The CADI Asian Democracy Index: 2011 Country Report – The Philippines

MIGUEL PAOLO P. REYES, CLARINDA LUSTERIO BERJA, MA. CELINE ANASTASIA P. SOCRATES

Introduction

Shortly after it was approached by the Democracy and Social Movements Institute (DaSMI) of Sungkonghoe University in August 2010 to conduct the Asian Democracy Index (ADI) project in the Philippines, the University of the Philippines Third World Studies Center (TWSC) found itself—in keeping with its orientation as a critical social science research center—questioning the fundamentals of the ADI initiative. What exactly was "Asian" democracy? With the project's quantitative-qualitative approach to measuring Asian democracy, how would consolidation/aggregation issues cropping up from the diversity of data be addressed? How was this ADI different from similarly named democracy indices?[1]

These issues were tackled in discussions over the next few months until June 2011, bringing the ADI project closer to what it aims to be—a means of comprehending, thereafter prognosticating the state of Asian democratization. The Consortium for the Asian Democracy Index (CADI) defines democratization as a process of politico-socioeconomic de-monopolization that unfolded following the collapse of an oligarchic authoritarian regime (CADI 2011, 6-8). The TWSC also saw the ADI project as yet another endeavor consistent with its long engagement in the study of democratic governance. Moreover, the research team for the pilot testing of the ADI—also the authors of this text—took a liking to the thought

Miguel Paolo P. Reyes is a university research associate at the Third World Studies Center, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman. Clarinda Lusterio Berja is an assistant professor at the Political Science Program of the College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines-Manila. Ma. Celine Anastasia P. Socrates is a teaching associate at the Department of Political Science, College of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of the Philippines-Diliman.

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of participating in a project that seeks to analyze our progress towards democracy from the perspective of "insiders"—similar to one of the aims of other evaluations of democracy in Asia. The ADI, however, adopted a different evaluative system, and does not claim to be a(nother) means of ranking democracies. We believe that the ADI can eventually become a reliable tool for describing how our country is progressing towards democracy.

Democratization in the Philippines in Brief

Before we delve into a discussion of the first ADI survey in TWSC's home country, a brief history lesson is necessary. The Philippines is often touted as the first democracy in Asia, a claim given credence by the fact that it was one of the first Asian nations to have democratically elected government officials. The word "democracy" has, since those early days of diffusion of political power, been bandied about by Filipinos either as a characterization of the nation or as an ideal yet to be achieved. According to the country's current (1987) constitution, the Philippines is a "democratic and republican state [wherein sovereignty] resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II). The overt affirmation that it is a democratic state, further elaborated by the succeeding statement that the Philippine sovereign is the Philippine citizenry, serves as an expression of a fervent desire to democratize despite the numerous obstacles that have faced Filipino democrats. According to Nolledo, "[as] a democratic State, the Government must not be authoritarian, thus manifesting the people's desire to be freed from dictatorship" (1992, 6). That affirmation is the product of a national trauma, as will be explained further.

The Philippines was formally declared independent from the United States of America (U.S.) in 1946, ending the nation's centuries-long existence under the rule of foreign sovereigns—over 300 years under Spain, over forty years under U.S. rule, as well as a little in excess of two years under Japan during the Second World War. The country thereafter followed the U.S. model; popular elections were the means through which the sovereign Philippine citizenry elevated their members to seats in the legislature or to non-appointive executive positions. The country's 1935 Constitution, which was in force during the first few decades of the country's existence as a sovereign nation-state, stated that the Philippines is a "republican state" (Section 1, Article II).

Come 1972, as the conclusion of his second elected term in office drew near, the country's sixth post-liberation chief executive, President Ferdinand Marcos, placed the entire nation under martial law, ostensibly in response to

"[national] decline and demoralization, social and economic deterioration, [and] anarchy and rebellion"—catastrophes allegedly brought about by members of the country's communist party (Marcos 1977, 154). In 1973, a hurriedly (and undemocratically) ratified constitution granting Marcos a legal basis for indefinitely ruling over the country as dictator came into force. Again, Section 1, Article II of this constitution referred to the Philippines as a "republican state" only.

Marcos's authoritarian regime would last for fourteen years, during which he took control of public utilities, the media, and numerous other businesses and industries. Numerous human rights violations—typically against Marcos's opponents, committed by members of the armed forces—were committed during the Marcos dictatorship. Corruption was also extensive during the martial law regime, with Marcos uninhibitedly dipping his hands into the government treasury to finance his and his wife's luxurious lifestyle. He was overthrown a few years after the assassination of key opposition figure Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. in 1983; with the February 1986 uprising—known as the "People Power" or "EDSA"[2] Revolution—began the continuing process of (re)democratization in the country.

After the 1986 revolution, Marcos fled the Philippines and became an exile in the nation that once backed him as an enemy of the Third World communist tide—the U.S. Corazon Aquino subsequently took the reins of government. Aquino was Ninoy Aquino's widow, and, according to one election watchdog, the winner of the presidency in the 1986 "Snap" Election called by Marcos when the legitimacy of his regime began to speedily crumble. Under her administration, the 1973 Constitution was succeeded by the popular referendum-ratified 1987 "People's" Constitution. The latter constitution contains numerous safeguards to ensure that a Marcos-like regime never recurs; it is but natural that such a decidedly anti-authoritarian constitution states that the Philippines is both a republican *and* democratic state in its declaration of state principles and policies.

Aquino's administration was followed by two democratically elected administrations, namely, those of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998) and Joseph Estrada (1998-2001). Ramos was a former military officer and an Aquino ally; the populist Estrada was a former movie actor affiliated with Marcos. Ramos built upon the gains of Aquino; Estrada shared Marcos's fondness for self-enrichment. Due to allegations of massive corruption, Estrada was ousted in an uprising that has been dubbed by mainstream media as "EDSA 2." There are still debates among scholars on whether Estrada's ouster was indeed the result of a popular uprising, or whether it was primarily a takeover

a few months after "EDSA 2" as a result of Estrada's arrest for plundering the nation's coffers. That last "EDSA revolt," a movement by Estrada's supporters, was unsuccessful, in that neither was Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's government overthrown nor was Estrada released from detention.

After one term as Estrada's successor by default, Arroyo was given six more years in the presidency via the 2004 General Elections. Within her more than nine years in office, there were attempts by certain members of the military to oust her, but all were unsuccessful. Allegations of corruption and election fraud were also insufficient to unseat President Arroyo, who was fond of using her police powers to impose "states of rebellion/emergency" to combat or keep at bay her more vocal detractors.

Constitutionally barred from seeking another term, Arroyo stepped down in 2010, giving way to Senator Benigno Aquino III, the son of former President and recently deceased Corazon Aquino and former Sen. Ninoy Aquino. By positioning himself as a leader who will lead his countrymen down the "straight path" (*matuwid na daan*) towards democracy, supposedly following in the footsteps of his venerated mother and father, Aquino won a significant majority of votes over his opponents in the 2010 General Elections. The current President Aquino is largely engaging his people in finding ways to "clean up" the government, as well as in helping him deliver on his campaign promise to jail Arroyo for her alleged wrongdoings.

It is in this milieu that in-house and affiliate researchers of TWSC conducted an ADI survey, in accordance with the following methodology.

Data and Methods

Sampling of Respondents

The TWSC generated a long list of experts (which serves as the sampling frame of the survey[3]) in three fields of expertise, namely, politics, economy, and civil society. The list includes experts from the academe; nongovernmental/civil society organizations (NGOs/CSOs); and the private sector, members of which are not affiliated with the government or any academic institution, nor are primarily affiliated with NGOs/CSOs. The experts were categorized according to their ideological leanings. They were designated by members of the research team as either "(extreme) left-left leaning" (L-LL) or "(extreme) right-right leaning" (R-RL). The original ideological delineations proposed by the project initiators—i.e., liberal, moderate, and conservative—were found to be inapplicable to the Philippines, given that primary self-identification using these labels is largely unheard of

Table 1: Respondent Profile

Field	Affiliation	NO. of L-LL	NO. of R-RL
Politics	Academe	0	3
	NGO/CSO	0	3
	Private Sector	3	0
Economy	Academe	0	3
	NGO/CSO	3	0
	Private Sector	0	3
Civil Society	Academe	3	0
	NGO/CSO	3	0
	Private Sector	2	1

in the country, while one often hears of the left and the right battling in various arenas of Philippine society.

In classifying whether a respondent is L-LL or R-RL, the research team made the following assumptions: 1) those who are known (by their reputations, publications, etc.) to exhibit critical or dissenting opinions against the Philippine government and its policies, and are at the same time avowedly supportive of "socialist" socioeconomic policies are left-left leaning; 2) those who have worked for the Philippine government, either in the bureaucracy or as consultants, and/or subscribe to the government's "neoliberal" socioeconomic policies are right-right leaning. We have yet to encounter anyone who can rightly be called an expert informant who is largely critical of the Philippine government (not just a certain administration) yet does not prefer socialist (or "socialist," e.g., welfare state-style expenditures) alternatives to neoliberalism; meanwhile, the few experts who can be classified as belonging to the extreme right are more critical of specific administrations than the Philippine government after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship. However, there exists the possibility that there are experts who were not considered by the research team who fail to fall under the categories described. In any case, the categorization primarily serves, as per the ADI guidebook, to "secure objectivity" (CADI 2011, 36); experts also include people who are former self-designated Marxists, who are now pushing for non-socialist (one can daresay "neoliberal") economic reforms, and left-left leaning journalists.

