father and son," he will be able "to draw out the

interplay of personal experience and regimes of knowledge that constitutes one's belonging and response to empire" (132). His history of how these "regimes of knowledge" came to be and the consequences of these distortions, propaganda, and systematized forgetting to nationalism and nationhood is Ileto's important contribution both to Philippine history and historiography.

As much as Ileto draws our attention to the silences and deliberate misapplication (or invention as in the case of cacique democracy) of concepts in the writing of history that justifies American colonial conquest and rule, Ileto can also be queried and faulted as to what his arguments dismiss, mute, or are totally silent on. But before dealing with these more substantive issues, it is also instructive to point out some minor ones that readers may encounter (nitpicking, no doubt, this is). These are passages in the book that seem to lack clarity or uncalled for asides. Take for example these sentences:

- "Relatives, neighbors, and children visited the sick or the dead without constraints. Some came to pay their respects, to join in the feast called *katapusan*; others just wanted to see what the dying and the dead looked like—and cholera victims were a horrible sight" (121). The way the sentences are strung together lends to a reading in which katapusan is made to appear as a feast with the dead still present. This was never the case. Katapusan, in both Southern Luzon and Bicol, is the last day of the pasiyam, the novena for the dead that starts after burial.

- Of the May 21, 1967 massacre in Pasay of Lapiang Malaya members led by Valentin de los Santos, Ileto wrote: "The demonstration never had a chance of success and Ka Valentin's followers were gunned down by the hundreds" (200). Gunned down means shot at. How many died? How many were injured? In current journalistic use, almost always, gunned down is taken as being shot dead. According to contemporary news accounts, thirty-three died among the Lapiang Malaya, forty-five were injured; one policeman was hacked to death (Associated Press 1967). When he wrote about this event in the opening paragraph of his book Pasyon and Revolution, at least he managed to come up with a near-precise number: "scores

of their comrades lay dead on the street" (Ileto [1979] 1997, 1). He made no mention of the policeman's death.

- "As we can see, the Congressional Records in 1956 were fully bilingual. If a member of the Senate or House spoke in Spanish, no translation was provided, for knowledge of Spanish was assumed among the politicians. And in this particular debate over Rizal's novels, a number of the privileged speeches were totally in Spanish, and all the Senators in attendance (including the Muslim senator Domocao Alonto) were expected to follow such presentations, even though they might ask questions in English" (227). Why did Ileto have to single out Senator Alonto with the qualifier "Muslim" and write it in such a way as to give the impression that he may not be as comprehending of Spanish as his other colleagues? Senator Alonto studied law at the University of the Philippines. At that time, students in law colleges studied decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court in Spanish and English. Alonto passed the bar in 1938 (Tribune 1938). The topnotcher of that bar exam, and a classmate of Alonto and a fellow Mindanaoan, was Emmanuel Pelaez. Alonto and Pelaez were senators in the Third Congress (1954-57). Ileto made no qualification of Pelaez's proficiency in Spanish and English. Why did he have to make one for Alonto?

- Ileto confused Partha Chaterjee with Prasenjit (he also misspelled his name in his bibliography as "Pasenjit") Duara. In the bibliography, the book *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* was attributed to both. It was Chaterjee's work.

Quibbling about details and interpretation will not suffice for the two key issues in Ileto's book that invite examination. The first one is on the supposed consequence of the Japanese conquest in occasioning a break from the controlling American discourse on the history of the Philippine revolution, in particular on how it marginalized and almost erased Andres Bonifacio from history. The second one is on Ileto's contentious accounting of the supposed ahistoric and colonial logic behind caciquism, cacique democracy and bossism, and his quest for the rural ilustrados that Duterte is now supposed to personify.

On the first issue, this he wrote:

> The collaboration issue has always been a vexing one in Philippine historiography. I would argue, however, that collaboration with Japan did not mean submission to a new "Mother Japan." The Japanese occupation had a positive effect, enabling those individuals who straddled empires such as Laurel, Recto, and Filipino-American war veterans Artemio Ricarte, Emilio Aguinaldo, and Servillano Aquino to make a conceptual break with Mother America and to reconnect the Philippines of 1943 with the time of Rizal—that is, with the time of the break from Mother Spain, or the Revolution of 1896. The experience of a third Empire, Japan, enabled these leaders to resurrect the Philippines of Rizal's time as the source of inspiration for the Republic of 1943 and, hopefully, for the independent republic of 1946 onwards. (212)

Ileto speaks of a "cultural renaissance under Japan," a key element of which "was the resurrection of the Filipino-American war as a key event in the national narrative" (233). He claimed to have ". . . shown how Japan, a third though short-lived empire, functioned to enable a creative tension to be established between the two major empires that figure in the Filipino historical narrative" (241). In effect, Ileto is drawing up a debt of gratitude for the Japanese imperial army that the Filipinos must repay with due recognition.

Yet how lasting is this "creative tension," this "positive effect"? Is it of consequence? Ileto argues for the affirmative. "Historical discourse was an autonomous domain that enabled Filipinos to pursue their own agenda of nation-building within the constraints of foreign occupation. Filipino historians and writers were, in fact, encouraged by their new rulers to explore the pre-Hispanic and late 19th-century nationalist roots of their identity" (172). Were it not for the Japanese imperial army, historians and scholars would not have been goaded to research the period that led to the 1896 revolution. Were it not for the Japanese imperial army, Jose P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto would not have sharpened and refined their arguments for a history that exposes the cunning and control of America, for a history that brings Bonifacio back in and valorizes the discourse of an "unfinished revolution." A discourse that both the Philippine Left and the dictator Ferdinand Marcos latched on given its potency in mobilizing people and fostering the idea of a nation.

One can reexamine Ileto's view on three grounds. First, the world of 1896 and the revolution, of Bonifacio and the Katipunan, their

history and memory were sustained, publicly memorialized, and written about all throughout the American colonial regime. It was marginalized but not in need of resurrection as Ileto implied. Second, summoning the ghosts of 1896 was not just the preserve of the Japanese imperial army during the Second World War. The American propaganda effort did as much as it could to resurrect Bonifacio for the war effort. And lastly, scholars and studies on the supposed cultural impact of the Japanese conquest on Filipino society disagree and do not sustain Ileto's argument. Ileto made no mention of them.

Actually, Ileto (2017) seems to disagree with Ileto (1998):

> "Unfinished revolution" was not a new discourse. It had flourished in the rhetoric of the labor movement from the first decade of this century, finding its way into various peasant movements in central Luzon in the 1920s and 1930s. The idea of "unfinished revolution" carries with it an interpretation of the revolution as a mass movement initiated by Andres Bonifacio. A history that gives primacy to Bonifacio invariably includes themes that go beyond mere freedom from Spanish rule; it points to the confiscation of church lands, the punishments and even execution of errant friar curates, and it carries a critique of the ilustrado betrayal of the cause.
>
> Politicians from the beginning of this century were aware of the potency of the Bonifacio/Katipunan sign. It was something to be exploited in political rallies. However, the meanings generated by the sign had to be kept under control . . . . The colonial state's sponsorship of a Bonifacio monument, and speeches like Quezon's in 1929, should thus be seen as attempts to coopt, to control, a potentially subversive historical consciousness, one that had always been there since Bonifacio's death in 1897, but which now threatened to break its boundaries. (Ileto 1998, 182-84)

What Ileto did not pursue in his 1998 book nor in the present one, was to answer and give details of what were inside the labor movement that connected it to the peasant movements during the American colonial rule for it to have preserved and empowered the discourse on Bonifacio and the 1896 revolution. The partial, though more important answer, of course, would be the socialist and communist movements (see Guillermo 2009). At the outbreak of the Second World War, these bearers of Bonifacio's legacy, the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Anti-Japanese People's Army), waged an effective guerilla war.

In the chapter "The Return of Bonifacio" in the current book, Ileto left out the three decades of articulations on Bonifacio and the 1896 revolution prior to the Japanese invasion. With the contribution of the socialist and communist movements muted, he can now sell his abovementioned argument. That is why when he started discussing the volatile agrarian situation in the immediate postwar period, the journalists, unionists, intellectuals, and revolutionaries that he started citing, seem to have come out of nowhere.

This is not to deny the effort by the American colonial educational system to marginalize the narratives of the 1896 revolution, but the efforts of scholars, historians, and journalists, not to mention participants to the revolution themselves, to write about Bonifacio and his generation and the revolt that they led have been going on since the 1900s, long before they were supposedly prodded or inspired into work by the Japanese imperial army. A look at the bibliography of Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* (1996) supports this point: Manuel Sastron published *La Insurreccion en Filipinas* in 1897, Emilio Aguinaldo wrote about the revolution in 1899, Isabelo de los Reyes wrote two monographs in 1899 and 1900, Manuel Artigas y Cuerva wrote on the same topic a decade later, Artemio Ricarte in 1927, Teodoro M. Kalaw have been publishing on Bonifacio and the Katipunan since the mid-1920s, Apolinario Mabini's *La Revolucion Filipina* written prior to his death in 1903 was published in 1931 by the Bureau of Printing, the father-son tandem of Epifanio de los Santos and Jose P. Santos were also writing on the same subject in the same period until the outbreak of the war. The play *Andres Bonifacio*, a Tagalog adaptation of Clifford Odet's *Waiting for Lefty*, was staged at the Manila Grand Opera House during the Commonwealth (Agoncillo [1965] 2001, 2: 557). Bonifacio's birthday, then known to be November 29, was a legal holiday "celebrated elaborately throughout the Philippines . . . Parades were held in Manila and in the provinces. Speeches extolling Bonifacio were delivered" (United Press Despatch 1933). Still, for Ileto, Agoncillo, and by extension, *The Revolt of the Masses*, "was probably influenced by the Japanese model of (and support for, during the occupation) an autonomous history of 'Oriental' civilization" (204).

Then there were the likes of Nick Joaquin, who in his writings (both in fiction and history), was protesting "against the effects of sajonismo, the 'Anglo-Saxonization' of the Filipino, a complaint raised by other Filipino intellectuals in the early twentieth century and one that gained ground during the Japanese occupation when

'Orientalization," the return to the Filipino's 'Malayan roots,' was the cultural mantra of the occupation government. It was not, however, a return to a mythicized 'ancient heritage' that Nick [Joaquin] preached but a recovery of the Spanish past that both the Americans and the Japanese had turned into a past to be excised . . . . [Joaquin] extolled a Western colonial past that in effect debunked the orientalismo that was the official policy under the Japanese occupation" (Mojares 2017, 4-5, 7).

The works of said revolutionaries, historians, and journalists as well as the discourse sustained in the socialist and communist movements are important contexts for the second point querying Ileto's favored view. The United States itself during the war resurrected Bonifacio and enlisted his iconic, revolutionary status in a propaganda fight against the Japanese. A step that the United States and her wartime propagandists could not have undertaken if Bonifacio's memory or that of the Revolution of 1896 needed reviving and was only revived by the Japanese imperial army during the war. In the war film *Back to Bataan*, John Wayne's character was featured with a character named Andres Bonifacio Jr. played by Anthony Quinn. The film was released in May 1945 before the United States forces reconquered the Philippines.

Here's Sharon Delmendo's insightful take on the topic:

> The ideological core of the film is its manipulation of the identity axis of nationalism. The film eases anxieties over the forthcoming moment of rupture between America and the Philippines by constituting Americans as ideal Filipinos. One of the film's culminating moments comes when Andres Bonifacio, the film's Filipino nationalist symbol, tells John Wayne, that quintessential American, "you're a better Filipino than I am." The film rewrites the history of the Philippines as the history of America in the Philippines—written by Americans who are better Filipinos than the Filipinos themselves . . . . the film's manipulation of Philippine revolutionary history to reinstate American political domination on the eve of official Philippine independence demonstrates . . . that U.S. and Philippine nationalisms overtly seek to create and maintain their respective political sovereignties through a covert dependence on the other. (Delmendo 2004, 87)

And while the Americans were capitalizing on Bonifacio's appeal, what was the Japanese imperial army doing? Censoring Bonifacio.