A sample of twenty-seven experts was chosen from a long list to answer the survey instrument using stratified multistage purposive sampling. To come up with this sample, the long list of potential respondents was first divided into three groups based on the three institutional affiliation categories. Next, experts were classified according to their field of expertise. Thus, nine

groups/sectors of experts were formed (e.g., political experts from the academe, economic experts from NGOs/CSOs, and so on). Lastly, the ideological affiliation of the experts was assigned by the research team. The complete respondent profile according to field of expertise, institutional affiliation, and ideological leanings can be found in table 1.

While the Philippine researchers wanted each sector to have a 2-1 or 1-2 mix of L-LL and R-RL respondents, such an ideal mix proved untenable, as 1) some of the field-specific sectors were not found to have any prominent members who belonged to one ideological leaning (the right-right leaning individual primarily identified with NGOs/CSOs is a rare breed; the left-left leaning economist in the academe is equally difficult to find), or 2) individuals who would have made a field-specific sector more diverse refused or constructively declined to participate in the survey.

Geographic Coverage

The survey includes experts nationwide. Specifically, it includes experts from the country's major island groups: Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. Manila, the capital of the country and the seat of the national government, is located in Luzon. Taking into consideration the possibility of differences in citizens' perception of democratization depending on their distance from the capital, the research team decided to ensure that at least two experts in each of the fields of expertise were rooted in and were strongly identified with localities in Visayas and Mindanao.

Data Collection

Self-administered questionnaires—one for each of the fields of expertise—developed by DaSMI were the study instruments, as constraints in distance, time, and resources made it difficult for the researchers to conduct face-to-face interviews. The phrasing of the questions and explanatory notes in the questionnaire were revised to be more easily appreciated by Filipinos. The questionnaires were either emailed to the target respondents or were handed to them personally. The experts were given a week to inform TWSC of their willingness to participate in the survey. This gave TWSC sufficient time to quickly select other experts from the long list in case some experts in the short list refused to take part in the survey. Those who agreed to participate were given one week to return the accomplished instrument given to them.

All experts were asked to indicate their responses to questions in the survey instruments using a scale of 0-10. Their ratings may describe their level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction about a certain situation, or their estimate

of a level of influence and control, among others. They were also asked to give explanatory comments to their ratings as they saw fit.

To ensure a modicum of objectivity among the respondents, in many of the explanatory notes to survey questions, the experts were advised to refer to international development indicators, notably the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index,[4] to assist them in giving their ratings.

Schedule of Data Collection and Analysis

In early June 2011, gathering of resources for the study's review of related literature started, concurrent with the initiation of the finalized survey instruments' "localization." Both these preparatory activities ended in late July 2011. Members of the project staff agreed on the grouped long list of expert informants in late July 2011. Data collection began in early August 2011 and ended in late September 2011. Processing the data took place from late September 2011 to mid-November 2011.

Difficulties in Data Collection

Over 70 invitations to potential respondents were sent out. The refusal rate was 64 percent. Some invitees either declined to participate in the project or did not reply to our invitations despite constant follow-ups. While most of those who agreed to take part in the project returned their filled out questionnaires immediately, some pushed their deadlines or decided to drop out of the project. The difficulty in gathering responses is largely attributable to the frequent holidays during the data collection period. Some of these holidays were calendared beforehand, while the others were due to successive typhoons. The fact that it was "midterm season" also made it difficult for some of the members of the academe with teaching duties to comply with the one-week deadline.

Analytical Method

According to CADI, there are two primary principles of democracy: liberalization, which refers to how a "monopoly of resources is de-integrated in the procedural level," or the level of autonomy achieved from the monopoly complex (CADI 2011, 11); and equalization, the principle that concerns the evaluation of how well agents are moving towards achieving socially just resource distribution (CADI 2011, 11). Liberalization is broken down into the subprinciples autonomy and competition, while equalization is broken

down into the subprinciples pluralization and solidarity. The subprinciples are further explained in the results and analysis sections of this text.

In accordance with the theoretical frame stated above, the country ADI will be obtained by determining the mean of the mean scores for the liberalization principle and the equalization principle. The score for the liberalization principle is the mean of the across-the-fields mean scores for the autonomy and competition subprinciples, while the score for the equalization principle is the mean of the across-the-fields mean scores for the pluralization and solidarity subprinciples. The field democracy indices, which are obtained by getting the across-the-subprinciples mean scores under each field, will also be computed. Lastly, the liberalization and equalization scores for each field will be obtained. The latter are calculated by getting the average of (field autonomy + field competition) and (field pluralization + field solidarity) for each field. Further information about the above relationships between the principles, subprinciples, and the fields of expertise and the number of items/indicators and indices/questions per field and per principle can be found in The CADI ADI Guidebook (CADI 2011).

The analysis of the numerical ratings is coupled with a thematic analysis of the comments given by the experts. Some of the comments were rating justifications using objective measures. Others were explanatory comments drawn from the experts' personal experiences/knowledge. As stated in the guidebook, these comments help to "[overcome] the limitations of quantitative [evaluation,] as the [comments as] rationales [will] help [the analysts to] better understand the specific meanings of each answer and conditions of each country" (CADI 2011, 37).

Results of the 2011 CADI ADI Survey in the Philippines

Indices of Democracy

Table 2 summarizes the estimates derived from the results of the 2011 CADI ADI survey in the Philippines.

The succeeding discussion describes in detail the ratings and the explanatory comments of the respondents per item.

Autonomy in Politics

The political autonomy subprinciple measures "how independent citizens are from government or political groups." (CADI 2011, 13). It includes the following: "degree of state violence [Q1], [civil liberties] [Q2], freedom

Table 2: Estimates of Democracy Indices

Core Principles	Subprinciples	Fields			Subprinciple Indices	Core Principle Indices
		Politics	Economy	Civil Society		
Liberalization	Autonomy	7.4	5.1	4.3	5.6	5.6
(L)	Competition	4.9	4.6	6.9	5.5	
Equalization	Pluralization	5.1	2.6	4.5	4.1	4.8
(E)	Solidarity	6.4	4.8	5.4	5.5	
		6.0	4.3	5.3		
Democracy Indices		L = 6.2	L = 4.9	L = 5.6	Philippine ADI – 5.2	
		E = 5.8	E = 3.7	E = 5.0		

Table 3: Item Scores for Autonomy in Politics

Politics	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q1	5.9	6.0	4.0	8.0
Q2	7.6	8.0	5.0	9.0
Q3	8.0	8.0	6.0	9.0
Q4	8.0	8.0	7.0	10.0
Autonomy	7.4			

to organize political groups and undertake political action [Q3], and the degree of freedom for political opposition [Q4]" (CADI 2011, 13).

In table 3, Q1 yielded the lowest mean score for autonomy (5.9). Although many experts believe that the incidence of violence is diminishing, there is nevertheless a consensus among respondents that extrajudicial killings still present a significant problem, differing in extent in the various regions of the archipelago. According to two respondents, one specific location where there is a high incidence of extrajudicial killings is Mindanao, wherein, according to the aforementioned experts, there is a laxity in the rule of law. A specific instance that would demonstrate this, as related by one expert, is the 2009 Maguindanao massacre, which involved the killing of journalists and civilians as they accompanied the family of a local politician in filing for a certificate of candidacy in the 2010 elections. The crime is attributed to the Ampatuans, a powerful political family in Maguindanao.

The comments given by majority of the respondents in their response to Q2 reflect their perception that there is a considerable degree of civic freedom in the country; indeed, the scores for this item range from 5 to 9, with the mean score at a relatively high 7.6. However, there is also consensus that the grant and protection of civic freedoms can still be improved. One respondent pointed out the absence of an official recognition of the "right to shelter." Another respondent highlighted the need for the government to improve its responsiveness to the demands of the citizenry.

While one respondent pointed out the possible constraint on "freedom of assembly" posed by the necessity of acquiring permits from local governments in order to conduct rallies, all the respondents gave high scores for Q3 (range: 6 to 9, mean: 8.0). One respondent even remarked that Filipinos enjoy "too much freedom." Much cynicism, however, was expressed by the respondents as regards the quality of political groups formed. This is largely because of the unseemly vested interests of many of those who form or head these groups.

Q4 likewise received high scores from all respondents. No score lower than 7 were given. One respondent even gave a score of 10, indicating that she believes that the degree of freedom for political opposition in the Philippines is very high. There is a consensus that opposition is generally allowed in law and in fact. However, the existence of militant opposition groups has created occasions for the government to resort to violence in order to regulate these groups. Moreover, one respondent observed that the existence of a radical opposition has had the effect of polarizing sides and reducing the public sphere for debate. One respondent also highlighted the role of money in the lack of party loyalty in congress.

Competition in Politics

Political competition, a measure of the ability of the a country's political system to "establish a self-reference system" (CADI 2011, 15), is measured in table 4 in terms of "expansion of universal suffrage [Q5], state efficiency [Q6], existence of non-elected supreme power [Q7], the rule of law [Q8], fair and competitive elections [Q9], and transparency [Q10]" (CADI 2011, 15).

The mean score is highest in Q5. The respondents agree that there are no formal limitations to suffrage. However, there is dissatisfaction among the respondents on the extent of citizen participation, particularly because of issues such as "warlordism," an apathetic citizenry, vote-buying, and the inefficiency of the country's election system.

Another indicator of competition is the efficiency in implementing government policies (Q6). This was given a relatively low mean score of 4.7. In the survey, the respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the inefficient bureaucracy and the existence of corruption within government. However, one respondent was optimistic about the possibility of improvements in this area in the future, especially considering the role played by a "vigilant and free media" and a "climate for redressing and reporting wrongs."

When asked about the extent of political power of nonelected groups (Q7), the respondents gave an average score of 3.7, representing high influence of nonelected groups on elected officials.[5] Although one respondent asserted there is low influence among lobby groups, the rest had a consensus that there are several non-elected actors who are able to permeate government through electoral funding of their candidates. One respondent refers to them as "big business, big religion, big media." Religious groups such as the Roman Catholic Church, El Shaddai (a charismatic movement within the Roman Catholic Church), and the Iglesia ni Cristo sect influence government

Table 4: Item Scores for Political Competition

Politics	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q5	6.9	7.0	4.0	9.0
Q6	4.7	5.0	2.0	7.0
Q7	3.7	3.0	1.0	9.0
Q8	4.8	5.0	3.0	9.0
Q9	5.4	5.0	4.0	8.0
Q10	4.2	4.0	2.0	6.0
Competition	5.0			

to the extent that they are able to influence their constituents' electoral choices.

When asked whether "rule of law" is established in the country, the respondents likewise gave a relatively low rating (4.8). Although there is one respondent who gave an unexplained numerical rating of 9, the rest of the respondents agree on the perception that the powerful elite are exempted from the rule of law. This is aggravated by the existence of extensive corruption in the judiciary.

In terms of having fair elections in the Philippines, the respondents gave a moderate rating (5.4). Two respondents had positive things to say about Philippine electoral laws, with one characterizing them as "excellent" and the other as "voluminous." All respondents believed that these laws are poorly implemented, decrying the role of powerful elites in influencing the selection of candidates. Other negative aspects of Philippine elections mentioned by the respondents include the weak political party system, electoral fraud, and the lack of transparency in the Commission on Elections. One respondent described a bright spot in all that negativity, highlighting the increase in election efficiency resulting from the use of precinct count optical scan machines in the 2010 General Elections—a first in Philippine election history.

Generally, the political experts do not think there is transparency of operations of government agencies. In this aspect, numerical ratings range from 2 to 6, with a mean of 4.2. There is a general dissatisfaction among the respondents with regard to the inefficient bureaucracy, particularly in relation to the lack of transparency due to the absence of a "freedom of information" law. Government operations were also considered as "graft-ridden." The examples given by one respondent are the NBN-ZTE deal (a contract

Table 5: Item Scores for Political Plurality

Politics	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q11	5.3	5.0	4.0	7.0
Q12	5.2	4.0	3.0	10.0
Q13	4.8	5.0	3.0	7.0
Q14	5.0	5.0	3.0	6.0
Pluralization	5.1			

between the Philippines and a telecommunications company from China), the Fertilizer Scam, and the helicopters bought during the administration of President Arroyo.

Pluralization in Politics

"Political pluralization shows how evenly political power is distributed" (CADI 2011, 17). In table 5, it is measured by four items: "independence and check and balance between state power apparatuses [Q11], power distribution in the parliament [or congress (Q12)], political representation [Q13], and democratization of government bodies [Q14]" (CADI 2011, 17).

The mean score for Q11—which is concerned with the maintenance of checks and balances in government—is 5.3. Although the respondents agree on the existence of legal checks and balances among the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judiciary), the respondents also agree that checks and balances are ineffective because the executive exercises control/influence over the legislative branch. The judiciary was characterized as "subservient" and "polarized" at times. One respondent noted the lack of synergy between the legislature and the judiciary.

The same observations were reported in terms of equal distribution of power within the legislature (Q12's concern) where the mean score is 5.2. Although two respondents find no problem with the distribution of power in the legislature, the rest of the experts who gave comments highlighted the absence of party subsidies and the absence of a formal party system, which has resulted in the dependence of members of the House of Representatives on a funding system referred to as "pork barrel," which these officials acquire by shifting allegiances to the party in power.

The mean score for Q13, which deals with representation of various social groups in the legislature, is only 4.8, with scores ranging from 3 to 7.

Table 6: Item Scores for Political Solidarity

Politics	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q15	7.3	7.0	5.0	9.0
Q16	5.4	5.0	2.0	8.0
Q17	6.4	6.0	4.0	9.0
Q18	4.8	5.0	3.0	7.0
Q19	8.0	8.0	6.0	9.0
Solidarity	6.4			

In the survey, the respondents agree on the lack of representation in the legislature, which is vastly dominated by the political elite from various districts in the country. The party-list system is perceived by the respondents as ineffective in representing various sectors in society because it is dominated by special interest groups.

The collective score for the item on fairness and rationality of government agencies in implementing policies (Q14) is also fairly low (5.0). While about 42 percent of the respondents commented positively on this matter, the experts all agree that not all institutions conduct fair implementation of policies. About 14 percent of the respondents observed that policies of national scope are fairly implemented, but much improvement is needed with regard to the implementation of local policies. Another respondent observed, "regulatory capture is prevalent." Lastly, about 28 percent of the respondents commented on the inefficiency of public hearings in terms of integrating the input of the citizens into the actual policies.

Solidarity in Politics

Solidarity in the political field refers to the willingness of citizens to challenge power disparity and the implementation of institutional measures that address political power distribution (CADI 2011, 19). In table 6, it is measured using four items: "institutional measures for and the degree of [citizens'] participation [Q15], affirmative actions [Q16], public confidence in the existing democracy [Q17], and public confidence in democracy and democratic values [Q18]" (CADI 2011, 19).

The experts gave a collective score of 7.3 for Question 15, which is on citizen's participation in political decision-making. There is consensus

among the respondents that there is a high degree of public awareness and voters' turnout during elections. However, public participation in decision-making is still limited to elections.

When asked how well they think affirmative action programs are established and implemented (Q16), scores given were from 2 to 8, with the average score being 5.4. According to the respondents, there are legal provisions that forward the protection of women, children, and persons with disabilities, though one respondent asserted that no special laws exist for these citizens.

In Q17, which concerns public trust in the government (understood to refer either to trust in the executive or the current administration), the mean score is 6.4 (range: 4 to 9). Although one respondent asserted that there is a high degree of cynicism towards government, the rest have observed that public trust towards the present administration is greater relative to public trust towards the previous one.

In the item concerning public trust in the legislature (Q18), the scores varied from 3 to 7, yielding an average score of 4.8. As can be gleaned from the data, the perceptions of respondents differ on this matter. One respondent stated that the current congress enjoys a positive trust rating. Another respondent observed that this trust is mixed with reservations. The rest commented that the citizens see Congress as corrupt.

Lastly, the data reveals that there is high public trust in democracy. When asked "How much do you think the public trusts democracy?" (in Q19), the scores range from 6 to 9. The mean score is 8, indicating that the respondents are in agreement that the citizenry at large still prefers democracy over other political systems despite its flaws. Two respondents noted that the trauma brought about by living under a dictatorial regime (under President Marcos) has made democracy the ideal political system for the majority of Filipinos.

Autonomy in Economy

Economic autonomy refers to the existence of institutions that protect economic entities from undue interference (CADI 2011, 21). In table 7, it is measured using three items: "freedom for political power [Q1], protection of labor rights [Q2 and Q3], and external autonomy for policy making [Q4]" (CADI 2011, 21).

When asked how much influence the government or political elites have on the operation of private companies (Q1), the ratings given were low (high influence) to moderate (range: 2 to 5) with an average score of 3.7.[6] Survey respondents explained that in the Philippines, politicians/bureaucrats and private companies are closely tied. However, it was pointed out that it is more

Table 7: Item Scores for Economic Autonomy

Economy	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q1	3.7	3.0	2.0	5.0
Q2	5.8	6.0	3.0	9.0
Q3	5.9	6.0	4.0	8.0
Q4	4.9	4.0	2.0	8.0
Autonomy	5.1			

likely that private companies influence government or the political elites, and not the other way around. They added, "[political] activities are not completely independent from the economically powerful and big private interests systematically influence policy-making in their interest." It was also mentioned that some of the political elite ascended to their positions because they own and control land holdings/land resources, large-scale business assets, other (valuable) properties, and other (major) financial resources. It was observed that those in the upper economic tier enter politics and eventually influence policies.

The respondents were also asked if they think labor rights are guaranteed in the country. The question, Q2, is designed to measure how well labor rights are institutionalized and legally guaranteed. It considers, as stated in the explanatory note in the questionnaire, the protection of three primary labor rights—freedom of union organizing, collective bargaining, and collective action—and whether law restricts labor rights of public officials, teachers and soldiers. To this question the experts responded by providing ratings that range from 3 to 9. The average rating is 5.8. Only one expert gave a high rating of 9 points in this item, arguing that "Philippine laws fully guarantee labor rights, both for workers in the private and public sectors." Other experts explained that while labor laws that protect the workers do exist, there also exist means to circumvent the law. In fact, given the "exiting" law, it would be difficult for an employer to terminate the services or layoff regular workers. This is the reason there is a "proliferation of non-regular workers" or "contractualization" in the Philippines. Further, it was expounded, "the rights are very much written-up in [law, but they are] very much subverted in practice with 'invisible' but systematic union-busting and trade union repression." Moreover, a respondent related how national figures indicate low and decreasing levels of union organizing, collective bargaining agreements, and collective action, which correlate with the last decade or so

Table 8: Item Scores for Economic Competition

Economy	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q5	4.4	4.0	3.0	7.0
Q6	4.3	4.0	3.0	8.0
Q7	5.2	5.0	3.0	8.0
Q8	4.6	5.0	2.0	7.0
Competition	4.6			

of systematic state-sponsored human rights violations and political repression. Thus, there is a collective agreement that while the country has good labor laws, implementation is limited, and, according to one expert, "has become practically [useless,]especially in the industrial regions and industrial-technology parks where contractualization, and even outsourcing, have become [the norm]."