> In order to control Filipino thought, censorship became mandatory in all forms of media: newspapers and magazines, theaters, movie houses and radio. Licenses and permits were required for any publication, which was subject to prior censorship. To check the spread of information, typewriters and mimeographing machines were required to be registered, together with samples of their type styles. Mail was opened and checked. Numerous regulations governed publication of any kind of information: bookstores had to have their stocks censored before they could reopen; schools had to have their courses and syllabi approved. In order to check unbridled nationalism (which could and did work against the Japanese), the Philippine flag (which had flown under the American flag during the Commonwealth years) was banned entirely and replaced by the Japanese flag and the Philippine national anthem was likewise prohibited (it would be replaced by the "Awit sa Paglikha ng Bagong Pilipinas" in late 1942). By order of the Hodobu even Bonifacio was excised from school texts. (Jose 1992, 13)

Ileto, in his book, deplores the "[s]tudies that are geared toward proving a theory or demonstrating some novel characteristic [sic] of a social formation tend to fish out of complex documentary collections only what is needed to make their point" (300). Is he not guilty of the same?

This fact also leads us to the third and last point contending Ileto's attempt to indebt the writing of Filipino revolutionary history and its legacy to Japanese conquest. If the Japanese conquest provided the opportunity and the inspiration for the writing of a history that broke free of the controlling American discourse, save for Agoncillo's The Revolt of the Masses, what other works of history came out of this period? Ileto discusses in his book two: Laurel's *Forces that Make a Nation Great* (1944), a compilation of newspaper articles on Filipino heroes, and a book-length poem of Philippine history, *Sa Lupa ng mga Lakan* (1948) by Ignacio Facundo. For Ileto, Laurel's work "is arguably the best statement of the ideology of the 1943 Republic" (172). Facundo's work, on the other hand, "captures a minority discourse in which the Japanese occupation period is a repetition, with variation, of previous experiences of invasion and conquest," it "highlights independence under Japanese auspices in 1943 as a landmark event in an ongoing process of national liberation" (178).

Both works are propaganda masquerading as history that today time has forgotten. But for Ileto they are important articulations of a suppressed nationalist sentiment. Who the author was is of less

importance than the treasured text. Hence, Ileto can simply hedge who Facundo was: "The author . . . has no other publication in his name that I know of." Then Ileto went on to imagine what Facundo may have been like, one of the " 'rural ilustrados,' were it not for the fact that his world is Manila and not the provinces" (178). Then Facundo would simply be a Manileño ilustrado. Though Facundo, Ileto again surmised, is not "in any account or anthology of Tagalog literature" (178). Had Ileto read Faustino Aguilar's report on the Commonwealth Literary Award for 1940, then he would have known that Facundo submitted an entry in Tagalog poetry entitled "Ang Laguna't Bulakan." He lost to Amado V. Hernandez (Quezon et al. [1940] 1973, 66-72). Facundo may have been laudatory of the independence that the Japanese promised, but as the war progressed, he remembered the world of 1896 less for its heroics and more for its brutality:

> Sa "Fuerza Santiago" piniit ng mga Hapones ang mga Pilipinos pinaghinalaan nilang mga gerilya at makagerilya, at pinahirapan hanggang ang marami ay namatay, na paris din ng ginawa ng mga kastila. (Facundo 1948, 214n1)

The impact of the Japanese occupation "in terms of cultural penetration has been found to be quite transitory . . . . The Japanese thrust to re-orient Filipino culture to its pre-Western Oriental tradition, in line with the objectives of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, did not effectively transform the identity and lifeways of the Filipinos, which at the time of Japanese conquest had already been heavily influenced by almost 450 years of intense acculturative processes under the Spanish and afterwards, American domination" (Tiongson and Roxas 1992, 5). Resil Mojares noted that "[w]riters who had begun to switch to local languages under the Japanese promptly returned to English after the war" (2017, 7; a more detailed observation is in Agoncillo [1965] 2001, 2: 593-96). Hence Ikehata Setsuho's trenchant assessment of the war years and its consequences:

> The ultimate paradox of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines is how its initial intent, real or imagined, to liberate the country from U.S. colonialism was turned completely upside down, resulting in the actual strengthening of Philippine dependency on the United States. The Filipinos' hope in, and loyalty to, the United States was heightened during the Japanese occupation. For the Filipino people, it was only the U.S. reoccupation of their country that could free them from the cruelty and indignity they were suffering under the Japanese army. . . . the historical view which claims that the occupation of Southeast Asia by Japanese

> forces during the Pacific War ultimately furthered national independence in the region is untenable in the case of the Philippines. (Setsuho 1999, 20)

Ileto's insistence that the "alternative to the official narrative of Philippine history . . . was shaped and implanted during the formative years of 1943-1948" (224) amounts, charitably, to a suspect sentimentality that hides a logic justifying violence: were it not for our experience of brutal subjugation we would not have known to learn more about our past. The corollary to this sentiment is the more cynical and insidious ethos of legitimating brutal authority provided that authority enables one to pursue greater knowledge. What is also overlooked in Ileto's argument was the actual devastation that both the Japanese and the Americans have wrought in the country that led to incalculable loss of the remnants of the world of 1896, the sources and writings of the incipient, revolutionary nation that so fascinates Ileto.