The succeeding question, Q3, refers to protection of workers against forced labor and child labor. It also considers the government's commitment to international labor conventions. The respondents gave an average rating of 5.9 (range: 4 to 8) to prohibition of forced and child labor in the Philippines, where both forced and child labor are legally prohibited. Unfortunately, as the survey respondents have indicated, implementation is limited to the urban areas; as one respondent stated, in the rural areas, there are documented cases of abuses in the agricultural-business sector where many rural landless workers and children are employed to undertake crop maintenance and heavy harvesting activities (i.e., banana, sugar, pineapples, palm oil/ oil palm, coconut) in plantations. Another respondent added that the guarantee of protection of workers from forced labor and child labor comes less from the government per se and more from the norms of society.

The survey also looked into how the government policymaking process is independent from foreign capital and states. Q4 probed into key Philippine industries, surfacing whether or not they are dominated by domestic capital. The range of ratings provided in this item is very wide, with a minimum score of 2 and a maximum score of 8. The mean score is 4.9. Those that gave a low score explained that "[government] has never been 'independent' from mainly U.S. capital and business systems." Further, another respondent described the Philippines as being "more independent of foreign intervention but less independent of ideologies that adhere to finance [capitalism,] i.e., policy makers and 'experts' independently adhere [to] and boxed into

neoclassical ideology." It was also pointed out that "[in] a country with limited resources, foreign capital as a funding source is part of policy [decisions; government] uses foreign capital to build needed infrastructure and expand social services."

Competition in Economy

Economic competition refers to the condition where the economic sector is "independent from government or the governing power," while it "establishes transparent and fair principles" (CADI 2011, 23). In table 8, it is measured in terms of the following: "economic transparency [Q5], fairness of the economy [Q6], government responsibilities [Q7], and corporate responsibilities [Q8]" (CADI 2011, 23).

The survey respondents provided low to moderate rating to transparency of corporate operations (range is from 3 to 7), the subject of Q5. The mean rating is 4.4. According to one of the respondents, "[corporate] transparency is too limited." Another respondent noted that it is difficult to give facts unless it is gathered through research. Another respondent observed: "[corporate] governance in terms of protecting insiders [i.e., the main family owners] is almost perfect but it is weak in terms of protecting outsiders [i.e., small investors]." Lastly, a respondent mentioned that there is a strong move of NGOs to improve governance in the private sector.

Responses to the question about fair competition between companies (Q6) revealed varied scores that ranged from 3 to 8. One respondent argued that there is no competitive law and that oligarchy characterizes many strategic sectors. To add, another respondent mentioned that only the "big four is representing the oil industry" namely: Shell, Petron, Caltex, and Mobil.Another respondent also pointed out the lack of detailed information on how the regulatory and supervisory bodies perform their tasks in ensuring free competition among private companies.

In terms of government effort to protect and guarantee labor rights, probed by Q7, a wide variation of scores is likewise observed. This is explained by the high rating provided by one respondent who justified his high rating by citing the existence of the National Tripartite Industrial Council for labor protection and welfare in the Philippines. On the other hand, it was pointed out that laws that protect workers exist but there are also loopholes in the law. As mentioned earlier, there is increasing proliferation of non-regular/contractual workers who are not protected by provisions of the law. There is also a perception that the government exerts low effort in making sure that labor rights are protected. There is also an observation that the

Table 9: Item Scores for Economic Pluralization

Economy	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q9	2.6	2.0	1.0	6.0
Q10	1.9	2.5	0.0	3.0
Q11	1.6	2.0	0.0	3.0
Q12	1.8	1.0	0.0	4.0
Q13	5.0	6.0	0.0	8.0
Pluralization	2.6			

government is more interested in the so-called public and private setups, which could only lead to government entities giving up their tasks and roles to private companies that have only a low interest in the labor sector's needs and requirements.

In Q8, concerning the compliance of private corporations with labor laws, the divergence of ratings is evident, with scores ranging from 2 to 7. A respondent argued that "[private] companies, by [their] very nature and role in the capital-inclined social [systems,] will never work to protect labor rights. Further, it was mentioned, "there are some companies [that] out of sheer social responsibility take care of their workers, but there are others that explicitly exploit [their workers] within bounds of the law." Another respondent observed differences in compliance to law by size of the company. He argued that "[small] and medium-sized companies are not as strict in abiding by relevant laws and regulations."

Pluralization in Economy

Economic pluralization refers to the "fair distribution of economic resources leading to both economic and socio-political democratization" (CADI 2011, 25). In table 9, the following items measure it: "economic monopoly [Q9], regional disparity [Q10], income inequality [Q11], asset disparity [Q12], and employment inequality [Q13]" (CADI 2011, 25)[7].

The respondents seem to agree that dominant groups monopolize the economy. The mean score for Q9 is 2.6.[8] It was argued that "[historically, the Philippine economy is] very much monopolized by dominant groups in the Philippines." Another respondent said that in the Philippines, "most large industries have concentrated market power." Another respondent added that competition in the economy only exists among the tycoons.

Table 10: Item Scores on Economic Solidarity

Economy	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q14	4.6	4.0	3.0	10.0
Q15	4.6	4.0	2.0	7.0
Q16	4.8	4.0	2.0	8.0
Q17	4.9	5.0	3.0	8.0
Q18	3.7	3.0	2.0	8.0
Q19	4.9	6.0	1.0	10.0
Q20	6.3	6.0	3.0	9.0
Solidarity	4.8			

Economic disparities among the regions of the country undeniably exist. This is evidenced by the ratings for the item on regional inequality (Q10); the range for ratings in this item is 0 to 3. One observation was that "economic disparity is reinforced by government's spending on urbanized regions and almost neglect of other regions." Here, the Cotabato provinces in Mindanao were cited as examples.

Similarly, ratings given on income disparity (Q11; range: 0 to 3 points) are consistent where it is perceived as a serious concern. As one respondent pointed out, this observation is consistent with official statistics that reveal that the Gini coefficient of the Philippines remains at about 0.44.

Like income disparity, asset disparity is also perceived as serious. Data reveals ratings for Q12 ranging from 0 to 4, with 0 indicating that asset disparity is a very serious problem. One respondent mentioned the case of Metro Manila, where there is a large and increasing number of informal settlers (i.e., squatters, illegal occupants). On the other hand, rural areas are also confronted with land problems. It was argued that agrarian reform and land distribution is almost a total failure. According to one respondent, "around 70 [percent] of the original leaseholders under the program, starting with Marcos's [Presidential Declaration] 717, has reverted to sharecropping and abandonment of their agricultural lands, which lead to the emergence of a new rural elite sector."

When asked about the gravity of discrimination in the labor market (Q13), responses were varied. The ratings given had a wide range, with 0 as the minimum and 8 as the maximum. One respondent mentioned that in the Philippines, there is a great deal of social mobility because of high rates of literacy. Despite this, it was observed by one respondent (an expert from

Mindanao) that there are still "discrimination when it comes to hiring of Muslims, and some other religious [groups,] although this is not comparable to racial discrimination in countries such as Australia, Japan, and even US and Europe."

Solidarity in Economy

Economic solidarity refers to how inequality in economic power is intensified by the lack of political power among members of society and government's inability to guarantee equal opportunities (CADI 2011, 27). In table 10, it is measured by four items: "social security [Q14 and Q15], labor union activities [Q16, Q17, and Q18], corporate surveillance [Q19], and awareness of inequality alleviation [Q20]" (CADI 2011, 27).

Differences in perception on whether support systems for the poor are working in the country (the concern of Q14) were observed. Scores given ranged from 3 to 10. Currently, there is a national conditional cash transfer (CCT) program for the poor, which is part of a more comprehensive social welfare program for those living below the poverty line. Pertaining to this program, there is concern about its coverage and period of implementation. One respondent commented: "The [conditional cash transfer program] is large [in scale] but apparently only temporary." Another respondent mentioned, "There are stories of success." However, one respondent argued that "[social] insurance is still practically non-existent for the poor." Consistently, another one commented, "Not much. All are only advertisements of government agencies, but really [unessential, with] lots of flaws. Local politicians controlling [local government units] also control implementation of programs [to the] benefit [of] their supporters."

When asked how well social insurance programs operate in the country (Q15), they gave low to high scores, ranging from 2 to 7 points, with a mean score of 4.7. It was pointed out that "the most important provider of social insurance in the country is family and that government programs provide minimal relief to households." Moreover, another respondent argued that "the health insurance coverage as reported by the national health insurance system is grossly overstated and belied by national household surveys." Another respondent pointed out the lack of data to assess whether the social insurance programs are doing well. Lastly, an expert indicated the need to improve targeting of beneficiaries to improve the social insurance program.