The third section of Ileto's book is an expanded (more re-arranged than expanded) version of his 2001 article in the Philippine Political Science Journal (Ileto 2001) and his response to John Sidel, after the latter wrote a reaction to his article. Carl Lande (2002) and Arnold Molina Azurin (2002) also responded to Ileto's piece. Given that sixteen years have passed since Ileto's PPSJ article and the publication of the present work, one expects that Ileto by now has engaged the comments of Lande and Azurin. He chose not to. Hence the book merely repeated the key issue in the debate that Ileto started, that is, whether the scholarly work done on the Philippines by the likes of Carl Lande, Glenn May, Norman Owen, Alfred McCoy, Benedict Anderson and John Sidel, among others, is of the same Orientalist strain as Stanley Karnow's *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (1989). For Ileto,

> Karnow, in effect, constructs Filipinos in terms of a variant of America's classic image of their Pacific wards. Images of the Filipino elite (oppressive caciques, bosses, patrons) and masses (blindly loyal and manipulated táo, clients of the bosses) constructed by James Le Roy, Fred Atkinson, David Barrows, and many other American writers a century or so ago reappear in modern journalistic garb. But just as these older images are complicit with the colonial project to pacify and tutor the Filipinos, Karnow's portrayal of a starkly different Filipino tradition has its political implications . . . . The American national imaginary is established and continually reinforced in writings about its cultural "others," and the

> Filipinos have occupied this position since the so-called imperial "blunder" of 1899. (270)

Two sub-issues inhere in this debate. The first one is the supposed essentializing tendency of the works of the mentioned scholars, that they have reduced Philippine culture and society into set characteristics from which the Americans can measure their progress and justify their tutelage. Totally obscuring the fact that these characteristics are in part a consequence of the colonial conquest and the neocolonial relationship that the United States fostered after the Philippines gained its independence in 1946. The second one is the issue of perspective and the kind of politics espoused by the scholars.

Some of the responses to the debate bear repeating here. Azurin charged Ileto of wielding an "Orientalism shotgun blast," arguing that "the outsider's viewpoint and efforts toward earnest scholarship are, more often than not, an addition to Filipino self-knowledge, as well as a stimulus for local scholars to compete in the challenging arena of research," that "[t]he outsider's privileged vista does not negate that of the insider's . . . Far better I think to regard these contraposing privileged vistas as a dialogue in reflexivity" (Azurin 2002, 150). Caroline Hau differs with Azurin on the ease and possibility of this dialogue:

> Ileto's salvo against "Orientalism" . . . had the salutary effect of raising the thorny but relatively unexamined issue of intellectuals—whether foreign or Filipino or Filforeign or overseas Filipino—and their relationship to each other and to the Philippines in ways that go beyond the terms by which Said originally framed his main arguments. Questions of exteriority and distance can no longer be so easily mapped onto an inside-versus-outside, metropole-versus-periphery, West-versus-the-Rest, or departure-versus-return dichotomy. (Hau 2014, 52)

In this vista opened by Hau's critique, can charges of essentializing cultures and political realities against other scholars even stick as they are always traversing localities and identities, the émigré refusing to settle and the native always deferring the act of return?

Lande countered Ileto's charge of essentializing Philippine political culture in his patron-client studies by arguing that "clientelism is a function of the economic dependency of the poor, and will become less widespread as an economy becomes more productive and the poor become less dependent on personal or governmental patrons" (Lande 2002, 124). Ileto takes exception to such developmentalist view. Hence Lande's query: "What does he think, or hope, will be the future

path for his country? To true national independence, of course! . . . . But what beyond that? Government by patriotic ilustrados? The growth of a more egalitarian liberal democracy? A Marxist transformation? Both of the latter represent development, though in quite different directions." (Lande 2002, 123). Ileto is silent in this regard, except for his search for the rural ilustrado, which for him ends with the current president, Rodrigo Duterte.

Ileto speaks of rural ilustrados as the supposed foil to the rise of the caciques in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Philippines. For example, the rural ilustrados drafted complaints against the excesses of the caciques. He documented the presence of rural ilustrados and their advocacies in his research of towns in Quezon during the revolutionary period and the Philippine-American War. The point Ileto is making is related to his critique of Anderson's cacique democracy and Sidel's bossism. That the towns, the municipios, the provinces, were not solely metastasizing locales of anti-democratic forces ruled by caudillos, "municipal elites as a whole [that] came to embody an evil called caciquism, which must be stamped out by force, education, or co-optation" (310). They could also be places where the ilustrados can assert their idea for a just society. And in an odd twist of fate, Ileto heralds the election of Duterte, "a mayor-president . . . able to lecture his audiences on the forgotten war against the United States" as proof of this (310).

Marcos had scholars and intellectuals rationalizing his brutal, kleptocratic, authoritarian rule. The murderous Duterte has rabid propagandists. The question now is whether Ileto, beyond his terse endorsement of being inspired by Duterte, will be counted with the likes of Adrian Cristobal, Onofre Corpuz, Remigio Agpalo, and others—brain trust of a dictator—or will he be lined up with Dante Ang, Martin Andanar, and Mocha Uson. One may object that this is an unfair association. Perhaps. But this very method of stringing along disparate authors and texts was what made possible Ileto's critique of the supposed patina of Orientalism that slimes studies on Philippine politics and history, mostly at the hands of American scholars. If Orientalism essentializes and disfigures the "Other," then awe of brutal and oppressive power that facilitates scholarly pursuits has the same consequence, it's violence is not just epistemic, it has real body counts.—**Joel F. Ariate Jr.**, *University Researcher, Third World Studie Center, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman.*

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Immediate reviews in the press of Ileto's book were mixed. One reviewer hailed the book as "one of the best books ever written about the Philippines" (Cruz 2017). Another cursory review highlighted one thing: how President Rodrigo Duterte inspired historian Rey Ileto to bring the book to fruition. "In fact, Ileto says this book, in the works for more than 10 years, is finally out in large part after Rodrigo Duterte brought up the Philippine-American War—even displayed pictures of American atrocities—to brush aside questions about his war on drugs" (Alcuaz 2017). For the historian Ambeth Ocampo, "a glaring omission emerges from the collection: There is no essay on how he developed from criticism, how he was actually honored by his detractors. Friendly praise is never the same or as formative as unfair criticism from an enemy" (Ocampo 2017).

These mentions in the press are quite instructive if one were to read Ileto's book. The one extolling the book's excellence easily induces skepticism. The one that mentions Ileto's affinity for Duterte alerts us to the possible controversial, if not disagreeable, politics that the author subscribes to. And that last one on how Ileto handles criticisms is an insinuation that Ileto would rather not have them, though one would hope that intramurals in the academe are more than issues of ego and turf.