The answers to Q16 reveal that there are contending views whether labor unions are well organized. The wide range of ratings, 2 to 8 points, shows this. One respondent mentioned that while they are diminishing in number as a whole, the labor unions that exist are well organized. Another respondent

stated that labor union membership (likely on the average) is only 30 percent. On the other hand, another respondent perceives labor unions to be disorganized.

Q17, which asked about the influence labor unions have on policies of the central government, yielded diverse ratings from the respondents, ranging from 3 to 8 points but overall indicating a low level of influence (the mean score is 4.9). According to one respondent, there is "very little influence (of labor unions on government policy). Politically inclined labor leaders tend to gain [in] other directions, and do not serve labor organizations' needs." It is also worthwhile to note that the level of influence is perceived by at least one expert as being manifested by the party-list representation in congress through the party-list system. Despite this, labor outcomes remain poor. To add, labor unions are also represented "in tripartite."

The experts were also asked Q18: "How much do labor unions participate in the management process in your country?" This question "is designed to measure the degree of labor unions' participation in [corporate] management" (CADI 2011, 28). It incorporates "labor unions' monitoring of and participation in corporate management, including labor-management co-decisionmaking systems [and participation] in the board of directors' meeting" (CADI 2011, 28).The range of ratings given to this item is 2 to 8, indicating a high variance of perception. It is worthwhile to note one comment that aside from labor unions, there are also labor-management councils in many enterprises to allow participation in corporate management. However, this is only true in the case of some large companies and rarely in medium- and small-scale industries.

The next question, Q19, is "designed to measure how much the general public is involved in monitoring corporate activities, and its consequences, including consumer rights violation and [environmental] problems" (CADI 2011, 28). It deals with "consumer and environment groups and [the assessment of] how effective their activities are, how well consumer protection laws are operating, and how proactively the general public are involved in the monitoring process" (CADI 2011, 28).The respondents disagree on how well public monitoring on corporate activities is being carried out. They gave low to high scores (range: 1 to 10). Respondents highlighted the active role of media and consumer unions in monitoring corporate activities. Another respondent pointed out that monitoring of activities of corporations seem to be available, particularly through the stock exchanges and the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The last question on the Philippine economy probed into the enthusiasm of the general public in improving economic inequality in the country. It aims

Table 11: Item Scores for Civil Society Autonomy

Civil Society	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q1	6.4	7.0	3.0	9.0
Q2	4.5	4.5	0.0	9.0
Q3	1.0	1.0	0.0	2.0
Q4	3.8	4.0	1.0	5.0
Q5	4.0	4.0	1.0	6.0
Q6	4.6	4.0	1.0	9.0
Q7	5.8	5.0	3.0	8.0
Autonomy	5.6			

to capture "public awareness in addressing economic disparities" (CADI 2011, 29). "In some cases, such awareness can be represented by active efforts, such as trying to change social systems, and by individual efforts, such as donations or voluntary activities. It also includes public opinions and actions about economic inequality" (CADI 2011, 29).In this item, the respondents gave low to high ratings ranging from 3 to 9 points. While one respondent gave an unexplained "3," the other survey respondents mentioned the abundance of corporate social responsibility programs carried out in communities by large companies and NGO/CSO efforts to lobby for ways to resolve economic inequality in the country.

Autonomy in Civil Society

Civil society autonomy concerns the freedom of civil society from the government and economy, as well as the ability of citizens to execute such autonomy (CADI 2011, 29). In table 11, it is measured by four items: "autonomy from [the] government [Q1 and Q2], autonomy from [the] market (Q3), autonomy of the [members] of the society [Q4, Q5, and Q6] and tolerance [Q7]" (CADI 2011, 29).

Q1 under civil society autonomy sought the experts' opinion on the level of government interference in citizens' social activities. The experts gave scores ranging from 3 to 9, with 3 being the only low score given. The respondents agreed that the government interferes with citizens' social activities through illegal or monopolistic activities, such as media killings and media control, sustaining what one respondent referred to as the "culture of impunity." One respondent, a labor leader, bewailed how the current labor

code, a legacy of the Marcos dictatorship, unduly restricts laborers' freedom to organize.

Q2 concerns the influence of government-supported NGOs on society. The question was apparently unclear, as some of the experts were unable to determine what was meant by "government-supported nongovernmental organizations"—that, or their response was possibly influenced by a strong belief in the supposed state-civil society divide. Many of the comments, however, seemed insistent on showing that this divide is either nonexistent, or has been tainted by government co-optation, particularly during the Arroyo administration. Scores from 0 to 9 were given; 9, representing low influence, came from a left-left leaning academic, while the 0, representing high influence, came from a right-right leaning member of the private sector, the sole R-RL respondent in the civil society field.[9]

The third question deals with the influence of private companies on society, tying up social activities with the activities of major economic power holders. Low scores were given across the board, ranging from 0 to 2, showing that the respondents believe that private companies have a very high degree of influence on society.[10] One respondent believed that "corporations, though divided [into] various factions, dominate the agenda setting in the country;" another opined that private sector companies "have significant political leverage in the country due to their contribution to the national economy." As with the first question, many of the respondents cited the strong influence of power holders (herein large business conglomerates) on the ideally independent media.

The experts were then asked, "How well do you think citizens' basic needs are met in your country?" Low to moderate ratings were given, ranging from 1 to 5. Some of the respondents backed up their ratings with statistics, primarily the country's poverty incidence. Some respondents also noted that the government tries to address problems such as poverty using palliative measures, failing to address the structural deficiencies underlying such problems.

Question 5, asking the respondents to rate the government's ability to meet the needs of vulnerable people, elicited responses similar to the above. The ratings given were from 1 to 6. The experts believed that women and children continued to be particularly lacking in the care they require. One expert stated that senior citizen care is improving, while another gave the opinion that economic class stratification within disadvantaged groups determines the level of care received. The existence of legal frameworks for the care of vulnerable people was cited by some experts alongside the poor implementation of such laws.

Table 12: Item Scores for Civil Society Competition

Civil Society	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q8	6.6	7.0	5.0	8.0
Q9	6.4	7.0	5.0	8.0
Q10	7.0	7.0	5.0	10.0
Q11	7.4	7.0	5.0	9.0
Competition	6.9			

Q6 dealt with the sufficiency of educational opportunities given to citizens. The ratings for this item were divergent, ranging from 1 to 9.The highest rating came from an L-LL categorized member of an NGO, who championed the Philippine public education system's unrestrictive entry mechanisms; this expert, though, like many of the respondents, was dissatisfied with the quality of education in the country. One respondent who gave a low rating linked the failure of the government to provide other necessities to citizens to the ineffectiveness of educational opportunities in the country; according to him "what's the use of sending children to school if they don't have anything to eat?"

The last civil society autonomy question was about the level of respect or tolerance among various social/political/cultural groups. Most of the ratings were moderate, ranging from 3 to 8. For the majority of the respondents, the most prominent evidence of prejudice between groups in the Philippines is the Christian–Muslim/indigenous peoples divide. One respondent also cited the lack of tolerance of the military for affiliates of the Communist Party of the Philippines, evoking the "commie scare" mentality of the Philippine soldiery.

Competition in Civil Society

Competition in civil society refers to the "self-reference system [of] society," i.e., voluntary association matters (CADI 2011, 31). Civil society competition is concerned with how "[social] movements bring social issues to the center of public discussion, and thereby contributes to democratization of the state, the economy and the civil society" (CADI 2011, 31). In table 12, this field-specific subprinciple is evaluated through four items: "capabilities [of voluntary association (Q8)], publicness [of voluntary association (Q9)], transparency [of voluntary associations (Q10)], and diversity [of voluntary association (Q11)]" (CADI 2011, 31).

Table 13: Item Scores for Civil Society Pluralization

Civil Society	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q12	5.8	7.0	2.0	8.0
Q13	6.0	6.0	4.0	8.0
Q14	4.8	5.0	1.0	7.0
Q15	3.4	4.0	1.0	8.0
Pluralization	5.0			

Q8 was the first of successive questions about NGOs. It asked the experts to rate the level of influence of NGOs in society. Scores given were from 5 to 8, with majority giving a rating of 7. The highest rating came from an individual with knowledge of specific NGO-government engagements; for him, NGO influence on society is largely dependent on NGO-government cooperation. This view is echoed by two other experts, one of whom believed that NGOs have been deliberately maneuvering to become part of the government to push for their advocacies. The rest seem to engage in government-NGO exclusivity, implying that NGOs are providing services independently from the government (thus, as some experts noted, they often face fund insufficiency issues).

The ninth question in the civil society survey asked the experts to rate the level of NGOs' ability to represent varying public interests in society. The experts gave ratings ranging from 5 to 8 in this item. Some respondents viewed NGOs' ability to promote the interests of marginalized groups positively, while one expert saw this as evidence that many NGOs are representing "narrow views" of public interest "invisible to the radar screen of government policymaking;" another expert went so far as to say that NGOs largely represent "the concerns and anxieties of the middle and educated class." While the others viewed NGO representativeness more positively than the latter two, some noted that a good number of NGOs are ironically in the NGO "business" solely for profit or to push for the interest of private entities.

Q10 asked, "Do you think NGOs are democratically operating in your country?" Most of the experts answered in the positive, with ratings ranging from 5 to 10, though many expressed misgivings about the way some NGOs form "exclusive" informal tactical alliances, have a "cult-like" following centered on their founders, or are answerable only to their benefactors—giving an "undemocratic" quality to such organizations. Interestingly, two respondents noted that while NGOs have a high degree of gender sensitivity, there is a lack of gender equality among many of them.

Table 14: Item Scores for Civil Society Solidarity

Civil Society	Mean	Median	Minimum	Maximum
Q16	4.4	4.0	0	8.0
Q17	5.9	5.0	4.0	10.0
Q18	5.9	7.0	4.0	8.0
Solidarity	5.4			

The last question in this category sought the experts' opinion on the adequacy of NGOs' representation of different values and demands of society. Majority of the ratings were in the 7 to 9 range—5 was the lowest rating and 9 the highest. The expert who gave the lowest rating noted that NGOs are largely urban-based, largely confined to advocating broad civil and economic rights, lacking commitment in pushing for more specific, "third-generation" rights. Many of his concerns were reiterated by those who gave higher ratings (one respondent stated that the leadership of NGOs tend to be "bourgeois intellectual"), but nonetheless gave their higher ratings because of their belief in NGO diversity in the country.

Pluralization in Civil Society

In table 13, civil society pluralization consists of four items: "inequality of public spheres [Q12], inequality of information [Q13], inequality of culture [Q14], and inequality of power [Q15]" (CADI 2011, 33).

The first question in this category was concerned with media-society relations. Q12, which queried the level of media fairness, elicited ratings ranging from 2 to 8, with the lowest rating coming from a member of an NGO based in Mindanao; her reason for giving a low score is the limited understanding of mainstream media of regional (e.g., Mindanaoan) matters. Most of the other respondents gave a higher rating because they believed that the media was generally fair, even if they are influenced by the interests of the oligarchic companies or religious groups that own them. The most optimistic expert stated that the "intense competition" among media helps ensure that media remains fair in the Philippines.

Q13 sought the experts' opinions on the wideness of the information gap in the Philippines. Answers ranged from 4 (wide) to 8 (narrow).[11] Some of the experts opined that while the infrastructure and technology are available, the quality of the information that usually reaches the "masses" is suspect. Others note that there is a wide "digital divide," with low internet penetration

in most areas; as some experts noted, information dissemination in the rural areas is still largely done through radio. One expert noted that access to information is not a "bread and butter concern" for most Filipinos.

Question 14 revealed no clear consensus among experts concerning the equality of citizens' access to cultural activities; ratings here were from 4 to 7. There is implicitly a consensus that all Filipinos have access to cheap, popular ("low") culture, while few can afford to have access to "high" culture activities. Some experts made note of the lack of cultural education in the Philippines.

The last question in this category asked, "How equally do you think power is distributed among the people in your country?" While most experts gave answers ranging from 1 to 5, one expert was an outlier, giving a rating of 8. This expert (the sole R-RL one) fully trusted NGO/CSOs' ability to diffuse power, in contrast to the two experts who gave a rating of 1 and believed that the politico-economic and religious elites still have a firm grip on power in the country. The rest of the experts echoed the claims of the latter two.

Solidarity in Civil Society

Civil society solidarity "is a criterion that directly measures how active the civil society is" (CADI 2011, 35). In table 14, it includes three items: "institutions and affirmative action to protect diversity [Q16], awareness and activities of social participation [Q17], and governance of the government and civil society [Q18]" (CADI 2011, 35).

The sixteenth question concerned how well affirmative action programs are in the Philippines. One set of respondents gave low-low moderate ratings, while others gave a rating of 8. One respondent gave a rating of 0, stating that he is unaware of any such programs currently being implemented by the government. Others noted that such programs have either only recently begun implementation, or never saw successful implementation. Those who gave high ratings cited improvements in addressing the needs of indigenous groups as evidence of successful affirmative action programs, as well as the diminishing bias against LGBTs (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals).

The seventeenth question wanted to get the experts' opinions on how actively citizens are participating in NGO activities. Most of the answers were in the low-low moderate range, with 4 being the lowest rating. Two outliers gave high ratings, with one giving a 10 rating without an explanatory comment. The other high-rater, an expert from the private sector, cited the high number of friends he has who are engaging in civil society work as proof

of high citizen participation in NGO initiatives. Others were less than convinced of broad support from the citizenry of NGO activities, despite some experts' claims of high awareness of NGO activities among members of Philippine society.

The final question of the survey was about the level of influence that NGOs have on government policymaking in the Philippines. Four experts answered with either a 4 or a 5, while the others answered with a 7 or 8 (the R-RL expert gave the highest rating). The line is drawn largely on the effectiveness of existing NGO consultation processes, as well as restrictions on street parliamentary actions. Those who gave a high rating lauded the track record of NGOs in influencing the government either using formal consultation processes or joining the government (as appointed or elected officials), while those who gave a low rating viewed NGOs as having a weak voice in government, usually being compelled to take to the streets or otherwise show a "critical level of unity on very specific issues."

Analysis

Interpretation of Principle and Field Democracy Indices

The overall score of 5.2 suggests a moderate level of democratization, suggesting that much needs to be done for further democratization in the country. Analyzing the multilevel breakdown of this overall score will show why this is so, and what can be done about it.

With a liberalization democracy index of 5.6 and an equalization democracy index of 4.8, it can be said that in the Philippines, actual de-monopolization and improving the means to stymie "re-monopolization" are advancing at a faster pace, or are making more significant strides, than the elimination of inequality and improving measures to eradicate poverty. The relationship between the two principles in the Philippine context—the answer to the questions "which is holding the other back?" or "which is pulling the other forward?"—can only be definitively answered after several survey rounds have been conducted. At present, hypothetical answers to these key questions can be drawn up after going to the level of the subprinciples, thereafter focusing on the field democracy indices.

According to the CADI Guidebook, generally speaking, "autonomy stands for independence [of sectors of society] from the government, competition for the level of the self-reference [i.e., transparency and accountability] system, equality for the degree of equal resource allocations,



Figure 1: Political Autonomy

and solidarity for the degree of mitigation of income [and asset] disparity" (CADI 2011, 12). These principles are clearly rooted in the realities of most democracies in Asia (or even in the rest of the world). In a democracy, all sectors of society have some degree of freedom from government interference, which necessitates a regulation system involving the entire society. The absence of such a system would result in power being consolidated in the hands of nongovernmental elites. Also, in most democracies in Asia, there exists a wide gap between the wealthy and the poor, a gap that can only be eliminated by coordinated efforts of all the members of a society worthy of the appellation "democratic," if one takes into account that equality is one of the democratic ideals dating back to the French Revolution.

How then should the sub-principle scores from the subject survey be analyzed? One can surmise, taking the immediately preceding paragraph into account, the following broad conclusions based on the results of the first ADI survey in the country: 1) while measures—legal or otherwise—to assure the continuation of democratization in the political, economic, and civil society fields exist, the implementation of these measures is poor or negligible; 2) government corruption and other abuses of power are checked in principle both by governmental and nongovernmental bodies, but such abuses persist because these monitoring mechanisms are poorly implemented,



Figure 2: Political Competition

especially at the local government level; 3) there is also a dearth of legislation and other means to ensure transparency and accountability among nongovernmental power holders; 4) coordination among the means and agents to address inequality in power and resource distribution in all the aforementioned areas of society is lacking.

Taking all of the above into account, one can validly conclude that there is a lack of significant united opposition to multi-field monopolization in the country, even if monopolies are anathema according to the law and popular belief. The doors to successful sustainable de-monopolization are open—widely so right after the Marcos dictatorship was toppled—but the few who struggle to keep them open are barely able, if at all, to combat those who would rather keep the status quo.

We can thus assume that the chief obstacles to Philippine democratization can be found by examining the field competition and field solidarity scores, as the former deals with different kinds of checks and balances, and the latter with the coordination of de-monopolization efforts. Judging from the survey results, the betterment of the country's autonomy democracy index is, presumably, a lesser concern, though only by a small margin. The Philippine pluralization democracy index, meanwhile, will most likely increase when



Figure 3: Political Pluralization

the scores for all the other subprinciples go up. The remaining paragraphs of this analysis will test the preceding presuppositions.

Going back to the country's overall democracy index, the 5.2 score is somewhat consistent with the adjectival ratings given to the Philippines by Freedom House ("partly free") and the Economist Intelligence Unit ("flawed democracy"). However, recall that economic democratization is hardly a concern of the aforementioned democracy/freedom indices. If the conventional way of measuring democracy is followed, i.e., if the economy indices are taken out, the democracy index of the Philippines would slightly increase. Considering only the scores for the political subprinciples and the scores for the civil society subprinciples, the Philippine overall democracy index becomes 5.6. In contrast, pairing the economic subprinciple scores with the subprinciple scores of either of the two other fields would further lower the country's current low moderate democracy index. Are the barriers to further democratization in the Philippines thus largely in the economic field?