The book's twelve chapters are grouped into three sections: the Filipino-American war; memory, history, and politics; and knowledge and pacification. Ileto presents how the Americans, and the Filipinos complicit in their conquest and rule, controlled the writing of the history of the Philippine-American War, even as that war of colonial conquest was still being fought over. The independent Philippine republic must be denied out of existence. The resistance forces must be denigrated as cutthroats and bandits, local despots that swindled and herded and flogged to the point of death the poor, ignorant masses into waging a losing war. The colonial rule must be rewritten as the onward march of the modernizing, civilizing, great American empire. Ileto even summoned personal details of his biography and that of his father, former defense secretary, Gen. Rafael Ileto, hoping that "[t]hrough this account of father and son," he will be able "to draw out the

interplay of personal experience and regimes of knowledge that constitutes one's belonging and response to empire" (132). His history of how these "regimes of knowledge" came to be and the consequences of these distortions, propaganda, and systematized forgetting to nationalism and nationhood is Ileto's important contribution both to Philippine history and historiography.

As much as Ileto draws our attention to the silences and deliberate misapplication (or invention as in the case of cacique democracy) of concepts in the writing of history that justifies American colonial conquest and rule, Ileto can also be queried and faulted as to what his arguments dismiss, mute, or are totally silent on. But before dealing with these more substantive issues, it is also instructive to point out some minor ones that readers may encounter (nitpicking, no doubt, this is). These are passages in the book that seem to lack clarity or uncalled for asides. Take for example these sentences:

- "Relatives, neighbors, and children visited the sick or the dead without constraints. Some came to pay their respects, to join in the feast called *katapusan*; others just wanted to see what the dying and the dead looked like—and cholera victims were a horrible sight" (121). The way the sentences are strung together lends to a reading in which katapusan is made to appear as a feast with the dead still present. This was never the case. Katapusan, in both Southern Luzon and Bicol, is the last day of the pasiyam, the novena for the dead that starts after burial.

- Of the May 21, 1967 massacre in Pasay of Lapiang Malaya members led by Valentin de los Santos, Ileto wrote: "The demonstration never had a chance of success and Ka Valentin's followers were gunned down by the hundreds" (200). Gunned down means shot at. How many died? How many were injured? In current journalistic use, almost always, gunned down is taken as being shot dead. According to contemporary news accounts, thirty-three died among the Lapiang Malaya, forty-five were injured; one policeman was hacked to death (Associated Press 1967). When he wrote about this event in the opening paragraph of his book Pasyon and Revolution, at least he managed to come up with a near-precise number: "scores

of their comrades lay dead on the street" (Ileto [1979] 1997, 1). He made no mention of the policeman's death.

- "As we can see, the Congressional Records in 1956 were fully bilingual. If a member of the Senate or House spoke in Spanish, no translation was provided, for knowledge of Spanish was assumed among the politicians. And in this particular debate over Rizal's novels, a number of the privileged speeches were totally in Spanish, and all the Senators in attendance (including the Muslim senator Domocao Alonto) were expected to follow such presentations, even though they might ask questions in English" (227). Why did Ileto have to single out Senator Alonto with the qualifier "Muslim" and write it in such a way as to give the impression that he may not be as comprehending of Spanish as his other colleagues? Senator Alonto studied law at the University of the Philippines. At that time, students in law colleges studied decisions of the Philippine Supreme Court in Spanish and English. Alonto passed the bar in 1938 (Tribune 1938). The topnotcher of that bar exam, and a classmate of Alonto and a fellow Mindanaoan, was Emmanuel Pelaez. Alonto and Pelaez were senators in the Third Congress (1954-57). Ileto made no qualification of Pelaez's proficiency in Spanish and English. Why did he have to make one for Alonto?

- Ileto confused Partha Chaterjee with Prasenjit (he also misspelled his name in his bibliography as "Pasenjit") Duara. In the bibliography, the book *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* was attributed to both. It was Chaterjee's work.

Quibbling about details and interpretation will not suffice for the two key issues in Ileto's book that invite examination. The first one is on the supposed consequence of the Japanese conquest in occasioning a break from the controlling American discourse on the history of the Philippine revolution, in particular on how it marginalized and almost erased Andres Bonifacio from history. The second one is on Ileto's contentious accounting of the supposed ahistoric and colonial logic behind caciquism, cacique democracy and bossism, and his quest for the rural ilustrados that Duterte is now supposed to personify.

On the first issue, this he wrote:

> The collaboration issue has always been a vexing one in Philippine historiography. I would argue, however, that collaboration with Japan did not mean submission to a new "Mother Japan." The Japanese occupation had a positive effect, enabling those individuals who straddled empires such as Laurel, Recto, and Filipino-American war veterans Artemio Ricarte, Emilio Aguinaldo, and Servillano Aquino to make a conceptual break with Mother America and to reconnect the Philippines of 1943 with the time of Rizal—that is, with the time of the break from Mother Spain, or the Revolution of 1896. The experience of a third Empire, Japan, enabled these leaders to resurrect the Philippines of Rizal's time as the source of inspiration for the Republic of 1943 and, hopefully, for the independent republic of 1946 onwards. (212)

Ileto speaks of a "cultural renaissance under Japan," a key element of which "was the resurrection of the Filipino-American war as a key event in the national narrative" (233). He claimed to have ". . . shown how Japan, a third though short-lived empire, functioned to enable a creative tension to be established between the two major empires that figure in the Filipino historical narrative" (241). In effect, Ileto is drawing up a debt of gratitude for the Japanese imperial army that the Filipinos must repay with due recognition.