Looking now at the liberalization and equalization scores, the slight difference between political liberalization and political equalization (a mere 0.4), suggests that liberalization and equalization in the political field are



Figure 4: Political Solidarity

proceeding at about the same pace. With a 5.6 civil society liberalization score and a 5.0 civil society equalization score, it can be asserted that in the Philippines, civil society has less politico-socioeconomic influence than it should have, given the conditions of society that make them, on paper, essential to continued democratization. The 3.7 economic equalization score makes economic liberalization, rated at 4.9, appear even more insufficient than it already is. However, is the blame for the low economic equalization score squarely on the inadequacy of economic liberalization efforts? According to the CADI Guidebook,

> [if] a country's political democracy index is high but its economic democracy index is low, the country's political democracy is institutionally well established but likely to face limitations in [practice; if] a country's civil society democracy index is high, this country is likely to develop its democracy even if the political and economic indices are currently low. (CADI 2011, 12)

Extrapolating from these interpretative guidelines, we can surmise that the Philippines's political democracy is procedurally secure (i.e., functional), and its civil society is vibrant (though uncoordinated, among other deficiencies), but both are restricted because of limited (and circumventable)



Figure 5: Economic Autonomy

means of monitoring the activities of economic elites in the country, a weakness exacerbated by a low level of economic solidarity (rating: 4.8). The latter suggests that pushing for economic equality is relatively unaddressed by civil society in conjunction with the citizenry at large; going over to political solidarity and civil society solidarity, which have ratings of 6.4 and 5.4, respectively, this assertion appears validated. The concern for closing the gap between the wealthy and the poor seems to belong to a vocal few; clamoring for democracy sans economic democratization seems to be a far more popular activity among the populace. In other words, the commitment of Philippine civil society as a whole to "third generation" civil society advocacies (such as environmental conservation/restoration) cannot be assailed as lacking, but the decline in influence of economic equalization advocates such as labor unions signals the need to reinvigorate "classic" civil society movements.

There is a homologous situation in the political field, where there is also a high degree of autonomy, but a low level of competition and pluralization; again, while diversity is guaranteed, those who benefit from this alleged atmosphere of competition are the established elites (which are apparently numerous enough to allow for a semblance of genuine democratic political



Figure 6: Economic Competition

competition to exist). A different situation can be found in the civil society field, wherein the highest democracy index is that of competition. The comments show that this relatively high score is attributable to the belief of majority of the experts that NGOs/CSOs are generally influential, democratically operating, and are able to deal with numerous issues concerning various groups in society. However, their ability to exercise whatever influence they have is limited by the "exclusive" nature of many NGOs/CSOs (a threat to their relevance to society at large, as well as the possibility of meaningful civil society-government collaboration) and their lack of resources to effect major changes to their target areas. The information gap and insufficiency of educational opportunities can be correlated to the low actual influence of NGOs/CSOs; lacking a platform to express their views (as provided by the Internet, which few people outside urban areas have access to) and a sufficiently educated audience, NGOs/CSOs are unlikely to enable more people to become agents of societal progress anytime soon.

In summary, based on the above analysis, democratization in the economic field must be prioritized (over, say, ensuring civic freedoms and improving civil society diversity) if any further major advances in wide-scale democratization can be hoped to be achieved. Economic control monopolizers,



Figure 7: Economic Pluralization

both local and foreign, abound in the Philippines, influencing everything from politics to the media. Disentangling these economic elites from the political field would increase genuine political competitiveness, giving greater legitimacy to the electoral system. A more cohesive civil society must remain distant from monopolistic companies (and similar entities), but would benefit from more direct engagements with the government, as well as the citizenry at large; it would be a depressing irony if NGOs/CSOs had a monopoly on socially transformative initiatives.

One might think that the above interpretation is undone by the diversity of responses resulting from the ideological diversity of the experts, in accordance with the expectation that the L-LL and R-RL respondents will have diametrically opposing opinions on numerous issues concerning democratization. This disparagement is rooted in the belief that the above interpretation is only valid if there is a consensus among the respondents, which is hypothetically improbable among L-LL and R-RL individuals. As will be shown in the discussion of divergences in expert responses below, in numerous instances, the respondents did seem to let their ideological colors fly, so to speak. The following discussion will also show whether or not ideological leanings appear to be significant factors in determining the opinions of the respondents most of the time.



Figure 8: Economic Solidarity

Let us first consider figures 1-4, showing the differences in ratings given by the experts in politics.

The most frequent outlier is an R-RL NGO/CSO member (giving scores higher or lower than all other respondents in 31.6 percent of all the questions), followed by an R-RL member of the academe (giving scores higher than all other respondents in 26.3 percent of all the questions). The deviant answers of the former expert are dispersed across the four subprinciples, while the latter expert gave no exceptional scores in response to the questions under political autonomy. In only one question did the L-LL respondents appear to rate as a bloc—Q16, which is concerned with the implementation of affirmative action programs. There appears to be consensus among the respondents in Q3 (existence of freedom of assembly), Q4 (freedom of opposition to the government), and Q19 (citizen's preference for democracy as a political system).

Figures 5-8 call attention to the differences in the scores of the economic experts.

A notable outlier among the economy respondents is R5, an L-LL NGO/CSO member. In 20 percent of the questions, she gave higher or lower ratings than all other economic experts. In two of the questions (Q9 and Q11),



Figure 9: Civil Society Autonomy

the L-LL experts (all NGO/CSO members) seemed to have given very low scores as a bloc apart from the R-RL experts; however, ratings for Q9 to Q12, all under economic pluralization, are generally low. R8 and R9, both R-RL members of the private sector, are also outliers in numerous items. R8 gave scores lower than all other respondents in 10 percent of the questions in the economy survey, while R9 gave lower scores than all the other economic experts 20 percent of the time. It is worth mentioning that both these respondents who presently fit perfectly under the R-RL category, were once strongly identified with socialists/Marxists.

Lastly, figures 9-12 show the divergences in the ratings given by the experts in Philippine civil society.

As mentioned in the survey results section of this text, one outlier among the civil society experts is the sole respondent labeled R-RL, a member of the private sector, who gave scores higher than all other respondents in 22.2 percent of all the questions. He gave one outlying score for one question under civil society autonomy and civil society competition, and scored higher than all other respondents in two questions under civil society pluralization. Another notable outlier is R1, an L-LL expert from the academe, who gave very low scores in four questions and a very high score in one question (four out of five of which were under civil society autonomy), in stark contrast to



Figure 10: Civil Society Competition

the ratings given by the rest of the respondents. R4, an L-LL-classified civil society expert from an NGO/CSO, is also worth noting for giving higher scores than all the other respondents in four items, two of which (Q6 and Q18) have something to do with the government's ability to address the needs of society. Given her explanatory comments, it is possible that she has been miscategorized as L-LL. Consensus was seemingly reached by the respondents in one item: all respondents gave high scores in Q3, which indicated their collective belief that private companies have a high degree of influence in Philippine society.

Thus, ideological leanings appear to significantly influence ratings in only a few instances, notably among experts in the economic field and experts in civil society. It appears to be no more influential than a respondent's institutional affiliation or geographic background. R1 in the political field (an R-RL in the academe) is an outlier in a number of questions concerning government effectiveness. R1 was once in the government bureaucracy. Those from election watchdogs and private survey groups (a mix of R-RL and L-LL) seem to equate public trust of the government with public trust of the chief executive, basing their opinion on data obtained from local public opinion surveys, thus resulting in similar scores in response to questions concerning the said topics. Geographic background brought forth regional



Figure 11: Civil Society Pluralization

concerns and perspectives, but by their nature as experts on nationwide issues, the non-Luzon respondents never exclusively dwelled on regional concerns; the Mindanaoans were able to highlight Mindanaoan issues, but in only one instance was a respondent's roots in Southern Philippines a major factor in shaping that respondent's opinion on a certain matter (R6 on Q12 in civil society).

The criticism that the results do not show L-LL and R-RL consensus—ideal in a specialist survey such as this—is thus valid, but unless representativeness of respondents according to ideological leanings can be achieved, any validation of the data gathered for this study cannot focus largely on bridging ideological divides. This is supported by the results of tests of significance, which give support to the existence of the left-right divide. Table 15 summarizes the mean scores in the four sub-principles by political leaning. The right leaning experts gave higher scores than the left leaning experts in the subprinciples autonomy, pluralism, and solidarity. It is only in competition that scores were reversed, although difference is small. When t-test of significance was conducted, of the 4 subprinciples of democracy, only autonomy is significant.

Table 16 summarizes the mean scores in the four subprinciples by sector. The political sector obtained the highest score in autonomy. Data reveal that



Figure 12: Civil Society Solidarity

political sector gained the highest scores in all subprinciples except in competition. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test for significance of differences in mean scores by sector. Based on the ANOVA test, only the differences in solidarity scores were not significant.

Even if the methodology followed did not provide for a means to arrive at expert consensus, the findings of the pilot test herein discussed cannot be dismissed as worthless. Yes, because of the variances in responses due to the diversity of respondents, most mean scores in all of the survey queries fall near the median of a 0 to 10 scale. However, the qualitative data gathered allows the researchers to identify key areas of contention due to divergent perceptions. In addition, the identification of economic democratization as requiring the most attention is greatly strengthened by the fact that scores for certain indices in this field are notably lower than the median in a 0 to 10 scale. The same can be said about conclusions drawn from items wherein the scores are significantly higher than the median of the 0 to 10 scale (e.g., item Q19 in the politics survey, on public trust of democracy).

Table 15. Mean Scores in Subprinciples by Political Leaning

	Political leaning	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean	Sig. (2-tailed)
Autonomy	Right	13	6.7885	1.15851	.32131	.041
	Left	13	5.7198	1.35987	.37716	
Competition	Right	13	5.2885	1.14191	.31671	.201
	Left	14	5.9464	1.43171	.38264	
Pluralism	Right	12	4.4917	1.66540	.48076	.214
	Left	14	3.6964	1.51041	.40367	
Solidarity	Right	13	5.7941	1.56761	.43478	.408
	Left	14	5.3020	1.47024	.39294	

Note: T-test was conducted to test the significance of differences in mean scores.