Yet how lasting is this "creative tension," this "positive effect"? Is it of consequence? Ileto argues for the affirmative. "Historical discourse was an autonomous domain that enabled Filipinos to pursue their own agenda of nation-building within the constraints of foreign occupation. Filipino historians and writers were, in fact, encouraged by their new rulers to explore the pre-Hispanic and late 19th-century nationalist roots of their identity" (172). Were it not for the Japanese imperial army, historians and scholars would not have been goaded to research the period that led to the 1896 revolution. Were it not for the Japanese imperial army, Jose P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto would not have sharpened and refined their arguments for a history that exposes the cunning and control of America, for a history that brings Bonifacio back in and valorizes the discourse of an "unfinished revolution." A discourse that both the Philippine Left and the dictator Ferdinand Marcos latched on given its potency in mobilizing people and fostering the idea of a nation.

One can reexamine Ileto's view on three grounds. First, the world of 1896 and the revolution, of Bonifacio and the Katipunan, their

history and memory were sustained, publicly memorialized, and written about all throughout the American colonial regime. It was marginalized but not in need of resurrection as Ileto implied. Second, summoning the ghosts of 1896 was not just the preserve of the Japanese imperial army during the Second World War. The American propaganda effort did as much as it could to resurrect Bonifacio for the war effort. And lastly, scholars and studies on the supposed cultural impact of the Japanese conquest on Filipino society disagree and do not sustain Ileto's argument. Ileto made no mention of them.

Actually, Ileto (2017) seems to disagree with Ileto (1998):

> "Unfinished revolution" was not a new discourse. It had flourished in the rhetoric of the labor movement from the first decade of this century, finding its way into various peasant movements in central Luzon in the 1920s and 1930s. The idea of "unfinished revolution" carries with it an interpretation of the revolution as a mass movement initiated by Andres Bonifacio. A history that gives primacy to Bonifacio invariably includes themes that go beyond mere freedom from Spanish rule; it points to the confiscation of church lands, the punishments and even execution of errant friar curates, and it carries a critique of the ilustrado betrayal of the cause.
>
> Politicians from the beginning of this century were aware of the potency of the Bonifacio/Katipunan sign. It was something to be exploited in political rallies. However, the meanings generated by the sign had to be kept under control . . . . The colonial state's sponsorship of a Bonifacio monument, and speeches like Quezon's in 1929, should thus be seen as attempts to coopt, to control, a potentially subversive historical consciousness, one that had always been there since Bonifacio's death in 1897, but which now threatened to break its boundaries. (Ileto 1998, 182-84)

What Ileto did not pursue in his 1998 book nor in the present one, was to answer and give details of what were inside the labor movement that connected it to the peasant movements during the American colonial rule for it to have preserved and empowered the discourse on Bonifacio and the 1896 revolution. The partial, though more important answer, of course, would be the socialist and communist movements (see Guillermo 2009). At the outbreak of the Second World War, these bearers of Bonifacio's legacy, the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Anti-Japanese People's Army), waged an effective guerilla war.

In the chapter "The Return of Bonifacio" in the current book, Ileto left out the three decades of articulations on Bonifacio and the 1896 revolution prior to the Japanese invasion. With the contribution of the socialist and communist movements muted, he can now sell his abovementioned argument. That is why when he started discussing the volatile agrarian situation in the immediate postwar period, the journalists, unionists, intellectuals, and revolutionaries that he started citing, seem to have come out of nowhere.

This is not to deny the effort by the American colonial educational system to marginalize the narratives of the 1896 revolution, but the efforts of scholars, historians, and journalists, not to mention participants to the revolution themselves, to write about Bonifacio and his generation and the revolt that they led have been going on since the 1900s, long before they were supposedly prodded or inspired into work by the Japanese imperial army. A look at the bibliography of Agoncillo's *The Revolt of the Masses* (1996) supports this point: Manuel Sastron published *La Insurreccion en Filipinas* in 1897, Emilio Aguinaldo wrote about the revolution in 1899, Isabelo de los Reyes wrote two monographs in 1899 and 1900, Manuel Artigas y Cuerva wrote on the same topic a decade later, Artemio Ricarte in 1927, Teodoro M. Kalaw have been publishing on Bonifacio and the Katipunan since the mid-1920s, Apolinario Mabini's *La Revolucion Filipina* written prior to his death in 1903 was published in 1931 by the Bureau of Printing, the father-son tandem of Epifanio de los Santos and Jose P. Santos were also writing on the same subject in the same period until the outbreak of the war. The play *Andres Bonifacio*, a Tagalog adaptation of Clifford Odet's *Waiting for Lefty*, was staged at the Manila Grand Opera House during the Commonwealth (Agoncillo [1965] 2001, 2: 557). Bonifacio's birthday, then known to be November 29, was a legal holiday "celebrated elaborately throughout the Philippines . . . Parades were held in Manila and in the provinces. Speeches extolling Bonifacio were delivered" (United Press Despatch 1933). Still, for Ileto, Agoncillo, and by extension, *The Revolt of the Masses*, "was probably influenced by the Japanese model of (and support for, during the occupation) an autonomous history of 'Oriental' civilization" (204).

Then there were the likes of Nick Joaquin, who in his writings (both in fiction and history), was protesting "against the effects of sajonismo, the 'Anglo-Saxonization' of the Filipino, a complaint raised by other Filipino intellectuals in the early twentieth century and one that gained ground during the Japanese occupation when

'Orientalization," the return to the Filipino's 'Malayan roots,' was the cultural mantra of the occupation government. It was not, however, a return to a mythicized 'ancient heritage' that Nick [Joaquin] preached but a recovery of the Spanish past that both the Americans and the Japanese had turned into a past to be excised . . . . [Joaquin] extolled a Western colonial past that in effect debunked the orientalismo that was the official policy under the Japanese occupation" (Mojares 2017, 4-5, 7).

The works of said revolutionaries, historians, and journalists as well as the discourse sustained in the socialist and communist movements are important contexts for the second point querying Ileto's favored view. The United States itself during the war resurrected Bonifacio and enlisted his iconic, revolutionary status in a propaganda fight against the Japanese. A step that the United States and her wartime propagandists could not have undertaken if Bonifacio's memory or that of the Revolution of 1896 needed reviving and was only revived by the Japanese imperial army during the war. In the war film *Back to Bataan*, John Wayne's character was featured with a character named Andres Bonifacio Jr. played by Anthony Quinn. The film was released in May 1945 before the United States forces reconquered the Philippines.

Here's Sharon Delmendo's insightful take on the topic:

> The ideological core of the film is its manipulation of the identity axis of nationalism. The film eases anxieties over the forthcoming moment of rupture between America and the Philippines by constituting Americans as ideal Filipinos. One of the film's culminating moments comes when Andres Bonifacio, the film's Filipino nationalist symbol, tells John Wayne, that quintessential American, "you're a better Filipino than I am." The film rewrites the history of the Philippines as the history of America in the Philippines—written by Americans who are better Filipinos than the Filipinos themselves . . . . the film's manipulation of Philippine revolutionary history to reinstate American political domination on the eve of official Philippine independence demonstrates . . . that U.S. and Philippine nationalisms overtly seek to create and maintain their respective political sovereignties through a covert dependence on the other. (Delmendo 2004, 87)

And while the Americans were capitalizing on Bonifacio's appeal, what was the Japanese imperial army doing? Censoring Bonifacio.

> In order to control Filipino thought, censorship became mandatory in all forms of media: newspapers and magazines, theaters, movie houses and radio. Licenses and permits were required for any publication, which was subject to prior censorship. To check the spread of information, typewriters and mimeographing machines were required to be registered, together with samples of their type styles. Mail was opened and checked. Numerous regulations governed publication of any kind of information: bookstores had to have their stocks censored before they could reopen; schools had to have their courses and syllabi approved. In order to check unbridled nationalism (which could and did work against the Japanese), the Philippine flag (which had flown under the American flag during the Commonwealth years) was banned entirely and replaced by the Japanese flag and the Philippine national anthem was likewise prohibited (it would be replaced by the "Awit sa Paglikha ng Bagong Pilipinas" in late 1942). By order of the Hodobu even Bonifacio was excised from school texts. (Jose 1992, 13)

Ileto, in his book, deplores the "[s]tudies that are geared toward proving a theory or demonstrating some novel characteristic [sic] of a social formation tend to fish out of complex documentary collections only what is needed to make their point" (300). Is he not guilty of the same?

This fact also leads us to the third and last point contending Ileto's attempt to indebt the writing of Filipino revolutionary history and its legacy to Japanese conquest. If the Japanese conquest provided the opportunity and the inspiration for the writing of a history that broke free of the controlling American discourse, save for Agoncillo's The Revolt of the Masses, what other works of history came out of this period? Ileto discusses in his book two: Laurel's *Forces that Make a Nation Great* (1944), a compilation of newspaper articles on Filipino heroes, and a book-length poem of Philippine history, *Sa Lupa ng mga Lakan* (1948) by Ignacio Facundo. For Ileto, Laurel's work "is arguably the best statement of the ideology of the 1943 Republic" (172). Facundo's work, on the other hand, "captures a minority discourse in which the Japanese occupation period is a repetition, with variation, of previous experiences of invasion and conquest," it "highlights independence under Japanese auspices in 1943 as a landmark event in an ongoing process of national liberation" (178).

Both works are propaganda masquerading as history that today time has forgotten. But for Ileto they are important articulations of a suppressed nationalist sentiment. Who the author was is of less

importance than the treasured text. Hence, Ileto can simply hedge who Facundo was: "The author . . . has no other publication in his name that I know of." Then Ileto went on to imagine what Facundo may have been like, one of the " 'rural ilustrados,' were it not for the fact that his world is Manila and not the provinces" (178). Then Facundo would simply be a Manileño ilustrado. Though Facundo, Ileto again surmised, is not "in any account or anthology of Tagalog literature" (178). Had Ileto read Faustino Aguilar's report on the Commonwealth Literary Award for 1940, then he would have known that Facundo submitted an entry in Tagalog poetry entitled "Ang Laguna't Bulakan." He lost to Amado V. Hernandez (Quezon et al. [1940] 1973, 66-72). Facundo may have been laudatory of the independence that the Japanese promised, but as the war progressed, he remembered the world of 1896 less for its heroics and more for its brutality:

> Sa "Fuerza Santiago" piniit ng mga Hapones ang mga Pilipinos pinaghinalaan nilang mga gerilya at makagerilya, at pinahirapan hanggang ang marami ay namatay, na paris din ng ginawa ng mga kastila. (Facundo 1948, 214n1)

The impact of the Japanese occupation "in terms of cultural penetration has been found to be quite transitory . . . . The Japanese thrust to re-orient Filipino culture to its pre-Western Oriental tradition, in line with the objectives of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, did not effectively transform the identity and lifeways of the Filipinos, which at the time of Japanese conquest had already been heavily influenced by almost 450 years of intense acculturative processes under the Spanish and afterwards, American domination" (Tiongson and Roxas 1992, 5). Resil Mojares noted that "[w]riters who had begun to switch to local languages under the Japanese promptly returned to English after the war" (2017, 7; a more detailed observation is in Agoncillo [1965] 2001, 2: 593-96). Hence Ikehata Setsuho's trenchant assessment of the war years and its consequences:

> The ultimate paradox of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines is how its initial intent, real or imagined, to liberate the country from U.S. colonialism was turned completely upside down, resulting in the actual strengthening of Philippine dependency on the United States. The Filipinos' hope in, and loyalty to, the United States was heightened during the Japanese occupation. For the Filipino people, it was only the U.S. reoccupation of their country that could free them from the cruelty and indignity they were suffering under the Japanese army. . . . the historical view which claims that the occupation of Southeast Asia by Japanese

> forces during the Pacific War ultimately furthered national independence in the region is untenable in the case of the Philippines. (Setsuho 1999, 20)

Ileto's insistence that the "alternative to the official narrative of Philippine history . . . was shaped and implanted during the formative years of 1943-1948" (224) amounts, charitably, to a suspect sentimentality that hides a logic justifying violence: were it not for our experience of brutal subjugation we would not have known to learn more about our past. The corollary to this sentiment is the more cynical and insidious ethos of legitimating brutal authority provided that authority enables one to pursue greater knowledge. What is also overlooked in Ileto's argument was the actual devastation that both the Japanese and the Americans have wrought in the country that led to incalculable loss of the remnants of the world of 1896, the sources and writings of the incipient, revolutionary nation that so fascinates Ileto.