Concluding Thoughts

Moving Forward

The authors are eager to continue conducting ADI surveys in the Philippines throughout the ADI project's projected four-year run. In 2012, with the implementation of programs designed to better the lives of those belonging to the lower socioeconomic classes (such as the CCT program), the continuation of the anti-corruption campaigns of the Aquino administration, the growing credibility and readership of online news sources, and the possibility of key pieces of legislation such as the Freedom of Information bill becoming law within the year, it is expected that some facets of national democratization will appear to have become better in the eyes of many experts. However, with the increasing concentration of economic power in fewer large corporations, the unlikelihood of the "retirement" of certain laws thought of as being restrictive to the exercise of certain civil rights, the onset of political violence as the 2013 Midterm Elections draw near, and the decreasing public trust in the judiciary in light of the impeachment complaints against certain justices of the Supreme Court, it is likely that many experts will consider a number of hindrances to national democratization to have worsened. In any case, comparing the 2011 survey results with the 2012 survey results should better show where the country's democrats must focus their attention to ensure that the country stays on the path towards democracy.

Table 16. Analysis of Variance and Mean Scores in Subprinciples by Sector

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum	Sig.
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound			
Autonomy	Pol	9	7.3611	.96105	.32035	6.6224	8.0998	5.50	9.00	
	Eco	9	5.7222	1.04914	.34971	4.9158	6.5287	4.25	7.25	
	Soc	8	5.6071	1.34175	.47438	4.4854	6.7289	3.43	7.14	
	Total	26	6.2541	1.35233	.26521	5.7079	6.8003	3.43	9.00	.005
Competition	Pol	9	5.3889	.83333	.27778	4.7483	6.0294	4.50	6.83	
	Eco	9	4.6389	1.21264	.40421	3.7068	5.5710	2.75	6.00	
	Soc	9	6.8611	.78174	.26058	6.2602	7.4620	5.50	8.00	
	Total	27	5.6296	1.31870	.25378	5.1080	6.1513	2.75	8.00	.000
Pluralism	Pol	9	5.0833	1.09687	.36562	4.2402	5.9265	3.75	7.00	
	Eco	8	2.4250	1.25783	.44471	1.3734	3.4766	.20	4.40	
	Soc	9	4.5000	1.17260	.39087	3.5987	5.4013	3.00	6.75	
	Total	26	4.0635	1.60316	.31440	3.4159	4.7110	.20	7.00	.000
Solidarity	Pol	9	6.4000	.90000	.30000	5.7082	7.0918	5.40	8.00	
	Eco	9	4.8095	1.23924	.41308	3.8570	5.7621	2.86	6.43	
	Soc	9	5.4074	1.89867	.63289	3.9480	6.8669	3.33	8.67	
	Total	27	5.5390	1.50923	.29045	4.9419	6.1360	2.86	8.67	.073

Note: Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to test the significance of differences in mean scores.

To address issues of representativeness noted in the analysis, the TWSC research team plans to double the number of respondents. The ideal mix is 9 L-LL and 9 R-RL respondents per field, with one L-LL and one R-RL respondent per institutional affiliation. The number of non-Luzon respondents per field will also be doubled. To address matters of validation mentioned in the analysis, a Delphi study will be conducted after the survey responses have been collated.[12] The approach being considered has a basis in the Hegelian/Dialectical inquiry system, as, given the diversity of experts, the "true nature" of Philippine democracy can only be arrived at when opposing views are made to engage each other "in an unremitting debate," an argument that will result (ideally) in a synthesis of opposing views (Mitroff and Turoff 2002, 28). The TWSC team also decided to use the Delphi method because of the improbability that most of the experts, due to their busy daily schedules, will be unavailable for focus group discussions or similar means of data validation.[13] The design of the Delphi is still being worked out.

Reflections on the ADI

In our unpublished inception report, submitted to our fellow CADI members in August 2011, we stated the following:

> The survey results [are] expected to show whether or not the known qualities of "Asian" (typically [permutations] of "Western") democracies remain valid. This is due to the fact that some of the survey questions are explained in the instruments as being rooted in certain preconceived notions of what "Asian democracy" is. Whether the survey results reveal that "Asian democracy" can be given an operational definition that does not deviate from what is known in [existing] literature, or that there is no such animal synonymous to anything in the existing political lexicon, these results are expected to show whether or not the [advances/regressions in Philippine democratization] are indeed attributable to movements centering on a monopolization/de-monopolization dichotomy.

We have since abandoned any desire to contribute to efforts to uncover if there is a distinctly "Asian" type of democracy; it is an unending debate that we find no value in contributing to. We believe that the survey results have validated that the most useful way to view democracy—i.e., the way to consider it if one wishes his or her state or society to actually attain it, not consign it to the realm of unattainable ideals—is through the framework of democratization as continuing de-monopolization.

If the results discussed at length are insufficient to support the above claim, consider this: it is undeniable that across Asia, economic power has for the longest time been concentrated in the hands of a few, even in so-called democracies. Thus, the poverty incidence in most Asian countries is depressingly high. What if, against all the dictates of neoliberal logic, all enormous private corporations begin to primarily function as charitable agencies, thus causing poverty to dramatically decrease in a certain country? What if the national government of the aforedescribed country also channels all its resources to the alleviation of poverty nationwide (leaving, say, the military high and dry, and foreign debt servicing a thing of the past)? One can reasonably expect that in such a scenario, inequality would decrease, thus the pluralization score of our hypothetical country will be high moderate-high. However, the overall democracy index in such a society would remain at the low moderate-moderate level, as the influence of both private corporations and the government on citizens' activities would be high (resulting in a low-moderate score in autonomy) and, presumably, civil society would have a low level of influence on society, as NGOs/CSOs will have been rendered irrelevant by the surge in what can be termed "monopolist social responsibility." Such an overall democracy index would still accurately show our hypothetical country's level of democratization. Monopolies that give more than they take are unsustainable; the degree of taking necessary to keep a welfare machine well-oiled will inevitably leave the majority of citizens with just enough resources to take up their daily burdens for the sustenance of society and get through a day with access to basic necessities. Also, as Bernard Crick observes, one-party states/military regimes have a "tendency for economic inefficiency and wasteful corruption" (2002, 117).

The main obstacle to democratization identified by the ADI's framers is the undue concentration of politico-socioeconomic powers. It presupposes that a type of comprehensive de-monopolization will result in a general internal consensus that a country has achieved sustainable democracy. The ADI also reminds us that democratization is essentially a war against authoritarianism waged in several fronts; as in all wars, strategic alliances, proper resource mobilization, and attack coordination are keys to victory. Discord among combatants supposedly on the same side is detrimental to having a continuous advantage in this continuing struggle.

Notes

1. Most of these questions emerged from discussions among the following current and former members of the TWSC research staff: Joel F. Ariate, Jr., Rowell G. Casaclang, Elinor May K. Cruz, and the principal/corresponding author of this text.
2. EDSA is an acronym for Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, along which people gathered to clamor for the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos (and later, other national chief executives whose mandates were brought into question in the court of public opinion).
3. CADI agreed that "expert" refers to a person who possesses knowledge and understanding in one of the fields of expertise either because he/she is a person who is (or was) directly engaged in that area or an academician/researcher whose expertise is in the area. These are people who are familiar with "technical [matters, e.g., statistical data] with which ordinary citizens may not be familiar" (CADI 2011, 36).
4. We use these in the absence of local holistic human development studies. A Human Security Index (HSI) for the Philippines, developed by TWSC, with funding from the Government of the Philippines-UNDP Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Programme, is, as of this writing, being pilot tested in numerous municipalities in the Philippines. The published findings of the HSI study may be referred to by the TWSC ADI survey team in future country reports.
5. The scores given by the experts for Q7 under politics were recoded for this report, because in the questionnaire, 0 signified the belief that nonelected groups had no political influence, and 10 signified that nonelected groups were highly influential. A reverse designation of extremes, while eliminating the necessity of recoding for aggregation purposes, would have been counterintuitive, possibly confusing the respondents.
6. The scores given by the experts were recoded for this report, because in the questionnaire, 0 signified the belief that government or political elites had no political influence, and 10 signified that the aforesaid entities were highly influential. Cf. footnote 5.
7. All the scores in economic pluralization were recoded so that they can be consolidated with the scores in political pluralization and civil society pluralization; in the questionnaire, 0 corresponds to highly desirable situations, while 10 corresponds to highly undesirable conditions. Cf. footnote 5.
8. Low score = high degree of monopolization
9. Scores for Q2 in the civil society questionnaire needed to be recoded for aggregation purposes. Cf. footnote 5.
10. Scores for Q3 in the civil society questionnaire had to be recoded for aggregation purposes. Cf. footnote 5.
11. As in the questionnaire, 0 corresponds to very narrow and 10 corresponds to very wide, the scores needed to be recoded for aggregation purposes. Cf. footnote 5.
12. The use of the Delphi method to CADI was suggested by Clarinda Lusterio Berja.
13. There is also the possibility of uncontrollable (and likely unproductive) aggression among ideologically opposed individuals.

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