The third section of Ileto's book is an expanded (more re-arranged than expanded) version of his 2001 article in the Philippine Political Science Journal (Ileto 2001) and his response to John Sidel, after the latter wrote a reaction to his article. Carl Lande (2002) and Arnold Molina Azurin (2002) also responded to Ileto's piece. Given that sixteen years have passed since Ileto's PPSJ article and the publication of the present work, one expects that Ileto by now has engaged the comments of Lande and Azurin. He chose not to. Hence the book merely repeated the key issue in the debate that Ileto started, that is, whether the scholarly work done on the Philippines by the likes of Carl Lande, Glenn May, Norman Owen, Alfred McCoy, Benedict Anderson and John Sidel, among others, is of the same Orientalist strain as Stanley Karnow's *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (1989). For Ileto,

> Karnow, in effect, constructs Filipinos in terms of a variant of America's classic image of their Pacific wards. Images of the Filipino elite (oppressive caciques, bosses, patrons) and masses (blindly loyal and manipulated táo, clients of the bosses) constructed by James Le Roy, Fred Atkinson, David Barrows, and many other American writers a century or so ago reappear in modern journalistic garb. But just as these older images are complicit with the colonial project to pacify and tutor the Filipinos, Karnow's portrayal of a starkly different Filipino tradition has its political implications . . . . The American national imaginary is established and continually reinforced in writings about its cultural "others," and the

> Filipinos have occupied this position since the so-called imperial "blunder" of 1899. (270)

Two sub-issues inhere in this debate. The first one is the supposed essentializing tendency of the works of the mentioned scholars, that they have reduced Philippine culture and society into set characteristics from which the Americans can measure their progress and justify their tutelage. Totally obscuring the fact that these characteristics are in part a consequence of the colonial conquest and the neocolonial relationship that the United States fostered after the Philippines gained its independence in 1946. The second one is the issue of perspective and the kind of politics espoused by the scholars.

Some of the responses to the debate bear repeating here. Azurin charged Ileto of wielding an "Orientalism shotgun blast," arguing that "the outsider's viewpoint and efforts toward earnest scholarship are, more often than not, an addition to Filipino self-knowledge, as well as a stimulus for local scholars to compete in the challenging arena of research," that "[t]he outsider's privileged vista does not negate that of the insider's . . . Far better I think to regard these contraposing privileged vistas as a dialogue in reflexivity" (Azurin 2002, 150). Caroline Hau differs with Azurin on the ease and possibility of this dialogue:

> Ileto's salvo against "Orientalism" . . . had the salutary effect of raising the thorny but relatively unexamined issue of intellectuals—whether foreign or Filipino or Filforeign or overseas Filipino—and their relationship to each other and to the Philippines in ways that go beyond the terms by which Said originally framed his main arguments. Questions of exteriority and distance can no longer be so easily mapped onto an inside-versus-outside, metropole-versus-periphery, West-versus-the-Rest, or departure-versus-return dichotomy. (Hau 2014, 52)

In this vista opened by Hau's critique, can charges of essentializing cultures and political realities against other scholars even stick as they are always traversing localities and identities, the émigré refusing to settle and the native always deferring the act of return?

Lande countered Ileto's charge of essentializing Philippine political culture in his patron-client studies by arguing that "clientelism is a function of the economic dependency of the poor, and will become less widespread as an economy becomes more productive and the poor become less dependent on personal or governmental patrons" (Lande 2002, 124). Ileto takes exception to such developmentalist view. Hence Lande's query: "What does he think, or hope, will be the future

path for his country? To true national independence, of course! . . . . But what beyond that? Government by patriotic ilustrados? The growth of a more egalitarian liberal democracy? A Marxist transformation? Both of the latter represent development, though in quite different directions." (Lande 2002, 123). Ileto is silent in this regard, except for his search for the rural ilustrado, which for him ends with the current president, Rodrigo Duterte.

Ileto speaks of rural ilustrados as the supposed foil to the rise of the caciques in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Philippines. For example, the rural ilustrados drafted complaints against the excesses of the caciques. He documented the presence of rural ilustrados and their advocacies in his research of towns in Quezon during the revolutionary period and the Philippine-American War. The point Ileto is making is related to his critique of Anderson's cacique democracy and Sidel's bossism. That the towns, the municipios, the provinces, were not solely metastasizing locales of anti-democratic forces ruled by caudillos, "municipal elites as a whole [that] came to embody an evil called caciquism, which must be stamped out by force, education, or co-optation" (310). They could also be places where the ilustrados can assert their idea for a just society. And in an odd twist of fate, Ileto heralds the election of Duterte, "a mayor-president . . . able to lecture his audiences on the forgotten war against the United States" as proof of this (310).

Marcos had scholars and intellectuals rationalizing his brutal, kleptocratic, authoritarian rule. The murderous Duterte has rabid propagandists. The question now is whether Ileto, beyond his terse endorsement of being inspired by Duterte, will be counted with the likes of Adrian Cristobal, Onofre Corpuz, Remigio Agpalo, and others—brain trust of a dictator—or will he be lined up with Dante Ang, Martin Andanar, and Mocha Uson. One may object that this is an unfair association. Perhaps. But this very method of stringing along disparate authors and texts was what made possible Ileto's critique of the supposed patina of Orientalism that slimes studies on Philippine politics and history, mostly at the hands of American scholars. If Orientalism essentializes and disfigures the "Other," then awe of brutal and oppressive power that facilitates scholarly pursuits has the same consequence, it's violence is not just epistemic, it has real body counts.—**Joel F. Ariate Jr.**, *University Researcher, Third World Studie Center, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines Diliman.*

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